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New miners in the Ruhr. Rebuilding the workforce in the 
Ruhr mines. 1945-1958. Summary 
In 1945, the Ruhr pits faced enormous gaps in the workforce as a result of 
wartime losses and pre-war difficulties in recruiting young labour. Regenerating 
the workforce was the key to reviving Ruhr coal production and thus to German 
and Western European economic recovery. Between 1945 and the onset of the 
coal crisis in 1958, the Ruhr mines were to hire over a million men. Using 
archival materials, private papers, contemporary printed sources and 
inteIViews, the thesis analyses the measures undertaken to win new labour for 
the Ruhr and the attempts to turn the newcomers into productive and settled 
miners. 
After an introductory section, the study looks at the degree to which workforce 
regeneration was achieved in the pre-currency reform era. The underlying 
theme is that the pre-1948 economy proved in many ways to be an uncontrolled 
economy. Despite the enormous priority given to the task, the British initially 
failed to rebuild the workforce. With US help, they achieved a breakthrough in 
1946-47, but the enterprise remained extremely costly and inefficient. These 
problems resulted from weaknesses inherent in any controlled economy but 
also from tensions and contradictions in British and later Bipartite rule. 
The second half of the thesis considers the poliCies of the 1948-58 period and 
argues that they were just as unsuccessful in regenerating the mining workforce. 
Neither a stable nor a compliant workforce was created and in desperation the 
industry began to turn to foreign labour. One reason for failure was the Federal 
Government's slowness in responding to the mines' need for housing 
investment. Another reason was that the established management style in the 
Ruhr mines alienated many newcomers. The employers' attitudes to 
management, integration and the labour market were stuck in a pre-war mould. 
This study contributes to our understanding of a number of different features of 
the reconstruction, notably the origins and limitations of the 'economic 
miracle', the impact of and response to the enormous population mobility after 
the war and the hopes and fears with which Germany's bourgeoisie entered the 
post-war era. Ultimately, however, the theme running through the study is the 
enormous and unique challenge that faced any organisation trying to create a 
stable and productive workforce in the mines. 
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Introduction 
Subject matter and background 
At the end of the war, when the Allies liberated the foreign conscripts with 
whom the Germans had maintained their war effort, the Ruhr pits faced 
enormous gaps in the workforce. Intense competition for labour in the 
overheated economy of the 1930's, military call-up in wartime and losses on the 
battle-field had all taken their toll. Many of the miners remaining in 1945 
were old or in poor health or both. The result was a pressing need to recruit and 
integrate new labour. It is no exaggeration to say that the key not just to the 
mining industry's future, but also to West German and, indeed, Western 
European economic recovery lay in rebuilding the colliery workforces of the 
Ruhr. Between the end of the war in 1945 and the onset of the coal crisis in 1958 
the Ruhr mines were to hire over a mlllion men. This thesis is about the 
measures undertaken to win new labour for the Ruhr and the attempts to turn 
the newcomers into productive and settled miners. 
As is the case with any historical research, the interests and questions embodied 
in the present study can be seen as responses, in some areas critical responses, to 
the existing historiography. The general chOice of subject matter was a 
conscious departure from the historiography as it existed at the beginning of the 
1980's. Until then, few studies had looked in detail at the process of economic 
and social reconstruction. Historical treatment of the post -war era was for a 
long time focused on the question of why a fundamentally different, non-
capitalist alternative did not materialise. Influenced by the general critical 
reappraisal of the Federal Republic which had been undeIWay in the universities 
since the student revolt of the 1960's, most writers concentrated on analysing 
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the forces that had led to the 'restoration' and investigated whether there had at 
any point been a viable democratic-socialist alternative. 1 
There is no doubt that this research produced many valuable inSights. in 
particular dispelling for ever the myth that the FRG had somehow developed 
naturally while the GDR had been forced into shape by foreign decree. Yet from 
the beginning there was the problem that the notion of 'restoration' was too 
undifferentiated. It ignored the striking new features of the West German 
political-economic system. such as the speed of economic recovery and the 
degree of political stability that characterised it almost from the beginning. 
Secondly. the notion of capitalism itself was too undifferentiated. There was a 
tendency to underestimate the possible range of variations within the general 
system and thus to ignore the question of what type of capitalism emerged. 
Both of these tendencies encouraged historians to concentrate on the period 
prior to 1949, by which time the basic outline of the political and economic 
system had been established, to the detriment of discovering the many features 
that emerged only in the later stages of reconstruction. In addition, the search 
for democratic-socialist alternatives encouraged a familiar Germanic tendency 
to remain too narrowly political. The enormous social and economic challenges 
that faced the authorities after 1945 - and the response to those challenges -
received little attention. Yet these problems and the need to respond to them, as 
well as being interesting in themselves, surely contributed to shaping the very 
political developments historians were trying to explain. 
1 The best introductions to the 'restoration' thesis are: AutorenkollekUv (Ernst-
Ulrich Huster. Gerhard Kraiker et all, Detenninanten der westdeutschen Restauratton 
1945 - 1949. Frankfurt/M 1972; JOrgen Kocka. '1945: Neubeginn oder Restauration?'. in 
Carola Stem und Heinrich A.Winkler (eds.). Wendepunkte deutscher Geschtchte 1848 -
1945. Frankfurt/M 1979. pp. 141 - 168; Gerold Ambrosius. Die Durchsetzung der 
soztalen Marktwtrtschajt in Westdeutschland 1949 - 1949. Stuttgart 1977. Among many 
studies focussing on the workers' movement see E. Schmidt. Die verhtnderte Neuordnung. 
Frankfurt 1970; U.Schmidt and T.F1chter. Der erzwungene Kapttaltsmus. Berlin 1971: 
Ernst-Ulrich Huster. Die Poltttk der SPD 1945 - 1950~ Frankfurt/M 1978. 
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At the beginning of the 1980's. therefore. there was a widespread feeling that it 
was time to look in more detail at the problems and policies of reconstruction. 
In 1975. Werner Abelshauser had been one of the first historians of the post-war 
era to leave the confines of political history and publish his influential account 
1 
of economic recovery. The last five to six years have seen a rapidly growing 
number of ventures into the economic and social history of the post -war years 
and of efforts to produce a more differentiated account of the emergence of the 
Federal German political-economic system. 2 This recent work has been 
influential on many aspects of the present investigation. but particularly on the 
sections concerned with economic policy. 
New labour and economic recovery 
One of the fruits of the work by Abelshauser and Adamsen has been to challenge 
traditional explanations of the economic miracle. The established view was 
that the recovery began in summer 1948 with the reinstatement of a largely 
liberalised market economy. the creation of a new currency and the adoption of 
a bundle of tax measures designed to encourage entrepreneurial initiative. The 
pre-currency reform period was generally portrayed as a period of restrictive 
Allied policy. inefficiency and shortages. By contrast. Abelshauser suggested 
that the seeds of economic recovery were sown long before the currency reform 
3 
and indeed that the first fruits of growth were reaped as early as Autumn 1947. 
1 Werner Abelshauser. Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948. 
Rekonstruktion und Wachstumsbedingungen in der amerikantschen und britischen 
Zone, Stuttgart 1975. See also by the same author. 'Problerne des Wiederaufbaus der 
westdeutschen Wirtschaft 1945-1953'. in H.A Winkler (ed.). Politische Wetchenstellungen 
in Nachkriegsdeutschland. Gottlngen 1979, pp.208-253 and Wirtschaftsgeschtchte der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1980. Frankfurt 1983. 
2 Recent studies include: Heiner R.Adarnsen. Investitionshilje for die Ruhr. 
Wiederaujbau. Verbdnde tmd soziale Marktwirtschaft 1948 - 1952, Wuppertall981; Hans 
GOnther Hockerts. Soztalpolittsche Entscheidungen in Nachkriegsdeutschland. Alliierte 
und deutsche Sozialversicherungspolitik 1945-1957 . Stuttgart 1980; Dtetrnar Petztna 
and Walter Euchner (eds.). Wirtschajtspolitik im brittschen Besatzungsgebiet 1945 -
1949. DOsseldorf 1984; Horst Thurn, MitbestimmWlg in d.er Montanindustrfe. Der Mythos 
vom Sieg der Gewerkschajten. Stuttgart 1982. 
3 Abelshauser. Wirtschajt in Westdeutschland, passim 
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The conventional contrast between ineffective controlled economy and 
successful market economy was thus presented with a serious challenge. Many 
other authors have adopted this view and in a recent essay on the British Zone. 
Falk Pingel argues that in sectors in which the British. for their own reasons. 
had a strong interest, respectable results were achieved from an early stage. The 
case of mining shows. he believes. that where the British were willing to promote 
rapid recovery, they were capable of it. I 
The other challenge which has been levelled at the conventional view of 
economic recovery is the argument that Erhard's 'laissez-faire' policies failed to 
provide the resources necessary for heavy industry's reconstruction. Both 
Abelshauser and Adamsen have drawn attention to the capital transfer schemes 
which Erhard, in conflict with his general policy. was compelled to accept in 
1951 and 1952? 
In this context, the poliCies adopted towards rebuilding the workforce in the 
mining industry are of major interest. Abelshauser has shown the mining 
3 industry's almost unparallelled importance for German economic recovery. 
Twice within the first five years of German post-war history. in 1946 and 1950-
1951, recovery and growth were seriously endangered by a shortage of coal. As 
the present study will demonstrate, the problem of rebuilding the labour force 
lay at the heart of the mining industry's difficulties. Regenerating the Ruhr 
workforce was therefore one of the central tasks of the reconstruction. 
1 Falk Pingel. 'Der aufhaltsame Aufschwung. Die Wirtschaftsplanung fOr die 
britische Zone 1m Rahmen der auJ3enpolitlschen Interessen der Besatzungsmacht', in 
Petzina and Euchner (eds.). WtrtschaftsJX>littk. pp.41-64. here p.46. 
2 See Abelshauser. Wtrtschaftsgeschtchte. p.65fT; Werner Abelshauser. 'Ansa.tze 
"korporaUver Marktwlrtschaft" in der Korea-Krise der fruhen fOnfziger Jahre. Ein 
Briefwechsel zwischen dem Hohen Kommlssar John McCloy und Bundeskanzler Konrad 
Adenauer'. Vterteijahreshefte for Zettgeschtchte.1982. 30. 4. pp.715-756; Adamsen. 
Investtttonshtlfe. passim. 
3 In addition to the references above. see Werner Abelshauser. De r 
Ruhrkohlenbergbau sett 1945. Wiederaujbau. Krise. Anpassung. Munich 1984. 
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Apart from its objective importance, mining is a crucial test case of economic 
policy in the immediate post-war period because, as the reference to Falk Pingel 
has indicated already, it was given such a clear priority. Whereas in April 1945 
virtually nothing about Germany's long-term economic future had been decided 
upon and the economic plans of the British and Americans were either punitive 
or nebulous or contradictory, there was agreement that Ruhr coal production 
1 
should be maximised in the short -term. The present study evaluates for the 
first time, using hitherto untapped primary sources, the degree to which the 
British and other interested groups were able to control and deploy human and 
material resources so as to obtain the so urgently deSired coal. After the 
currency reform, rebuilding the labour force remains of vital interest not 
because it continued to enjoy priority but. on the contrary, precisely because the 
failure to provide the resources necessary to house and settle mining labour is 
2 
seen as one of the key weaknesses of Erhard's economic policy. The thesis 
analyses the degree to which this is so and compares the ability of the pre- and 
post-48 economic systems to solve mining's labour problems. 
Workforce regeneration and industrial social policy 
These questions about transfer and deployment of national resources embody 
the main interest of the subject for the economic historian. But as well as being 
a question of resource management, regenerating the workforce was also very 
much an issue of social policy. Particularly after 1948, when the urgency of coal 
demand abated somewhat and the Allies relinquished a lot of their direct 
control, colliery managements were faced with the challenge of creating a new, 
stable and productive workforce. Other organisations too, particularly the 
1 See chapter 2. page 57. 
2 Abelshauser. Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau sett 1945 . p.64ff. 
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mining union, had an interest in influencing and shaping the way in which new 
labour was drawn and integrated into the mining community. 
Part of the interest of looking at the responses to this challenge is that, in 
general terms at least, what was happening in the mining industry was taking 
place allover Germany. The influx of newcomers into established communities 
whether as new labour for a particular industry or simply as homeless migrants 
in search of somewhere to settle, was one of the most pervasive phenomena of 
the reconstruction period. In 1945, something like two fifths of the German 
1 population had been on the move. With time. almost every community in West 
Germany was affected. As regards new labour in particular. most industries 
had, like mining, experienced conSiderable war time losses, had had recourse to 
the expedient of forced labour from occupied Europe and were faced in the post-
war period with the problem of rebuilding the workforce. They, like mining, 
were able to take advantage of the enormous pool of mobile labour that was 
available, comprising such groups as expellees, former evacuees, ex-POW's and 
the many more who had been impelled by material pressures and the 
disappearance of former sources of employment to seek new means of earning a 
living. 
Despite the pervasiveness of population migrations and labour mobility, there 
are almost no established hypotheses or theories which the present 
investigation could adopt as its starting point. Industrial social policy in the 
post-war period remains almost virgin territory for the historian and there 
2 have been no studies of new labour in German industries. True. the integration 
1 Manfred Overesch, Deutschland 1945 - 1949. Vorgeschtehte tmd Gnindtmg der 
BRD. Etn L.etifaden in Darstellung und Dokumenten, KOnigstein/Ts and DOsseldorf 1979. 
pAl. 
2 During the 1950's, new labour did receive some attention from sociologists. 
particularly in Carl Jantke, Bergmann und Zeche. Die soztalen ArbeitslJerMltntsse etner 
Schaehtanlage des nDrdltehen Ruhrgebtetes tn der Steht der Bergleute. Tablngen 1955 
(Continued overleaf.) 
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of the expellees and refugees 1 has received a great deal of attention, and the 
many excellent studies in this area have provided valuable information and 
insights about the experiences, mentality, legal status and other characteristics 
of the large minority of the new miners (probably around a third of them) who 
were refugees. 2 However, they did not produce hypotheses pertinent to this 
study, partly because refugee policy tended to leave off where industrial new 
labour policy began. Once the refugee had been secured employment and a place 
to stay, the primary task of those who were responsible for refugee integration 
had been solved; the task of the employers to mould and integrate the newcomer, 
on the other hand, had only just begun. 
and In Theo Plrker, S.Braun, B.Lutz, Arbeiter Management, Mitbestimmung, eine 
industriesoziologische Untersuchung der Struktur, der Organisation und des Verhaltens 
der Arbeiterbelegschaft in Werken der deutschen Eisen- und StahUndustrie, for die das 
Mitbestimmungsgesetz gilt, Stuttgart und DOsseldorf 1955. The only historical study to 
deal with new labour is a short Examensarbeit at the University of Essen based on 
interviews with new miners. See Ingrid Grundmann, 'Erfahrungen Essener Neubergleute. 
Untersuchungen zur ProblemaUk Vertriebener im Ruhrgebiet nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrteg', (Hausarbeit fOr die erste Staatspriifung fOr das Lehramt, Essen 1981). 
1 
'Expellees' were the former citizens of Germany's lost Eastern territories, 
deprived of their former homeland; 'refugees' were Germans who fled from the Soviet Zone 
of Occupation, later the G.D.R. For the sake of convenience, 'refugee' is frequently used in 
the present study as a generic term for both groups; where the narrower definition is 
meant, this is made clear in the text. 
2 A useful survey of contemporary refugee studies can be found in Peter 
Waldmann, 'Die Eingliederung der Vertriebenen in die Westdeutsche Gesellschaft', in 
Josef Becker. Theo Stammen, Peter Waldmann (eds.), Vorgeschichte der BRD. Zwischen 
Kapitulation und Grundgesetz, Munich 1979, pp.163-192 esp. pp.163-4. Among the most 
important of contemporary studies was the three volume collection by Eugen Lemberg 
and Friedrich Edding (eds.), Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland. Ihre Eingliederung und 
Ihr EinjluJ3 auJ Gesellschaft. Wirtschaft und Gelstesleben. Kiel 1959. See also Elisabeth 
Pfell's studies, Der FlQchtling: Gestalt elner Zettwende, Hamburg 1948 and FUnJ Jahre 
spater. Dle EingUederung der Helmatuertriebenen in Bayem bis 1950, Frankfurt/M 1951. 
Of interest for the Ruhr region is Gertrud Stahlberg, Die Vertriebenen in Nordrhein-
Wesifalen , Berlin 1957. A review of historical research on the refugee question can be 
found in Hellmuth Auerbach. 'Uteratur zum Thema. Ein kritischer Oberblick'. in 
Wolfgang Benz (ed.). Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten. Ursachen, 
Ereignisse, Folgen. Frankfurt/M 1985. pp.219 - 231. This collection represents the most 
accessible summary of recent German scholarship on the refugees. See also Franz J. 
Bauer, F1Qchtlinge und F1uchtlingspolttik in Bayem 1945 bis 1950. Stuttgart 1982: 
Siegfried Bethlehem. Hetmatvertreibung. DDR-Flucht, Gastarbetterzuwanderung: 
Wanderungsstn5me und Wanderungspolitik in der BRD. Stuttgart 1982 and Hans 
SchOnberg. Germans from the East. A Study oj their migration, resettlement and 
subsequent group history, The Hague 1970. Of particular interest for the Ruhr are Falk 
Wiesemann. 'FIOchtlingspolitlk in Nordrhein-Westfalen'. in Benz (ed.). Die Vertreibung. 
pp.173-182 and Falk Wiesemann and Uwe Kleinert. 'FIOcht11nge und wirtschaftllcher 
Wlederaufbau in der britischen Besatzungszone'. in Petzina and Euchner (eds.). 
Wtrtschaftspolitik . pp.297 - 326. 
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The absence of relevant theories is also a sign that much of the mining 
industry's problem was unique. It had its roots as much in the colliertes' special 
long-term failure to draw and integrate new recruits as in the war-time losses 
with which every industry had been afflicted. Even before the war, the 
collieries had felt it necessary to develop strategies for regenerating the 
workforce. Seen against this long-term background, it can be seen that the 
post -war situation was both challenge and opportunity for the mining industry. 
War and its aftermath intensified the shortage of labour. it is true. but also 
unleashed new and Sizeable labour reseIVes. Mining was probably unique 
among German industries in seeing in the post-war labour market a chance to 
surmount long-standing labour problems. Because of this specific mining 
background, looking at the industry's new labour policy says probably more 
about the hopes and anxieties with which mining managers - and trade 
unionists - entered the new era, about their attitudes to industrial relations and 
about the type of workforce they wished to create. as it does about the general 
phenomenon of regenerating the German labour force. 
There is, however, one established. general hypothesis which is relevant to the 
present investigation. namely, that post-war Germany's huge population of 
migrant labour, particularly the refugees, acted as a 'reseIVe army', depressing 
wages and generally weakening labour's position in relation to the employers. 
This view. though seldom the subject of serious study, has long been part of 
1 
received wisdom about the post-war period. In the course of analysing the 
way in which the influx of new labour was shaped and managed. the thesis 
therefore looks at whether the employers were able to exploit the situation and 
1 See for example Christopher Huhne's review of Alec Caimcross's study of 
British economic polley after the war in The Guardian. Friday 2 AUgust. 1985. Huhne 
writes that 'Britain had no reseIVe army of labour. like the refugees who flooded into West 
Gennanyor the fanners sucked from France's land. so there was (in Britain, MR) a relative 
lack of 'labour discipline' and a willtngness to maintain time-honoured demarcations'. 
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increase their power vis a vis the workers, for instance by imposing new 
practices or output norms. 
Sources 
Because the period under review is a fairly recent one, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the documentation differ from those for Similar proj ects covering 
earlier periods. Much of the material gleaned for this study was found not in 
archives but in the file cabinets and cellars of institutions which are still active 
today. The material was often not properly ordered and finding documents of 
historical value was a time-consuming process: however, the advantage of 
covering such a recent period is that everyday records and papers are still intact. 
In a few years, it is probable that much of the interesting documentation looked 
at will end up in the paper shredder. 
Investigation of the measures aimed at the new miners involved using the papers 
of the following organisations: various sections of Military Government, 
British, American, Bipartite and Quadripartite, in particular in the field of 
Manpower, Coal and Economics: a large number of regional bureaucracies, 
particularly the North-Rhine Westphalian Ministries of Reconstruction, 
Economics, Labour, Welfare and Culture, the regional Mining Inspectorate in 
Dortmund (and some of the local Inspectorates)' the Mining Section of the 
Regional Labour Administration (Auj3enstelle Bergbau des Landesarbeitsamtes) 
and some of the local labour exchanges and, finally, the Ruhr Regional Planning 
AuthOrity (Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk, now Kommunalverband 
Ruhr): the Federal Ministries concerned and their predecessors, above all the 
Central Office for Labour (Zentralamt fur Arbeitl, the Department of Economics 
of the Btzonal Executive Council (Verwaltung fur Wirtschaft), the Mining 
Department of the Ministry for Economics, the Intenninisterial Committee on 
Production in Coal Mining, and the Federal Housing and Labour Ministries: 
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many industrial sources, among them employers' records for individual pits and 
from the Employers' Association for Ruhr Mining (Unternehmensverband 
1 Ruhrbergbau), works councils, the Mining Trade Union IG Bergbau (now IG 
Bergbau und Energie), the German Trade Union Federation as well as the body 
responsible for running the mines' training schools, the WestfA.lische 
Berggewerkschaftskasse; a number of outside religious and political 
organisations including the Catholic Diocese of Munster, the Social Office of the 
Protestant Church of Westphalia (isolated papers), the Westphalian section of 
the Social Democratic Party (again only limited papers) and a private collection 
of Communist Party materials. 
Social historians dealing with periods prior to 1945 and, particularly, prior to 
the 1930's and 1940's will envy the writer the quality of the statistical materials 
that were available to him. It was rarely necessary to use mass data, payrolls or 
wage tables: detailed information about the social composition of the workforce, 
the places of origin of the men, living conditions and so forth is available in 
collated form. 
Although the statistical materials are thus generally good, the centralisation of 
Germany's social and political institutions did introduce some methodological 
difficulties. The era following the Second World War was a phase in German 
history in which the power of municipal institutions had reached its lowest ebb. 
As the Germans became more aware in the 1960's and 1970's of the need for 
planning at all levels, local institutions won back some of the functions they 
had lost to regional and national government. When historians come to deal 
with these years, they will find a wealth of detailed information which takes 
account of local variations and looks at social processes from a level closer to 
1 Uunfortunately the documentation of the Deutsche Kohlenbergbauleitung 
(DKBL), which ran the industry from 1947 to 1953. is largely inaccessible to the historian. 
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the ground, so to speak, than could the regional and national institutions which 
supplied the bulk of the data used here. Statistical comparisons of different 
areas within the Ruhr, for example, were almost impossible to make with the 
available sources. 
Turning to a quite different type of source material, many of the men who were 
involved in rebuilding the workforce are still alive as are many of the new 
miners themselves: these have been able to give expert advice and resolve a 
number of problems which the documentation had raised or left unanswered. 
Amongst the interviewees were new miners, trade unionists, works councillors 
(both Communist and SOCial Democrat), representatives of collieries, of the 
Employers AsSOCiation, the Miners' Union, the Deputy ( ie. acting) Controller 
General of the North German Coal Control (the British body which ran the Ruhr 
mining industry) and others. 
Interviews can supply more than expert advice. Through longer interviews with 
1 former new miners (in part carried out by myself, in part by the LUSIR oral 
history proJect), it was possible to gain insights into a number of areas which are 
otherwise very hard to document. The detailed autobiographies supplied by the 
interview partners gave valuable clues as to why some miners stayed and others 
left. The interviews exposed local variations and idiosyncracies that do not 
appear in the documents and the respondents were also able to deSCribe 
incidents and developments in their relations with the established workforce 
and to suggest ways in which the new miners may have altered the society 
around them. It was essential to treat this information very cautiously. Not 
all the miners interviewed had stayed in the mines but all had stayed in the Ruhr 
region and most still had something to do with mining: the leavers were much 
1 'Lebensgeschlchte und sozlale Kultur tm Ruhrgeblet'. 
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1 harder to find. Long interviews are so time-consuming to conduct and evaluate 
that only a very limited number is practicable in a research project primarily 
using other materials. Statistically meaningful analyses of such small 
samples are impossible. 
One invaluable source which supplemented this information was the series of 
empirical social research projects carned out by the Sozialforschungsstelle in 
Dortmund and some other institutions. 2 Overshadowed by the brash and often 
3 
speculative pronouncements of Schelsky and a few others. this painstaking 
research is only now being rediscovered by historians of the post-war period. 
Such studies deliberately restricted their theoretical ambitions and suppressed 
the deSire to contribute directly to broad theories of social change. The authors 
were keenly aware of the way the Nazi era had interrupted empirical research 
and wanted to create a new corpus of hard fact and observations on which future 
theories might be built. The result is that their work contains a wealth of 
information (from which the present investigation has benefited greatly) about 
workers in the post-war period. In addition to the published material. some of 
the original questionnaires and survey data have been preserved and these were 
generously made available to the author. 
1 The significance of distinguishing between the stayers and the leavers. although 
in a slightly different context. is neatly demonstrated in Detlev Peukert. 'Kolonle und 
Zeche. Arbeiterradlkal1smus. Wldersta.ndlgkeit und Anpassung der Bergarbelter 
zwischen Faschismus und Wirtschaftswunder'. Soztalwissenschaftltche Informattonen 
filT Untenicht unci Studtum. 1980. pp.24 - 30. 
2 These include: Helmuth Croon and Kurt Utermann. Zeche unci Gemetnde. 
Untersuchungen rlber den Strukturwandel etner Zechengemetnde tm nordltchen 
Ruhrgebtet. TOblngen 1958; Carl Jantke. Bergmann unci Zeche. Die soztalen 
Arbettsverhdltnisse einer Schachtanlage des nordltchen Ruhrgebiets in der Sicht der 
Bergleute. TOblngen 1955; Helmut Klages. Der Nachbarschaftsgedanke und die 
nachbarltche WirkUchkeit in der Gro./3stadt. Cologne and Opladen 1958; D. v.Oppen, 
Famtlten in ihrer Umwelt. Au&>re Bedingungen von Famtllen im Proze./3 der industriellen 
Verstddterung einer Zechengemeinde. Cologne and Opladen 1958; Elisabeth Pfeil. Die 
WohnwUnsche der Bergarbeiter. Soztologlsche Erhebung. Deutung und Krittk der 
Wohnoorstelllmgen eines Berufes. TOblngen 1954: Kurt Utennann. Fretzeitprobleme bet 
der mdnnltchen Jugend einer Zechengemeinde, Cologne and Opladen 1957. 
3 See Helmut Schelsky. Auf der Suche nach Wirkltchkei.t. DOsseldorf and Cologne 
1965. 
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Alongside independent work from institutions like the Sozialforschungsstelle, 
the interested authorities also carried out or commissioned a number of social 
sUIVeyS amongst miners in general and new miners in particular. Military 
Government research teams elicited a great deal of information from miners in 
1 1946 and 1947 and in later years public opinion research organisations such as 
EMNID and INFAS were commissioned to do the same by employers and state 
2 
organisations. This type of sUIVey material was supplemented by newspaper 
reports, based largely on a number of excellent collections of newspaper 
3 
clippings. Another valuable source on social conditions and miners' 
behaviour are the Situation Reports of the Mining Inspectorate. 
Definitions 
Most of the speCialist terms employed in the theSis are either self-explanatory or 
elucidated in the text, but it may be as well to define at the outset the way in 
which the terms 'new labour' and 'new miner'are employed. In the parlance of 
the 1940's and 1950's, 'Neubergleute'. or 'new miners', was a term used to deSCribe 
men who, with other working experience behind them, came to the mines as 
1 Among the Military Government surveys are: German Personnel Research 
Branch, Intelligence Division, CCGBE, Social Survey No. 1, 'Attitudes of Germans to coal 
mining'( 1946); Social Survey No.4, 'The coal miner and his family. A study in incentives' 
(1946); Social Survey No.5, The life and working conditions of the mining trainee' (1947); 
Public Opinion Research Organisation, Political DMsion, CCG(BE) (PORO) (ed.), The Ruhr 
Miner and hisJamily 1947. A social SW1Jvey, Bielefeld 1948 and PORO (ed.), A social survey: 
The mining 1947, Bielefeld 1948. These surveys are to be found either in the Public 
Record Office, London (PRO), file FO 1005,1738 and the Bergbau-BOcherei, Essen-Kray. 
2 EMNID survey, 'Die Meinung des Bergmanns', (1952), the results of which are to 
be found in the archive of the Industrlegewerkschaft Bergbau und Energie (IGBEA) , File 
T4'; a private investigation into the relationship between new and old miners was 
carried out by Walter KOpping, Welches VerhAitnls hat der gelernte bzw. der ungelernte 
Bergmann zu seinem Bernt? Erne soziologisch-empirtsche Untersuchung', (1952), to be 
found in the above file; Instttut fOr Sozialforschung, Frankfurt. 'Die subjektiven und 
objekttven Abkehrgr1lnde bei 7 Zechen des westdeutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus in ihrer 
Auswirkung auf die Slchernng des Belegschaftsstandes unter Tage', (1955) a copy of 
which Is in possession of the Gesamtverband des deutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus, Essen 
(Ges.Verb.); Institut fOr angewandte Sozialwissenschaft, 'Untersuchung Ober die 
Fluktuation der ArbeitsknUle 1m Steinkohlenbergbau. Ergebnisbericht', (Bad Godesberg 
1966) a copy of which Is to be found at the Gesamtverband. 
3 These are In the IGBEA, Stadtarchiv Heme, Hauptstaatsarchiv DOsseldorf 
(HStaD)' the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Archiv der Sozlaldemokratie, Bonn and Bergbau-
Archiv Bochum (BBA). 
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adults to retrain as miners. A more precise term for the same group was 
'UmschiLler', or 'adult trainees'. Both terms are used interchangeably in the 
present text. The term 'new labour', by contrast, denotes all new recruits, 
irrespective of their age or previous working experience. (In early chapters, 'new 
labour' and 'new miner' are used as virtual equivalents since the vast majority of 
recruits were in fact adult trainees.)l 
Youngsters of 17 or less, who entered the industry straight from school as 
apprentices (Berglehrlinge) , or juvenile trainees (Bergjungleute), were not 
normally classed as 'new miners'. The logic behind reserving the term 
'Neubergleute' for the adults was that youngsters were regarded as the industry's 
traditional source of intake, whereas the adult trainees were a special product of 
the post-war era. In fact, however, since many of the mining apprentices in the 
post-war period came from other regiOns and social backgrounds, they were just 
as much a new source of labour as the 'new miners' proper. Where the study 
wishes to deal with all such new groups together, this is made clear in the text. 
Structure oj the thesis 
It remains to give a brief outline of the thesis structure. 
Chapter one provides the background to the study with a general description of 
the Ruhr area, a short account of Ruhr mining's development up to 1945 and a 
more detailed analysis of the industry's pre-war and wartime labour problems 
and poliCies. One of the themes of the latter analysis is that the pre-war era saw 
the emergence of a strategy of 'immaterial gratification', whereby mining's 
fundamental inability to stay ahead of iron and steel wages was to be countered 
1 For stylistic reasons, the tenn 'new miner' has been employed in the thesis title. 
111is is not meant to suggest that other categories of the mines' new labour will be ignored 
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by training and propaganda policies designed to enhance the status of the 
occupation. 
The following three chapters belong together and look at the degree to which 
workforce regeneration was achieved in the pre-currency reform era. The 
underlying theme is that the pre- '48 economy proved in many ways to be an 
uncontrolled economy. Even the limited successes achieved were so costly that 
it seems very unlikely economic growth could have been sustained for long on 
such a basis. These problems were partly the result of weaknesses inherent in 
controlled economies but also of tensions and contradictions in the nature of 
British (and later Anglo-American) control, an argument summarised at the end 
of chapter 4. 
The currency reform, while improving the material supplies problem, did not 
bring the industry relief. Chapter 5 looks at the way coal was starved of 
resources in the 1948-1951 period and again in the mid-1950's and demonstrates 
the German authorities' failure to come to terms with mining's special needs. 
particularly its lack of capital for house and hostel construction. 
Chapter 5, in effect. marks a transition in the thesis by taking us into the post-
'48 era and bringing to a close the analysis of national resource management. 
The following four chapters go on to investigate the way the employers 
approached workforce regeneration and at the other groups which supported or 
contested management's policIes. Here too the underlying theme is of a failure 
of control, this time, a failure to control new labour's behaviour. Neither a 
stable nor a compliant workforce resulted from the massive labour influx of the 
post-war period and in desperation the industry began to turn to foreign labour. 
It is questionable whether any policy could have reversed mining's underlying 
unattractiveness but, as both chapter 7 and the conclUSion try to show, one of 
mining's fundamental problems was something that could have been changed. 
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namely the whole nature of industrial and human relations within the industry. 
It was management's authoritarianism, as much as the dark, dirt and danger 
that attended coal production, which undermined the attempt to integrate new 
labour. 
Chapter 1: Industry, region and workforce 1850 - 1945 
1: Ruhrpott and Ruhr pits. A general introduction 
The Ruhr was Gennany's most important coal field and had been so ever since 
the Kaiserreich. After the First World War, its importance had been enhanced 
by the loss of the Silesian field to Poland and until World War Two it supplied 
around 70 percent of German coal 1 . But it was in the context of western 
Germany, the area that later became the territory of the FRG. that the 
dominance of the Ruhr was most pronounced. In 1936, for example. over 90 
percent of the 117 million metric tons of hard coal produced within this area 
2 
came from pits in the Ruhr. The story of West Gennan coal production was, 
therefore. in large part the story of the Ruhr. 
Structure of the Regfnn 
Exploitation of the Ruhr coal field took off in the middle of the 19th Century. 
Until then. the limited mining activity in the region had been concentrated in 
the shallow seams in the south. along the Ruhr river itself. The knowledge that 
there were deeper, richer seams further north had been around for a long time 
but, because of the limitations of available technology, extraction had not been 
commercially viable. Technical progress in the second quarter of the century, 
capital accumulation in the region and the liberalisation of the mining laws all 
contributed to overcome this barrier and during the second half of the 19th 
1 In 1888. the Ruhr suppUed 50% of Gennany's coal production. This rose to 60% 
in 1913 and 70% throughout the 20's and 30's, Paul Wiel. Wtrtschaftsgesch1chte des 
Ruhrgebtets • Essen 1970, p.127. During the war. the Ruhr's importance declined 
relatively because of Gennan acquisitions in Eastern Europe. 
2 Statlstik der Kohlenwirtschaft e.V.. Essen (ed.}.Zahlen der 
Kohlenwtrtschatt(ZdKW). 34. p.3 (figure excludes the Saar. which did not become part of 
ilie BRD until the end of the period under review. and also the (very small) output of the 
Bavarian field). 
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1 
century the Ruhr mining industry expanded with incredible speed. Between 
2 1850 and 1913 the workforce grew by a factor of thirty and in the latter year 
3 
nearly 400,000 miners were producing over 100 million tons of coal a year. By 
1914, the Ruhr mining industry had reached maturity. 
At the time of the Second World War the industry covered an area which at its 
widest point stretched some 60 - 70 miles from west to east and 25 - 30 miles in 
the north-south direction. Roughly speaking, the Ruhr river now marked the 
southern edge of the coalfield, although a few of the oldest pits in operation were 
still to be found on the south bank. To the West, the field extended across the 
Rhine as far as Kamp Lintiort, while the easternmost mines were clustered 
around the town of Hamm. The northern border was slowly being extended as 
the industry moved into ever deeper seams, and by the Second World War it had 
penetrated deep into the Vest Recklinghausen. 
The growth of mining transfonned the Ruhr from an agricultural area, not much 
different from surrounding regions, to possibly the largest heavy industrial 
4 5 
concentration in the world. In 1850, the greater Ruhr area of around 1,700 
square miles contained a population of 500,000; by 1905 this figure had 
increased almost sixfold to 2.8 million and in 1939, there were 4 1/4 million 
6 people in the Ruhr. Urbanisation went on apace and by 1939 population 
1 Klaus Tenfelde, Soztalgeschtchte der Bergarbetterschajt an der Ruhr tm 
19.Jahrhundert. Bonn 19812 , p.l63fT. 
2 There were 1.546 miners in the Ruhr in 1800, 12,741 in 1850 and 394,569 in 
1913. Stephen Hickey, Workers tn Imperial Germany. The miners of the Ruhr, Oxford 
1985, p.13. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Heinz GOnther Steinberg, Soztalrdumltche Entwtcklung und Gltederung des 
Ruhrgeblets , Bad Godesberg 1967, p.151. 
5 Ie the districts which later came to form the administrative area of the Ruhr 
Regional Planning Authority (Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezlrk (SVR)). 
6 All figures from Paul Wiel, Wtrtschaftsgeschtchte des Ruhrgebtets. Essen 1970. 
p.l3, table 7. 
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density had become almost four times that of the surrounding region. 1 
Visually. economically and socially the Ruhr was dominated by heavy industry. 
In 1933. coal mining and iron and steel accounted for over 50 percent of 
industrial employment in the region. 2 Coal mining was the biggest single 
employer and in the narrower Ruhr area provided almost two fifths of industrial 
3 
employment. Even these figures do not show the full importance of heavy 
industry. for on its fortunes the prosperity of many other trades and industries 
4 depended. 
The other way of looking at this information is to recognise that mining was at 
no time the only industry in the Ruhr. in contrast to some other coalfields in 
Europe. Even an archetypal mining town like Bochum was characterised by 
growing economic diversification. By the end of the 19th Century. Bochum's 
miners were outnumbered by other industrial workers (although remaining the 
5 biggest single group). The 1920's and particularly the 1930's saw further 
diversification in the Ruhr with rapid growth of iron and steel, engineering, 
6 
construction and seIVices. The presence of alternative sources of employment 
was of crucial significance in affecting labour supply to the mines. 
Distinctive though it was, the Ruhr was by no means homogeneous. ObseIVers 
7 differ over how to divide up the region, but most would agree that the central 
mining area can be divided into a series of east-west stripes which rise 
somewhat towards the east, the differences between them stemming largely. 
1 Ibid .• p.1 O. table 5. 
2 Ibid., p.102. table 40. 
3 Ibid. 
4 David Crew, Town in the Ruhr. A social history of Bochum 1860 - 1914 , New 
York 1979. p.16. 
5 Ibid .. pp. 15-16. 
6 Wlel. Wtrtschaftsgeschichte. p.91. table 36 and p.1 02. table 40. 
7 See Wilhelm Brehpohl. Jndustrtevolk Ruhrgebiet tm Wandel oon der agraren zur 
tndustrtellen Dasetnsfonn dargestellt am Ruhrgebtet • TOblngen 1957, passim Steinberg, 
soztalraumliche EntwtcklUIlg: passim: Wlel. Wtrtschaftsgeschtchte. p.15. 
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though not exclusively, from the varying pOints in time at which they were 
penetrated by the rninJ.ng industry. 
Farthest south, along the Ruhr itself, is the oldest mining area, often referred to 
as the Ruhr Zone. Here, the pits were smallest and by the 1930's many had 
ceased operation; all the expanding collieries lay to the north. With certain 
exceptions such as the steel works in Hattingen, there was little other heavy 
1 industry either. North of the Ruhr and extending from central Duisburg 
through the centre of Essen and Bochum to Dortmund lies what is commonly 
referred to as the Hellweg zone. In 1939, 35 percent of the Ruhr's population and 
2 
around 60 percent of its industrial employment was concentrated in this strip. 
It had been penetrated by the mining companies in the first half of the 19th 
century and in the 1930's was stUl the site of a thriving coal industry. In 1939, 
44 percent of all miners in the Ruhr were to be found in the Hellweg and Ruhr 
3 Zones. Despite mining's undoubted importance, the urban centres of the 
Hellweg predated the mining indusby. Dortmund and Duisburg in particular 
had been significant (although small) commercial centres well before 
industrialisation began. As a result. the range of trades and services in the 
Hellweg area was greater and the structure of employment more differentiated 
than in other mining areas. In 1939, almost 30 percent of local employment lay 
4 in the service sector. The Hellweg was also the area where the mines faced the 
5 greatest competition for employment from iron and steel plants. Miners, steel 
1 Consequently, the zone increasingly lost signUlcance and by 1939 accounted 
for only 6 percent of the Ruhr's population. WIel, Wfrtschaftsgeschichte, p.1 0, table 4. 
2 Industrial employment % includes Ruhr Zone. Ibid. p.104, table 42. 
3 Ibid., p.108, table 44. 
4 Ibid., p.94. table 38 (,Handel und Verkehr' and 'Offentl. und private 
Die nstleist ungen ') . 
5 Ibid., p.104, table 42. In 1939 there were 126,500 employees in the mining 
industty in the Ruhr and Hellweg area and 94,500 in iron and steel. Elsewhere the ratio 
was far more heavily weighted towards the mines. The close proximity of steel plants 
and mines was particularly marked in Duisburg and Dortmund. 
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men and other workers frequently lived side by side 1 . The close proximity of 
different occupational groups reflected the fact that most pits were situated in 
the middle of towns. 
To the north of the Hellweg lies the Emscher Zone. which in the 1930's housed a 
little over one third of the overall Ruhr population. Here the mines were newer. 
bigger and deeper than those of the Hellweg. Built between 1860 and 1910 they 
transformed what had been an almost exclusively agricultural area into one 
which. by the 1930's. was almost as densely populated as the Hellweg.2 Unlike 
the older. more orderly urbanisation further south. the dramatic growth of the 
Emscher towns produced a chain of sprawling. disorganised conurbations. 
3 lacking clear centres or borders. Some even lost their civic identity. becoming 
northern suburbs of Duisburg. Essen. Bochum or Dortmund. They lacked the 
differentiated employment structures of more established towns so that the 
dominance of mining was much greater than in the Hellweg Zone. In 1939. 
94.000 out of the 376.000 citizens in full time employment were to be found in 
4 the mining industry. Taking industrial employment on its own. mining's 
5 
share rises to over two fifths. 
Further north stlll we enter the Lippe Zone. again named after the river which 
runs through it. In 1939. it accounted for almost a quarter of the total territory 
6 
of the Ruhr but only 8 percent of its population and 12 percent of its miners. 
1 See Helmut Klages. Der Nachbarschaftsgedanke und die nachbarliche 
Wtrkltchkeit in der Groj3stadt. Cologne and Opladen 1958. p.118ff. for a detailed 
description of occupational background in three Dortmund housing estates. 
2 Wie1. Wirtschaftsgeschtchte. p.lO. table 5. The northern part of the Emscher 
area. connecting Hamborn. Oberhausen and Reckllnghausen. was much less urbanised 
than the south. 
3 Franz-Josef BrOggemeier. Leben oor art. Ruhrbergleute und Ruhrbergbau 1889 
_ 1919. Munich 1983. p.30ff; Lutz Niethammer. UmstdndUche Erllzuterung der seeltschen 
Storung eines Communalbaumetsters in Preu,J3ens groj3tem Industrtedorf oder: Die 
UT1flihtgkeit zur Stacltentwtcklung • Frankfurt a. M. 1979. 
4 Wiel, Wtrtschaftsgeschtchte. p.92. table 37 and p.l04. table 42. 
5 Ibid., p.l06. table 43. 
6 Ibid .. p.lO. table 4 and p.lOS. table 44. 
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Much of the area's potential and in particular its deep-lying coal remained to be 
exploited. Over 12 percent of the gainfully employed population was still 
I 
engaged in agriculture; twenty years later this had fallen below 4 percent. The 
carbo-chemical industry, which was later to play such an important role in the 
2 
area, was then in its infancy. Few mines were much more than 30 years old and 
3 
a number came into full operation only in the post- 1945 period so that, by 
1961, the Zone's share of mining employment in the Ruhr had risen to over 16 
4 percent. Much of the region still had a rural appearance and many of the mines 
were situated in predominantly agricultural settings, indeed in some cases 
5 
miners continued to farm land while holding down a job in the mines. Yet, 
despite the rural character of parts of the region, the mines were already a vital 
part of the local economy, accounting in 1939 for 54 percent of industrial 
6 
employment. They belonged to the most advanced and productive in the Ruhr 
and by 1948 were responsible for a considerable proportion of the Ruhr's coal 
7 production. In contrast to the Hellweg Zone, the mines faced relatively little 
competition for labour, although there were some signs in the 1930's that this 
8 
was beginning to change. 
In many respects the mining area to the west of the Rhine resembled the Lippe 
Zone, with limited urbanisation, low population density and a relatively large 
1 Ibid., p.94, table 38. 
2 Ibid., p.106, table 43. 
3 Eg. the Walsum mine. 
4 Wiel, Wtrtschaftsgeschtchte, p.108, table 44. 
5 Even in the 50's, this continued to apply in communities such as Oer-
Erkenschwlck to the north of Recklinghausen. IGBE 8ezlrk Ruhr Nord (ed.), Jahre die wir 
ntcht verges sen 1945 - 1950. Recklinghduser Bergbau-Gewerkschaftler erinnem stch. 
Recklinghausen no date, p.195ff. 
6 Wiel, Wtrtschaftsgeschichte . p.106, table 43 and my calculation based on p.92. 
table 92 & p.l 04, table 42. 
7 Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau sett 1945 , p.19. 
8 Michael Zimmennann, 'AusbruchshotTnung. Junge Bergleute in den Drel61ger 
Jahren', in Lutz Nlethammer (ed.), "DteJahre wet.6 man ntcht. tOO man die heute htnsetzen 
soll". Faschtsmuserfahrungen tm Ruhrgebtet. Berlin Bonn 1983. pp.97 - 132. 
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proportion of the population still engaged in agriculture in the 1930's. Mining 
was the chief source of industrial employment and in the Moers area it 
accounted for over 50 percent of all (te not just industrial) employment. 1 As in 
the Lippe Zone, most of the coal field was developed only after the First World 
War and the mines were amongst the biggest and most modern in the Ruhr. 
Some of them are still in operation now. whereas in Duisburg. Essen and 
Bochum there is not a single working pit. 
Ownership and Control of the mining industry 
2 3 A few of the 148 Ruhr mines operated as independent companies, but most 
were part of larger concerns and indeed the industry had long been characterised 
by heavy concentration. By 1913, over 70 percent of mines belonged to 
vertically or hOrizontally concentrated companies and the top nine concerns 
4 
controlled one quarter of the Ruhr's coal production. Many of the vertical 
concentrations were mine-owning steel companies and by 1912 the 
Huttenzechen produced one third of the Ruhr's coal. 5 Foreign companies. too. 
6 had conSiderable shares in Ruhr collieries. During the 1920's further 
concentration took place in the industry, largely as a result of steel companies 
7 increasing their mining holdings. The most dramatic product of the 
concentration process was the fusion of many leading steel firms into the giant 
Vereintgte Stahlwerke (VSt). This was closely followed by the creation of the 
1 Steinberg. Sozialraumliche Entwicklung. appendix, map 17. There were local 
varlatlons. In Rheinhausen. for instance, the meta1industry was also a major employer. 
2 (In 1945). Wiel. Wirtschajtsgeschichte. p.132. table 46. 
3 Eg. Gewerkschaft ver. Klosterbusch which operated the Klosterbusch mine in 
Herberde. 
4 Werner Berg. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft tn Deutschland unci Groj5brttannien 
tm Ubergang zum 'organtsterten Kapttalismus'. Untemehmer, Angestellte, Arbeiter und 
Staat tm Steinkohlenbergbau des Ruhrgebtetes und von SUdwales 1850 - 1914, Berlin 
1984. p.80-8l. cr. GoldschmJdt's calculation in Ibid .. note 81. 
5 Ibid .• p.80. 
6 Abelshauser. Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945. p.23. 
7 Wiel. Wirtschaftsgeschichte. p.123 
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Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG (GBAG). a daughter concern controlling the VSt's 
mining interests. 1 By 1936. the GBAG employed 50.000 people. The only 
company even approaching the GBAG in size was the state-owned firm. 
Hibernia. the one significant exception to private ownership in the industry. 
ThiS general pattern of private ownership. heavy concentration and the 
dominance of steel firms was not fundamentally altered by Nazi rule. The same 
is true. with some qualifications. for another important feature of the mining 
industry. namely. the close cooperation and coordination between the mining 
companies (and also between mining and iron and steel companies). This 
cooperation was effected by the 'engmaschiges Verbandsnetz' (Bernd 
2 Faulenbach) of industrial. marketing and employers' associations such as the 
Rheinisch-Wesifdlisches Kohlensyndikat (RWKS). the Bergbauverein. the 
Zechenverband and others. The most important organisation was probably the 
RWKS, created in 1893 and one of the most powerful cartels in Germany. It 
virtually eliminated open competition between mines. fixing coal prices and 
3 
setting production quotas. Competition within the industry became a covert 
affair. taking place in board rooms and meetings where the production quotas 
were fixed. In the RWKS but also in general a very high premium was placed on 
discipline and unity amongst the individual mines and every effort was made to 
present a united front to the outside world. This also applied to the employers' 
approach to the labour movement. During the Weimar period wage negotiations 
took place not at company but at regional level with the Zechenverband 
1 Klaus Wlsotzky. Der Ruhrbergbau im Drttten Retch. Studten ZUT Soztalpolitik im 
Ruhrbergbau und zwn sozialen Verhalten der Bergleute in den Jahren 1933 bis 1939. 
DOsseldorf 1983. p.10. 
2 Bernd Faulenbach. 'Die Herren an der Ruhr. Zum Typus des Unternehmers in 
der Schwerindustrte'. in Lutz Nlethammer. Bodo Hombach et al (eds.). "Die Menschen 
machen ihre Geschtchte nicht aus ./reten Stl1cken. ab er sie machen sie selbst". 
Einladung zu etner Geschtchte des Volkes in NRW. Berlin Bonn 19852• pp.76-88. here p.85. 
3 Berg. Wirtschajt wul Gesellschajt. p.92ff. 
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representing the mining companies. Even in the field of company social 
policy. the employers' associations made great efforts to ensure that no company 
got too much out of line with general practice. 
The willingness of the Ruhr collieries to minimise internal competition and to 
formulate and adhere to common poliCies owed a lot to the character of the 
employers themselves. Werner Berg has described how the group identity of the 
employers emerged from the 1870's onwards. l The owner-entrepreneur was 
increasingly replaced by a new class of salaried director which by the First 
2 World War had become the dominant group among the employers. A few 
extremely wealthy owners - the Thyssens and Krupps - continued to exert a great 
3 deal of influence in the Ruhr but they were the exception rather than the rule. 
The salaried Untemehmer were a very homogeneous group by virtue of both 
social and educational background. Most came from the families of higher 
4 
civil servants and company directors. Virtually all studied at the mining 
academies or one of the other Hochschulen offering speCialist mining studies 
5 
and took the civil service exams for the State mining adminstration. The 
studies were lengthy and most students had turned thirty before qualifying as 
Bergassessoren, making them older and better qualified than most German 
6 
employers, indeed than most employers anywhere. at that time. The common 
background and awareness of their own high qualifications encouraged a strong 
sense of identity and an esprit de corps which was further intensified by the 
association with the civil service. The absence of an established ha u te 
bourgeoisie in the Ruhr only strengthened the Ruhr employers' consciousness of 
1 Ibid .. p.370fT. 
2 Ibid .. p.376fT. 
3 Faulenbach. 'Die Herren an der Ruhr'. p.85. 
4 Ibid .. p.86 and Berg. WUtschaft uncI GeseUschaft, p.382. 
5 Ibid .. p.378fT. esp. p.38l. 
6 Ibid. 
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being a group apart. This group identity contributed to their willingness to 
promote common rather than just company interests, an orientation which 
received a further boost from the ideological content of their education, in which 
economic activity was presented as a patriotic seIVice. 1 
N either this tradition nor the cartels and associations in which it found 
expression were adversely affected by the Nazi seizure of power. Of all the 
mining organisations, only the Zechenverband did not survive into the Nazi era; 
the impact of its dissolution was in any case small since its social-policy 
functions and personnel were taken over by the Bergbauverein.2 The fonner 
Mining section (Fachgruppe Bergbau) of the Weimar Republic's central 
employers' association, the Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie, became, 
virtually unchanged, the WirtschaJtsgruppe Bergbau in the new Reichsgruppe 
3 Industrie. In the course of the 1930's and particularly during wartime, it is true 
that state controls led to ever greater restrictions on the industry'S freedom of 
4 
action. The WirtschaJtsgruppe was increasingly forced to be the executor of 
state decisions rather than the representative of the mining employers. But 
this only strengthened the organisation vis a vis the collieries since corporate 
deCisions were now reinforced by state authority. As the post-war period was to 
reveal, the long-term influence of the mining associations and the cohesion and 
discipline of the industry had not been impaired. Indeed many of the industry's 
leading lights in the Nazi era returned (after a brief hiatus) to the top in the late 
5 1940's and the 1950's. 
1 On all this see Ibid. 
2 Wisotzky, Der Ruhrbergbau (m Drttten Retch. p.35tT. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., pp.265-272. 
5 For a powerful UlustraUon of mining's corporate identity and discipline in the 
post-war period see Werner Abelshauser, 'Kohle und Marktwtrtschaft. Ludwig Erhards 
Konfllkt mit dem Untemehmensverband Ruhrbergbau am Vorabend der Kohlenkrtse', 
VterteUahreshefte.filr Zettgesch1chte, 1985, 33,3, pp.489-546. 
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Productivity and profitability 
Before looking at general trends. it should be noted that the Ruhr mines were 
very diverse. Taking the region as a whole. average pit size was 2.000 men with 
an annual production approaching the 1 million ton mark. 1 Yet some mines 
employed only a few hundred men and produced under 200.000 tons of coal a 
year.2 while the top producers of the 1930's brought around 3 1/2 million tons to 
the surface annually and employed 5.000-6.000 men.3 Profitability varied 
enormously. not only because of the differences in productivity, but also because 
of the types of coal produced. Some mines. notably those in the Ruhr wne. 
produced anthracitic coals. unsuitable for coking. and were therefore unable to 
4 benefit from the lucrative bUSiness of supplying the steel companies. 
During the 1920's came the first signs that shifts in the world energy economy 
5 
were undermining Ruhr mining's profitability. The industry was increasingly 
forced to export at a loss in order to be able to compete with cheaper British and 
6 American coal. If proper allowance is made for depreciation. it can be seen 
that even in Weimar's boom years 1925 - 1929 the mines were not working 
7 profitably. Instead of reducing output and concentrating on the more 
profitable mines further north. the industry introduced a rapid programme of 
rationalisation. In a few short years. coal-cutting by hand was replaced by the 
pneumatic pick and the older methods of working made way for long-wall 
1 Wlel. Wirl.schaftsgeschichte. p.132. table 46. figures for 1938. 
2 For instance the YEW mine 'Carollne' In Holzwickede was in 1938 producing 
143.000t of coal a year. Wilhelm und Gertrude Hermann. Die alten Zechen an d.er Ruhr. 
KOnigstein 1m Taunus 19822. p.lll. 
3 The leaders in the 1938 league table were the Zollverein mine with 3.564.000t 
and Prosper with 3.376.000t. Wiel. Wirtschaftsgesch1chte. p.183. 
4 Wisotzky. Der Ruhrbergbau tm Dritten Retch. p.l O. 
5 See John GUlingham. Industry and politics in the Third Retch. London 1985. 
pp.5-3l 
6 Ibid. 
7 Wisotzky, Der Ruhrbergbau tm Dritten Retch. p.17. 
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mining. It is questionable whether rationalisation on this scale made 
econOmic sense and there is little doubt that in the absence of a coal cartel many 
of the smaller producers would have gone to the wall. 1 
During the 1930's. the rearmaments boom brought a revival of the industry's 
fortunes. Overall. 1939 was the industry's most productive year: more coal was 
brought to the surface in the Ruhr than in any year either before or Since.2 
Production held up well until 1944. when it fell by about 15 percent.3 In January 
and February 1945. it was still running at about half the 1939 levels and only 
4 
collapsed in March as an increasing part of the Ruhr came under occupation. 
In fact. however. the Ruhr mines had not fared as well in war and the armaments 
boom preceding it as might appear. True. the fall off in production from 1944 
onwards was less a function of bomb destruction than of disruption of supplies. 
The mines had proved difficult bombing targets and sustained relatively little 
damage. although a number of cokeries and other overground installations had 
been destroyed. Many observers indeed believed that it would be a relatively 
5 
easy task to restore the industry after the war. But this was an error. During 
the 1930's. the industry had suffered from a lack of investment. The Nazis did 
not wish to make big investments in mining. partly because they would only 
begin to pay themselves back after 15 or 20 years. To help industrial expansion 
in other sectors. the coal price was not allowed to rise, thus discouraging private 
investment in the mines.6 From 1938 onwards. no new shafts were sunk and 
the eqUipment and machinery grew steadily older and more obsolete. An even 
1 RudolfTschirbs. TruiJpolittk {m Ruhrbergbau 1918-1933. Berlin 1986. p.339ff. 
2 Wiel. Wtrtschaftsgeschtchte. p.13l. table 46. 
3 Ibid. 
4 
ZdKW, 1. p.3. 
5 Abelshauser. Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau sett 1945 . p.l9ff. 
6 Ibid .. p.16ff. 
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more pressing issue by 1945 was the condition and structure of the workforce, a 
problem analysed in more detail below. 
Thus mining entered the post-war era in a shaky condition and facing unknown 
market conditions. To remain at all competitive the industry would have to 
modenlise - mechanise its production and sink large new mines. Even more 
immediate was the need to regenerate the workforce. And, though in the short 
term Europe would need all the home-produced coal it could get, the Ruhr mines 
were likely at some point in the future to re-encounter that problem of the 
1920's, namely, that cheaper coal and other fuels encroached upon their market. 
The emergence of the labour movement 
Until the liberalisation of the 1850's and '60's, strikes were unknown in the 
industry. Prussia's miners were a privileged group, an estate with special rights 
and duties. They enjoyed, for instance, a system of sickness benefit when no 
other group of workers had one and the right to submit petitions and pleas to the 
royal mining authorities. Symbols of their status included a special uniform 
1 
and their own particular oath to the king. The state's withdrawal, the 
replacement of tradition by market forces and from 1850 onwards the massive 
influx of outsiders to the industry all transformed the situation. The first 
strikes occurred in the late 1850's and 1860's and the first major strike came in 
1889. Two more large-scale stoppages, the Kaiserreich's most important 
2 disputes, followed in 1905 and 1912. 
The first lasting miners' union was founded in 1889, following the strike of that 
year. The Verb and zur Wahrung und Forderung der BergmAnnischen Interessen 
1m Rheinland und Westfalen, reformed itself a year later to the Verband der 
1 Tenfelde,Sozialgeschtchte der Bergarbetterschaft, p.87ff; Hickey, Workers in 
Imperial Gennany, p. 170. 
2 Hickey, Workers in Imperial Germany, p.169ff. 
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deutschen Bergleute and was generally known as the Alter Verband. Almost 
from the beginning. disputes between socialists and religious groups 
undermined union unity. The Alter Verb and became closely linked with the 
Social-Democratic party and a rival Christian union. the Gewerkverein. was 
formed in 1894. By 1912. these two unions represented 70.000 and 40.000 
miners respectively. Almost as large as the Gewerkverein was the Zjednoczenie 
Zawodowe Polskie (ZZP), a union formed to represent the rapidly growing group 
of Polish-speaking German citizens from East Prussia who emigrated to the 
Ruhr. To complete the picture, the mining section of the liberal Hirsch-Duncker 
1 
unions drew support from around 2,000 miners. 
These divisions were hardly surprising given the heterogeneity and newness of 
the Ruhr labour force. Equally unsurprising was that the unions collectively 
were unable to win the support of more than a third of the miners. Though grass 
roots militancy was burgeoning and there was an increasing number of wildcat 
strikes, the inexperienced and highly mobile young workers who made up the 
bulk of the workforce were hard to win for slow and disciplined union growth. It 
was a vicious circle in which disunity and low membership condemned the 
union either to inactivity or to ineffective strike action which in turn made it 
hard to win support. All the industry's major strikes in the pre-1914 period 
ended in failure for the miners. 2 
Partly as a result of this situation, there was a growing gap between the 
leadership of the Alter Verband and the militant rank and me. The gap was 
also a function of the different mentalities of functionaries and ordinary 
miners. Composed largely of men with a long mining tradition behind them, 
the Alter Verband's leadership regarded the mass of recently settled miners as 
1 Ibid .. p.226ff. 
2 Ibid .. p. 169ff. 
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wild and unreliable. The union was generally hostile to strike action and 
1 
concentrated instead on boosting union membership. It failed to give 
leadership to the explosion of unrest at the end of the First World War, to the 
socialisation movement of 1918/19, and indeed to the protest that followed the 
Kapp Putsch of 1920.2 The unions' passivity cost it much support and for a brief 
period in the mid-1920's radical and anarchistic unions proved serious rivals 
for the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein. From 1924 onwards, rapid 
rationalisation robbed local militancy of much of its ground. However, the 
unions' problems continued and unionisation remained well below 50 percent. 
In 1927, for example, Just 14 percent of the miners were represented in the Alter 
Verband. In 1928, the Communists set up a rival union. Though the 
organisation itself was not very successful, the Communists were very effective 
in works council elections, in 1931 winning almost as many votes as the Alter 
3 Verband. Disunity and the gap between union leadership and grass roots 
remained endemiC to the end of Weimar. 
Labour policy and labour relations 
The history of labour relations in mining up to 1933, is, with brief exceptions, 
the history of employer dominance. Against the weak and divided labour 
movement was ranged a group of employers with capital, coordination and 
esprit de corps perhaps unrivalled in Europe. The employers refused to 
recognise the unions and it was only the revolutionary events of 1918 that forced 
them to change their stance. For a brief period, labour was in the ascendant. 
Employers and unions instituted central wage negotations and introduced an 8 
hour working day. Though this was undoubtedly a major step forward, the 
1 Braggemeier, Leben oor art, p.180ff. 
2 Mommsen. 'Die Bergarbeiterbewegung an der Ruhr 1918-1933', in JOrgen 
Reulecke (ed.), Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr. Bettrage zur Geschichte der 
Arbetterbewegung in Rheinland und Wesifalen. Wuppertall974, pp.275-314, here p.278. 
3 Tschirbs, TarifpolttUc. p.399. 
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unions. by not mobilising the energy of the protest and strike movement. missed 
a great opportunity to achieve much more significant encroachments on 
employers power. The tide was soon to turn. Following the Ruhr Occupation of 
1923 and the end of the inflation. the employers went on the offensive. 
Rationalisation was accompanied by maSSive redundancies and throughout the 
second half of the 1920's the mine-owners gave vent to a series of increasingly 
bitter attacks on the unions and the system of collective bargaining. 1 
At company level, the employers' approach to labour was characterised by a 
mixture of authoritarianism and paternalism. The employers in the Ruhr 
mining industry were notorious for their ruthlessnesss in dealings with the 
miners. In part, they had simply maintained the authoritarian tradition of the 
2 pre-1S51 period when the Prussian state had run the mining industry. But, as 
Franz Bruggemeier has demonstrated. management's approach was also the 
function of their lack of direct control over the labour process in the mines. The 
existence in each mine of a large number of small faces, precluded any direct 
control over the men. Until the introduction of long-wall mining in the late 
1920's and early 1930's, miners spent most of the day without any supervision. 
Consequently, mine managers felt it necessary to be very tough in their 
3 
approach to the workforce. At lower levels of management, the pit deputies and 
overmen (Steiger) were particularly prone to this since they were under pressure 
to keep productivity up and wage costs down, yet were responsible for far too 
4 
many faces and working points to oversee them properly. A semi-military. 
authoritarian spirit pervaded the entire industry. 
1 Tschlrbs. TartJpoltttk. p.190ff and p.241ff; Bernd Weisbrod. 'Economic power 
and political stabUtty reconsidered: heavy industry in Weimar Gennany'. Social History. 
1979.4.2.241-265. 
2 Tenfelde. Soztalgeschtchte der Bergarbeiterschaft. p.273ff; Faulenbach, 'Ole 
Herren an der Ruhr', p.86. 
3 Bnlggemeler, Leben oor art .. p.l12ff. 
4 Ibid. and Hickey. Workers in Imperial Germany. p.160. 
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At the same time there had always been a strong element of benevolent 
paternalism. Krupp was the earliest and most celebrated practitioner of 
extensive social policy but by the First World War virtually all mining 
companies had made considerable investments in social and welfare 
provisions, particularly in the construction of company housing. 1 By 1937, 
there were 162,567 mine-owned houses and apartments in the Ruhr? As well 
as instilling loyalty to the company, many provisions (for instance, the 'good 
ladies' of the WerksJilrsorge or the strict rules of behaviour on company estates) 
clearly aimed to 'civilise' and educate the miners, thus revealing the 
3 paternalistic way in which the employers regarded the workforce. 
Because of their relative weakness, the unions relied heavily on state support. 
During the First World War, it had been the state which in the interests of 
domestic peace and production had first prompted the employers to make some 
4 
recognition of labour. In the Weimar era, the political climate and most of the 
governments were more favourably disposed towards labour than before. 
Directly and indirectly, the unions received conSiderable state support in 
5 
collective bargaining. During the inflation, employers made agreements to 
wage rises conditional on government support for increases in the coal price, 
while in the second half of the 1920's, the unions were increasingly dependent on 
1 Hickey, Workers in Impertal Germany, p. 51 ff; Joseph HOffner. Soztalpolttik im 
deutschen Bergbau, Mo.nster 1956. p.49ff. 
2 Josef Lang. 'Die geschichtliche und rAumliche Entwicklung des 
BergarbeiteIWohnungsbaus tm Ruhrgebiet', (Diss. Cologne. 1952). p.97. 
3 BrOggemeler. Leben vor Ort. p.148fT: Theodor Terhorst. 'ZehnjAhrige Mltarbett 1m 
Dienst der Mitbestlmmung belm Hambomer Bergbau'. (unpub. Ms.. 1963). p.163; 
Faulenbach, 'Die Herren an der Ruhr', p.86; Hickey. Workers in Imperial Germany. p.65-
69. 
4 Gerald D. Feldman, Army. Industry and Labor in Germany. 1914-1918, Princeton 
1966. 
5 For a general account. see Nathan Retch. Labour relations in republican 
Germany, New York 1938. 
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the (legally binding) decisions of the state wage arbitration panel to achieve any 
improvements in wage levels. 1 
Within the colliery too, the state's influence made itself apparent. The State 
mines inspectorate, composed of the Berg- and Oberbergdmter . oversaw the 
industry and had special responsibilities in questions of safety and training. 
Impressive on paper, the inspectorate's powers were limited by shortage of staff 
and it tended in any case to sympathise strongly with the employers.2 a 
sympathy which survived the fall of both Kaiserreich and Weimar Republic. 
Nevertheless, until the Second World War. when little attention was paid to 
3 
safety rules, it represented an important check on employers' authOrity. In 
addition, the state introduced in the Weimar era a number of innovations giving 
employees more rights and reducing the scope for authoritarian paternalism. 
New works councils were created with conSiderable power. New housing 
legislation and selective subsidy poliCies weakened the ability and inclination 
4 
of employers to use company housing as an instrument of coercion. A state 
unemployment benefit scheme was introduced, involving sizeable employer 
contributions. 
The employers resented these incursions into what they regarded as their 
legitimate sphere of authority and resented too the costs which state social 
policy imposed upon them. They might have been more tolerant had it not been 
for the profit squeeze in the second half of the 1920's. Tensions grew further 
1 Tschlrbs. Tarifpolittk, p.50fTand p.314ff. 
2 See for instance the position of theOberbergamt Dortmund on training 
questions in Braggemeier, Leben oor art. p.95ff. 
3 Wolfgang Franz Werner. "Bletb ilbrig". Deutsche Arbeiter tn der 
nattonalsoztaltsttschen Krtegswtrtschaft , DOsseldorf 1983, p.241 ff: '(Es) .. besteht kelne 
Veranlassung mehr die wahrend des Krteges in der bergpolizeilichen Beaufslchtigung der 
Gruben elngetretenen Lockerungen beizubehalten'. Archive of the Oberbergamt 
Dortmund (OBADA) 13063/649/45, Oberbergamt Dortmund to all BergAmter, 31.July 
1945: OBADAI2004/2784/46, Bergamt Bottrop toOberbergamt Dortmund. 12.12.1946. 
4 Lang, 'Bergarbelterwohn ungsba u', p.86ff. 
Industry, region and workforce 46 
with the onset of the slump in 1929 and Ruhr industrialists were at the forefront 
of demands for a reversal of Weimar labour and social legislation. 1 Even 
before 1933, a number of Weimar's social and industrtal policy innovations had 
been reversed. Nevertheless, they were to provide a model for the post-war 
period. State intervention in many aspects of labour policy resumed in the late 
1940's where it had left off in the slump and, as will be seen, the union's 
influence in many areas of mining policy owed more to state support than to 
collective struggle. 
With the advent of Nazi rule many of the rights and poliCies introduced in the 
Weimar era were removed. On the whole, the impact of the Nazis was to weaken 
the pOSition of labour and to stimulate a return to the Herr im Hause approach 
on the part of the employers. The unions were forcibly dissolved and those 
Nazi organisations which, like the Deutsche Arbeltsjront, demanded more 
rights and social services for employees were largely unsuccessful in persuading 
2 
employers to adopt their suggestions. In any case the Arbeitsfront was at best a 
half-hearted advocate of workers rights. The approach of war and particularly 
the adoption of total war poliCies in the early 40's, saw further drastic 
restrictions on the freedom of the miners. The state became increasingly 
involved in industrial discipline and backed up the authority of the managers 
3 
with the Gestapo and the Arbeitserzlehungslager. Nevertheless, the employers 
did not have it all their way. Under the Nazis, the state administration played 
an ever greater part in determining industrial policy. Labour supply was state 
controlled and employers required official permission for dismissals. Wages 
1 Weisbrod, 'EconomiC power and political stab1l1ty', passim. 
2 Wtsotzky, Der Ruhrbergbau im Dritten Reich. passim Michael Zimmennann. 
"'Betriebsgemeinsschaft" - der unterdrackte Kontlikt. Aus den Protokollen des 
Vertrauensrats der Zeche Friedrich der GroJje " in Niethanuner, Hombach et al (eds),"Die 
Menschen machen thre Gesch1chte ". pp.171-174. 
3 Werner. "Bletb Uhrig". , p.26tr. p.77fI. p.171 fI and p.318ff. 
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were fixed by the Treuhlmder der ArbeiL Gradually. the industry found its own 
interests subordinated to other state priorities. l 
For both labour and employers. the fascist and war-time experience had 
important implications for future industrial relations. The experience of 1933 
produced amongst German union leaders recognition that the union movement 
could not afford to be divided. Almost from the first day of peace it was clear 
that there would no longer be a series of competing religious and politically 
2 
affiliated unions. And what of the employers? Much as they found state 
interference irksome. employers had made little resistance to the more 
unpleasant aspects of Nazi rule. and had made willing use of the Gestapo and the 
3 labour correction camps. Foreign conscripts had received the sharpest 
treatment and the employers' racism had been exposed by the fact that that 
treatment varied according to the conscripts' nationality. Historical research 
has made clear that these measures were not being fOisted by outsiders onto an 
unwilling industry, as the mine-owners themselves liked to suggest in later 
4 years. On the other hand, few employers were convinced NaziS and many 
5 
aspects of National-Socialist ideology left the industry unmoved. For German 
employers, generally, the signs of approaching defeat were a signal to begin a 
covert rapprochement with labour representatives. There was a growing 
1 Wlsotzky, Der Ruhrbergbau im Dritten Retch. passim. 
2 Hartmut Pietsch, Militarregierung. Burokratie und Soztalisierung. Zur 
Entwicklung des polttischen Systems in den StMten des Ruhrgebietes 1945 -1948 . 
Dulsburg 1978, p.80. 
3 Werner. "Ble#b Ubrlg" . . p. 77ff and especially p.171 fr. 
4 Christian Streit. Keine Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht und die sowJettschen 
KrtegsgeJangenen 1941 - 1945 . Stuttgart 1978. p.268-284. esp. p.280ff: Ulrich Herbert. 
Fremdarbetter. Polittk wtd Praxis des "Auslander-Etnsatzes" in der Krtegswirtschajt des 
Drttten Reiches, Berlin Bonn 1985. p.220tTand p.273fr. 
5 This is nicely captured in Zlmmermann. "'Betrtebsgemelnschaft"·. p.171 fr. 
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acceptance that any post -war settlement would have to involve extensive labour 
1 
recognition. 
However, in the closing weeks of the war, that settlement was still 
Zukunftsmusik. All Germans were very uncertain what the economy in general 
or mining in particular would look like in future. Above all it was not clear 
what or who from the industry would survive the Allied takeover. Senior 
mining personnel, nervous of retribution from miners, foreign conscript labour 
and the approaching Allied troops, now slipped away in their Mercedes to 
country hide-outs, preferring to await events from a distance. 2 
2: Workforce regeneration: problems and strategies 
The gaps in the workforce 
The most pressing problem facing any attempt to revive coal production in 1945 
was the condition and structure of the workforce. During the war, the Germans 
had made increasing recourse to foreign conscript labour (see fig. 1) as ever more 
German miners were called up to the armed forces. By the beginning of 1945, 43 
percent of the underground workforce consisted of foreigners, most of them 
Russian prisoners of war. When, between February and April 1945, these men 
were removed or liberated from the mines, the workforce was thus left almost 50 
percent under strength. 
1 See Gunther Mai, "Warum steht der deutsche Arbeiter zu Hitler?" Zur Rolle der 
Deutschen Arbeltsfront 1m Herrschaftssystem des Drltten Relches'. Geschichte und 
Gesellschqft. 1986, 12,2, pp.212-234, esp.232. 
2 A graphic description of senior management's quiet disappearance Is to be 
found in 'Die krlegerlschen Erelgnlssen In den Ma.r.l-Aprll Tagen 1945 auf der Zeche 
Brassert. Marl', In WesWUlsches Wlrtschaftsarchlv. Dortmund (WWA) F35: 3767. 
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F1J Foreign labour 
The ageing process had started 
during the 1920's, when as part of its rationalisation programme the industry 
had made little attempt to recruit new labour. At first, the impact had been not 
unfavourable since in the early 1920's the workforce had been rather on the 
youthful side, with over 50 percent of 30 years of age or less.2 In the mid-1930's, 
the age structure, with almost half the workforce in the peak age range of 30-45, 
3 
was very productive and output per head was higher in 1937 than ever before. 
It was nevertheless clear that there were too few youngsters in the industry to 
maintain this in the future, yet the mines, still recovering from the depression, 
were slow to respond and began only in the mid-'30's to recruit apprentices in 
1 Rheinlsch-Westfalisches Institut fOr Konjunkturforschung (ed.), Die Ursachen 
der niedrtgen F6rderung {m Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit Krtegsende. Essen 1946. pp.I -2, in 
Archive of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund. Dfisse1dorf (DGBA) , File 'Ruhrprobleme 
1945/6', 
2 My swnmation from 1926 figures in table 'Altersgl1ederung der Bergarbelter 1m 
Ruhrbergbau. % der Belegschaft', in Oberbergamt Dortmund (OBAD) (ed.) , Jahresbericht 
fUr den Oberbergamtsbeztrk Dortmund 1958, Dortmund 1959. 
3 My summation from Hans Heinrich Bischoff. 'Die Altersgl1ederung der Arbeiter 
1m Stetnkohlenbergbau', Gli1ckauj. 1952.88.41/41, pp.l009-1012, here p.l012, table 5; 
Wie1. Wirtschaftsgeschlchte. p.131 f, table 46. 
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1 
earnest. They were too late. Competition from the Wehrmacht and the metal 
industries drew potential recruits away from the mines and in 1939 the 
collieries received only a quarter of the deSired number of apprentices. 2 In 
addition, many youngsters already in the pits left for the more attractive and 
often better paid employment elsewhere. 3 During the war, the problem was 
exacerbated by the military call-up and by 1944 less than 9 percent of the 
workforce was under 30, while almost two thirds were in excess of 40 years of 
4 
age. 
Thus in 1945 many of the miners left in the Ruhr were due for retirement or at 
least to leave the underground workforce. The effects of ageing, of reductions in 
the quality and quantity of food available and of exhaustion through overwork 
were manifest in the productivity levels which by 1944 had fallen almost 25 
5 percent from their peak in the 1930's. Clearly, a major regeneration and 
rejuvenation of the workforce would be required after the war. 
The emergence of a strategy 
The 1930's brought home to many mines that they faced a fundamental problem 
on the labour market. At the prices they were allowed to charge, they could not 
afford to pay the wages necessary to win adequate new labour and create a stable 
workforce. One reason for this was that mining was seen in the Ruhr as a low 
status occupation. To be seen as a miner was to be seen to have failed. For 
1 In 1934, for example, the under-20 group accounted for only 8 1/2% of the 
workforce. My summation from the table 'Altersgltederung der Bergarbetter 1m 
Ruhrbergbau. % der Belegschaft', in OBAD (ed.) Jahrbuch 1958; Wisotzky, Der 
Ruhrbergbau tm DTitten Reich, p. 135. 
2 Wlsotzky, Der Ruhrbergbau tm Dritten Reich, p.137. 
3 Ibid., p.122tT. 
4 My summation from the table 'Altersgliederung der Bergarbeiter 1m 
Ruhrbergbau. % der Belegschaft', in OBAD (ed.) Jahrbuch 1958. It is not made explicitly 
clear, but these figures probably apply only to the German workers. 
5 Werner, "Bleth Uhrig", p.30 1. (figures for underground workers only); analysis of 
ill-health and accidents p.300tT. 
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instance, young miners from the Ruhr would go to elaborate lengths to conceal 
their profession - because that was the only way to get the girls: 1 
Wir Jungen kriegten naturlich mit, da.B die Rustungsindustrte aufgebaut 
wurde. Und das war fur uns Junge Burschen: Weg vom PUtt! - Wenn wir 
damals schon mal nach den Ma.dchen guckten, haben wir nicht gesagt: 
Wir sind vom Putt', sondern 'Ja, ja, wir arbeiten dahinten auf Montage.' 
Die ersten Fragen der Ma.dchen waren doch immer: 'Hast du Arbeit?' und, 
Was tust du?' Putt - da wollten sie nichts mit zu tun haben. Allein 
deswegen wollten viele von uns weg. 
Heinrich Husmann too, in his ethnographical study of workers in Hamborn, 
noted the tendency to look down on the miner, a fact which he attrtbuted to the 
past influx of 'culturally disadvantaged' people into the profession. 2 
Engineering, on the other hand, benefited from that fascination with technology 
that characterised young Germans in the 1930's. As a Wirtschaftsgruppe 
Bergbau study noted in 1942, every six year old knew the exact technical details 
of every plane, car and radiO produced in Germany but the difference between 
3 hard coal and lignite was a closed book even to most stxty-year-olds. 
To compensate for these factors, mining's wages had to be well ahead of their 
competitors. Yet this was impossible to achieve. According to the GBAG, 
mining and steel employees earned about the same in 1933-34, but by 1939, 
earnings in the blast furnaces lay between 10 percent and 75 percent higher than 
4 the take-home pay of the underground miner. Mining could not keep up. For 
one thing, the steel works' productivity was improving much faster than 
mining's; for another, wages were a much smaller part of their total expenditure. 
The industry looked to the state for support but in the 1930's little help was 
forthcoming. On the contrary, the mines found themselves compelled to foot 
1 Miner Oskar Wolfram in Michael Zimmennann, 'Ausbruchshoffuungen', p.102. 
2 Heinrich Husmann, 'Lebensfonnen und ihr Wandel beim Arbeiter in Hamoorn', 
(Dissertation, Mainz University, 1952), p.14. 
3 Cited in Hanns W. Brose, Etne Gemetnschaftswerbung zur Gewtnnung oon 
Nachwuchs JUr den Bergbau. Sonderdruck of the journal Die Werbung, July 1950. 
4 Wisotzky, DeT Ruhrbergbau tm Dritten Retch. p.146. 
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the bill for an expensive overtime and incentive scheme known as the Hermann 
Goring Verordnung.l During the war, it is true, the state agreed to shoulder 
some of the burden for the miners' health insurance and at the same time 
considerably improved the benefits. 2 Nevertheless there was little doubt that 
these measures, on their own, could not compensate for mining's 
unattractiveness. 
Thus mining employers began to give thought to ways in which they might 
improve the situation without requiring major injections of resources. During 
the war, some employers seem to have considered maintaining permanent 
colonies of conscript labour who would be kept within specially created ghettos. 
Wilhelm Tengelmann from the Hibernia company wrote in 1943 that it might be 
necessary to absorb large numbers of foreign labourers after the war. They 
should be accommodated 'in geschlossenen, abseitsgelegenen 
Siedlungsgemeinschaften ... und zwar so, daJ3 sich dort ihr Leben ihrer Eigenart. 
3 ihrer MentaliUit und ihrem Volkscharakter entsprechend abwickeln kann'. By 
creating such ghettos, argued Tengelmann, one could avoid 'biologische Schaden 
am Erbgut des deutschen Volkes' while maintaing a permanent presence of 
racially inferior foreigners. 
This was an exceptional view and Tengelmann himself did not seem to regard 
the prospect with any enthusiasm. Most employers looked forward to 
dispensing with foreign labour as soon as possible. Within the Bezirksgruppe 
and in a number of forward-looking collieries. two main strategies were 
developed, both of which attempted to enhance mining's status and thus to 
increase the 'immaterial gratification' associated with mining work. 
1 Ibid., p.243ff. 
2 Zimmennann, 'Ausbruchshoffnungen', p.121. 
3 Be rgbau-Arch lv, Bochum (BHA) 10, 28. Tengelmann, 'Erfahrungen aus dem 
Arbeitselnsatz der FremdvOlkJschen 1m Ruhrbergbau', 1.5.1943. 
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One was to create a new. officially recognised apprenticeship which would 
restore mining's status. increase recruitment and create a new core of loyal. 
stable and highly qualified young workers. This was not a new idea. although 
the commitment to it from the late 1930's onwards was new. Ever since the First 
World War. there had been consideration of ways of improving the training in 
mining. A government commission had been set up in 1920. amongst other 
things. to look into this question. 1921 had seen the founding of what later 
became the school for mining apprentices (bergmanrusche Berufsschule). In the 
mid-1920's. the beginnings of rationalisation and the interest created by the 
Deutsche Institut fur technische Arbeitserziehung in training matters had added 
1 
a further stimulus. In 1926. the qualifications necessary for miners to become 
'Hauer' (men capable of working independently at the various skilled jobs 
2 
underground) were formalised and an exam instituted. A few mines also began 
preparing their juvenile recruits for underground work. although training here 
was very perfunctory. 
One reason for taking juvenile training more seriously in the 1930's was that the 
nature of mining work was changing. So long as the miners had still been 
working in small teams. the mines had been able to rely on the older men to 
3 impart their skills to newer recruits. With the advance of long-wall mining in 
the early 1930's. the mines found themselves under greater pressure to institute 
formal training. Not only would safety and productivity depend on it. but it 
might well facilitate mechanisation too. 
However. the real logic to the new emphasis on training lay elsewhere. For some 
time. as Rudolf Schwenger obselVed in a 1932 study on social policy in mining. 
1 OBADA 16300. GMSO. Circular No. 138. November 1945. annex 2: 
'Gesichtspunkte fOr die FortfOhrung der systematischen Berufsausblldung 1m 
Ruhrbergbau'. 
2 Ibid. 
3 See Hickey. Workers in Imperial Gennany • p.l1 O. 
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there had been the hope that what the employers regarded as the unstable and 
unreliable workforce of the 1920's could be transformed through training into a 
pennanent. responsible and cooperative one. 1 The more the industry faced 
recruitment and wastage problems in the 1930's. the more this goal of workforce 
stability became the employers' dominant consideration. It was the need to win 
and hold on to labour. rather than any immediate dictates of production itself. 
which galvanised the industry to go beyond the rather haphazard approach to 
juvenile training of the 1920's and move towards a formal apprenticeship. The 
hope was that apprenticeships would have a two-fold effect. On the one hand. 
they would convince parents and youngsters. 'daJ$ 1m Bergbau eine qualitativ 
ebenso wertvoUe Ausbildung vermiUelt wird wie in der fIbIigen Industrte,.2 On 
the other hand they would enable the employers to brtng to bear 'erziehliche 
Einfliisse ... die auf die Schaffung einer verantwortungsbewu13ten Arbeiterschaft 
3 
abgestelIt sind'. 
Finally. in 1941. the mining apprenticeship was codified and received official 
recognition. Youngsters entering the mines would receive a three year training 
programme giving them a comprehensive introduction to mining work. At the 
end of the apprenticeship. the young miners qualified as 'Knappen'. From the 
4 
very beginning, however, there was something artificial about the concept. 
Only after three years working underground - ie following qualification as 
Knappe - could they take the Hauer exam, and only then did they become 
qualified to work independently and to receive the top wage rates. Miners who 
entered the industry as unskilled adults could become Hauer just as quickly as 
1 Cited in OBADA 16300. GMSO. Circular No. 138, November 1945. annex 2. See 
also BOttchereit, 'Probleme des bergmAnnischen Bildungswesens', Mitteilungen der WBK. 
1957,5, pp.5-10. 
2 OBADA 16300. GMSO. Circular No. 138. November 1945. annex 2. 
3 Schwenger. Die betriebliche Sozialpolitik. cited in Ibid. 
4 BOttchereit. 'Probleme des bergmAnnischen BUdungswesens', passim. 
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the Knappen. This was clear evidence that the specific set of skills imparted by 
the apprenticeship was not very significant. Its real logic lay in its other 
functions - above all the goal of binding the youngster to his occupation. 1 
The mines hoped that they could now win apprentices from groups previously 
unwilling to send their offspring to the mines. Consequently, a number of 
mines set about constructing special apprentice hostels to accommodate 
2 
outsiders to the Ruhr. By 1942, several of these were in existence and were 
already being featured in the industry's recruitment campaign. 3 The growing 
shortage of building materials, the Wehrmacht's claims on young able-bodied 
Germans and the need to accommodate increasing numbers of foreign conscripts 
forced the mines to halt the construction programme and a number of the 
4 hostels were given over to foreign workers. Nevertheless, the apprentice 
strategy was ready and waiting, as the speed with which it was revived after the 
war was to demonstrate. 
The other major 'immaterial' strategy developed before and during the war was 
the use of modern advertising methods to alter the way the miner was perceived 
both inside and outside the industry. In 1941, the Wirtschaftsgruppe Bergbau 
began to design a massive recruitment and advertising campaign to be 
implemented in the post-war period. A special team including Hanns W.Brose 
and Karl Bax prepared the groundwork and produced 12 test advertisements that 
5 
were to be just a small part of the envisaged post-war campaign. Readers of the 
journal 'NS-Frauenwarte', for instance, were treated to the first fruits of this 
1 Ibid. and Zimmermann, 'Ausbruchshoffnungen', p.121. 
2 Hans-Georg Erzmoneit. Was tut der Ruhrbergbau far seinen Nachwuchs?', 
Bergbau, 1956,7, pp.I68-175, here p.172 
3 Zimmerman, 'Ausbruchshoffnungen', p.1l4. 
4 Erzmoneit, Was tut der Ruhrbergbau', p.I72. 
5 Brose. 'Etne Gemetnschafswerbung', passim 
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work with an article entitled "Der Bergmann ... ein Facharbeiter".l The main 
work was to take place after the war. however. when such journal articles would 
be complemented by films. exhibitions. propaganda within the mines. letter 
2 
campaigns to schools and other means. 
Thus. without one being able to say that there was a precise and coordinated 
plan. a number of policies were crystalliSing in the the 1941-42 period as to how 
mining could be rebuilt and reshaped in the post-war period. These poliCies 
aimed both at solving the labour shortage and at creating a new attitude of 
loyalty amongst the miners. the majority of whom continued to be seen. in one 
3 
way or another, as unreliable. 
As it turned out, the massive gaps in the workforce left behind by conscript 
labour, the urgency of coal demand and the fact that post-war coal policy was 
decided by Military Government all meant that these strategies could not be 
implemented immediately. However, as time went on. they rose to the surface 
again and were to playa major role in employers' attempts to regenerate the 
colliery labour-forces. 
1 Ztnunennann. 'Ausbruchshoffuungen'. p.114. 
2 Brose. 'Eine Gemelnschafswerbung'. passim. 
3 Ibid. 
Chapter 2: Coercion and constraint. Military 
Government and the regeneration of the Ruhr mines 
1945-46 
1: The failure to control labour 
Priority Jor coal 
As the war drew to a close, there was no doubt in the Allies' minds about the 
importance of Ruhr coal and from the start there was agreement that Ruhr coal 
production should be maximised in the short term. 1 When the US 9th Army 
advanced into the Ruhr in March 1945, the solid fuels section, G4, of SHAEF 
moved in directly behind it and, even before all the cities in the area had been 
. 2 
occupied, began to establish control over the mines in the area. The urgency of 
increasing coal production was underlined in June when the findings of the 
Potter /Hyndley report were submitted. The report, the outcome of a joint 
Anglo-American mission to countries in north-western Europe, argued that 
economic collapse and serious disorder would result throughout the area unless 
3 it received immediate and sizeable injections of German coal. In July, 
American and British commanders in Germany received directives to the effect 
that Germany should export 10 million tons of coal up to December 1945 and a 
further 15 mUllon tons in the first four months of 1946.4 
1 PRO FO 942, 178, Economic and Industrial Planning Staff (EIPS) , The Gennan 
coal industry. Report of the working party' (September 1944): Werner Milert, 'Die 
verschenkte Kontrolle. Bestlmmungsgnlnde und GrundzOge der britlschen Kohlenpolitlk 
im Ruhrbergbau 1945 - 1948', in Petzina and Euchner (eds.), Wirtschaftspolttik, pp.l05-
119, here p.l05. 
2 The Concordia mines, for instance, were taken over by the Rhine Coal Control 
before the whole of Oberhausen had been occupied. See WWA F26 377, Rheinische 
Kohlenkontrolle I, Ruhrkohlenbezirk, HQ, Nr.l Coal District, Hamborn to General 
Directors, 9.4.1945; Pietsch, MtUtliITegterung, p.5. 
3 PRO FO 942, 179, Combined Production and Resources Board. London Coal 
Committee, 'The coal situation in North West Europe. Report by the Potter /Hyndley 
Mission to North West Europe', June 1945. 
4 WWA S22 (OMGUS) AG 45-46/103/1, Joint Chiefs ofStatIto US Forces Berlin, 
26.7.1945; Robertson to Clay, 21.9. 1945. 
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Early successes 
This urgency notwithstanding. the first few confused weeks of occupation saw 
little coal being moved from the mines. largely through lack of transport 
facUities. The SHAEF team concentrated on setting up an administrative body, 
the Ruhr Coal Control, to supervise the mines, on restarting production and on 
collecting statistical data to determine the manpower and material necessary 
for increased production. This interregnum continued untU the British took 
over in July. and absorbed the Ruhr Coal Control into their own organisation. 
the North German Coal Control (NGCC).l 
The NGCC could not help but recognise that improving the manpower situation 
was the key to increasing coal production. In April 1945, the underground 
workforce had fallen as low as 127,525 men, little more than half the size of 
Accordingly, measures were begun immediately to replenish the 
3 depleted workforce. The NGCC's manpower target was 320,000 miners ,roughly 
equivalent to the pre-war figure, and designed to attain the 1938 production level 
4 
of around 400,000t a day. 
Initially the NGCC devoted its energies to returning former miners to the 
industry. This meant, among other things, combatting widespread absenteeism. 
Large numbers of miners had, in the first weeks after the war, failed to report for 
work, preferring to concentrate on repairing their homes or make foraging trips 
for food. By mid-July over a third of the avaUable workforce was not attending 
work. From the beginning of August onwards the NGCC issued 'Orders to attend 
1 WWA S22 BICO BISEC 11/103/2/22, Report by WUliam Strang and William 
Thorpe to the governments of the US and UK, September 1947, Appendix: 'Review of Hard 
Coal Productlon in the Ruhr area since the capitulation'. 
2 
mKW, 1, p.20. 
3 Above and below ground. 
4 PRO FO 1005, 345, NGCC Monthly Report No.2, (September 1945). 
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work' and by November absenteeism had dropped from 36 to 17.2 percent. 1 In 
addition to these measures, the manpower authorities screened German 
prisoners of war in the British zone for former miners and these were rapidly 
released. By the end of August, 'Operation Coal-scuttle', as it was called, had 
2 
returned 35,000 POW miners to the pits. Furthermore the workforce registers 
of the collieries, the labour exchanges and the Ruhr Knappschqft, (the Miners' 
Insurance Association) were used to trace men with mining experience who had 
taken on other employment. Labour Supply Directive No.2 ruled that all former 
miners, without exception, were to be returned to the pits. In one week in August 
alone, over 1100 ex miners were directed back to the industry. 3 The result of 
these measures was a steady rise in employment and output. Between April and 
October, underground employment increased from 127,525 to 157,415, while 
4 
monthly coal production jumped from 268,000t to 3,607,000t. 
The manpower problem 
Until September 1945, the majority of the men brought back to the mines were 
Ruhr miners happy or, at least, not too unwilling to return to their former 
employment. Neither the administrative abilities nor the coherence of British 
recruiting policy had been put to the test. As the flow of fonner Ruhr miners 
began appreciably to slow down towards the end of August 1945, the British 
5 
authorities were under pressure to find a new source of manpower. 
1 PRO FO 1005,345, NGCC Monthly Progress Reports 2 - 4; PRO FO 1005, 1819. 
Manpower Division, CCG(BE), 'Report on Labour, Housing and Working Conditions in the 
Ruhr', Lt1bbecke 25.9.1945. 
2 PRO FO 942, 183, (EIPS/97/146B), Economic Sub-Commission (ECOSC), 
CCG(BE), 'Brief for the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Part 1: Hard Coal 
Production in the British Occupied Zone of Gennany', 8.4.1946. 
3 PRO FO 1005, 1824, Labour Supply Directive No.2, 21. August 1945: Labour 
Supply Directive No.3. 18. Sept. 1945; Manpower Division. CCG(BE). 'Report on Labour. 
Housing and Working Conditions', op.cit. 
4 ZdKW . 1, p. 20 & p.3. 
5 Manpower Division, CCG(BE), 'Report on Labour, Housing and Working 
Conditions', op.cit. 
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This would not be a simple task. Despite the huge migrations of refugees and 
expellees, there was no obviOUS and immediately accessible reseIVoir of suitable 
labour for the mines. Above all, the supply of experienced men was drying up, so 
that recourse would have to be had to inexperienced men, or 'green labour' in 
1 
offiCial parlance. In addition a significant proportIon of the population in 
working age was unfit for heavy labour by virtue of age, exhaustion or injury. 
According to one estimate, three quarters of male workers aged between 18 and 
2 45 were underweight or in poor physIcal condition. When a census was taken 
in 1947, It was established that only a third of those available for work in the 
3 British Zone were fit for heavy labour. 
Then there was the problem that, despite the depressed economy, few workers 
were coming on to the labour market because the Reichsmark's loss of value 
4 
encouraged a lot of economically meanIngless employment. Nonnal 
relationshIps between wages and production figures did not apply. Many 
employers reimbursed their workforce in kind, leaving the employees to bargain 
with the goods on the black market. Not being under financIal pressure to 
streamline the workforce, big Industrial companies were 'hoarding' their 
workers in the hope of being able to restart production in the foreseeable future. 
Exact figures are not available but in mld-1947, when a s1milar labour market 
situation still prevailed, unemployment lay at 274,000 for the British zone, or 
just 3 percent of the employed workforce, despite the fact that industrial 
production in the same geographical area was barely more than one third of the 
1 Ibid. 
2 PRO FOI005, 1947, 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 
1946. Visit of Russian, French and US experts to the Ruhr.', August 1946. See especially 
minutes of meeting held on Tuesday, 6 August, 1946, remarks by August Halbfell. 
3 BAK Z40, 308, ZAA. 'Das Arbeitspotentialin der britischen Zone', October 1947. 
4 Manpower Division, CCG(BE), 'Report on Labour, Housing and Working 
Conditions', op.cit. 
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1 
1936 level. Therefore, the authorities might well be forced to screen workers in 
other employment and to transfer those who were engaged in inessential 
activity to the mines. Although an apparatus was being developed to do this in 
the form of Labour Priority Boards, it would be a complex and time-consuming 
task.2 
A further difficulty was that the bulk of the usable and inessentially employed 
labour was not in the locality but in rural areas. This was the result of a 
combination of wartime evacuations, the offiCial direction of refugees and 
expellees to rural areas of intact housing and the voluntary migration of many 
city dwellers. Obtaining this labour would raise transportation problems and 
the housing difficulties would be almost insuperable since the authorities were 
in any case engaged in a 'race against time' to provide accommodation for the 
3 
existing Ruhr population before winter set in. 
The most serious problem, however, was that mining work, unattractive at the 
best of times, offered very little at the end of 1945. During the Third Reich 
miners' wages had dropped badly relative to other important industrial groups 
and the decline in the miner's pOSition was not made up after the end of the war. 
Indeed, with the termination soon after the capitulation of the Goering decree 
(originally introduced in 1939). the miners suffered a 10 percent cut in their 
monthly pay.4 Another blow in 1945 was the cut in pensions. During the war, 
the State had helped the industry by funding a major part of the contributions to 
the miners' health and old-age insurance organisation, the KnappschaJL The 
British did not feel in a position to continue this support and as a result the 
1 ZAA, 'Das ArbeltspotenUalin der britlschen Zone', op.cit, 
2 Manpower Division, CCG(BE), 'Report on Labour, Housing and Working 
Conditions'. op.cit. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Wisotzky. Der Ruhrbergbau im Drttten Retch. p.146 & 244ff: MUert. 'Die 
verschenkte Kontrolle'. p.112. 
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Knappschaft was forced to make large cuts in the levels of miners' pensions, 
eliminating one, the 'Bergmannssold', altogether. 1 It was true that miners, 
like other workers engaged in heavy labour, still received higher rations than 
most groups, but in practice they suffered from the food shortages that affected 
most urban areas. Many miners or their families saw themselves compelled to 
go on foraging trips into the country to obtain food. 2 It would take a major 
improvement in working conditions and incentives to induce new recruits to 
3 
sign on at the Ruhr mines. 
Losing directions 
These were difficult problems, yet they were surely not insuperable. There was 
no true scarcity of labour but rather a maldistribution of human and other 
resources. To right this maldlstribution, the British had two options at their 
disposal. They could channel towards the mining community the resources 
(foodstuffs, consumer goods and building materials) that would ensure a 
plentiful supply of volunteers to the mines; or they could compel men to enter 
the pits. The British chose the second solution and in the autumn of 1945, the 
British Control Commission's Manpower Division, on whom the Job of finding 
new labour devolved, set the administrative wheels in motion to detect usable 
labour and to direct, that is, coerce, it to the mines. 
Since a task of this size could not be undertaken by the British alone, the 
Division's main role was to coordinate, direct and monitor the activity of 
German offiCials. The actual detection and directions were largely carried out 
1 Ibid. 
2 Hochlarmarker Lesebuch. Kohle war ntcht alles. 100 Jahre 
Ruhrgebtetsgeschichte, Oberhausen 1981, p.200ff. 
3 Many of those later directed to the mines complained that they had suffered 
both a cut In pay and above all a reduction in available food by coming to the mines. See 
IGBEA Nachschlag Helnrtch Weeke, I. 'Besprechungen mit den ArbettelVertretem der 
Zeche julia und Reckl1nghausen am 21.1.1946',21.1.1946. 
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by the German labour exchanges which as one of the very first elements of 
German administration had been revived soon after the British took control of 
1 the Zone. A huge amount of the labour exchanges' time and energy was 
expended on the miners' programme - according to a reliable estimate at the 
beginning of 1946 up to 50 percent of the total activity of German labour 
exchanges was devoted to finding new miners. 2 
Given this concentration of effort. it was not surprising that a steady stream of 
men began to arrive at the mines. In the fourth quarter of 1945 new labour 
outnumbered returning ex-prisoners of war by almost three to one and by March 
1946 99 percent of recruits were gained by directions to work. 3 The unemployed 
who registered with labour exchanges were given a medical examination and, if 
fit, sent off to the mines; discharged prisoners of war were checked for 
suitability for mine work; German labour offiCials and British Military Police 
carried out spot checks on street and cinema queues to flush out likely labour 
and a series of labour supply directives established the overriding manpower 
4 priority of hard coal mining. 
5 directed 60.000 men to the pits. 
By March 1946. the labour exchanges had 
There was no doubt however that these results stood in no proportion to the 
amount of time and energy expended on producing them. Overall. the attempt 
1 OBADA I 1100/791/45,307 P. Military Government Detatchment to Dr. Rudolf 
Amelunxen, 6.7.1945; Manpower Division, CCG(BE) , 'Report on Labour, Housing and 
Working Conditions', op.cit. 
2 'sechs Jahre A1.J..6enstelle Bergbau des Landesarbeitsamtes Nordrhein-
Westfalen', (unpublished Ms. 1952), p.4. I would like to thank Herr Na,6krendt of the 
Landesarbeitsamt Nordrhein-Westfalen (LAA NRW) for the loan of the manuscript. 
3 PRO FO 942, 183. (EIPS/97/146B), ECOSC. 'Brief for the Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster. Part 1: Hard Coal Production in the British Occupied Zone of 
Germany'. 8.4.1946; OBADA. 18010/723/47, OBAD. Lagebericht. February 1947. atta_ched 
(DKBL) table; August Niehues. 'Ruhrbergbau und Arbeitsvermittlung'. Arbettsblattftir die 
brtttsche Zone. 1947, 1. 3. pp.88-90. 
4 PRO FO 1005. 1822, Manpower Division Technical Report for fortnig~t ending 
29 12 1945' 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 1946 .. op.cit., 
especially i~tervtew with Halbfell in minutes of meeting held on 1\tesday August 6th, 
1946; FO 1005,1824, Labour Supply Directlves No.'s2,3,8.16.17.28 & 32. 
5 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 1946.'. op.cit. 
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to conscript unskilled miners required. in the words of a German observer, 
'schlie.Bl1ch einen Umfang an VerwaltungskrMten. an Leerlauf. an Zeit und 
unproduktiver Arbeit. die in keinem VerhaItnis zum Erfolg standen,.l An even 
bigger problem was making sure the directed labour stayed and worked in the 
mines. The British failed to achieve this. indeed failed so completely and 
disastrously as to put the whole coal recovery programme in jeopardy. 
Table 1: Workforce and Production 1945 - 19462 
Month Workforce as % of Coal Produced (t) 
under~round ~3 
(at month's end) 
~ 
average 4 228813 10.607.000 
1945 
October 157,415 68.7 3,607.000 
November 166.958 73.0 3.844.000 
December 174.740 76.4 3.909.000 
.lM2 
January 177.756 77.6 4.394.000 
February 179.295 78.4 4.088.000 
March 180.790 79.0 3.875.000 
April 181.148 79.2 3.629.000 
May 180.728 79.0 3.927.000 
June 180.410 78.8 3.794.000 
July 181.573 79.4 4.493.000 
August 182.986 80.0 4.485.000 
September 184.250 80.6 4.197.000 
















The directed labour did not stay in the mines. often fled in the first week of 
employment and frequently absconded with work clothing that was hard to 
replace. Of 60.000 workers sent to the mines by labour exchanges up to March 
5 
1946. only 18,000 were still there by the end of March. Between January and 
the end of September 1946 almost 50.000 men were dragged to the pits, yet over 
1 'Sechs Jahre Au.6enstelle Bergbau'. p.3. 
2 ZdKw. I, pp.3 & 20. 
3 Workforce and production percentages are the author's calculation. 
4 Production figure for 1938 is the average monthly figure. 
5 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 1946.'. op.cit. 
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the same period the number of workers underground increased by less than 
1 
10,000 men. This meant that at any given point in time, a large proportion of 
the newcomers in the mine had only just arrived - having been drafted in to 
replace those who had escaped the week before. The lack of skill of the 
newcomers coupled with their lack of motivation had a disastrous effect on 
productivity. In November 1945 the trend towards more normal coal 
production began to slow down and by the end of the year daily output per 
man/shift had fallen (from 2.76t for the week ending 26 November to 2.23t for 
2 the week ending 31 December). Production ceased to climb in February, dropped 
sharply in March and regained its February level only in October 1946 (see table 
1). It was not just that the newcomers themselves were under-producing. The 
continued influx of unmotivated men lowered also the level of general morale in 
3 
the mines and in this way reduced the output of the experienced men as well. 
The low productivity figures meant that at the very same time as it was proving 
impossible to meet the NGCC's manpower targets, those targets had to revised 
upwards to take account of the unexpectedly low productivity. 
Against the backcloth of the urgent European demand for coal, these results were 
striking indeed. How can they be explained? At the best of times, conscription 
is a makeshift measure, not designed to enhance workforce productivity or 
morale. Yet, during the war production had held up well despite the growing 
proportion of conscript workers. 4 Once a decision had been made to give them 
adequate food, Soviet prisoners of war and workers from Eastern Europe 
1 OBADA 18010/723/47. OBAD. Lagebericht, February 1947. attached (DKBL) 
table. 
2 PRO FO 942. 183. (EIPS/97/ 146B). ECOSC. 'Brief for the Chancellor of the Duch~ 
of Lancaster. Part 1: Hard Coal Production In the British Occupied Zone of Germany. 
8.4.1946. esp. note 13. FIgures are for faceworkers only. 
3 It Is. however. difficult from the aVailable figures to make a clear distinction 
between the two groups. See chapter 3. p.122. 
4 See chapter 1. pp.48-50. 
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attained between 60 and 80 percent of their German counterparts' productivity. 1 
So why was the post -war experience so disastrous? 
The mechanicS oj Jailure 
In June 1946, the labour exchange in Arnsberg gave an account of a recent 
recruitment action. 68 men had been given a preliminary medical 
examination and issued with directions to work in the mines. Three directions 
were for one reason or another withdrawn, leav1ng 65 men to be given a more 
thorough medical examination. Before this could be carried out 31 of the 
draftees had disappeared. The remaining men were then duly examined and 
thirteen found to be unfit for mining work. The lorry to take those who passed 
the examination to the mines was supposed to arrive at 11 a.m. but in fact it did 
not turn up till 13.15 p.m. By then seven more of the 'recruits' had slipped away 
so that only 14 men were actually driven over to the Dortmund mines which 
2 
were to be their destination. A subsequent examination established that only 
eleven out of the fourteen men actually reported to the mine. By registration 
that even1ng the number had dropped to seven. On the following day, only two 
3 
were still present. Later, some of those who left the mine made representations 
to the labour exchange in Arnsberg, complaining that the accommodation was 
4 infested. For its part the labour exchange compla1ned to the regional labour 
office that ever since the men returned to the area, recruitment for mining had 
5 become even more difficult than before. 
1 See Herbert. Fremdarbetter. p.282 and Streit. Ketne Kameraden. p.283. 
2 StaM Arbettsamt Dortmund. 47. AA Arnsberg to Prc\sident des LAA. Westfalen-
Lippe. 28.6.1946. 
3 StaM. Arbeitsamt Dortmund. 47. AA Dortmund to Prnsident des LAA. Westfalen-
Lippe. 8ergbau AbteUung. 11.7.1946. 
4 StaM Arbeitsamt Dortmund. 47. AA Arnsberg to Prnsident des ~ Westfalen-
Lippe. 28.6.1946 and enclosure: Niederschrift 26.6.1946. gez. Wenzel Plodek. 
5 Ibid. 
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A similar pattern emerges in a report drawn up a month or two earlier by the 
works' council of the Gneisenau pit. The report dealt with fifty conSCripts sent 
by train from Holstein of whom 38 arrived at Dortmund station. On their 
arrival the conscripts complained of having been sent against their will and of 
being treated like slaves. The majority declared themselves unwilling to work 
('eine Aufnahme der Arbeit (kame) iiberhaupt nicht in Frage'). The response of 
the works council, already aggrieved by newcomers absconding with good work 
clothing when the established workforce received nothing, was to suggest that if 
they were going to leave they should do it now before they were kitted out. By the 
following day there were only three of the conscripts left - and two of those 
1 departed shortly afterwards. 
Every works council and labour exchange could tell a similar story. The value 
of these particular accounts is that they convey concisely many of the 
conditions which undermined the labour directions. First, they are not 
properly policed. There are no guards at the hostel, no police at the labour 
exchange. Men are drafted from Holstein against their will and yet no guards 
accompany them on the train. Secondly, the directions are not supported or 
accepted either by the draftees themselves or by those who should be enforcing 
them. Works council and management make no effort to restrain the 
newcomers. The works councillors actually invite the unwilling recruits to 
return home and no one lifts a finger to stop them. Even those who made the 
directions, the labour exchanges, seem to have given them so little support that 
the draftees are prepared to surface again at the labour exchange to make a 
complaint. The response of the labour exchange was not to send the men back to 
the mines but to pass on their criticisms to the regional labour exchange. 
1 Archive of the Zeche Gnelsenau, Dortmund (AZG) FUe' I 126 Zuwelsung von 
Arbettsknlften aus anderen Bezlrken 1.11.45 - 31.10.56', 'Declaratlon of miners' 
representaUves at mine Gne1senau about the last transport of workmen', 3.5.1946. 
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Thirdly, the men have evidently very little anxiety about what will happen to 
them if they flee. They make no secret of their intention and do not go into 
hiding, simply return home. 
The recruits' lack of anxiety revealed that the established system of tracing 
labour was remarkably ineffective. In theory, it should have been possible 
sooner or later to trace anyone who had disobeyed an order to work in the mines. 
Their names would be recorded in the labour exchanges' files. To obtain new 
employment they would have to re-register with a labour exchange and at that 
point the authorities ought to have been able to catch up with them. Yet this 
does not seem to have happened. The NGCC claimed that a large number of 
deserters from the Schleswig-Holstein action had been sent back to the Ruhr at 
their own expense but this did not tally with the mines' experience and was 
probably a bluff. The labour exchanges admitted in confidence that they were 
in no position to trace men who had absconded. In March, it is true, three men 
were sentenced to six months' imprisonment for refusing to go the mines and 
another two were given three month sentences for leaving the Ruhr without due 
1 
cause. Yet, considering that in March alone, 5,000 miners left the pits this was 
2 
no great achievement. Evidently by registering in a different district or other 
means it was easy to avoid detection. 
Even when the newcomers stayed in the mines, it proved impossible to get much 
work out of them. In September 1946, the OBAD was investigating a complaint 
against a pit deputy who had refused to allow a young haulier to leave the mines. 
The deputy's defence provided an indication of the problems which the 
conscripts presented to mine managements. The haulier in question had been 
on the mine's books for about a month. Yet during that time. he had barely 
1 Excluding inValidity, death or movement from one mine to another. 
2 WWA F26, 380. Concordia to HQ 1. Ruhr Coal District. 7.2.1946 and HQ NGCC to 
RCD's.26.2.1946. 
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worked a complete shift. Either he had been absent altogether. or had arrived 
late or wanted to leave early. 'Wenn das Arbeitsamt glaubt. wir hatten hier erne 
Irrenanstalt. dann l~ es auch die notigen Warter dazu stellen. Ich lehne jede 
Verantwortung fur Z ab und bitte. ihn dem Arbeitsamt zur Verfiigung zu 
stellen ... Der Ton. den sich die im letzten J ahr eingestellten j ungen Manner zum 
groj.3ten Tell angeetgnet haben. geht entschieden zu weit. Sagen w1r ihnen etwas. 
bekommen wir immer freche Antworten". 1 The Mines' Inspectorate noted 
frequent complaints that the newcomers were not only refusing to do their share 
but were also intimidating the established workforce and preventing it from 
2 
working properly. Although the NGCC repeatedly demanded tougher 
measures. management seemed unable to assert its authority on the workforce. 
The unguarded prison 
These failures revealed that the administrative system as a whole was simply 
not geared up to coerce labour on a large scale. During the war. directions had 
been carried out within the framework of a police state. A centralised. efficient 
and ruthless network of security forces had backed up the system of labour 
controls and had intimidated the labour force into compliance. By contrast. the 
authOrities in the post-war period were from the start hampered by the lack of 
police. The British did not create a security administration to match the Nazis 
police apparatus. This was doubtless a good thing but it made it very difficult to 
enforce the directions or to trace those who fled the mines and it meant that new 
labour was not deterred from quitting the mines. 
The classic example here was Operation Clobber. At the beginning of December 
1 OBADA 1 3850/2263/46. 'N1cht Herauslassen des Schleppers Z vom Revier 25. 
Prosper 1'. Berlcht des Fahrste1gers G6bbelsmann. 30.9.1946. 
2 OBADA 18010/28/47. OBAD to HQ NGCC. 'Kurzberlcht aber die Lage 1m 
Ruhrkohlenbergbau fOr November 1946'. 10.1. 1947. 
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1945, the Gennan Mines Supplies Organisation l (GMSO) infonned the collieries 
that a large number of soldiers were to be released from Prisoner of War camps 
in the near future and that these would be scrutinised for potential recruits for 
the mines. 30,000 new miners were expected from the action and, in view of 
this, recruitment of civilians was to be discontinued. A Military Government 
manpower report at the end of December was forced to reduce this estimate. It 
appeared likely that only about 40 percent of the soldiers released registered 
with the labour exchanges. Civilian recruitment was therefore to be resumed. 
A further report on 12th January 1946 had to make the unhappy admission that 
of the 30,000 miners promised from the operation, 384 had been delivered? 
As well as making it more difficult to trace likely recruits or recalcitrants, the 
absence of an efficient and ruthless police force weakened the managers' ability 
to discipline the conscripts. During the war, the threat of bringing in the 
Gestapo, a step which managements had not hesitated to take even in minor 
diSCiplinary matters, had been a major element in sustaining the pressure to 
work. 3 
It could be argued that the British might still have posted troops to the mines, 
guarding the new recruits' barracks and so on. Indeed this is what the French, 
concerned at the failure of the Ruhr's export programme and themselves 
4 inclined to a tougher approach, continually demanded. Yet the British were 
loath to adopt a more obvious military presence. In part their unwillingness to 
do this stemmed from their recognition that, no matter how many troops they 
posted in the Ruhr, they would not be able to create a watertight system. The 
1 In German the organisation was known as the Versorgungszentrale des 
deutschen Bergbaus. 
2WWAF353495 GMSOCIrcular 161. 7.12.1945; PROFO 1005.1822. Manpower 
Division Fortnightly Tec~ical Reports for fortnight ending 29.12.1945 and 12.1.1946. 
3 Werner, "Bletb Uhrig", p.26ff, p.77ff, p.171ff. and p.318ff. 
4 'Minutes of the Committee to Investigate coal production 1946,'. op.cit.; WWA S22 
(OMGUS) AG 45-46/103/2. US Political Advisor to Clay, 26.4.1946. 
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labour might simply flee into other zones. 1 More significant was their fear of 
arousing the opposition of the established workforce and thus depressing rather 
than increasing production. The British had not forgotten the lesson of 1923 
when the French occupation had resulted in a policy of passive resistance. the 
miners reporting for work and then idly sitting in the pits.2 It was not that the 
established workforce was particularly ill-disposed to the British. Indeed. 
labour was the only group initially to have high expectations of the occupying 
powers. But they could not be expected to endorse a coercive policy which 
appeared to maintain the methods of the Nazis and was directed at their own 
3 
countrymen. The unions continually protested against the directions and it 
was clear that the reaction of the workforce to a more military presence. to 
guards and barbed wire at the conscripts' barracks and so on would be very 
negative. Such a policy would not only offend against the loyalties of the 
miners, it might also seem to them the first step towards placing the whole 
workforce under coercion. So. the British ended up trying to conduct a coercive 
policy in a non-coercive manner, hoping that new labour would knuckle down to 
mining the coal and undertaking very little when it turned out that they would 
not do so. 
The weaknesses of indirect rule 
Even given the limitations to the security system and the understandable 
reluctance to create a police state, the ineffectiveness of the directions was 
striking. Many of the problems stemmed from the fact that most of the 
enforcement was actually being carried out by Getman officials. The British felt 
1 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 1946.'. op.cit. 
2 PRO FO 943. 185. 'Brief on special pOints arising from Coal Experts' report for 
in Foreign Secretary's discussion with the French', october 1946: PRO FO 943, 186, ~~onnal meeting with Mr. H.E.Collins ... at Norfolk House', 6.5.1947. 
3 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 1946.', op.cit., In 
particular minutes of meeting held on Tuesday, 6 AUgust. 1946, remarks by August 
Schmidt. 
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constrained in the amount of pressure they could put on the German 
administration because they saw themselves as being dependent on its 
cooperation. M1l1tary Government apparatus was small. The size of Manpower 
Division. for example. and even more so of the North German Coal Control bore 
no relation to the tasks involved unless they were to delegate large areas of their 
1 
responsibility to Gennan officials. The question as to why they were not larger 
goes beyond the limits of this study since it applied to all sections of Military 
Government. In part the British probably felt they had no choice. since money 
was short and a British administration would have been expensive. On the 
other hand at least some of the costs might have been borne by the Zone so that 
financial pressures can not be the sole explanation. The British seem to have 
believed that a system of indirect rule. in which German administrations 
carried out the bulk of the work, would be less likely to arouse resistance and so. 
ultimately. more eftlclent. There was much to support this view. but it meant 
that poliCies could be implemented only with the cooperation or at least on the 
sufferance of the German authorities. As a leading representative of the 
Manpower Division's Labour Supplies Branch put it. '1 do not think it is merely 
a matter of checking a sample here and inspecting there because on many sides 
of the work we have not suffiCient Allied officials to carry out the detatled 
checks required if the Gennan offiCials we are checldng are In the ovelWhelm1ng 
majority In complete opposition to our polley". He went on. " ... we have to 
ch~- ,,2 consider facts. we have to see how far we can drive the human rna J.ue. 
Many Gennan officials gave the directions only half-hearted support. 1b1swas 
true. for example. of the German labour administration. The then president of 
1 WWA 522 (OMGUS) CO HlST BR 3/406-1/22. Undated notes by NGCC ~ 
an omc1al htatoty of the NOCC. esp. SecUon 1. The noteelble~ tha~.~ l:m. In 
were only 44 omcere In the Production Branch. respons or conuvauua 
the BriUm Zonel 
,. 'MlnuUle of the Committee to InVeStigate coal production 1946.'. op.dt 
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the Westphalian regional labour exchange, August Halbfell, noted that both 
Gennan and Military Government inspectors carried out controls in cinema and 
street queues but that only the Military Government's checks were effective. 1 It 
may well have been a problem of legitimacy - that in the crucial moment of 
encounter, a rueful smile or a pleading look could deflect the German official not 
quite certain of his cause from pursuing his control too forcefully. It is true that 
the labour administration engaged in little open opposition to British policy. 
Yet senior offiCials did protest against coercion and, in private, repeatedly spoke 
against compulsory placings.2 The German authorities made such little 
attempt to place conscripts under guard or to prevent them from fleeing that it is 
evident they deliberately avoided enlisting the full panoply of coercion. 
Another piece of evidence for covert reSistance to the directions was the low 
number of juvenile recruits to the mines which suggested that many careers 
advisers in the exchanges refused to obey the order to direct youngsters to the 
mines. 3 
Moreover, the negative or uncertain attitude of the labour exchange offiCials 
very probably transmitted itself to the recruits. Certainly, the wUlingness of 
the Arnsberg recruits to complain in person at the labour exchange suggests that 
they knew the offiCials to be of one mind with themselves. 
That the labour officials were uncertain of their cause is not surprising. For a 
start, the German officials probably found It very uncomfortable to issue labour 
directions in the name of the former enemy. Secondly, it was well known that 
I ibid. 
2 OBADA 18000/1147/46. President of LAA Hannover to MWtaJy Government, 
Hannover 22 Febru8.IY 1946' OBAD 16301/927/46, Memorandum by Dr. Herwegen. 
Referent tOr Berufsberatung ~Im LAA Westfalen-lJppe. MOnster 25 AprIl 1946: "Arbeiter 
kOnnen durch ZwarlgSIIldnahmen In die Gruben geachickt werden. Bergleute sind durch 
ZWang Dleht zu gewtnnen". 
S See the comments In Manpower Dtvtalon. CCG(BE). 'Report on Labour. Housing 
and Worldng CondlUons'. op.clt.. Appenc:UxA. SecUon 'PrcwlsIan ofTraJntng'. 
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most of the coal produced was going for export and at prices well below the 
market rate. (In fact. in order to avoid greater unrest. the British were covertly 
feeding more coal into the zonal consumption than their international 
conunitments allowed them. but this was kept secret to avoid a diplomatic row.)l 
It was generally felt that the British had no overall commitment to 
reconstruction as a whole. except where it suited their interests to do so. 
Everyone !mew of the Morgenthau plan and the level of coal exports seemed to 
prove that German recovery was a low priority. Thus few Germans could see 
the coal recruitment programme as a contribution to German recovery. 
The half-hearted approach to enforcing the directions was even more marked 
amongst the colliery managers. For them. recognition that the production drive 
was not serving national recovery was joined by a second concern. namely. that 
it contributed little to the recovery of the industry either. The mines were 
running on a loss and subsidy basis which covered operational costs but not 
2 depreciation. let alone making a profit. In any case. the devalued 
Reichsmarks were a poor reward for an industry that desperately needed 
supplies. eqUipment and new preparatory and development work. In effect. 
every ton of coal mined was using up the reserves of the industry without putting 
anything back. American obselVers believed that under existing price and 
subsidy poliCies the managers' logical policy was to keep 'production at the 
m ,3 lowest possible level conSistent with its members continuing in 0 ce. Given 
this Situation. the employers could not be expected to exert themselves in 
extracting production from unwilling recruits. In addition. the influx of 
unskilled labour of all ages. often in poor condition. would in the long term 
1 WWA 522 (OMGU5) AG 45-46/103/2. Echols. AGWAR. to eJay. Apr1II946 (exact 
date Ulef1ble). ref: W-85224. 
1 WWA 522 (OMGUS). aleo alSEC 11/104 - 1/39. Special intelligence Report. 
'Some German views of the poUtical. economic and sociological .. peets of Ruhr coal 
mIntng'. 19.8.1948. 
SIbkL 
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Intensify the tndustry's labour problems and costs. 
Thus, the managers tended not to share the British sense of urgency. They gave 
longer-term Interests a greater priority to the detriment of max1m1sing coal 
production In the short term. Halbfell complained to the British that a number 
of employers were paying no attention to the realities of the labour market and 
were setting unreasonable standards for new recruits. 1 Large numbers of men 
were passed as fit by the labour exchanges, sent to the mines and then rejected by 
the doctors of the Knappschajt, the industry's health insurance body. Some of 
these rejections were understandable. The labour exchanges, mindful of the 
manpower quotas imposed by the British authorities, were remarkably 
unselective in the health standards they appUed to possible adult recruits. Quite 
a number of the conscripts would have been 'useless in any industry'. 2 
Nevertheless, there was clear evidence that the Knappschaft was more 
concerned about the possible future burden on its resources of large numbers of 
medically sub-standard recruits than about the urgency of the situation. It was 
therefore prepared to maintain a Iigour In its standards which the British 
3 
officials regarded as excessive. The Chief Medical Omcer of the British 
Ministry for Fuel and Power estimated that at least 10 percent more candidates 
4 
could be accepted than had been passed by the Knappschaft. 
Authortty and power in the mining industry 
An even more important factor restraining management from asserting Its will 
on the workforce was not opposition to British goals but uncertainty about Its 
1 'Minutes of the Committee to InVeStigate coal ptodUCUoD 1946.'. op.dt. 
:I PRO PO 1005. 1738, O.P.R.B .• lntell.lgence DiV1alon, CCO(BE). Social Survey 
Report No.5: '1be life and working condlUona of tile mining trainee', 31.12.1946, p.s. 
a 'MInutes of the Committee to InVeStigate coal producUon 1946.'. op.cIt.. minutes 
oCthe 2nd meeting. 
"ibid. 
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own position. A point often missed in historical accounts emphaSising the 
swift return of Gennan employers to power is that. in the early years. employers 
and managers in mining and in other Industries were in a very peculiar. 
uncertain position. In some cases the top directors were in prison. in others the 
parent company was no longer able to control colliery policy. The chain of 
command had been broken and colliery managers often had to deCide whose 
interests they should be seIVing. 1 They had to weigh up the possibility that the 
British would be in charge for years to come against the loyalty to their fonner 
bosses. Furthennore. at the end of 1945. the British expropriated the mine 
owners and it seemed as if the pits would be SOCialised or nationalised on the 
British model. The trade unions were in the ascendant and the managers had 
every reason to be cautious in their dealings with the men. Another. more 
direct and personal. threat to mine mangers was that of denazification. At the 
end of 1945. Bergamt Dinslaken reported that discipUne generally was very lax 
and an improvement could not be expected. 'bis die Aufslchtsbeamten lOO%1g 
sicher sind. daB Ihnen kelne Unannehmtchlichkelten durch AnschwArzerelen 
2 
und Anzetgen entstehen'. Managers feared that the workforce would make 
accusations to a denazification panel about their behaviour in the Nazi era. 
Despite repeated efforts on the part of the NGCC. denazification continued into 
1947.3 
As a result of their insecurity vis a vis the workforce. the employers were unable 
to apply much pressure to the new recruits. Bergamt Krefeld complained In July 
1946 that the instructions of the ovennen were continually being disregarded. 
even violently opposed. If the ovennen tried to punish the offenders. the works 
1 Spedalintelllgence Report. 'Some German views of the poltUcal. economtc and 
sociological aspects ofRuhr coal mtnIng'. 19.6.1948. op.dt. 
2 OBADA I 8010/1415/45. Bergamt (BAl DIn.laken to OBAD. Lagebertcht far 
November 1945. 2.12.1945. 
S SpedallnteWgence Report. 'Some German views of the poIIUcal. economtc and 
8OC101oglcal aspects ofRuhr coal mtnIng'. 19.6.1948. op.dt. 
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council overturned the pUnishment. 1 The industry's medical staff who, during 
the war, had been extremely niggardly in allowing miners sick leave suddenly 
became extremely lenient since 'bei etngetretenen (gesundheitlichen, MR) 
Kompl1kationen wohl keine der Stellen, die darauf drAngen, da6 diese Leute 
mOgl1chst weiterarbeiten sollen, den entscheidenden Arzt decken wird .. ', as the 
management of one colliery noted.2 Absenteeism in general was treated with 
great laxtty.3 
Given the difficulties in enforcing discipline, it is not surprising that managers 
adopted a resigned and passive attitude to the conscripts.4 In place of forcing the 
recruits to work, managers favoured dismissing those who would not do so. Yet, 
dismissals were clearly a measure of desperation in a situation where the men 
wanted to leave the industry. Managers must have been aware that they were 
thereby encouraging other recruits to behave badly on the off chance of being 
5 
sent home, thus underm1n1ng the whole coercive approach. Again and again, 
the Ruhr coal controllers had to warn the mines that they could not dismiss 
6 
when they wanted to, which suggests that the warnings had lillie effect. 
The weakness and insecurity of the management and deputies contrasted 
sharply with the wartime situation, a fact which helps to explain why 
production stayed so high during the war despite the ever larger percentage of 
conscript labour in the workforce. During the war 'tAtliche ObergrtfJe' had been 
1 OBADA 18010/1824/46, BA Krefe1d, Lageberlcht fQrJult 1946. 
2 OBADA 13874/281/48, BA Lothrtngen, 'Gutachten Qber die Kranken- und 
UnfaJlzahlen'. 31.5.1948. 
s PRO FO 942. 183, Brief for Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Part 1 Hard 
Coal Production Brltiah Occupied Zone of Germany, 8.4.1946. 
4 See Paul Breder. Oeschlchten uor art. Er1nner'W'1gen etnes Berymanns, Easen 
1979. chapter 'Neubergleute'. passim. 
5 1bere was clear evidence that new miners were committing oJfencee In the hope 
ofbeJngdlamlMed. OBADAI5207/1275/46. BADtnalaken toOBAD, 7.6.1946. 
8 WWA F26. 379. I.RCD to Concordia. 17.1.1946; F26. 380. I.RCD to 
Betrlebec:llrektor. Concordia. 5.6.1946; F26. 782. I.RCD to GeneraldIrekton. 5.9.1946 and 
I.ReD to QeneraIcJIrekto. 9.9.1946: F26, 783. I.RCD to an mining companle8. 26.8.1947. 
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'an der Tagesordnung'. as miners subsequently recalled. 1 For example. a 
foreman entrusted with the job of supervising Ukrainian forced labourers is 
recorded as having advised Gennan miners working alongside them that the 
only way to get a Ukrainian to work was to beat him.2 So bad was the treatment 
meted out by the mines (and sometimes by the miners) that the Wehnnacht 
sections responsible for Soviet POW's felt obliged to warn the industry that the 
conscripts were being treated too badly. 3 
If management insecurity was a key problem in the post-war period. the 
question then arises why the British were undennining the authority of the very 
offiCials on whom their production drive depended. There were two points here. 
The first was that different goals were in confliCt. The moral and political 
imperative of denazification was at odds with the drive for economic recovery. 
Though the NGCC itself was hostile to denazification and its officers frequently 
assured German managers that they looked at mining 'nicht aus politischen 
4 
sondern aus technischen Gesichtspunkten'. pressure came from higher up to 
continue. 5 Here in miniature was a problem that was to confront Military 
Government on a large scale in the following years. 
Secondly. the British were playing an uneasy balancing act between capital and 
labour. 
labour. 
They needed management's help but were unwilling to antagonise 
Military Government's nervousness was exacerbated by the fact that 
they felt unable to offer the miners any special material gratification for their 
work. There was therefore a readiness to make other concessions. The 
expropriation of the mines. for instance. was. as is now clear. a sop to labour 
1 Herbert. Fremdarbetter. pp.225-6. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 WWA F26. 381. Minutes of a discussion with ReD 1 on 21.11.1946. 21.11.1946. 
5 See also chapter 3. p.135. 
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demands, rather than the first step in a seriously meant programme of 
1 
socialisation. Even the decision to continue denazification in the mining 
industry was in part a concession to labour. In Spring 1946, the NGCC had 
successfully requested that all denazification be brought to an end because of its 
impact on production. In July, however, union representations led to the 
establishment of a new denazification cOmmittee.2 On a much smaller scale, a 
telling example of Military Government's unwillingness to back management 
too strongly came in an exchange between an NGCC district officer and the 
mining directors in his area. The NGCC representative, colonel Ritchie, 
requested the directors to stop works councillors from coming to his office to 
discuss matters which should be settled within the colliery. The directors 
responded that they gave works councillors plenty of opportunity to air their 
grievances and suggested that Ritchie might like to inform them himself. This 
Ritchie was not prepared to do. He could hardly throw them out, he said, and 
hoped that management's influence would be sufficient to solve the problem. 
3 No one wanted to be seen wielding the big stick. 
Apart from opposition to British policy or insecurity, one thing that applied to 
all German participants was that early failures undermined the conscription 
programme's credibility and started a vicious Circle in which lack of 
commitment and failure only selVed to strengthened each other. What so 
inflamed the works councillors of Gneisenau, in the example given earlier, was 
not the notion of conscripting labour itself but the inefficiency of an operation 
in which the newcomers were given the only supplies of work clothing and then 
allowed to disappear. Thus disposed against an ineffiCient system. the works 
1 Milert. 'Die verschenkte Kontrolle', p.110. 
2 Henry Collins Mining memories and musings. Autobiography oj a mining 
engineer, London 1985. p:421T.: PRO FO 1005.379. COPROD/P(46)12. 'Denaztficatlon of the 
Coal Industry'. 5.10. 1946. 
3 WWA F26. 381. Memo concerning directors' conference on 2.71947. 2.7.1947. 
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councillors ensured that it failed to work. 
The costs of the failure to control: training 
The costs of British policy were felt not Just in terms of coal production but also 
in human terms, particularly in the mines' appalling safety record in 1945 and 
1946. The approach to training revealed that, despite initial good intentions, a 
coherent and safety-conscious approach to inducting the newcomers was 
impossible within a programme of unenforced directions. 
It was, of course, to be expected that the urgency of increasing production would 
lead to a fairly short training programme. It was also true that it was not easy 
to deCide how comprehensive any training should be. The nature of the skills 
involved was hard to specify. At the face - where most of the new miners were 
needed - the demands on the worker were great but there were few formal or 
easily definable skills. Many of the individual Jobs involved little speCialist 
knowledge and could be imparted relatively swiftly. On the other hand 
experience and knowledge could make an enormous difference whenever, as 
frequently happened, some difficulty was reached, conditions became 
unfavourable and so on. In addition conditions between faces varied 
enormously. A newcomer could be prepared for one type of work in one set of 
conditions fairly swiftly, but the smooth running of the mine often depended on 
the colliery being able to direct men to different work or to different faces with 
different conditions. And of course, apart from production considerations, the 
danger to the new miner and to the men around him from lack of adequate 
preparation was greater than in almost any other profession. In other words, 
green labour could be sent with minimal training into the mine and be expected 
to make a contribution to production, but the potential costs of such a strategy 
in terms of productivity, health and safety were great. 
Nevertheless, despite the undoubted pressures and the diffIculty of defining the 
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appropriate training period, there were a number of signs that training would be 
taken fairly seriously. The British authorities themselves called for an 
improvement in general safety standards. One of the first acts of British 
officers in the Ruhr was to stress the need to restore the authority of the Mines' 
Inspectorate. The Oberbergamt Dortmund felt empowered to inform the local 
Bergamter that the relaxation of the Inspectorate's safety regulations during 
1 
war-time now no longer applied. The OBAD itself seemed determined to set new 
training standards. In November it sent out a directive which began with the 
demand for the resumption of proper training methods and impliCitly distanced 
itself from wartime practice: 'Der von uns aus grubensicherheitlichen Grunden 
immer wieder erhobenen Forderung, niemand im Bergbau zu beschMtigen, der 
nicht planm~ig ausgebildet worden ist, muJ3 auf allen Zechen wieder die 
2 
erforderliche Beachtung geschenkt werden'. Particularly important at the 
present time, the directive continued, was the training of adult trainees (I.e., as 
distinct from juvenile recruits) who should be trained 'nach einem festen Plan zu 
wirtschaftlicher und unfallsicherer Arbeit'. 3 
Another organisation interested in a humane and productive training and 
induction programme was the regional labour administration. The 
Westphalian Landesarbeitsamt (LAA)'s ruling on the payment procedure for new 
miners contained many clauses deSigned to protect the new miners from being 
4 thrown unprepared into production. For the first three to four weeks the 
newcomers were not to be employed on a contract (ie. piece-work) wage. This had 
a number of advantages. Above all, the newcomers would not feel under 
1 OBADA I 2004/657/47, Meeting between OBAD and representatives of the 
British Mines' Inspection Control, 3.July 1945; OBADA I 3603/649/45. OBAD to all 
Bergamter, 31.7.1945. 
2 OBADA 16300/1080/45, OBAD to all Bergdmter, 17.11.1945. 
3 Ibid. 
4 WWA F35. 492. GMSO, Circular No. 140 to all mining companies and mines. 
22.11. 1945. 
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pressure either from their own pocket or (where a group contract wage 1 was in 
operation) from their experienced colleagues to produce more than they were 
really able to in order to raise their personal or group earnings. After an initial 
period, the new miners could be employed on contract wages but were not to be 
assessed as full miners. Thus in the first month of contract wage work. for 
instance, average performance was defined as 60 percent of the performance of a 
fully skilled worker. There would thus be no group pressure on them to produce 
as much as experienced labour, while a training supplement of RM 2.50 a shift 
meant that their lower output would not put them out of pocket either. 2 
It is true that the regulations were often veIY vague. The Mines Inspectorate, for 
example, long conscious of its limited powers and its duty not to interfere with 
coal production, was well versed in the art of designing general directives which 
created the appearance of systematic and safety-conscious controls but in 
reality involved little constraint on managerial practice. The November 
3 directive itself was a typical example of this. Most of the more detailed gUide-
lines which followed the general demands at the beginning were concerned not 
with green labour at all but with the training of young apprentices, a group 
which in 1945 comprised but a tiny fraction of new labour in the mines. The 
page and a half devoted to adult trainees was vague in many respects and, where 
it did lay down standards, they tended to be fairly minimal ones. Special 
training groups ('Anlemgruppen') should be created (ie corresponding to wartime 
practice) in which the newcomers would learn all the skills pertaining to that 
1 Kameradschaftsgedtnge or Gruppengedtnge, then the most common forms of 
payment. In 1949. just over 2/3 of face workers were covered by group contract wages. 
See Hans Walther. 'Dle Entwlcklung der Gedinge 1m Jahre 1954 1m Verglelch zu den 
Jahren 1949 - 1950 1m westdeutschen Steinkohlenbergbau·. Ghickauf, 1955. 91. 9/10. 
pp.217-226, here p.221. table 10. 
2 WWA F35. 492. GMSO. Circular No. 140 to all mining companies and mines. 
22.11.1945. 
3 For this and following remarks. see OBADA I 6300/1080/45. OBAD to all 
Bergtimter. 17.11.1945. 
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group. Yet what those skills were or whether the training was to take place at a 
productive face or a special training face the directive did not say. The length of 
training was also not specified, save that it be determined by the prevailing 
needs of production. The only thing about the groups which the guide-lines did 
specify was that they should not 'normally' contain more than 8 men. In 
addition, the new miners should receive at least 16 hours theoretical instruction 
alongside the practical work. 1 
This vagueness would not have mattered if the mines had voluntarily acted in 
accordance with the spirit of the regulations, but in fact there is ample evidence 
that they did not even comply with the letter. For instance, a number of mines 
put trainees into contract wage without making allowance for their inexperience 
and without the trainee supplement. The new miners were thus from the 
beginning under pressure to produce as much as their more experienced 
2 
colleagues. Even when the letter of the law was upheld there was nothing in 
either the OBAD or the LAA rulings to prevent the mines from putting great 
pressure on the newcomers to produce more coal. In particular, the OBAD 
directive had not specified that the training ('Anlernung') should take place away 
from productive faces. What seems to have happened in many cases is that 
after an introductory period of one week, the trainees were put into productive 
faces where training considerations came a very poor second to the short-term 
3 dictates of production. Clear evidence that neither the letter nor the spirit of 
the OBAD ruling was being upheld is given by the fact that OBAD itself grew 
increasingly restive and in September 1946 wrote to the GMSO expressing grave 
1 Ibid. 
2 WWA F35, 493, GMSO, Circular No. 41 to mining companies and mines, 4.2.1947 
and attached memo. 
3 BBA 30, 31, Jahresbericht des Stemkohlenbergbaues der Gutehoffnungshatte 
1945/1946 section 'AusbUdungswesen'; BBA 30,245, GHH to BADinslaken-Oberhausen, 
17.6.1947:' OBAOA 16307/1076/45, BA Dortmund 1 to OBAD, 8.10.1945; OBADA I 
6300/27/47, 'Sammelberichte zu 16300/2607/46', no date. 
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concern at the lack of systematic training and the high accident rate. 1 
Why was this? One of the problems was that. because of the difficulties of co-
ordinating transports. the mines often received large numbers of men at one go. 
which precluded their measured introduction into production. 2 Another point 
was that wartime practice continued to influence the colliery managers. try as 
the Inspectorate might to engender a new spirit in peacetime. Though not all 
wartime experience was negative 3 and the approach to labour induction 
evidently varied considerably. there is little indication that wartime 'training' 
usually meant anything more than that the newcomers were flung into the 
production process and given the minimum information necessary to carry out 
4 the allotted tasks. Many managers continued to approach induction in this 
manner in the post-war period. The new miners were commonly regarded as 
work-shy and it was widely believed that the primary task was to 'educate' them 
to a more productive attitude by putting on as much economic. managerial and 
5 
collegial pressure as possible. 
Even this approach. inhumane and narrow-minded as it was, might not have 
been so disastrous had it not been for the fact that the conscripts were both 
unwilling to work and not susceptible to blandishments or management 
pressure. It was the combination of coercion and lack of authority that made 
1 OBADA 16307/1993/46, OBAD to GMSO. 10.9.1946; OBADA 16300/2607/46, 
OBAD to all Bergc'lmter, 2.12.1946. 
2 BBA 10. 88. MInutes of Meeting of Company Managers on 20.11.1945, 
20. 11.1945; see also WW A F26, 375. Internal Concordia memorandum of 30.11.1945 
concernIng 'Arbeitsbedingungen bergfremder Arbeiter'. 
3 The offiCially recommended strategy from 1942 onwards was to train groups of 
conscripts for one specific task. such as coal-getting. packing or shifting the conveyor 
and this if implemented conscientiously. was a reasonable approach. The OBAD itself 
drew on 'the method both in the 1945 code and even more expliCitly in its revised traIning 
regulations of 1947. See Herbert. Fremdarbetter, p.282; OBADA 16307/1993/46. OBAD, 
'Bestimmungen Ober den Einsatz bergfremder Personen'. 5.2.1947. 
4 Herbert. Fremdarbetter. p.283f. 
5 A succinct statement of this attitude can be found in a confidential paper 
prepared by the management of the ConcordIa mine in WWA F26. 375. 'EntIohnung 
bergfremder UmschOler'. 7.12.1945. 
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the post -war situation so dangerous. In the first place, the fallure to hold on to 
recruits meant that the NGCC was under ever greater pressure to achieve results. 
and consequently to sacrifice even the minimum training programme envisaged 
by the collieries. Again and again the mines were ordered to get all possible men 
1 
to the face. But even more deCisive was that the trainees' own attitude meant in 
most cases that a measured training scheme was useless. For many conscripts, 
the main priority was to get out of the mines as soon as possible. Even if they 
were nervous of fleeing the mines without permission, they wanted to avoid 
becoming qualified, fearing that this might make it harder to leave in the 
2 future. Their reluctance was manifest in the strikingly low attendance 
figures at training classes (particularly, though not only, when the instruction 
was held outside working hours). At Mont Cenis mine, for example, of 114 new 
miners called to attend classes after work in April 1946, only one appeared and 
he, as it transpired, was actually a student at a mining academy gaining some 
3 practical experience. It was a self-perpetuating cycle, in which the 
unWillingness of recruits convinced management that only toughness and 
material pressure would get them to work, whlle management's hostile attitude 
confirmed the unhappy conscripts' view that they had landed in a nightmare 
situation from which they sought to escape. 
The result was a catastrophiC rise in accidents. During the war, the worst 
accident figure had come in 1943, with 65 reported accidents per 100,000 shifts. 
For 1945 as a whole the figure lay slightly higher at 69. In the first quarter of 
1946 the figure reached 116 (excluding the disastrous accident at Grtmberg 3/4) 
and rose further in the second quarter to 138 per 100,000 shifts, or over double 
1 Eg. BBA 8, 401. Note from the directors. ref.: D /Di 1. to sections B 11/821. '8etr.: 
Einsatz UmschOler'. 25.7.1947. 
2 OBADA I 6300/348/46. BA Reckltnghausen to OBAD. 11.2.1946: OBADA I 
6305/609/46. 'Sammelberlchte': report ofBA Ltlnen. no date. 
3 OBADA 16305/609/46, 'Sammelbertchte', report of BA Castrop-Rauxel. no date. 
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the war-time record. 1 
The costs of conscriptinn: prestige 
On top of the economic and social costs, the mining programme also lost the 
British a lot of their prestige, not only because it was contradictory and 
ineffectual but also because it was so blatantly undemocratic. It appeared that 
the British regarded the new miners purely as a factor of production, as inert as 
capital equipment, without needs or inclinations. Men were coerced to the 
mines in Nazi fashion and the goal of democratisation seemed to have gone out 
of the window. Even those Germans reasonably well disposed to the British will 
have echoed Konrad Adenauer's sentiments when he said that Britain, with its 
democratic traditions, could afford to introduce the Bevan boys, but Germany 
needed a taste of freedom. 2 
The logic of coercinn 
Why had the British opted for coercion? To a certain extent the decision does 
seem to have reflected a rather utilitarian approach to German labour on the 
part of the Military Government. A Manpower Division report from September 
1945, for example, concluded on the question of compulsory directions for the 
mines that 'management interviewed were reasonable confident of success in the 
light of their war experience and in spite of the reluctant attitude of the 
recruits,. 3 It comes as something of a surprise to see how readily this and other 
reports speak of reintroducing the German 'machinery', ie the Nazi apparatus for 
I OBADA 13050/1499/46, OBAD to the Oberpn'lsldent of Westphalia, 27.8.1946. 
This Is not to suggest that the Increase In accident reporting was due solely to an 
increase in the actual number of accidents, nor to attribute the increase exclusively to 
new labour. See OBADA I 2107/630/46, 'Bertcht aber die Besprechung mit den Leitem 
der Bergclmter Werden, Essen 1', 15.3.1946. 
2 PRO FO 1005, 379, COPROD paper P(46)l8, 'Report on conversation with 
Dr.Adenauer by the Assistant Director ISC Branch', 5.12.1946. 
3 Manpower Division, CCG(BE), 'Report on Labour, Housing and Working 
Conditions', op.clt. 
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controlling labour, of compelling youngsters to work in the mines against their 
will and of benefiting from the proven ability of German mine managements to 
squeeze production out of under-nourished and poorly housed modeTIl slave-
labour. Hostility towards the Germans, on the one hand, and long immersion in 
the climate of total war, on the other, had no doubt prepared the ground for these 
measures. 
But it has already become clear that the attempt to rebuild the labour force by 
compulsion was more the result of constraint than conviction. In a moment of 
wry humour, the Oberprasident of the North Rhine Province, Robert Lehr, caught 
perfectly the dilemma of the British. Lehr had just advocated a sort of National 
Service in the mines for all young Germans as a means of solving the labour 
problem (see below) and was now defending himself against Criticism from some 
German colleagues that such a policy was undemocratic. Dr Lehr, as the 
minutes record, 'betont die Pflicht als Regierungschef, die Jugend zur 
Demokratie zu erziehen und erklart aber, da.B er abends nach Beendigung seiner 
Dienstgeschafte nicht ganz den Eindruck habe, d~ er tagsiiber ein guter 
Demokrat gewesen sei, aber er glaubt auf der anderen Seite, da.B die 
Militarregierung ebenso wenig gute Demokraten gewesen sind.' 'Dieses Bon-
Mot', note the minutes, 'wurde von englischer Seite sehr gut und humorvoll 
1 
aufgenommen' . 
The British authorities' lack of conviction was manifest in the fact that they 
were neither able nor willing to introduce the measures necessary to make the 
directions work. On the positive side Military Government was neither 
ruthless nor immoral enough to wish to recreate the Nazi state. Its goals of 
democratisation and denazification undermined attempts to mount a coercive 
1 HSTAD NW53, 272. 'Nottzen von der Konferenz 1m britischen HQ In Ltlbbecke 
am 9.5.1946', 13.5.1946. 
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labour policy. On the negative side, it did not have the legitimacy, the resources 
or the nerve to be able to enforce its decisions. Military Government's hold 
was doubly tentative: not only was its authority insecurely anchored in the 
general population, but its control over the Gennan administration was equally 
tenuous. The result was not only a failure to produce coal but also a dangerous 
and scrappy approach to new labour's integration. 
So why did the British persist with directions? The alternative would have 
been to offer the sort of incentive which would have ensured a steady supply of 
voluntary and motivated workers. Given that mining enjoyed such a clear 
priority, one would not have thought this an insuperable task. Once achieved, it 
would make the conscriptions work without too much pressure or perhaps even 
enable the British to dispense with the whole sony apparatus of coercion. Yet it 
is clear that this did not happen. The question is why. 
2: The failure to provide incentives 
Living conditions and remuneration 
CondItions, even when measured agaInst the low standards of post-war 
Germany, were generally unattractive in the Ruhr and indeed growing worse. 
1 
In March 1946 miners' rations were cut from 3,400 calOries per day to 2,864. 
According to British nutritional calculations, miners were receIving little more 
2 
than half the calOries necessary to do very heavy work. Some workers 
3 
actually found themselves taking a wage-cut by going into the mines. Small 
wonder that few recruits felt Inclined to stay. 
1 PRO FO 943, 186, (EIPS 147A), Memo, The Coal Industry in the British Zone'. 
(April 1947). 
2 Ibid. 
3 IOBEA Nachla..6 Heinrich Weeke I. 'Besprechungen mit den ArbeiteIVertretem 
der Zeche Julia und Rerkltnghausen am 21.1.1946', 21.1.1946. 
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Housing conditions were very miserable. Most of those new miners who came 
from outside the Ruhr were housed in barracks. much of it originally 
constructed for the forced labour during the war. Many of the barracks were 
little more than wooden huts. in some cases barbed wire was still around them 
1 
when the first new miners arrived. Facilities were extremely limited. A 
British survey reported of such barracks that 'the bUildings and surroundings 
are squalid. They bear the stigma of their former use and the atmosphere of the 
2 prison still remains'. In many cases there were no partitions between rooms. 
Just rows and rows of double or treble bunks. Some of the barracks were 
3 infested with lice. Another British survey of six mines. carned out in the 
autumn of 1946, gave a graphic description of conditions in one of the worst 
hostels. It was an inn, half of which was occupied by 34 miners. Light and 
ventilation were poor and a small stove was all that was available for heating. 
cooking and drying clothes. The furniture consisted of beds. lockers. two tables 
and some benches. There was no other furniture and the whole place was sordid 
in the extreme .... The beds had straw filled palliasses made of sacking. One or 
two beds had a single dirty sheet and all had either one or two ragged blankets. 
some of them torn into ribbons and crudely pieced together again with thread'. 
In common with many hostels there were practically no cooking utensils or 
crockery and any eqUipment was apt to be stolen immediately by those who 
absconded. Yet for lack of clothes, energy and money, the miners spent 
4 practically all their time in the room. 
Poor conditions were not restricted to the new miners. of course, and the lack of 
1 Social Survey Report No.5. op. cit 
2 Ibid .. p.4. 
s OBADA 13850/1805/46, sammelberichte der Bergc'lmter. September 1946: StaM 
Arbeitsamt Dortmund. 47. AAArnsberg to Pra.sident. l.AA Westfalen-Uppe. 28.6.1946. 
4 PRO FO 1005. 1738. PRO FO 1005, 1738. Intelligence DMsion CCG(BE). GPRB. 
Social Survey No.4: The Coal-miner and his family - a study tn incentJves. December 1946. 
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incentives was also progressively sapping the established workforce's 
willingness to produce. It is true that other aspects of British policy were also 
responsible for alienating the miners - the slow pace at which the British 
allowed unions to develop, for instance, and their apparent unwillingness to 
democratise control over the mining industry. 1 Another irritant was the high 
level of coal exports at below-market prices; resentment at what were seen as 
covert reparations was to prove a continuing hurdle to getting the miners to 
commit themselves to greater production.2 But by far the most important 
factor was the deterioration in the miners' standard of living, particularly the 
cut in miners' rations in March.3 The cuts undoubtedly had a physical impact 
on the miners, particularly so on married men, since they did not consume their 
full ration anyway: miners' families received only the meagre civilian rations 
(as little as 900 calories a day in some cases) so that the men often shared their 
4 food with them. Clear evidence of the physical costs of lower rations was 
5 provided by a progressive decline in miners' weight. The British had, in effect, 
not only not regenerated the workforce but actually reduced its productive 
capacity. However the biggest impact of the ration cuts was probably 
psychological. Productivity dropped sharply before the cuts had even been 
6 introduced but after they had been announced. Periodical pronouncements 
about miners' weight loss hit morale harder than the loss of weight itself. To 
the miners, the food cuts symbolised the unwillingness of the British to put 
1 Milert, 'Die verschenkte Kontrolle', passim: 
2 Ulrich Borsdorf, 'Speck oder Sozlal1s1erung. Produkt1onssteigerun~s-
kampagnen 1m Ruhrbergbau 1945 - 1947', in Hans Mommsen, Ulrich Borsdotf (ed.). GlUck 
auf Kamaradenl Die Bergarbeiter lUld thre Organisationen in Deutschland. Cologne 1979. 
p.345 - 366. esp. pp.354ff. 
3 See, ego OBADA 16305/609/46, Sammelberlchte. Report from BA 
Gelsenkirchen, April 1946. 
4 ZAA, 'Das Arbeltspotential in der britischen Zone'. op.cit.; OBADA ,I 
3874/281/48, Bergbau AG Lothrtngen, 'Gutachten aber die Kranken- und Unfallztffem . 
31.5.1948. 
5 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 1946.'. op.cit. 
6 Collins. Mtning Memories. p.34. 
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something into the industry in return for what they were demanding from it. 
Delayed response 
Initially, Military Government was slow to recognise the need for a 
concentration of resources on the Ruhr. One of the problems was that, though 
the men on the ground might already be thinking in terms of the long-term 
reconstruction of the industry, at higher levels there was no long-term 
commitment to the regeneration of the mining industry. It was characteristic 
of British economic policy towards Germany at the end of the war that the 
negative goals, the dismantling of munitions and weapons production, strict 
production limits on other industries and so forth, were well defined, but the 
positive sides of policy such as establishing which branches were to be 
1 
encouraged and how quickly they should recover remained vague. Attempts 
before the Occupation to develop a more constructive policy were hampered by 
British fears of future competition from Germany and this was particularly true 
of the coal industry. A major policy document of the time concluded that, ' .. .it 
is unthinkable that the circumstances which may preserve the German coal 
industry intact to meet a vital short-term European coal defiCiency should be 
allowed to give that industry any undue initial advantage when normal supply 
conditions again prevail. ,2 It was not then clear how long that defiCiency would 
last and consequently there was no initial willingness to spend money on the 
3 
miners. 
In addition, despite the acknowledged importance of coal, planning for even the 
short-term requirements of increasing production was strikingly inadequate. 
1 Pingel. 'Der auJhaltsame Aufschwung', passim. 
2 PRO FO 942. 178. EIPS: The German Coal Industry. Report of the Working 
Party'. (September 1944). 
3 Ibid. 
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One indication of this is that the man who was to become head of the NGCC. 
Henry Collins. was first approached only in May 1945. At that point he refused 
to take on the job. and was not approached again until July. just a couple of 
weeks before the British were due to take over control of the Ruhr mines. Once 
acceptance had been secured. there was very little briefing and the first visit to 
the Ministry of Fuel and Power came two days before he left for the Ruhr. 
Collins was able to gain an accurate picture of Ruhr conditions in advance only 
because of the coincidence that a number of former students were stationed in 
the Ruhr and while on leave in England described the situation there. 1 
Throughout 1945 and 1946. it was to be the experience of the authorities on the 
ground that there was little understanding in London of the problems in the 
Ruhr. 2 
One other understandable. though certainly not helpful. factor which initially 
hindered true appreciation of the Ruhr's needs was hostility towards the 
Germans. It was true that British occupation policy was characterised by the 
view that harsh coercive poliCies were not enforceable and jeopardised that 
minimum of consensus necessary between rulers and subjects. but it was also 
true that British policy in Germany was imbued with hostility to the German 
people. It was a major contradiction in British occupation policy that the 
victors went to Germany with democracy on their lips and anger and bitterness 
in their hearts. This hostility fomented coercive solutions to the labour 
problem and made it initially unthinkable that German workers should be 
allowed to call the tune and detennine the conditions that were to be offered to 
them. Ernest Bevin himself opposed making extra rations available with the 
1 InteIView with Henry Collins. 29.6.1984. Collins was actually Deputy Controller 
General of the NGCC but to all intents and purposes it was he who ran the organisation. 
The Controller General. Brigadier Marley. was rather the link between the NGCC and the 
Fuel and Power Division. CCG(BE). 
2 Ibid. 
Coercion and constraint 93 
argument that German miners should not be better fed than Welsh miners. 
This was the voice of anger not of reason since, as American experts pointed out. 
there was at that time neither bread nor potato rationing in the United Kingdom 
and thus no limit on the calOIY intake of the miner.! 
Lower down the British administration too there was an initial unwillingness to 
take miners' welfare very seriously. There was the feeling that the Germans 
could jolly well take what they had been dishing out and that they should put 
their shoulders to the wheel and help rebuild Europe without worrying over 
2 
much about their own comfort. Even in 1947, when attitudes had changed a 
great deal, the GMSO claimed that British authorities had forbidden it from 
ordering sheets for the hostels with the argument that English soldiers did not 
3 
receive any sheets either. 
When German organisations, particularly the unions and the labour exchanges, 
called for an improvement, the British accused them of having a double 
standard. What had been tolerable for forced labour during the war was now 
apparently intolerable for German workers. There was certainly some 
Justification for this criticism. It was true that far worse conditions had been 
tolerated in war-time. And it was also true that racist thinking sometimes lay 
behind the differential standards. For example, a fact-sheet produced for labour 
exchanges and potential recruits contained, after an acknowledgement that 
most of the accommodation for outsiders was in barrack-style building, the 
undertaking that, 'Von Seiten der Zechen.. (alles) geschieht, urn die 
Gemeinschaftsunterkunfte in einen zumutbaren und angemessenen Zustand fur 
1 WWA S22 (OMGUS). AG 45-46/103/2. J.K.Galbratth & WW.Rostow to General 
Clay. 31.5.1946. 
2 A common attitude was. as Henry Collins observed. that 'the Germans have 
made their bed. now they must bloody well sleep In It. '. Interview with Henry Collins, 
29.6.1984. 
3 HStaO NW9, 55. Minutes of meeting on 22.2.1947 In the Mannesmannhaus, 
22.2.1947 
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deutsche Arbeitskrafte zu versetzen'. 1 Clearly, the sheet was trying to allay 
anxieties that the accommodation for new miners resembled war-time 
conditions, and it was perfectly understandable that it should do so, but the 
language used revealed that the employers were operating with a mental 
distinction not as between peace and war time but between conditions 
appropriate for foreign and those for German workers. British, indeed Allied, 
impatience with this attitude was expressed forcibly in the bitter exchanges 
between British and French manpower experts visiting the Ruhr in summer 
1946 and German labour and housing officials. Allied officials wanted to know 
why accommodation was not available for recruits given that many men had 
been housed in the Ruhr during the war; by dint of angry and repeated 
questioning they forced the German representative, Dr. Rappaport, to admit that 
the Camps used during the war had, in many cases, by normal standards never 
been fit to live in. 2 
Given this climate of opinion it is not surprising that initially the British made 
no extra provision for the Ruhr miners. A major report by Manpower Division 
in September 1945, which dwelt at length on the manpower requirements of the 
Ruhr and on the need to direct labour to the mines, contained no discussion of 
3 
incentives, which suggests that they were simply not on the agenda at that time. 
However, it was not long before the Division and the NGCC realised that a 
different approach was needed. For, as well as being more aware of the reality 
on the ground, they tended to take a longer term view of their reconstruction 
task. It is, for example, noteworthy that both organisations tried from the start 
1 AZG File 'I 126 Zuweisung von ArbeitskraJten aus anderen Beztrken 1.11.45 -
31.10.56', GMSO, 'Merkblatt fOr die Anwerbungsaktlon in Holstein', no date. 
2 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 1946.', op.clt., esp. 
minutes of Working Party on Manpower, Housing and Related Subjects, 7.8.1946. 
3 Manpower Division, CCG(BE), 'Report on Labour, Housing and Working 
Conditions', op.cit. 
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to recruit apprentices to the industry. a move clearly not orientated to purely 
1 
short-term production requirements. The NGCC in particular could not fail to 
recognise that the regeneration and above all the rejuvenation of the mining 
workforce required major and long-term improvements in the status and 
relative and absolute material position of coal miners. As early as autumn 
1945, the NGCC was arguing for special incentives for miners. 2 At a meeting 
with French representatives in spring 1946. the NGCC concurred wholeheartedly 
with the French opinion that more food should be available for the miners but 
regretted that this did not lie within the competence of the coal authorities. 3 
When the Deputy Controller General was asked in February 1946 what effect a 
small ration drop would have on the miners he predicted accurately the 
disastrous consequences which then ensued. Yet his words were not heeded and 
4 the ration cuts were implemented. 
Priming the pump oj Gennan recovery 
Why. in view of the priority accorded to coal production. were the British unable 
to improve, indeed even maintain the miners' living and working conditions? 
There were, understandably enough. limits to what the British could be expected 
to offer from their own resources. The British budget was overburdened and the 
British population was in any case making increasing sacrifices to sustain 
5 
occupied Germany. 
1 OBADA 16301/1339/45. Circular from LAA Westfalen-Lippe to Labour 
Exchanges, 28.10.1945. 
2 NGCC. 'Interim Report on the General and Financial Situation of the Ruhr 
mining industry'. in Astrid FOllmer Edling. 'Die Pol1tik des Industrieverbands Bergbau 1m 
Ruhrgebiet 1945 - 1948. (Die Anstrengung urn die ErhOhung der KohlenfOrderung 1m 
Ruhrbergbau)'. (Staatsexamensarbett, BochumUniversity. 1977), pp.6-7. 
3 PRO FO 943. 183. 'Conversations with M.Partsot, Directeur des Mines, 13-15 May 
1946'. May 1946. 
4 Collins. Mining memories. p.34. 
5 John E.Farquharson, The Western Allies and the politiCS oj Jood. Agrarian 
management in postwar Germany. Leamington Spa 1985. p.93tT. 
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Yet if the British were not prepared to invest their own resources in Ruhr 
mining, they still had the option of using those of the Germans. To a certain 
extent this was done: the mining industry received sizeable subsidies from the 
1 British Zonal budget to cover operating losses. However, taking German marks 
of little value from the Zonal budget was comparatively easy. To obtain the 
resources that really mattered more serious steps were required. 
Before looking in more detail at the options open to the British, it should be 
borne in mind that foodstuffs, consumer goods, building materials and so on 
were extremely thin on the ground throughout the British Zone. Above all, food 
was becoming desperately short. Even before the influx of several million 
refugees, the area encompassed by the Zone had not been self-suffiCient in terms 
of food production and well before the cessation of hostilities it had already been 
2 
clear that the future British Zone would be dependent on outside sources of food. 
Apart from the objective limits to agricultural production within the area, 
shortages of fertiliser and eqUipment had reduced agricultural yields. 
Furthermore, the controlled prices of the wartime and post-war economies gave 
farmers little incentive to sell their goods, so that a substantial proportion of 
3 
agricultural produce never found its way into official distribution channels. 
Shortages of manufactured goods were no less acute than the shortfall in food. 
The closing stages of the war had brought production in most sectors to a virtual 
halt and coal and food shortages had prevented all but the most essential 
industries from making much of a recovery. 
One of the Zone's biggest problems was that a very considerable proportion of its 
coal was being exported. Indeed, by the end of 1947 the three western Zones had 
1 See Theo Horstmann, 'Die Angst vor dem finanziellen Kollaps. Banken und 
Kreditpolttlk in der britlschen Zone zwischen 1945 und 1948', in PetzIna and Euchner 
(eds.), Wtrtschajtspolittk. pp.215-234. 
2 Farquharson, The Western AUtes, p.28. 
3 Ibid., p.61tJ. 
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exported 25 million tons of coal, primarily to France, the Low Countries and 
1 Scandinavia. As a proportion of overall production this was not dramatically 
above pre-war peacetime levels, but in the context of post-war conditions it 
represented a very serious drain on German resources.2 
Coal exports would not have had such a negative impact if the Zone had been 
properly recompensed for them. The Germans made much play of the fact that 
coal was being exported at $10.50 a ton while the market price lay between $25-
30. Had Germany actually received the full price, it was argued, there would 
have been no difficulty in boosting calories and hence the level of coal 
3 production. This was an oversimplification which did not take into account 
the European countries' capacity to pay. They were extremely short of US 
dollars (indeed, that was one reason for the attractiveness of Ruhr as against US 
coal) and it was dollars that Germany would have to earn if it was to buy up grain 
4 
on the world market. However there was no doubt that the low price paid 
made the coal exports an almost intolerable burden for the British Zone's war-
torn economy. 
A reduction in coal exports would therefore have had an enormously benefiCial 
impact on the economy as a whole and on Ruhr coal production in particular. 
The extra coal available for internal consumption could have been channelled 
back to the miners via the production of consumer goods, for instance, or of 
mining supplies. Even more productive would have been to use the coal to 
produce fertiliser. This would rapidly have led to better food supplies for the 
Ruhr. 5 Another option would have been to produce finished goods for export, 
1 Abelshauser, Wtrtschajtsgeschtchte, p.31. 
2 Ibid. 
3 FrIedrich Jerchow, cited in Pingel, 'Der auJhaltsame Aufschwung'. p.48. 
4 WWA S22 (OMGUS). AG 45-46/103/2. Echols, AGWar to OMGUS for Clay. 
9.4.1946; Farquharson. T11e Westem Aliles, p.124. 
~ Farquharson. The Western Allies. p.122. 
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the proceeds of which could have been employed for food imports and so on. 1 
Why, then, did Britain not reduce the level of coal exports? It was not as if these 
'reparations' benefited Britain's economy; they went largely to other countries 
and in effect actually cost Britain large amounts of money. After all, if the Zone 
had been properly recompensed for its coal it could itself have afforded to pay for 
the large-scale food imports into Germany which became such a severe burden 
2 
on British finances. 
British policy can be explained almost in one word: France. In 1945 and early 
1946 the British were far from seeing the Americans as their principal allies; 
they were still pursuing the traditional policy of balance of power in Europe to 
3 limit a future German threat. Cheap exports from Germany were the means to 
cement a European alliance and France was undoubtedly the most important 
destination for these exports. Clear confirmation of the intimate relationship 
between the British export policy and their attitude towards France came in May 
1946 at a conference between British experts and the German Zonal Advisory 
Council to discuss ways of improving German coal production. The Germans 
called for a moratorium on coal exports to allow them to produce finished goods 
for export. Over lunch the Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Bishop, confided 
to Robert Lehr, Oberprasident of the North-Rhine Province that a cessation of 
exports to France would not be in the British interest, because France might 
interpret a moratorium as an unfriendly act, particularly as elections were 
4 pending there. 
1 HStaD NW 53, 272, 'Notlzen von der Konferenz 1m bIitischen HQ In LObbecke am 
9.5.1945', DOsseldorf 13.5.1948. Although here again, the Germans would have run up 
against the dollar problem. Farquharson. The Western Allies, p.124. 
2 Pingel. 'Der auJhaltsame Aufschwung', p.48. 
3 Ibid., p.48ff. 
4 HStaD NW 53,272. 'Notlzen von der Konferenz 1m bIitischen HQ in LObbecke am 
9.5.1945', DOsseldorf 13.5.1948. 
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Beyond the general European goal, the British had other more pressing reasons 
for supplying the French with cheap German coal. In the first place, there was 
American pressure. The Americans urged the British to max1m1se coal exports 
to France because they were very frightened that economic chaos there would 
1 lead to a Communist victory. In addition, the French were growing ever more 
critical of British policy in the Ruhr and challenging their ability to control the 
area. As early as November 1945, the French voiced their dissatisfaction to the 
British. 2 More worrying still for the British, the French tried to enlist the 
support of the other Allied powers. In March 1946, the French complained to 
the US State Department that they were being deprived of Ruhr coal to benefit 
3 the German steel industry. French pressure came to a head in April because in 
that month the Export directive based on the Potter-Hyndley report terminated 
4 
and a new policy would have to be formulated. General Koenig presented to the 
quadripartite Allied Control Authority in Berlin a formal complaint about the 
supplies of coal from the British Zone and at the same time demanded 
international control over the Ruhr. 5 The British feared that they might have 
to surrender control over the Ruhr to some quadripartite body and were keen to 
keep France sweet at all costs. A whole series of measures was undertaken to 
placate the French and Britain was clearly not going to Jeopardise their success 
6 by reducing cheap coal supplies to France. 
One option remained. The British could still have used German stocks of food 
1 Farquharson, The Western AUies. p.122. 
2 PRO FO 942, 182, Economic and Reparations Working Party, Agenda for 
meeting on 19 November 1945, November 1945. 
3 WWA S22 (OMGUS), AG 45-46/103/2 AGWar to OMGUS, 24.3.1946. 
4 WWA S22 (OMGUS) AG 45-46/103/2. Echols, AGWar, to Clay, Aprtll946 (exact 
date illegible), ref: W-85224: PRO FO 942, 183, Duff Cooper to Bevin, 8.4.1946. 
5 PRO FO 942, 183, Paper, 'Ruhr Coal', no date (April-May 1946). 
6 Concern at loss of control was apparent as early as November 1945. See PRO 
FO 942 182 Economics and Reparations Working Party. Agenda for meeting 19.11.1945, 
November 1945. For placatory measures see PRO FO ~2, 183. EIPS/97 /150, ~etter to Duff 
Cooper. April 1946: PRO FO 942, 500, EIPS FIle 1330, Coal: technical advisors, passim. 
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and consumer goods. or the existing scanty allocation of coal to Gennan civilian 
uses. to give the miners favoured treatment. The French continually urged the 
adoption of this policy. A rigorous transfer of the meagre Gennan resources to 
the Ruhr might well have ensured a flow of manpower to the mines. but this was 
just the type of ruthless occupation policy that the British were not prepared to 
undertake. From the start of the occupation there was a great sensitivity on the 
part of Military Government to the dangers of mass unrest that might result if 
too few resources were allowed for general consumption. In August 1945. for 
example, Montgomery had protested against the Potter-Hyndley 
recommendations that coal consumption in Germany be kept to an absolute 
minimum with the argument that 'I conSider that unless an adequate 
interpretation is placed upon the extent of civil and military 
requirements ... grave consequences to the Gennan people can be expected and a 
measure of trouble arising therefrom which would result in the necessity of 
1 increasing our military commitments.' During the following months, the 
Americans came to believe that the British were, at the cost of favouring mining 
and ancillary industries, making secret injections of coal into industry 
2 generally so as to avoid unemployment and unrest. 
As the food situation in the British Zone became increasingly critical, as morale 
and public health worsened and productivity declined, the British saw their 
freedom of manoeuvre grow ever smaller. So strong was their fear of public 
unrest that the British refused to countenance giving extra rations to the miners 
even when these were offered by other countries and would not have been at the 
expense of the normal consumer. 3 It is this anxiety that explains why the 
1 WWA S22 (OMGUS). AG 45-46/103/1. Clay to Warcad for Joint Chiefs of Staffs. 
20.8.1945. 
2 WWA S22 (OMGUS) AG 45-46/103/2. Echols. AGWAR. to Clay. Aprtl1946 (exact 
date illegible). ref: W-85224. 
3 WWA S22(OMGUS). AG 45-46/103/2. J.K.Galbraith & WW.Rostow to General 
(continued overleaf.) 
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miners suffered a ration cut in March 1946 like everyone else. When, in July, 
the British reestablished the miners' pre-March rations, they did not make the 
move public. The US suggested that the increases should be given publiCity, but 
General Robertson replied that he would do so only when he was in a position to 
1 give an all round increase in rations. The restoration remained secret and the 
impact on recruitment was therefore very limited. 
The British probably felt that the general public would react particularly 
sensitively on the issue of priority for the miners precisely because so much of 
the coal was being exported. Had the production drive been more clearly 
orientated towards German recovery it seems likely that the British would have 
been less nervous of giving the miners special status. It is true that. no matter 
what policy was being adopted towards exports, the severe food shortage in 
spring 1946 would have disposed the general populatlon against special rations 
for miners. But the problem of absolute shortages was compounded by the 
problem of legitimacy and it was above all the level of coal exports which 
ensured that this was so. 
The British thus found themselves in a desperately difficult positlon. There was 
no constituency in Germany or in Europe which was prepared to make a 
sacrifice for the miners, to prime the pump, as it were and begin a virtuous cycle 
whereby coal production fuelled other industries and economies which in turn 
would contribute to further growth in mining. The other victorious powers 
were unwilling to see a reduction in coal exports and yet at the same time were 
not prepared to provide the Zone with more food or to pay more for its coal. The 
German populatlon, for its part, would bear no further sacrifice for the sake of 
Clay, 31.5.1946: PRO FO 943, 183. Record of a conversation between Mr. Blaisdell. Mr. 
Galbraith and Mr. Mark 1\uner, 11.6.1946. 
I PRO FO 943. 183. Council of foreIgn minIsters. Conversations between British. 
French and American experts about Gennan coal. First Meeting. 4 July 1946: WWA 
S22(OMGUS), AG 45-46/103/2. Robertson to Draper. 11.7.1946. 
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an export -orientated coal production programme and the British were neither 
powerful. respected or ruthless enough to demand that sacrifice of them. When 
the Potter-Hyndley mission had made its report in June 1945 it had recognised 
the enormous sacrifices that would be necessary to reach production targets. It 
had argued that ' ... if acute unrest is to take place somewhere. as would seem 
inevitable unless coal is made available, it would surely be better for this to 
occur in Germany than elsewhere. Should it become necessary to preserve order 
by shooting this would best occur in Germany'. 1 Yet Military Government was 
not prepared to shoot. 
The pressure for change 
What could the British do? Unable and unwilling to force production out of the 
workforce, they were equally unwilling to demand the sacrifices in or outside 
Germany that would be necessary to offer the miners a viable incentive. And if 
they did plump for incentives. who should bear the sacrifice? The chOice 
between neglecting their European allies' urgent need for coal or risking a 
catastrophe in the British Zone was almost unbearable. In Germany the 
British found themselves under pressure to suspend or at least reduce coal 
exports. while at the same time the European Coal Organisation. on behalf of the 
liberated countries, continually urged the British government to reduce German 
2 
coal consumption and increase exports to European countries. 
Yet, ultimately, the British would have to make a clear chOice because their 
failure to get the coal was retarding recovery in Germany and the liberated 
1 PRO FO 942. 179. Combined Production and Resources Board: London Coal 
Committee. The coal situation in North West Europe. Report by the Potter /Hyndley 
Mission to North West Europe', June 1945. 
2 HStaD NW 53. 272, 'Notlzen von der Konferenz im britischen HQ in LObbecke am 
9.5.1945', DOsseldorf 13.5,1948. PRO FO 942, 183. Eaton Griffiths. E.C.O. to Be~comb for 
Econ Coal. Berlin - several letters. April 1946: PRO FO 943. 183. Memo, Informal 
discussions on German problems', July 1946. 
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countries alike. Coal was 'the Ufe blood of Gennan economy' and almost as 
important for Western Europe. 1 In a memorandum on measures to improve the 
coal position. the American economists J.K.Galbraith and W.W.Rostow wrote of 
the 'utter seriousness' of the British responsibility. 2 It is barely an 
exaggeration to say that the fate of European reconstruction depended on 
whether the British would be able to regenerate the labour force in the Ruhr 
mines. 
It was therefore inevitable that British policy towards the Ruhr mines would 
change. Neither politically, economically nor financially could the British 
afford to continue failing to get the coal. The only question was how quickly the 
pressure would reach a point where the British were forced to burst through the 
constraints and adopt a more consistent and successful approach. 
1 Quotation from General Balfour, Brltlsh Deputy Chief of Staff. at a conference 
on coal held in May 1946. HStaO NW 53. 272. 'Conference held at Main HQ CCG(BE) ~~ 
10 May on the subject of "Methods of Increasing the Coal Output in the Brltlsh Zone. 
official Minutes. May 1946: Abelshauser. Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland. p. 140. 
2 WWA S22(OMGUS). AG 45-46/103/2. J.K.Galbratth. WW.Rostow to Clay. 
31.5.1946. 
Chapter 3: New labour and the drive for coal. 1946-48 
1: 'Putting trust in the miner'. The emergence of an incentives 
policy 
The pressure for change 
In the first months of 1946 pressure began to build up both inside and outside 
Gernlany for a new approach to coal. One prod in this direction came in April 
1946, when senior Gernlan economic experts, with the backing of industrial and 
trade union leaders. fOrnlulated an alternative to the coercion policy. Hitherto 
the German opposition to directions had lacked clear exponents. With the 
creation of the German Economic Advisory Board/ Zentralamt fur Wirtschaft 
(ZfW) in March 1946. a platform emerged for a more forthright Gernlan 
contribution. At a conference held in Dusseldorf at the beginning of April, ZfW 
experts, trade unionists and industrialists thrashed out their recommendations. 
Recognising that the problem of labour motivation had to be solved, they called 
for rations of 3,800 calOries for underground workers. special entitlements to 
consumer goods, productivity bonuses in the form of tobacco allocations, wage 
and pension increases and a shortening of the working day for miners above 
1 ground. 
A second and for the British more disagreeable stimulus to change came in June 
1946, when the Americans refused to begin recruiting for the Ruhr in their zone. 
Both American and German officials from the US Zone were deeply disturbed by 
2 
conditions in the Ruhr. They would not countenance compulsory directions 
1 BAK ZI, 361. 'Bericht zur Kohlenfrage' & 'Gutachte,n des deutschen 
Wirtschaftsrats zur Kohlenfrage'. 10.4.1946; PRO FO 942, 183. German Economic 
Advisory Board Coal Report'. 10.4.1946. 
2 BAR Zl. 926. Minutes of meeting ofUnterausschu6 Arbeltslenkung. 11.6.19·~6°: 
WWA S22(OMGUS). OMGUS Manpower DMslon. Manpower Allocation Branch. Report on 
Inspection trip to the Ruhr coal mines, 10.6.1946. 
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and believed that under present conditions voluntary recruitment had no 
chance of success. 1 
It is not surprising. therefore. that British Military Government itself became 
increasingly convinced of the need for more incentives. The conclusions that 
the NGCC had already drawn in autumn 1945 began to spread though the 
administration. By spring 1946 most important sections in the Control 
Commission were pressing for a new direction on policy towards the miners. In 
April 1946. for example. the Food and Agriculture Division endorsed the 
suggestion that they should receive additional rations. 2 And in the Control 
Office, too, the view was making headway that at 'one stage or another we have 
to put our trust in the miner and permitting him to have the disposal of the extra 
food allowance, in view of past events, appears a sound way to start the 
3 
rehabilitation process'. 
This burgeoning consensus amongst the occupation authorities was, however, 
not enough to effect a change of policy on its own. Questions of food allocations 
and coal exports were of such Critical importance that any decision would have 
to come from the British Government. This explains the repeated and 
exasperating experience of French and American officials in Germany that 
whoever they talked to agreed to the need for incentives but did not have the 
4 
authority to implement the policy. 
What made it possible for the British Government itself eventually to adopt a 
different approach to the Ruhr mines were the progressive and interrelated 
1 OMGUS Manpower Allocation Branch, Report on InsepcUon Trip to the Ruhr 
coal mines, op.clt. 
2 PRO FO 1005, 379, COPROD P(46) 5. 
3 PRO FO 943, 183, 'German Economic AdviSOry Board Coal Report', Cover note 
from J.5impson. 25.4.1946. 
4 PRO FO 943, 183, 'Conversations with Parlsot'. op.clt.; WWA S22(OMGUS), AG 45-
46/103/2. Leo Werts to Ch1efofStaff. 2.7.1946. 
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changes in American reconstruction policy and Britain's overall international 
orientation which took place during the spring and summer of 1946. As is well 
known, the British moved towards a more open recognition of their financial 
and economic dependence on the US. 1 The results of this were threefold. Freed 
from some of their dependence on France, the British were able to give 
Germany's own need for coal a higher priority in their general economic 
strategy. A sign of their disassociation from the French was that by the autumn 
the British were refUSing to engage in formal talks on coal matters with France.2 
Secondly, the Americans' new commitment to rapid recovery, as proclaimed in 
the Byrnes speech of September 1946, brought with it the offer of more help for 
the British Zone, which would make an incentive strategy less burdensome to 
introduce. Finally, Byrnes' public statement made it easier for the Germans to 
see the coal drive as part of a general recovery programme and thus gave 
Military Government the legitimacy to favour the miners with incentives. 
A summer oj cautious initiatives 
In this changing climate, the British tentatively explored a number of possible 
strategies for solving the coal crisiS. One option was to reduce or suspend coal 
exports, an idea mooted in June by Sholto Douglas, the Commander-in-Chief of 
the British Zone.3 The Control Office and the Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster accepted the desirability of a moratorium, recognising that it would 
improve miners' morale, allow supplies and goods to be produced for the mining 
industry and in general provide a desperately needed injection into the British 
Zone's economy. In July, the British approved the formation of a quadripartite 
1 Pingel. 'Der au1haltsame Aufschwung', p.4S. 
2 F French overtures see a series of documents in PRO FO 943, 183, E 1/7/4 
106fT On ~~ntlnUing problem of coal allocation see FO 943, 183, 'Brtef on special points ariSI~g from coal experts report for use In Foreign Secretary's discussion with the 
French', october 1946. 
3 Farquharson, The Western Allies. p.121. 
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experts' committee to investigate coal production in all four zones of Germany 
but primarily in the Ruhr. At the meetings of this committee, as well as at the 
tripartite meetings with American and French representatives which preceded 
it, the British tested the waters of international opinion over the possibility of 
1 
an exports moratorium. Though the Americans involved in the talks were 
favourable, France, supported by US State Department offiCials in Washington. 
2 
was hostUe. In the end, the British government decided not to risk opprobrium 
in Washington and Paris and left the export level unchanged.3 
Another option was to concentrate existing German resources on the Ruhr. 
Control Office and Control Commission grappled with ways of faVOUring the 
4 
miners without offending the rest of the population. Though the general food 
situation was improving, they remained very nervous about how the public 
would react, particularly as intelligence reports suggested that giving miners 
5 
extra rations would have negative repercussions elsewhere. To make matters 
worse, the German authorities were giving the British contradictory signals. At 
the same time as experts from the ZfW advocated the rigorous diversion of 
manufactured goods and foodstuffs from other consumers to the miners, the 
Oberprlisldenten of North-Rhine and Westphalia stated categorically that the 
normal consumer could not be called upon to make any further sacrifices.6 The 
result was that when, in July, the miners' ration was restored to its pre-March 
1 PRO FO 943. 183. Council of Foreign Ministers. Conversations between British. 
French and American experts about German coal. FIrst Meeting 4.7.1946. 
2 Ibid. and PRO FO 943. 183. 'Informal discussions on German coal problems', 
July 1946; Farquharson. The Western Allies. p.122. 
3 PRO FO 943, 183. Mark Turner to Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. 
20.6.1946; Extract from the Conclusions of the 9th Meeting of, the Overseas 
Reconstruction Committee. 21.6.1946: '3: SUn of the German coal industry; Farquharson. 
The Western Allies. p.122. 
4 PRO FO 943. 183. Memo. 'Gelman Coal Production. Meeting at Norfolk House .. .'. 
22.6.1946. 
5 WWA S22(OMGUS). AG 45-46/103/2. Robertson to Draper. 11.7.1946. 
6 Abelshauser. Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau sett 1945. pp. 37-8; Minutes of 
'Conference held at Main HQ CCG(BE) on 10 May .. '. op.cil 
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level, the move was kept secret and indeed remained so throughout the summer. l 
By September, the British felt inclined to be bolder in their support for the Ruhr. 
The fusion of the British and American zones created a more optimistic and 
supportive climate in Germany. The food situation was much less critical. 
thanks not least to Sizeable grain imports. 2 In addition, the quadripartite 
Experts' Committee submitted its report at the end of August and the British were 
keen to be seen responding to its recommendations in the hope that support 
might be forthcoming from other powers, particularly the Americans. 3 Thus 
in September 1946, the British announced an increase in miners' rations to 
3,800 calories. In October, the face workers' ration was raised to 4000 calories 
4 
and further rises were to follow. Finally, miners' wages were increased by 20 
percent in November. 
Whilst debating whether to commit these resources to the Ruhr, the British had 
also been experimenting with yet another option: universal conscription. 
5 Attempts to obtain four-power support proved abortive, but within the British 
Zone the idea was given a boost when the Oberprasident of the N orth-Rhine 
province, Robert Lehr, suggested that all youngsters between the ages of 15 and 25 
might be made liable for a period of compulsOIY service in the mines, 'eine Art 
6 Ehrendienstpflicht', as' Lehr put it. Although the proposal was bitterly 
condemned by Lehr's opposite number in Westphalia, Rudolf Amelunxen, who 
regarded it as the beginning of a 'new militarism', the British were delighted at 
1 See chapter 2, p.1 0 1. 
2 Farquharson, The Western Allies, p.127. 
3 The British had found the Americans' atutude In the committee 'not very helpful' 
(Interview with Henry Collins, 29.6.1984). 
4 PRO FO 943, 186, Paper, The coal Industry in the BriUsh Zone', April 1947. 
5 PRO FO 1005, 776, Manpower Directorate Committee of Labour Supply and 
Manpower Allocation. Minutes of 30th and 31st Meeting, April/May 1946. 
6 'NoUzen von der Konferenz 1m brttJschen HQ in LObbecke am 9.5.1946', op.clt. 
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the possibility that conSCription might now enjoy Gennan support. 1 In June 
1946. Manpower Division began to make preparations for the scheme and in a 
secret directive to the labour exchanges ordered them to fonn a separate 'Coal 
Mining Register' of all men born in 1926, 1927 and 1928? 
Here, as in the incentives question, the British proceeded extremely cautiously. 
Trade union leaders were consulted, a fonnal request for views was made to the 
Zonal Advisory Council (ZAC), the top Gennan body in the Zone, and a major 
3 public opinion poll was carried out. Since both general public and unions 
4 proved hostile to the idea, it was never implemented, although the fact that the 
British did not allow the special coal mining register to be dissolved until May 
1947 suggests that they were keeping their options open.5 
In any case, the plan for universal conscription rapidly became redundant as the 
new incentives improved labour supply and motivation. The effect of higher 
rations on production was, in fact, pretty well instantaneous: hard coal output 
averaged 180,000t per day in September and by 8 November had risen to 
6 193,5OOt, the highest daily output since the end of the war. In March 1946.99 
percent of newcomers to the mines had been conscripted, but. by December, 85 
7 percent were volunteers. The overall number of recruits rose steadily. More 
important. observers in the Ruhr commented on the willingness to work of the 
1 Ibid. 
2 PRO FO 943, 190, Manpower DMsion. 'Labour Supply for Coal Mining', 29.6.1946: 
PRO FO 1005, 1824. Labour Supply Branch Directive 17. 19.6.1946. 
3 Parlamentsarchiv, Bonn (PA) , File 1, 203, ZAC P(46) 93: PRO FO 1005, 1738. 
Gennan Personnel Research Branch. Intelligence Division. Social Survey No.1, 'Attitudes 
of Germans to coal mining'; 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 
1946.', op.ctt. 
4 Social Survey No.1. op.cit.; PA 1. 203. 'Stellungnahme der Gewerkschaft 
IGBergbau. 15.11.1946. 
5 StaM Arbeitsamt Dortmund. 47. LAA NRW AuI3enstelle Westfalen-Ltppe. 
Circular to directors of labour exchanges, 2.5.1947. 
6 PRO FO 943. 185. Note by Coal Branch. ECOSC/P(46)45: 'Progress of coal 
production drive', November 1946. 
7 August Niehues, 'Ruhrbergbau und Arbeitsvenntttlung'. Arbettsblatt.fUr die 
britische Zone. 1947, 1. 3. pp.88-903. 
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volunteers. in marked contrast to the conscripts. 1 Almost one and a half years 
after submission of the Potter-Hyndley report. the tide had begun to turn. 
Prisoners of war 
One other minor but revealing example of the way in which the Americans' new 
commitment to recovery and Britain's closer ties to the US created greater 
freedom of manoeuvre in the coal question is provided by policy towards 
German POW's employed in foreign mines. 
Between them. France and Belgium employed some 90.000 German POW's 
2 
mining coal. If this group were returned to Germany, it was large enough to 
make a significant difference to the labour pOSition in the Ruhr. Furthermore, 
because of the Ruhr's superior geological conditions, the POW's could be expected 
3 to be twice as productive there as in France or Belgium. Yet up till summer 
1946. British approaches to the two powers over the possible return of the men 
4 
remained extremely tentative. 
By the end of the year. however, the Control Office felt more confident and in 
addition able to enlist American help. Certainly. there was still some 
nervousness about antagonising the French but. as a senior official of the 
Ministry of Power noted in January 1947. the Americans had 'screwed up their 
5 
courage' to the point where they were prepared to make official representations. 
The pressure was sufficient to galvanise first Belgium and then France into 
I WWA Kl, 803/03, Report ofHamm labour exchange for December 1946. 
2 Figures in PRO FO 943, 190, Paris to Foreign Office, 22.1.1947 - for France; 
Telegram G/339. Control Office to BerUn, 5.3.1947 - for Belgium; PRO FO 1005, 1821. 
Manpower Interim Report. 9.8.1946- for Britain. 
3 PRO FO 1005, 379. COPROD P(46) 11, 'Return of POW's from France and 
Belgium'. October 1946. 
4 Ibid. and PRO FO 943, 183, Council of Foreign Ministers. Experts' 2nd Meeting, 
July 1946. 
5 PRO FO 943, 190. J.H.Brook, Ministry of Fuel and Power to J.S1mpson. Control 
Office, 9.1.1947. 
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taking steps to release their captives. 1 
As well as the changed international climate. the incentives themselves had 
contributed to this outcome. France and Belgium agreed to release the 
conscripts in part because they recognised that the new incentives policy 
increased the chances of getting the ex-POW's to work in the Ruhr. Until the 
miners' ration and wage increases. most of the POWs had shown little desire to 
2 
work in the mines after release. an understandable fact given that 90 percent of 
those employed in the Belgian mines and possibly even more of those in France 
were not miners by profession but had gained their experience of coal mining as 
3 prisoners. As conditions in the Ruhr improved. the ex-POW's showed greater 
wlllingness to work there. so that France and Belgium lost some of their anxiety 
4 
about releasing the rest. 
Added incentives 
It is hard to say what would have happened to the flow of new labour had no 
further incentives been introduced. It is probable that the mines would have 
continued to attract workers away from other Ruhr industries. at least for a 
while. but that the rations on their own would not have been enough to draw 
large numbers from areas further afield. Since essential industries in the 
Ruhr. and hence the economy as a whole, would begin to suffer lfmining recruits 
continued to come almost exclusively from the immediate vicinity of the mines. 
5 it was vital to offer something more. 
This was one reason why the British considered introducing a coupon system to 
1 PRO FO 943. 190, Eaton Griffiths to J.H.Brook. 30.6.1947. 
2 HStaD, NW 73. 135. 13th Meeting of the Coordinating Committe. 12.6.1947. 
3 PRO FO 943. 190. Telegram G/339. Control Office to Berlin. 5.3.1947. 
4 PRO FO 943. 190. Eaton Griffiths to J.H.Brook. 30.6.1947. 
5 HStad NW53. 465. Bate. NRW Manpower Dept. to NRW Reconstruction Minister 
(WAM).24.2.1947. 
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enable the miners to obtain scarce consumer goods. In August 1946, the 
Americans had introduced such a scheme for (the admittedly small number of) 
miners in their zone and they offered the British help in supplying goods to 
1 develop a similar programme. At the beginning of November, members of 
ECOSC, the NGCC, Manpower Division and other sections of Military 
Government met to discuss the issue and outlined a provisional solution. 2 
Discussions began with the GMSO and the miners' union, the Industrieverband 
Bergbau (IVB), and in mid-November the GMSO submitted a more detailed 
3 proposal for a coupon system. In December, the head of ECOSC, Cecil Weir, 
invited the German coal working party (Arbeitsgruppe Kohle), an organisation 
founded by the new bizonal Executive Committee for Economics (Verwaltungsrat 
fur Wirtschaft), to help finalise proposals and in January the introduction of the 
Points System was announced, making headlines in almost every country in the 
western world.4 
The basic outline of the System was very simple: it consisted of special coupons 
and points with which the miners were able to buy goods otherwise virtually 
unobtainable in Germany, except on the black market. The coupons for spirits 
and tobacco were graded according to the type of job, face workers naturally 
receiving the biggest allowance. Points were in relation to the wage, although 
5 
there was a guaranteed minimum as long as a worker did not miss shifts. 
1 PRO FO 943, 185, Doc 121A. Bevin to Byrnes, 11.11.1946. 
2 DGBA. File' Gewerkschaftljches ZonensekretaI1at, Britische Zone. 1947, I'. VfW 
to Economics MinistIy, NRW and others, 25.3.1947, Appendix 3: 'Minutes of a meeting held 
at Melitta Factory on Monday 4 November 1946'. 
3 Ibid., appendix 7: Vorschlag "Punktsystem" vom 16.11.1946 . .'. 
4 OBADA 18000/294/47. 'Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe Kohle Ober die TAtigkeit seit 
Anfang Dezember 1946', DOsseldorf 14.1.1947. 
5 PRO FO 943. 185. NGCC Production Branch. Memorandum. 'Points System'. 
14.1.194 7; FOllmer-Edling. 'Die Politlk des IVB', p.33ff. 
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11l.e Points System: accident or design? 
The Points System attracted much attention abroad because it was the first time 
that a major reward for success had been offered the Gennans and because it 
appeared to be the most overt indication hitherto of Allied commitment to rapid 
Gennan recovery. Yet at least some of this attention was misplaced. As the 
previous account has made clear, the scheme was in many ways merely the 
logical extension of poliCies already tried and tested. Encouraged by the 
favourable impact of the autumn ration rises (and by the fact that the rest of the 
population had shown no violent aversion to the miners' privileges), the British 
had simply gone further down the same road. 
The one really new aspect was the degree of privilege now accorded the miner. 
Striking though this was, it represented far less of an Allied commitment than 
appeared at first sight. In the first place, the resources given the miner were 
obtained at the cost of other Gennan consumers and not of the foreign recipients 
1 
of Gennan coal. No extra coal was made available to produce the miners' 
consumer goods. They were simply withdrawn from the general civilian stocks. 
In spring 1947, 20 percent of all textiles available to the Gennans went to the 
miners, or in other words one sixtieth of the population received one fifth of the 
goods. While in April 1947 civilian rations fell to a low of 900 calOries per day 
2 in some parts of the Ruhr, the miners were receiving 3,000 calories. 
Secondly, this degree of favouritism was not really what the Allies wanted. The 
original British proposal had been to limit the miners to four times the normal 
Civilian allocation; in fact, as the above figures show, in textiles and other 
1 PRO FO 943,185, 'Miners' Points Scheme', Extract from BIB/M (47) 3, 3.3.1947; 
Farquharson, 'The Western Allies, p.189. 
2 PRO FO 943, 185. 'Miners' Points Scheme', Extract from BIB/M (47) 3,3.3.1947. 
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supplies the miners received 8-10 times the general rate. 1 What had happened 
was that the scheme subsequently worked out between GMSO, !VB and NGCC 
linked the amount of incentives not to the total volume of available supplies but 
instead to the miners' wages. The original ceiling of four times the average 
civilian allocation was thus removed. Under the new proposal the top limit to 
incentives was governed solely by the wages earned.2 The GMSO and the !VB 
hoped that a share of the extra coal produced could be used to pay for imports of 
food and consumer goods and also to provide fuel for Germany's consumer goods 
industry: thus the miners would 'pay for' their own privileges and the special 
allocations would not be at the cost of the ordinary consumer. 3 
Then, in December 1946, it became clear that other parts of Military 
Government and the Control Office were hostile to the idea of a guaranteed coal 
4 
contingent for Points System goods. In view of their foreign commitments, the 
British were not prepared to make any guarantee as to the amount of coal that 
could be made available to pay for imports nor to give a firm undertaking that 
5 
extra coal would be injected in to the German consumer goods industries. The 
scheme might well have been dropped at that point since it suited neither the 
Germans nor the British administration. The Germans were hesitant to 
endorse a programme which could end up being supplied exclusively from 
existing German stocks at the expense of other consumers, while many British 
1 The actual degree of privilege varied from commodity to commodity. In respect 
of bicycle Inner-tubes, for instance, the miners were almost 20 times better supplied than 
other Industrial groups, while their shoe supplies were only 4 times above normal. PA 2, 
558, VfW, Memorandum, 'betr.: Antell des Bergarbeiter-Punktsystems an der 
Gesamtversorgung des Vereinlgten Wlrtschaftsgebletes', 23.2.1948. 
2 VfW to Economics Ministry, NRW and others, 25.3.1947, appendix 7, op.cit. 
3 Ibid. 
4 OBADA 18000/294/47. 'Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe Kohle aber die T.Uigkeit selt 
Anfang Dezember 1946', DOsseldorf 14.1.1947. 
5 DGBA. File 'Gewerkschaft1lches Zonensekretariat. Britische Zone. 1947. 1', VfW. 
'Protokoll der Sitzung Ober die DurchfOhrung des Punktsystems am 27.1.1947'. Minden 
28.1.194 7; OBADA I 8000/ 542/47. Copy of a letter from Wlrtschaftsminlster NOlting to the 
executive of the IVB. 13.2.1947: PRO FO 943. 187. Telegram from Foreign Office. German 
Section. to Control Office. Berl1n. 25.7.1947. 
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officials regarded as dangerous and immoral such heavy favouritism as might 
well ensue. The deputy Military Governor himself considered the scheme 
1 
'opportunist'. Both sides recognised, however, that non-implementation 
might have a serious impact on production because news of the scheme had 
already been leaked to the miners. Indeed, as early as August 1946. August 
Halbfell had been suggesting to senior mining officials that a POints system 
would soon be introduced in the British Zone.2 In an attempt to counteract the 
dangerous assumption that all was settled. the NGCC temporarily forbade public 
3 discussion of the matter. This was to no avail so that it was deemed too 
dangerous to disappoint the miners' expectations after so much publicity. With 
a heavy heart, the German authorities endorsed the Points System and agreed. if 
4 
necessary, to allocate all available consumer goods to it alone. 
In other words the scheme actually came into being as the result of political 
pressures, perhaps even of a little political brinkmanship from GMSO and !VB. 
who may well have deliberately raised miners' expectations in order to put 
pressure on the authorities. It was not the result of the careful cost-benefit 
analysis of diverting so many resources to the miners. This seems to have been 
5 
a characteristic feature of the post-war controlled economy. It meant in this 
case that the scheme went into operation without any proof that the necessary 
stores were available and, over the following months, supply problems 
continually threatened to undennine the programme's credibility. 
1 PRO F0943, 185. Extract from BIB/M(47)3. 3.3.1947. Clay concurred in this 
Judgement. 
2 WWA F35, 493. Report ofa talk by I.AA President Halbfe1l in Heme. 9.8.1946. 
3 OBADA 18000/2624/46. OMSO to OBAD. 2.12.1946. 
4 DOBA File 'Oewerkschaftliches Zonensekretarlat. Brltische Zone. 1947. I', 
Report of a Meefutg of the Sonderausschuss at the VfW in Minden. 27.1.1947. 
5 See chapter 4. p.181 IT. 
New labour and the drtve for coal 116 
2: Bringing home the bacon. Labour. incentives and output 
1947 
Thming the tide 
Despite this uncertain beginning, the Points System transfonned the labour 
supply position in the mines. Small wonder, when according to the estimate of a 
top bank official in Diisseldorf, a miner's real income was equivalent to a gross 
annual salary of RM 300,000. 1 Within weeks of the critical shortage of labour 
in the collieries, other industries were complaining about labour losses to the 
2 pits. Whereas 61,988 men had been taken on in 1946, the number rose to 
87,235 in 1947. More important, these new miners did not disappear within the 
first few days. Less men left the pits in 1947 than in 1946, despite the higher 
3 intake. Even during the spring food crisis, the monthly level of recruitment 
remained above and the monthly labour losses below the average figures for the 
4 previous year. The new measures called forth not only the labour reseIVes in 
the British Zone but also thousands of young men in the Soviet Zone, many of 
5 them seeking to evade Russian registration of labour. 
6 To attain its Zonal production goal of 4oo,ooot a day by 1949, the NGCC had 
7 
calculated that 300,000 underground workers would be needed in the Ruhr. 
Workforce growth in 1947 was well in line with this manpower target. By the 
end of the year the underground workforce had increased to 240,101 compared 
1 Special Intelligence Report, 'Some German views of the political, economic and 
sociological aspects of Ruhr coal mining'. 19.6.1948. op.cit. 
Ruhr'. 
2 PRO FO 943. 185. Simpson to H.E.Collins. 4.3.1947. 
3 Ges.Verb .. StdKW. Unpublished table: 'Belegschaftswechsel. Arbeiter Untertage. 
4 Based on figures in OBADA I 8010 vols 2.3.4 & 5. OBAD Lageberlchte. 
5 OBADA 18010/2189/47. OBAD Lageberlcht for July 1947. 
6 PRO F0943. 185. F.H.Harrtson. Fuel and Power Division, The Forward planning 
of coal production and distribution', 3.3.1947: report on a meeting on 23 January in Villa 
Hagel, in OBAOA 18010/433/47, Lageberlcht for Januar 1947. 
7 'Sechs Jahre Aulknstelle Bergbau', p.23. 
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1 
with 193,069 at the end of 1946 and it would have risen even more swiftly if 
shortages of housing and other supplies had not limited the mines' capacity to 
absorb newcomers. 1948 needed to be only as good as 1947 for the 300,000 fIgure 
to be attained. This growth was probably the biggest single year's increase in 
the history of Ruhr mining, without parallel even in the explosive growth phase 
2 
at the end of the 19th century, and a sign of Just how irresistible were the twin 
sirens of extra rations and scarce consumer goods. 
The influx of new labour overcame the worst of the coal shortage. As early as 
autumn 1947, experts involved in the distribution and allocation of coal 
3 
obseIVed that output was beginning to ease coal's stranglehold on the economy. 
In a congratulatory speech to the NRW Landtag General Robertson confirmed the 
connection between labour supply and production when he noted that, "Die 
Steigerung der KohlenfOrderung 1st gro~tenteils auf einen erh6hten 
Arbeitseinsatz in den Bergwerken zuruckzufiihren". 4 
The productivity gap 
Nevertheless, the story of coal from autumn 1946 onwards is not the success 
story it seems. Undeniable though the Points System's effectiveness was at 
expanding the workforce, production and productivity lagged far behind 
expectations. The British had, not unreasonably, expected the underground 
5 
miner's efficiency to rise by 15 to 20 percent in the course of 1947. This would 
1 
mKW, vol 1. p.20 & vol 7, p.32. 
2 The 19th centuty statistics do not distinguish between the arrival of newcomers 
to the industry and movement from colliety to colliety. so it is impossible to say how many 
genuine newcomers arrived in anyone year. What is clear is that actual workforce growth 
never reached the 1947 level. Bn1ggemeier. Leben oorOrt .. pp.271-2. 277. 
3 BAK Z40,2, Deutsches Kohlenstatistisches Arnt. 'Die Kohlenwtrtschaft zu 
Beginn des Winters 1947/1948'. Essen. November 1947. 
4 'Sechs Jahre Aul3enstelle Bergbau'. p.70. 
5 There are no recorded productivity targets for the end of 1947. but British 
expectations can be established by looking at their projected workforce and production 
figures. 
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have brought shift output up to between 1.4t and 1.5t a head by the end of the 
year, a figure equivalent to around three quarters of 1938 productivity. In fact, 
average output/man/ shift. in 1947 showed virtually no improvement over the 
previous year's and was actually somewhat below the figures attained at the end 
of 1946 (see table 2)! Despite the Points System and other incentives, the 
underground workforce was operating at barely more than 60 percent of pre-war 
1 
efficiency. 
As a result, production failed to meet target. By the end of the year, the mines in 
the British Zone were supposed to be producing 300,OOOt a day, yet for the period 
October 1947 - March 1948, average daily production was only about 266,OOOt? 
in other words the increase since the end of 1946 had been little over half that 
hoped for. In the period up to the currency reform, the gap between target and 
reality widened. In spring 1948, the coal shortage became, briefly, as pressing 
as it had ever been. By June 1948, daily production had not gone much beyond 
3 285,OOOt when it should have been well on its way to 4OO,000t. 
Thus, once again, the enormous priority given to coal had not produced the 
deSired results. At first sight this is even more inexplicable than in the early 
period, for the miners had now been offered the incentives that were earlier so 
sorely lacking. On closer inspection, however, the production drive exposed 
fundamental weaknesses in the political and economic system of the occupation 
period. The characteristic deficiencies of a fixed-price economy were joined and 
exacerbated by the tensions arising from the relationship between occupying 
power and su bj ect people. In the ostensibly 'controlled' economy', resources, 
management and labour proved. as this and the following chapter will 
1 Calculated from ZdKw. 7. p.44. 
2 Calculated from the monthly averages in ZdKW. 4. p.3. Production figures for 
British Zone. 
3 Ibid. 
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demonstrate, to be largely beyond control. 
Ta:bl~ 2; W Qrkfor~~. 12rodu~1iQn ang 12rQgu~1ivity 1946-19471 
Month Workforce size avera~e daily Output/man-shift ration calories 
at end of month production {under~roundl (tl pertod rec'd 2 
(underiU"0undl (metric tons) be~innin~ 3 
(1938 = 228,813 416,300 1.970) 
1946 
October 186,421 1.227 14.10.46 3672 November 189,812 1.221 10.11 3373 December 193,069 1.231 9.12 3834 
1947 
January 198,877 198,()()() 1.234 6.1.47 3586 February 203,288 212,800 1.253 3.2 3823 
March 205,394 218,500 1.258 3.3 3645 April 207,391 204,300 1.199 31.3 3628 
May 209,461 201,100 1.176 28.4 3643 
June 212,599 203,400 1.181 26.5 3570 
July 217,940 208,900 1.192 23.6 3767 
August 223,700 220,800 1.214 21.7 3795 
September 227,577 224,800 1.229 18.8 3837 
15.9 3929 
October 232,627 229,400 1.198 13.10 3855 
November 238,267 260,700 1.212 10.11 3833 
December 240,101 244,600 1.230 8.12 3780 
.l.91B 
Jan 240,755 237,100 1.196 5.1.48 3637 
March 242,916 269,600 1.307 
June 244,916 265,800 1.307 
Maximum production or maximum e.ffictency? 
How much more could the British have achieved? One thing not in doubt is that 
their general strategy of recruiting as many men as possible was the best way to 
achieve a rapid increase in production. Equally certain was, as the Ruhr mines 
had several times been reminded in the course of the 20th Century, that the effect 
of rapid recruitment was to depress or at least retard the progress of individual 
1 Source: ZdKW 1, pp.20, 28; 4, pp.2; 7, pp.32, 44; WWA S22(OMGUS) CO HIST BR 
3/404-1/8. Telegram from Wright to Adcock. 26.2.1948. 
2 Rations for underground workers. 
3 Ration periods were exactly 28 days. They are aligned in the table with the 
month in which most of the ration period fell. 
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1 
output. The rationale of mass recruitment was that the costs to average 
individual output would be outweighed by the gains in workforce size. The 
highest production possible under the circumstances would be obtained. but at 
the cost of some inefficiency. 
Quite a lot of the inefficiency of the post-war period falls into this category of the 
unavoidable and economically Justifiable consequence of a mass recruitment 
strategy. For example, to obtain so much labour so swiftly. the selection criteria 
had to be fairly lax. At the behest of Military Government. the mines continued 
to take 'alles. was Arm und Bein hatte'. Indeed. in the course of 1946 the British 
had raised the upper age limit to 45? Clearly. the recruitment of unskilled men 
3 
over 40 was not likely to improve productivity. 
Even more important. mass recruitment could not help but lead to a fairly 
minimal training programme. For a start. there were Simply not enough 
4 
experienced men and pit deputies to provide adequate supervision or training. 
Similarly. the training faces were not big enough to absorb anything like all the 
newcomers. In any case. a recruitment strategy which maximised workforce 
size rather than productivity made sense only if the recruited labour was 
brought into production rapidly. It was no doubt in tacit recognition of this that 
the ObaD's revised training code. which came into force at the beginning of 1947. 
5 
was almost as vague as its predecessor. The Inspectorate itself was to 
1 Eg. after the first world war and again in the second half of the 1930's. See 
Tschlrbs. Tartjpolitik. p.251; Wlsotzky. Der Ruhrbergbau tm Dritten Retch. p.231fI. 
2 PRO FO 943. 185. British Monthly Report on Implementation of Agreed 
Recommendations of Part II of Coal Experts' Report. 28.10.1946; PRO 943. 183. Extract. 
ACA Economic Directorate. Minute of 49th Meeting, 23.5.1946. Annex B: Statement of the 
British member. 
3 At some point in 1947. the upper age ltmit must have been reduced to 40 again. 
since this was the figure approved by the Washington conference in the summer. 
4 Public Opinion Research Organisation (ed.). The mining trainee 1947: A social 
survey. Bielefeld 1948. p.27; OBADA 18010/2523/47. OBAD Lageberlcht for August and 
September 1947. 
5 OBADA I 6307/1993/46. OBAD. Besttmmungen aber die AusbUdung und den 
Einsatz bergfremder Personen 1m Stelnkohlenbergbau, Dortmund. 5.2.1947. 
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1 
acknowledge this in later years. In practice. therefore. the newcomers' 
induction was only marginally less rudimentary than in 1946.2 Local branches 
of the Inspectorate reported that. 'Oberstes Bestreben der Betrtebsleitungen ist es 
noch immer. die Bergfremden so rasch wie moglich e1nzusetzen. was .. noch 
immer auf Kosten einer planvollen Anlegung geschieht'. 3 
For all these reasons. the high rate of recruitment necessarily resulted in less 
than optimum individual productivity and this was perfectly acceptable. Given 
the objective value of coal to the German and wider European economies. a 
certain amount of labour inefficiency was more than Justified. Not quite so 
easy to Justify were the high human costs of the strategy. As table 3 
demonstrates. the minimal training levels resulted in an accident rate almost as 
4 disastrous as the previous year's. A high proportion of these accidents 
involved newcomers. At the Emscher-Lippe mine. for example. new miners 
made up 14 percent of the workforce but accounted for 46 percent of all 
5 
accidents. Yet so much depended on getting the coal that possibly even these 
costs could be excused. 
1 OBADAI 6307/1840/49. Memorandum. 13.8.1949. 
2 BBA 8.401. Note from the management. ref. 0/01 1. to sections Bll/B21. 'Betr. 
Einsatz Umschuler'. 25.7.1947. 
3 OBADA 16307/1941/46. BA Heme to OBAD. 28.6.1947. 
4 It should be born in mind that accident reporting was much higher than nonnal: 
all observers, including the unions. were agreed that miners were taking time off for 
accidents that under normal circumstances would not have kept them away from work. 
Ev it Is a safe assumption that there were genuinely at least twice as many Ught ac~~eS;:ts in 1947 as in 1938. In the case of more serious accidents. reporting 
behaviour had Uttle influence and the figures show an increase of 50% over 1938. 
5 BBA 35.235, Minutes of Belegschaftsversammlung, 1.6.1947: See also OBADA I 
6307/2420/48. OBAD to all BergAmter, 16.9.1948. 
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Table 3: Accidents per 100.000 shifts 1 

















Contrasting the performance of established and new labour 
The point is, however, that a lot of of the inefficiency in the 1946-'48 period does 
not fall into this category of the unavoidable consequence of mass recruitment. 
To prove this we need only contrast the output of new and experienced men. It is 
true that in Werner Abelshauser's authoritative history of economic 
reconstruction the productivity of skilled miners is shown as having risen 
substantially from 1946 to 1947 while the newcomers' output stagnated.3 The 
argument draws on OMGUS statistics which appear to indicate that the 
experienced men (Hauer) increased their output by over 10 percent from 1946 and 
attained 80 percent of 1938 0.m.s.4 Were this so, it would indicate that the 
British could not have been expected to do much better given the pace of 
recruitment. However, the terminology in the original Anglo-American 
statistics is misleading. The English language term 'hewer' was in fact being 
5 
used to denote all face workers, whether experienced or new. It was actually 
impossible, using the normal statistical returns, to distinguish between Hauer 
and other face workers. (In 1948, in order to establish how new miners 
6 
compared with experienced men, the Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung had to 
1 compiled from OBAD Lageberlchte in OBAD I BOlO, Vols 2.3 & 4. 
2 This Jump is accounted for mainly by the Grlmberg disaster. 
3 Abelshauser, Wtrtschaft in Westdeutschland, p.140-1. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See Collins. 'Progress In rebuilding the coal-mining Industry in Western 
Germany'. Transactions of the lnstitutton of Mining Engineers. 1947-B. 107. B. p.19. which 
properly refers to the same figures as face worker o.m.s. 
6 See below. p.149tf. 
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use special statistical returns. collected by a small number of individual pits). 1 
Properly interpreted. the OMGUS figures point in a quite different direction. 
TIley show that productlvtty at the face recovered much better than effictency in 
the rest of the mines. From other sources we know that new recruits were 
concentrated at the face. In the two collieries belonging to the Gute 
Hoffnungshfttte. for example. statistics show that new miners made up 42 
percent of the face workers in one case and 65.9 percent in the other but only 18.7 
percent and 40 percent respectively of the underground workforce as a whole. 
In the Hibernia mines. at the end of 1948. three quarters of all new miners were 
concentrated at the face. From the following year's statistics we can see that 
2 
about 40 percent of all face workers were newcomers and over 50 percent of 
those directly involved in coal getting itself. 3 In other words. the concentration 
of newcomers was highest at the very point which was achieving the best results 
- suggesting that their Inexperience was not the only. indeed not the major factor 
depressing productivity. 
Why was It then that a group so immensely prtvUeged as the miners could not be 
Induced to higher output? As a senior US official complained. 'Large 
proportions of raw materials [have) been diverted from the German economy to 
an exclusive set of workers. who [have) not in return deUvered the coal'. 4 The 
results achieved were so poor that some sections of Military Government 
5 
considered removing the Points System altogether. 
1 WWA FSS. 3S11. DKBL. Circular No. I 11. 7.2.1948. appendix: G.Rauer. Die 
Entwtcldung der Lelstung unter Tage und der indlvlduellen Lelstung des BergmanneB 1m 
~u in den Jabren 1946 - 1947. 
I.e .• adults who bad been in the mining lndusUy less than three years. 
S See. for GHH, BBA 30, 34, GHH mines' annual report for period 1948-1949; 
32.1509, 'BerpJInDJ8Cbe Zahlenberichte' 1948 &: 1949. table 'UmachQJerbewegunt. 
4 WWA S22(OMGUS), BICO BISEe 11/103-2/16. Minutes ofmeeUng ofWorIdng 
Party on the MtDenI' Pdnta Scheme. 21.8.1947. 
51bld. &: meeting on 11.9.1947. 
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Coal and calories 
One key problem was that. despite the incentives programme. food was 
periodically in short supply. In 1947. there were two food crises in the Ruhr. one 
in spring and another one in December. To a certain extent the miners' rations 
were directly affected. The fluctuations in calorific content. though relatively 
small. could still make considerable impact and. in addition. the figures masked 
more serious drops in the quality of the ration. In January-February 1948. for 
example. the heavy worker's ration was adequate in terms of calOries (3.875 per 
day) yet very poor in quality terms. There was no meat at all. the fat ration was 
not fully met and a good deal of the calories came in the form of cereals and 
1 
sugar. In general however. the miners' ration held up reasonably well. In flat 
contrast to this. the rations allocated to miners' families and to other Ruhr 
'civilians' (Le. those not in special labour categories) fell to absolutely 
catastrophiC depths. far below the subsistence level. The official civilian ration 
in 1947 was around 1550 calOries a day. itself insufficient to maintain body-
weight. In April 1947. the actual ration in a number of Ruhr towns averaged 970 
calOries. In May. citizens in Bochum were treated to Just 629 calories. By July 
2 
the Ruhr average was still only 1.260. 
These crises were accompanied by major reversals in the upward trend of 
production (see table 2). Until March 1947. productivity had risen rapidly but 
in April and May the trend was reversed abruptly and productivity fell well 
below the levels it had attained before the introduction of the Points System. 
Production was hit not Just by a general fall in productivity and attendance but 
also by sporadic strikes from February 1947 onwards. often led by miners' 
1 WWA S22 (OMGUS). CO HIST BR 3/404-1/7. UK/US Coal Control Group 
(UK/USCCG). Report to the Bipartite Control Office for February 1948. 
2 WWA S22 (OMGUS). CO HIST BR 3/406-1/22. NGCC. Notes on NGCC: 
Abelshauser. Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau sell 1945. p.40. 
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1 
wives. In April the Oberbergamt noted 'eine wachsende Unrohe und GereJztheit 
unter den Belegschaften,.2 Protests and strikes grew in number. culminating in 
a 24-hour protest strike on 4 April in which 300.000 miners took part.3 At the 
end of April. the NGCC reported that coal prodUction estimates had had to be 
reduced dramatically. Instead of the original prediction of 292. 193t a day by 
September, the expectation now was only 260,0001.4 It was not until August that 
daily production attained the performance of March. A renewed drop occurred 
in the December-January period. forcing a further revision of Military 
Government's estimates. 5 
It is evident from all this that the Points Scheme and the extra rations for 
miners had not solved the problem of incentives. It was a striking indication 
of the scale of the food shortages in post-war Germany, that rations in the Ruhr. 
the crucible of German recovery, should fall to such devastatingly low levels. 
Of course, the authorities could have introduced even more rigorous 
prioritisation within the Ruhr or within the British Zone than they did and 
have increased the disparity between miners' and the rest of the population. 
This might have maintained coal production at a higher level. Yet the option of 
greater inequality and particularly the introduction of special privileges for the 
Ruhr area as a whole was rejected by the Military Governors because they felt the 
limit of what was morally justifiable and politically advisable had been 
1 OHADA 18010/723/47, OHAD Lageberichte for Februar 1947 and March. 
2 OHADA 18010/1343/47. OHAD Lagebericht for April. 
3 Michael Clarke, 'Die Gewerkschaftspol1tik der KPD 1945-1951. dargestel~,t am 
Beispiel des "Industrieverbandes Bergbau/lndustriegewerkschaft Bergbau 1m 
Ruhrgebiet'. (Staatsexamensarbelt. Bochum University. 1982). p.35. 
4 PRO FO 1005, 380. COPROD P(47)23. NGCC. 'Forward estimates of coal 
production'. 29.4.1947. 
5 The December figures In table 2 may appear to be contradictory In that 
productivity rose. the workforce grew and yet dally production fell. The missing variable 
is absenteeism. Productivity Is calculated on the basiS of shifts worked and not the 
number of workers on the company's books. If absenteeism rises sharply. It Is perfectly 
possible for production to fall even though both the number of workers on the book.-; and 
shift productivity have grown. 
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reached. General Clay argued that there 'can be no justification for a greater 
ration call-up for the entire Ruhr area. Even the additional food for miners is 
causing increased resentment in other areas and labor ranks. It was not 
approved by German administration and had to be ordered by Military 
Government. We do have political objectives in Germany and such favouritism 
to Ruhr area [sic] would be most damaging .... We can not let economic palliatives 
[or specific areas destroy over-all effort and I am convinced special treatment 
1 for Ruhr area will so result.' The only concession that was made was to declare 
the Ruhr a special priority area with respect to any supplementary imports of 
food that would be made in future. a move which eventually had some impact on 
ration levels in the area. 2 
In the minds of the many anxious observers in the Ruhr. there was no doubt that 
3 the fall in the civilian ration was the primary cause of the drop in production. 
They could point to the fact that married men. who felt obUged to give an ever 
increasing portion of their extra rations to their undernourished families. were 
4 directly physically hit by the ration cuts. Yet. though the food shortages were 
undoubtedly the trigger for the deterioration in productivity. the causes were 
more complex. As in the earlier period. the cuts' psychological impact was 
probably more decisive than their direct physical implications. 
5 
was harder and longer hit than the mere calory loss would warrant. 
Prod uctivity 
1 WWA 522 (OMGU5). AG 1947/178/1-2. Telegram from Clay to Draper, 10.8.1947: 
WWA 522 (OMGU5). BICO BIECO 17/8203/12. BIECO/M(47)l3: 15th Meeting of the 
Bipartite Economic Panel (BIECO). 19.5.1947. 
2 Farquharson. The Western Allies. p.l88fT. 
3 The NGCC even produced a graph showing the correlation between the progress 
of production and the amount of food given to Ruhr civilians. See CollinS Papers. loose 
graph. copy In author's possession. 
4 Even when the full civilian ration was being met. 2 out of 5 miners were in the 
habit of taking food home from the pits. Public Opinion Research Office. Political 
Division (ed.). The Ruhr miner and hisfamily 1947, Bielefeld 1948. p.l. 
5 This was certainly the NGCC's view. See PRO FO 1005.380. COPROO P(47)22. 
NGCC Progress Report. 3.5.1947. 
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Scepticism and resignation 
Part of the background to this disappointing performance was that in the 1945-
46 period, the British had aroused considerable hostility amongst the miners. 
This affected both the way the incentive scheme worked and the miners' reaction 
to it. 
The causes of discontent in the early period have already been noted. The slow 
pace at which unions were allowed to rebuild, failure to democratise control of 
the mines and the ration cuts in March all worsened relations between the 
British and the miners. Another irritant to the miners was the high level of 
coal exports at reparations prices. The general mood of hostility or at least 
sceptiCism undoubtedly had an important effect on productivity. 
The delicacy of relations between NGCC and miners was graphically illustrated 
in September 1946. Henry Collins approached the !VB leader, August Schmidt, 
with the proposal that the miners would receive extra rations and the 
population some coal for domestic use (which until then had not been the case) if 
the miners would agree to working one Sunday a month. Such extra shifts had 
been common during the war and the proposal was quite a clever one since it 
recognised both the material and psychological causes of miners' discontent. 
Schmidt provisionally agreed, although the exact details of the incentives 
remained to be worked out. However, when the extra shifts were announced on 
24 September, the miners greeted the news with conSiderable dissatisfaction. 
The fact that the extra rations were not yet on the table and, in addition, the 
continuing high level of exports at 'reparations' prices served to dIspose the 
1 
miners against the shifts. 
This discontent was articulated and mobilised by the CommunIst element in the 
1 Borsdorf. 'Speck oder Soziallslerung'. p.355f 
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Union and works councils. led by the !VB deputy president WUly Agatz. The 
Communists were keen to take a high profile on the issue after disappointing 
municipal election results in the Ruhr. They demanded better rations for 
miners without conditions. arguing that the benefiCial effects would render 
Sunday-working unnecessary. In effect this was a call for the miners to be 
given a more privileged status at the cost of the rest of the population. As Willy 
Agatz put it: "Die 238.000 Bergarbeiter unseres Gebietes machen ein Prozent der 
gesamten Bevolkerung der britischen Zone aus. Von diesem einen Prozent 
h~gt Leben und Gedeih der ubrigen 99% der Bevolkerung der brit1schen Zone 
abo Sollte es nicht moglich sein. die 99% der Bevolkerung zu einer genugend 
starken Hllfeleistung fur die BergarbeUer heranzuziehen?". 1 They also 
reiterated their call for socialisation of the industry. a demand which enjoyed 
2 
conSiderable support amongst the men. As a result. Schmidt was outvoted and 
a delegate conference rejected the Sunday shifts. 
1 Ibid. and Clarke. 'DIe Gewerkschaftspolitlk der KPO'. p.24 
2 Christoph Kl~mann and Peter Frtedemann. Stretks und Hungermdrsche tm 
Ruh ebiet 1946 - 1948. Frankfurt 1977. p.42; this support may have been more an 
expr;sslon of general resentment than a speCific endorsement of the concept of 
socialisation. See Borsdorf. op.clt. 
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The miners' reaction in the early months of 1947 now becomes more intelligible. 
Even before the spring food crisis, the good will and commitment that the Points 
System might have earned under more favourable circumstances was 
jeopardised by problems in supplying the goods for purchase. Some goods failed 
to materialise altogether; others did not meet the miners' quality expectations. 1 
These supply problems reinforced the miner's scepticism towards the British 
recovery programme. Then came the food shortages and it is easy to imagine 
the general mood in spring 1947. Hunger protests fused with political demands, 
an amalgam skilfully mobilised by the KPD. The socialisation movement 
reached its apogee. 2 
Hostility towards the authorities was probably strengthened by the miners' 
3 
acute awareness that they were regarded with envy by the rest of the population. 
One miner later recalled his experiences of being in hospital in 1947: 4 
Wir lagen mit sechzehn Mann auf der Bude, und nur wir zwei, drei 
Bergleute dort bekamen mittags ein Stuck Fleisch oder einen 
Huhnerbollen. Die anderen mu,Bten sich mit Kartoffeln und etwas 
Gemuse begnugen. Fleisch gab es fur sie nicht. Da wurde ein 
Unterschied gemacht. Klar, d~ auf der Bude ein ziemlicher H~ war. 
Wir Kumpels sind manchmal verdammt schrag angeguckt worden. 
The combination of being the butt of so much anger and at the same time not 
getting what they felt had been promised was difficult for the miners to bear. 
5 This undoubtedly contributed to the psychological impact of the food crisis. 
The absence of authortty 
This description of the miners' mood is a necessary but not a sufficient 
1 Borsdorf, 'Speck oder Sozialisierung', p.354fI. 
2 Clarke, 'Die Gewerkschaftspolltlk der KPD', p.35fI. 
3 One survey of miner's attitudes conducted later in 1947 concluded that the 
'feelings of the miner regarding incentives are mixed. He welcomes the extras which they 
bring but is worried by the belief that these are at the expense of the rest of the 
community.' The Ruhr miner and his family 1947', p.3. 
4 Hochlannarker Lesebuch. p.204. 
5 See OBADA 18010/2189/47, Lageberlcht for July 1947. 
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explanation for the productivity problems in 1947. Certainly the miners were 
disappointed with the goods they received. Nevertheless, Points System goods, 
particularly the Cigarettes and spirits with their enormous black market value. 
were still well worth working for. What remains to be established is why it was 
that they did not stimulate higher output. 
Part of the explanation lies in inherent features of the Points System itself and 
to understand these, it is necessary to return to 1946, to the point at which the 
scheme was being designed. After the debacle over the Sunday shifts it was 
evident to the British authorities that there was still a credibility gap between 
themselves and the miners. The miners had shown they were not prepared to 
commit themselves for uncertain future rewards. Any future scheme would 
have to be to ensure that enough extra supplies were 'up front' to win support. In 
addition the whole incentives question had now become very politicised. Any 
future scheme would have to be introduced cautiously and full union support 
would need to be secured in advance. Conscious of their own limited authority 
and of the continued weakness of German management, the British authorities 
were now more nervous than ever of pushing the miners too hard and risking a 
1 
negative reaction which might actually bring production down further. 
Thus when they came to discuss the Points System, the NGCC was very 
concerned to enlist the full support of all sections of the union. The German 
economic administration, too, regarded union endorsement and, in particular, 
2 
support from the union left wing as the absolute pre-condition for success. As 
I British anxiety on this score perSisted until 1948. See the remark of Harrison. 
F&P.Dlv. CCG(BE) concerning the creation of the DKBL, In WWA S22 (OMGUS), CO HI ST. 
Sr. 3/404-1/8, Memo, 'Re: German Coal Production. Summary Notes of Conference 
13.10.1947'. Caution was essential, Harrison warned, otherwise the Allies might 'find 
themselves back on the 1923 coal level' . 
2 When, a few months later, Deissmann suggested that the miners might be 
invited to work supplementary shifts In order to generate enough coal for a miners' 
housing programme, he wrote that It was essential to involve the left wing of the IVB. 
'ohne dessen Zustimmung ein solches Untemehmen keine Ausslcht auf Erfolg hat'. 
HSTAD NW73. 458, VfW, Arbeitsgruppe KoWe, to Reconstruction Minister Paul. 26.4.1947. 
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a result. the !VB was able to extract a number of important concessions from the 
British. which had a general effect of weakening the link between incentives and 
output and putting goods on the table before any great increases in production 
1 had been achieved. The Americans were very critical of the scheme for this 
2 
reason. General Clay himself declared with some exaggeration that the 
'incentive goes to the miner just because he is there. If he shouldn't get the 
incentives until he got up to 1.4t or 1.5t he would have been there a long time 
ago,.3 
The provisions which most exemplified this tendency were. first. the inclusion 
in the scheme of virtually all wage-earners in the mines. including workers 
above ground and white collar employees. and. secondly. the decision to give 
those workers earning fixed hourly wages a set number of pOints according to 
their position on the wage scale. In other words. workers on hourly rates would 
always receive the same number of points no matter how hard they worked or 
how well their pit produced; there was no output-related component in the 
number of pOints they received. Together. these two provisions meant that a 
significant proportion of the Points Goods was being dispensed simply as a 
reward for good attendance. Other provisions exhibited a similar generosity. 
Illness and aCCidents. for example. were accorded fairly generous treatment. In 
the case of light accidents. it is true. workers received no pOints for the shifts in 
which they were unable to work. But they continued to receive the coupon for 
Schnapps and Lebens- und GenL(/3mittel and. if they missed only a few shifts. 
they would still have enough pOints to redeem the coupons. For more serious 
accidents there was in any case a more generous ruling. In the case of illness. 
1 FOllmer-Edling. 'Die PoUlik des IVB'. p.41ff. 
2 WWA S22(OMGUS). BICO BISEC 11 / 1 03-2/16. Minutes of meeting of Working 
Party on the Miners' Point Scheme, 21.8.1947. 
3 WWA S22(OMGUS), BICO BISEC 11/104-1/38. Verbatim Draft of Meeting of 
General Clay with BICO staff. 14.5.1948. 
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works council and management were to decide what the treatment should be on 
1 
the merits of each case. Since the works council continued to exercise a great 
deal of authority in the mines while management remained hesitant about 
reasserting itself. the outcome was likely to be on the generous side. 
2 As far as contract workers were concerned. the POints System was more output 
related. The number of points earned increased with the wage and the wage in 
turn was related to output. so that there was an incentive to put in more effort. It 
is true that the Union did manage to ensure that there was an upper limit to the 
amount of points that could be earned. thus limiting the pressure on the workers 
and the possibly divisive effects of the scheme. Furthermore. a guaranteed 
minimum of pOints plus the coupons for cigarettes and Schnapps were 
obtainable as long as the miner worked his shifts. no matter what the output. 3 
Yet the contract workers' earnings tended to remain well above the guaranteed 
minJmum wage - and thus their pOints earnings well above the minimum pOints 
allocation - indicating that they were not relying on the guaranteed wage and 
4 point allocation. Conversely. average earnings were well below the point at 
which maximum pOints would have been earned. The miners could have 
produced a lot more than they did before reaching the point that the scheme 
5 deterred them from working any harder. The upward progress of productivity 
1 DGHA. File' Gewerkschaftljches Zonensek.retartat, Britlsche Zone. 1947, 1', VfVV 
to Economics M1nishy. NRW and others. 25.3.1947. Appendix 8: HQ NGCC Coal Mining 
Supplies Dept, 'Das Punktsystem'. 
2 Contract wages (Gedtngelohn) are the mining equivalent of piece rates. See 
below. p.133ff. for details. 
3 There was no clause in the Points System specifically to this effect. but it was 
the logical consequence of the minimum wage clause in the wage regulations. 
4 ZdKW. 23. p.63. The table shows that average Hauer earnings in 1947 were well 
above the guaranteed minimum. Unfortunately. a similar comparison for all contract 
workers (and not just the experienced Hauer) can not be made because the other contract 
workers were entitled to different wage rates according to their length of worldng in the 
mines. 
5 Miners received ten points for every mark earned. Their average shift wage in 
the previous month was taken as the gUide. Since the experienced men's average shift 
wages hovered around the 11 Mark level. average points earnings were around 110. The 
maximum earnings were 150 points. See ZdKW. 23. p.63 and PORO (ed.). The Ruhr miner 
and his family 1947. p.g. 
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in February and March 1947 testified to the miners' willingness to increase shift 
earnings, as the Oberbergamt obsetved in March. 1 The points scheme therefore 
was capable of stimulating higher productivity if conditions were favourable. 
The guaranteed minimum pOints allocation and the supply of cigarettes and 
Schnapps that could be bought with it did reduce the stimulus to higher output, 
however, when it became apparent that nothing could be obtained with the extra 
points. In April, the Oberbergamt noted that not only was there a widespread 
fear that the entire system of food rationing was about to collapse but in 
addition textiles and shoes were almost impossible to obtain. 2 It was only then, 
in the atmosphere of resentment and mistrust engendered by the shortages, that 
3 the Scheme became 'mehr und mehr eine Anwesenbeitspramie'. The problem 
lay therefore in a combination of factors: the problems of supply, the less than 
stringent terms of the incentive scheme and the existence of a black market 
which made it hard to maintain any rigorous link between incentives and 
output. 
Just as important in limiting the pressure on the men to increase productivity 
was the pattern of wage negotiations, for on the outcome of the negotiations 
hung not only the cash earned but also the number of points. But first some 
explanation should be given of the wage system prevailing in the mines. 
4 Some 60 percent of underground miners were contract workers whose wage. 
like piece-workers in other industries, depended on their actual output rather 
than on a fixed hourly rate. In most German industries, piece-work rates were 
negotiated for the whole industry or for a whole region and remained in force 
1 OBADA 18010/1021/47. OBAD LagebeI1cht for March 1947. 
2 OBADA 18010/1343/47. OHAD LagebeI1cht for April 1947. 
3 OBADA 18010/1902/47. OBAD LagebeI1cht for June 1947. 
4 H.H.Blschoff, 'Arbelterzahl und FOrderanstleg'. GlIlckauj. 1951. 87, 23/24. 
pp.563-567. here p.566. 
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until the next round of pay negotiations. They were (and are) rarely the subject 
of shop-floor bargaining. This is because the job specification could be 
standardised and defined in a national or regional contract. In mining on the 
other hand, each face is unique and the conditions in each face constantly in 
flux. Standardised regional piece-work rates1 were impossible. All that the 
regional pay settlements did was to establish the wage which the miner. at 
normal effort, could be expected to reach (Hauerdurchschnittslohn). It was 
then up to the monthly (sometimes less frequent) contract negotiations in each 
face to establish how much coal the miners could be expected to mine. how many 
props to recover or how many cubic metres of packing were to be carried out in 
order to reach this standard wage. These negotiations, which took place 
between the pit deputy (Steiger) and a representative of the face workers 
(Ortsdltester). therefore involved difficult judgements as to the severity of 
conditions. In reality they were a test of the Steiger's authority against the 
resolution of the men, a conflict in which a whole range of factors such as the 
demand for coal, the labour market, the degree of unionisation. the nature of the 
personalities involved and so on could influence the outcome. 
Thus, more than in any other industry, wages in the mining industry were a test 
of authority and power, a continuous battle between management and men. 
Moreover, in the post-war period, the degree to which shifts in power could 
influence the outcome of the negotiations or. put another way, the openness of 
interpretation as to what output could be expected under the given conditions 
was greater than ever. This was because there was general agreement that 
'normal' output, by pre-war standards ('FTiedensleistung') , was not a realistic 
goal. Undernourishment, shortage of supplies and other factors meant that, 
with the best will in the world, the productivity of 1938 was unlikely to be 
1 Pay settlements did. of course. define rates for miners on shift wages. 
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attained. In September 1945. the NGCC formally laid down that. though the 
standard of 1938 was the ultimate objective. at present '80 percent of this 
estimated output per man/shift will be taken as the normal.'l At the same time. 
the NGCC acknowledged that there would be cases where even 80 percent of pre-
war output could not realistically be anticipated and a procedure for vetting such 
special cases was established. In other words. the contract bargaining now had 
to determine not one but two intangibles - the ease of working at the face and the 
degree to which general living and working conditions allowed normal working. 
The miners were in a good pOSition to exploit this situation because 
management continued to feel insecure. Despite repeated attempts to halt it. 
denazification dragged on. What was probably so unsettling for the offiCials 
was that each time it appeared that the process had come to an end, some new 
programme began. The first arrests had come soon after the capitulation when 
2 the Americans made 61 arrests and 96 removals from the industry. Then in 
October 1945 a new drive began and by the end of January 1946. over 1.000 
3 
offiCials had been dismissed. As was noted in the previous chapter. 
representations by Collins led to the decision that there should be no further 
4 dismissals of mining officials. Yet. in July. the programme was resumed with 
the creation of a new denazification committee. The committee eventually 
considered some 336 cases. winding up its work in October 1946. At this point 
it really did seem as if denazification was over in the industry but in 1947 a 
general 'categorisation' of all suspected NaziS was carried out. thus raising the 
issue once more. As long as denazification was in the air. deputies could not be 
1 AZG, Ftle'I 1 13. Gedinge Regelung. 1.1.45-31.12.1945'. Directive from ADMG 
Production. Nr.5 Ruhr Coal District. NGCC to Mining Companies, 29.9.1945. 
2 PRO FO 1005. 379, COPROD/P(46) 12, 'DenazUlcation of the Coal Industry', 
5.10.1946. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. and Collfns, Mining memories, p.42tT, 
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expected to be firm disciplinarians. A secret report by the Hibernia 
management noted that 'Bei den Angestellten ist es bekannt, daJ3 ein gutes 
Zeugnis des zusHindigen Betriebsrates vor den Entnazifierungsausschiissen 
besonders hoch gewertet wird.'1 An American investigation at the beginning of 
1948 found that managers were still haunted by the threat or the perceived 
threat of denazification. 2 
The uncertain ownership situation and the threat of socialisation was another 
factor that continued to trouble management. Even after a five year 
moratorium on SOCialisation was introduced at American insistence in the 
summer of 1947, the managers' position remained uncertain. Most regarded 
themselves as trustees for their former owners, yet in matters such as 
dismissing or disciplining lax deputies and foremen they lacked 'the protection 
of boards of directors' and had 'all the pressure in the world from below' not to 
3 take a tough line, as a senior figure in the industry remarked. The same source 
commented that 'to secure the measure of discipline which is actually 
prevailing, managers are depending on trade unions and would never take a 
4 
serious stand against them.' There was certainly a fair measure of 
exaggeration in this, particularly as the comment came in summer 1948 when 
the balance of power was already shifting conSiderably in favour of the 
employers. But by and large the period up to at least the spring of that year was 
characterised by very uncertain management in the mines. 
Part of the problem here was that, as before. Military Government was reluctant 
to give management full backing. Apart from their continued sensitivity 
1 BBA 32, 882, Hibernia, Memo, 'Ernahrungsverhaltnisse', wtth additional heading 
in pencil: 'Geheim. Bericht an Mr.Hughes 2RCD. 23.5.1947'. 
2 Special Intelligence Report, 'Some Gennan views of the political, economic and 
sociological aspects of Ruhr coal mining', 19.6.1948. op.cit. 
3 Interview with Bergassessor Wimmelmann in Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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towards labour, British offiCials recognised that management, for reasons that 
have been touched on in the last chapter and will be explored in more detail 
below. could not be relied upon to commit itself fully to the coal drive. This 
probably explains why it was that managers were still forbidden from 
dismissing men until labour exchange approval had been obtained. The danger 
was that management would otherwise concentrate on improving productivity 
to the detriment of maximising output. British policy was therefore 
understandable but its consequence was to limit further management's capacity 
to control labour. 
The continuing fragility of authority had direct and important implications for 
the wage negotiations. 'Bei der Vereinbarung der Gedinge haben die 
1 Aufsichtspersonen .. meist keinen leichten Stand', noted the Oberbergamt. The 
introduction of the Points System served only to intensify the miners' interest 
in a favourable contract, since, as already noted, the number of pOints received 
was determined by the cash earnings and thus both money and pOints were 
dependent on the negotiations' outcome. The Steiger found themselves 
continually confronted with the demand for more lenient contract rates, often 
accompanied by the argument that the food shortages and the ill-health of the 
2 
men prevented any greater output. In general the Steiger - and behind them 
senior management - put up only limited resistance to these demands. 3 
In sum, it was not food shortages alone but instead a crisis of legitimacy and 
authOrity, exposed and exacerbated by food and other supply shortages, that was 
the real cause of low productivity. 
1 OBADA 18010/433/47, Lageberlcht for Janucuy 1947. 
2 OBADA 18010/1021/47. Lageberlcht for March 1947. 
3 See the comments of the vew. cited in Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau sett 
1945. pAl. 
New labour and the drlve for coal 138 
Tinkering with the system 
In the summer of 1947 the British and particularly the Americans made 
considerable efforts to increase the pressures and incentives to extra production. 
Within the organs of the Bipartite Control Office (BICO) the Americans worked 
with their British counterparts to revise the incentives schemes. 1 The Points 
System was tightened up in a number of ways and the conditions for accidents 
2 
and sickness made less generous. A supplementary three phase programme of 
incentives was introduced. In Phase 1, mines were given a four week production 
target which, if met over the period specified, entitled the miners to so-called '10-
in-1' or 'C.A.R.E' Packets of luxury goods, foodstuffs with a total of 40,000 
calories, textiles, childrens' toys and other articles.3 There were three such 
Care Packet actions. The new philosophy manifested itself not only in the 
direct linking of the incentives to a specific production target but also in the fact 
4 that, in the first action, only underground workers were to receive the Packet. 
'Phase III' which began in JanuaIY, was also linked to output and provided the 
miners with a variety of imported food and consumer goods. The miner 
received a certain number of coupons or Import-Kaufmarken on the basis of 
5 individual performance and that of the mine. The intervening Phase II, on 
the other hand, had no such productivity link and was designed simply to 
protect the miner from fluctuations in the food supply in the period between the 
1 FOllmer-Edling, 'Die PoUlik des IVB', p.68fT. 
2 OBADA 18010/2523/47, OBAD Lageberlcht for August and September 1947; the 
effect of the harsher treatment for sickness was somewhat neutralised by a dirctive from 
the Land Office for nutrition in November 1947 which reinstated the practice of giving 
sick miners full supplementary rations for the first two weeks of the illness. See OBADA 
18874/63/48, BA Bottrop to OBAD, 5.1.1948, annex: Rheinisches Stahlwerk Abt. Arenberg 
to Ruhrknappschaft, Bochum 30.12.1947. 
3 WWA S22(OMGUS), CO HIST BR 3/404-1/8, Bipartite Board Memo, BISEC M(47) 
25, 'Incentive Scheme for Coal Miners" 27.8.1947. 
4 FOllmer-Edling, 'Die Pol1tlk des IVB', p.74. 
5 WWA S22(OMGUS), CO HIST BR 3/404-1/8, Bipartite Board Memo, BISEC M(47) 
25, 'Incentive Scheme for Coal Miners', 27.8.1947. 
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first and second care packets. 1 
These additions made some contribution to productMty but the weakness of the 
Care Packet actions was that they produced a great deal of effort in the target 
month itself and a relapse as soon as the Packet ceased to be in operation. 2 In 
addition, it proved not to be possible to protect the miners or their families from 
the renewed food shortages at the end of the year. 3 Moreover, none of these 
measures filled the 'authority vacuum'. The revised Points System regulations 
contained the clause that contracts should be periodically reviewed to ensure, 
'daJ3 sie einer normalen Leistung entsprechen,.4 Yet this instruction, 
introduced in September 1947, could have little impact until the mining 
offiCials believed their situation to be more secure. 
Voting with their feet 
What has become evident is that it was not just new labour that was responsible 
for the disappointing results. At the same time as the established workforce was 
being regenerated with new labour, it was also degenerating. It was degenerating 
in a physical sense, as long years of poor diet took their toll, and in a 
psychological sense, as morale deteriorated and the normal structure of 
authority fell apart. This raises the question of whether there was a specific 
new labour problem at all. Of course, newcomers were less experienced and 
therefore less productive than established men. The interesting question is 
whether, once such unavoidable effects of inexperience have been discounted, it 
proved any harder or easier to harness the newcomers' productive potential than 
1 Ibid.: OBADA 18010/2523/47, OBAD Lagebericht for August and September 
1947. 
2 See, for instance, WWA 522 (OMGU5) BICO BI5EC 11/104-2/3, UK/USCCG 
paper, 'Review of hard coal production in the Ruhr', 10.6.1948. 
3 WWA 522 (OMGU5) CO HIST BR 3/404-1/8, COCOM M(48) 1. Minutes of 2nd 
meeting of COCOM, 20.1. 1948 and see also table 2 above. 
4 Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945, p.4l. 
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that of their experienced colleagues. 
Though the situation was much better in 1947 than in the previous year. it 
continued to be very difficult to hold on to new labour. Many newcomers 
departed after working only a few shifts. The mine Prosper I/Il. for instance. 
reported at the beginning of July 1947 that. of 75 men recruited in mid-June. 
1 
some 27 had already left. Over 30 percent of all new miners hired in the first 
half of 1947 by the GBAG's Gruppe Hamborn disappeared within a few weeks of 
being laid on. Conditions were considerably better in the second half of the 
year and the proportion of early departures had fallen to 6 percent. 
Nevertheless, by the end of December 1947 about one third of new miners hired 
2 by the Group since July had already left. In 1947 as a whole. the Ruhr mines 
hired 87,235 men and lost 42,346 of which 3/4 were voluntary losses. 3 
Within the group of new miners. it was those who came from outside the Ruhr 
who were most likely to quit. Workers from the Ruhr made up little over 50 
percent of all new miners laid on between September 1945 and August 1947 but 
4 
almost two thirds of those still there at the end of that period. According to 
the Gruppe Hamborn's figures. outsiders were 1 1/2 - 2 times as likely to leave as 
other new miners. 5 
Some of this wastage would have taken place under any circumstances. 
Working conditions in the mines have always been of a nature to deter outsiders. 
1 WWA F35. 493, 'Erfahrungsbertcht der Zeche Prosper 1/11. BetrtebsabteUung 1', 
July 1947. 
2 WWA F35, 494. copy of report from Abteilung U (GBAG Gruppe Hamborn) to 
Vorstand. 'betrtfft.: Erfahrungsbericht fiber Neubergleute', 14.7.1948. 
3 UnpubUshed figures of the Ges.Verb. StdKW, tables 'Belegschaftswechsel-
Arbeiter unter Tage. Ruhr' & 'AufteUung des Abganges nach GrOnden - Arbeiter unter 
Tage. Ruhr'. 
4 WWA F35, 494. GMSO, Circular Nr. 340, 16.6.1947. annex: 'Ruhrbezlrk. A: 
Zeitraum September 1945 bis August 1947 elnschlie.l3l1ch'. 
5 Abtellung U (Gruppe Hamborn) report. 14.7.1948. op.cit. Outsiders were 
defined as all miners coming to the mines via the Reception camp in Bochum-HUtrop. 
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particularly men with very different standards and working experiences behind 
them. On top of this perennial mining problem, the high number of leavers was 
yet more evidence of the way supply shortages prevented the miners, despite the 
priority they were given, from obtaining more than a very basic standard of 
living. A detailed American survey of conditions in the Ruhr observed that 
'since top priorities are given to the miners for repairing or building houses, it is 
widely assumed that they all live quite comfortably. Prospective miners who 
came from other parts of Germany to join this "privileged class" soon realise 
that, although miners are given preferential treatment. the situation in the Ruhr 
is very tight as far as food, clothing and housing is concerned'. 1 
Hostels remained in many cases very miserable places. Even in 1947, some 
were still surrounded by barbed wire and concrete pillarboxes, 'a grim reminder' 
2 
of their former function. In one of the worst camps visited by a British survey 
3 team, the sixty occupants had to share three stoves. A 'frying pan could be 
precariously balanced on one, leaving little or no room for additional pots and 
pans. The confusion and frustration of 60 independent cooks attempting to 
operate at the same time might well be imagined', noted the survey laconically. 
4 In addition the room stank because of faulty plumbing. In none of the camps 
5 
and hostels visited by the survey team were there any sheets on the beds. Social 
facilities were extremely limited. The common rooms contained neither games, 
6 
nor newspapers, nor books and sometimes no radio. Even where they tried, the 
collieries could not obtain simple pieces of eqUipment such as footballs and 
1 Special Intel11gence Report, 'Some German views of the political, economic and 
sociological aspects of Ruhr coal production', op.cit. 
2 PORO (ed.), The mining trainee 1947, p.18 and on conditions in camps generally 
see also OBADA 18010/183/48, OBAD Lageberlcht for December 1947. 
3 See the introduction, p.24, fn.l. 
4 PORO (ed.), Themtning trainee 1947, p.18. 
5 Ibid., p.20. 
6 Ibid and OBAD Lageberlcht for December 1947, op.cit. 
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1 
table-tennis bats. Boredom and social isolation often engendered drunkenness 
and rowdiness in the hostels, which in turn deterred many. 
Furthermore, the narrow scope for improvement which the general shortages 
allowed was often not properly exploited. That vicious circle of management 
neglect and recruits' behaviour that has already been observed in the early 
period continued to paralyse attempts to create a more pleasant environment. 
In many camps, for instance, there was a great deal of theft and this discouraged 
the mines from investing money in improving facilities. 2 It also deterred many 
new miners from remaining. Another area where management was 
discouraged from taking initiatives was that of cash or credit advances. Many 
new miners faced the problem that they arrived at the mines with very little 
money, then had to wait a week or ten days for their first wage packet and then 
found that repayments on their work clothes in conjunction with other charges 
were such that they had too little money left. This is one important reason why 
wastage in the first few weeks was so high. Yet both management and the NGCC 
were cautious about giving advances because of frequent experiences of men 
3 
absconding with the money. Similarly, men who had been ill might find 
themselves returning to work with a crippling burden of hostel charges to pay 
and, in many cases, the mines do not seem to have responded in a very 
sympathetic manner. Again, the mines were discouraged from taking a more 
• 
generous line by the feeling that a number of new miners were exploiting the 
system and using Sickness notes as a means of taking time off. Even where 
management could easily have made small improvements, their attitude 
towards the new recruits was often so negative or passive that nothing was done. 
1 BBA 35,36. Emscher Lippe mine to RCD4, 26.6.1946. 
2 See for instance BBA 30, 267, Memorandum from the GHH Mines, dept. 'Einsatz 
ortsfremder Arbeltskn'lfte', Oberhausen 9.9.1946. 
3 See for example BBA 10. 88, letter from Walker, 3 RCD, to Mine Friedrich der 
Grosse, 'betr.: Fh1chtlge Bergleute', 22.1.1947: HStaD NW42. 912, C.H.Hudson, '8esuch der 
GutehofTnungshatte, 12-19.12.1948', 
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Again and again British obselVers were to note instances where a small amount 
of concern and imagination could have transformed the situation. 1 
New labour and the autlwrity vacuum 
How productive were those new miners who stayed in the mines? Employers 
and Mines Inspectorate knew an answer to this. According to them, the 
disproportion between Stammbelegschajt and new miner output was bigger even 
than the understandable difference in skill level would lead one to expect. In 
June 1947, for example. the OBAD reported that the behaviour of the established 
workforce remained generally disciplined and orderly but that the newcomers 
had in many cases lost ~ede Empfindung fur Einordnung, Recht und Moral'? In 
the beginning of 1948. the DKBL Circulated the mines with the results of a sUlVey 
which suggested that if it had not been for conSiderable efforts on the part of the 
3 
skilled men, output would have fallen far more sharply than was the case. 
Some of this was more the result of prejudice than real obselVation. Whatever 
differences there were between the newcomers and established men, we know 
they can not have been as dramatic as the DKBL report suggested. After all, it 
has already been seen that face output, where the newcomers were concentrated, 
recovered better than productivity elsewhere in the mine. 
Nevertheless. it does seem to have been particularly difficult to get a 
conSiderable proportion of the new miners to commit their energies to 
production. Newcomers seem to have been more likely than their skilled 
counterparts to exploit the generous clauses in the incentive schemes. Many 
1 Eg. PORO (ed.), 
The mining trainee 1947, p.19ff: WWA S22 (OMGUS) BICO BISEC 11/104-2/2, Coalco 
report to BICO, October 1948: HStaD NW42, 912, C.H.Hudson, 'Besuch der 
2 OBADA 18010/1902/47, OBAD Lageberlcht. June 1947. 
3 WWA 1"35,3511. DKBL, Circular No. I 11. 7.2.1948, appendJx: Gerhard Rauer. 'Die 
Entwtcklung der Letstung unter Tage und der tndiv1duellen Letstung des Bergmannes 1m 
Ruhrbergbau in den Jahren 1946 - 1947'. 
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new miners relied on black-marketeering of coupon and Care Packet goods to 
make up their income and made no effort to maximise their earnings or points. 1 
So much so, that some mines went over to paying new miners less than the 
minimum wage in cases where it was felt that he men had deliberately worked 
less than they could. 
New miners were more likely to take time off for accidents and Sickness which 
did not really warrant it. By registering as sick or injured, they were able to 
absent themselves from work while at the same time not jeopardising the 
coupons or the minimum number of points necessary to redeem them. At the 
mine Prosper III, for example, 12 percent of the overall workforce but almost 30 
percent of the newcomers in the hostels were off work at anyone time for 
reasons of Sickness or accident. In another mine, Prosper 1/11, the absentee rate 
of the hostel occupants was even higher. This discrepancy went beyond the 
2 
newcomers' objectively greater susceptibility to accidents and tllness and, in 
any case, the timing of absences was even more revealing than their number. 
Throughout the July to December period, the amount of accidents and sickness 
amongst the established men in the Prosper pits remained reasonably constant. 
On the other hand the new miner's absences fluctuated wildly. During the Care 
Packet actions, when absenteeism for reasons of illness meant loss of 
entitlement, the newcomers were actually less liable to sickness than the 
established men. Immediately following the completion of each Care Packet, 
the newcomers' Sickness statistics leapt up far beyond that of their experienced 
colleagues. For example, at the end of the last week of the second Care Packet 
action, 3 1/ 2 percent of the established men in mine Prosper I/ll and only 1 1/2 
percent of the new miners in hostels were off sick. Three weeks later. 23 
1 OBADA 18010/1597/47. Lageberlcht for May 1947. 
2 OBADA I 8874/63/48. SA Bottrop to OBAD. 5.1.1948. annex: Rheinisches 
Stahlwerk Abt. Arenberg to Ruhrknappschaft. Bochum 30.12.1947. 
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percent of the newcomers and between 8 and 10 percent of the Stammbelegschaft 
were on the sick list. Absenteeism due to accidents also fluctuated wildly. but 
since absence though accident did not mean loss of the Care Packet (so long as 
the worker had been present at the beginning of the action) the new miners' 
accident statistics rose steeply almost from the beginning of each action. 1 
Other mines had similar experiences to report. 2 
Hand in hand with this behaviour went a refusal to accept either the rules of 
their superiors or the working pace of their established colleagues. There were 
frequent reports of the young trainees' resistance to instruction from the 
deputies, of newcomers leaving work before the end of the shift and so on.3 The 
Bergamter complained that it was extraordinarily difficult to persuade the 
young newcomers of the importance of the safety regulations, 'da vielen von 
Ihnen in den langen Jahren des Krieges das Gefuhl fur geordnete Verhaltnisse 
4 
abhanden gekommen sel'. In March, the OBAD reported that older miners were 
frequently unwilling to work with the newcomers because of the 
'OberheblichkeU der Neulinge, die haufig jede Belehrung durch Altere von 
vornherein entschieden ablehnen, selbst wenn sie offensichtlich in ihrem 
5 
eigenen Interesse liegt.' 
There were a number of reasons for the newcomers' behaviour. In contrast to 
6 
the established workforce, many were young and single. They were therefore 
1 Ibid.. especially the two attached diagrams. 'GegenOberstellung der 
Fehlschlchten in % zur Belegschaft'. 
2 Eg. BBA 32,741. Minutes of Directors' Meeting. 4.6.1948. See, however. OBADA 
13874/281/48, BA Lothringen. Gutachten Ober die Kranken- und Unfallzahlen. 21.5.1948. 
which saw the sickness rate after the Care Packet actions as genuinely reflecting over-
exertion during the actions themselves. 
3 OBADA 18010/1343/47. OBAD Lagebertcht for Aprtll947, also June 1947: BBA 
30. 268. Minutes of meeting with mine officials on 18 August. 20.8.1947. 
4 OBADA 18010/433/47. OBAD Lagebertcht for January 1947. 
5 OBADA 18010/1021/47. OBAD Lagebertcht for March 1947. 
6 Over 4/5 of the established workforce were married as against around 1/3 of the 
new miners. See AbteUung U (Gruppe Hambom) report. 14.7.1948. op.clt 
New labour and the drive for coal 146 
less drawn by the consumer goods, particularly textiles and furniture, which 
might otherwise have given them an incentive to maximise their points 
earnings. A Military Government survey noted that experienced men were 
more likely than newcomers to complain of having too few POints. 1 Being 
without dependents, single newcomers were also more willing to engage in the 
risks of detection that serious black-marketeertng involved. For all hostel 
occupants, the temptation to engage in black market actMties must have been 
considerable since a veritable army of Schieber (spivs) and traders waited at the 
2 
entrance to the camps. Even where newcomers did not augment their earnings 
in this manner, their aim in coming to the mines was often simply to weather 
out the difficult post-war years; they were not particularly interested in earning 
everything they could and asked for little more than a roof over their heads and 
3 for decent measures of food, drink and Cigarettes. The lack of sympathy, 
training or welfare provision offered by mine managements merely intensified 
their unWillingness to do more than the bare minimum of work required. 
Though it was predominantly new miners who exploited the system in this way, 
they were able to do so only because of management's loss of authority over the 
workforce as a wfwle. For example, the ease with which the men obtained 
doctor's notes indicates the reluctance of the Knappschaft doctors to ask too 
many quest!ons.4 It was a sign of the union's influence in the industry and a 
dramatic reversal of the situation in the Nazi era, when the doctors had put ever 
5 
more pressure on the men to continue working. Within the mines, the deputies 
1 PORO (ed.), The mtning trainee 1947. p.15. 
2 OBADA 18010/1343/47, Lageberlcht for April 1947. 
3 OBADA 18010/1597/47, Lageberlcht for May 1947. 
4 Rheinisches Stahlwerk Abt. Arenberg to Ruhrknappschaft, Bochum 30.12.1947. 
op.ctt. 
5 'Da mu.6te man schon halbtot sein. bevor der Ant wegen Krankheit 
Arbeitsverschonung verschrieb'. as Hans Dieter Baroth recalled in his autobiographical 
novel 'Aber es waren schOne Zetten'. Munich 1982. p.13. 
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were unable to control recalcitrant new labourers because of their general 
apprehensiveness about intervening too forcefully. Managements were often 
reluctant to impose fines and were unable to dismiss at will. 1 
Why did the established miners not impose their own discipline on those 
newcomers whose behaviour endangered their safety, threatened group earnings 
or Simply gave offence? In the first place, the threat to group earnings should 
not be overstated given the ability to force favourable wage agreements out of 
management and the fact that the established workforce, too, was often not 
hying to maximise its earnings. It was only after the currency reform that new 
miners really became a threat to their colleagues' earnings. Nevertheless. 
workers' representatives sometimes did try to exert sanctions. Works 
councillors spoke out on more than one occasion for penalties against new 
2 
miners found to be wilfully underproducing. However, they found that the 
sanctions that they could bring to bear were llmited. Even more important was 
the fact that the IVB was very concerned not to alienate the new miners and risk 
3 
creating a permament division in the workforce. It also did not want to make 
concessions to management that might set a precedent. !VB leaders. for 
instance opposed the idea of withholding coupons from 'slackers,.4 Even in 
respect of smoking underground. an offence committed almost exclusively by 
newcomers, the unions and works councillors were reluctant to endorse a hard 
line. It was not until the beginning of 1948 that the OBAD instituted body 
searches for smoking materials at the pit head and. even then. both union and a 
1 OBADA 18010/723/47. Obad Lagebertcht for February 1947. op.clt.: BBA 35.40. 
Minutes of meeting ofProduktionsaussch~. 24.6.1947. 
2 BBA 32. 882. Report on meeting of production committee deputy-chairmen. 
25.6.194 7: FOllmer-Edling, 'Die Polltlk des IVB', p.80. 
3 See chapter 7. p.313if. 
4 BBA 32. 882. Report on meeting of production committee deputy-chaJnnen. 
25.6.1947. 
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number of works councils opposed it. 1 In other words, newcomers exploiting 
the system found themselves the beneficiaries both of the lack of managerial 
authority and of the hidden class struggle that characterised the industry under 
British control. 
3: The Bergassessoren fight back. The impact of German 
management. November 1947 - June 1948 
The transfer of authority 
Both British and Americans increasingly believed that the key to increasing 
output was to strengthen management's confidence and control. As early as the 
beginning of 1947, the British and Americans had deCided that the time was 
opportune for transferring control over the mining industry to the Germans. 
This would allow British staff to be reduced, conform with the general 
occupation policy of returning power to the Germans and, it was hoped, 
encourage greater efforts from management. The VfW was requested to draw up 
details of an organisational structure, headed by itself, to be implemented by 1 
April. However the VfW was very reluctant to resume authority over the 
industry under the prevailing conditions and its proposals, presented after 
2 
much delay, were seen by the Allies as being completely inadequate. There were 
also international constraints hindering the delegation of control to the 
Germans.3 The transfer of power was therefore shelved for the time being, the 
NGCC remaining in control. Perhaps one other reason for the slow progress in 
this direction was that the British in particular remained extremely 
1 OBADA 15200/3119/47, GM50, Circular, 25.11.1947: 15200/255/48, o BAD , 
Circular, 31.1.1948; 15200/376/48, OBAD. Circular. 14.2.1948; 15200/255/48. various BA 
responses to the above. 
2 WWA 522 (OMGU5). BICO BIECO 17/8203/19, BIECO/P(47) 140, 'Controlof 
Coal Production', 27.5.1947: BICO BIECO 17/8203/12. Minutes of 12th Meeting of BIECO. 
23.4.1947 and 13th Meeting, 30.4.1947. 
3 WWA 522 (OMGU5) BICO BI5EC 11/105-3/8. Verbatim minutes of meeUn~ of 
BICO Chainnen with Btzonal representatives, 13.10.1947. 
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circumspect about backing management in a way that might strengthen unrest 
or depress morale in the workforce. Even when the British and Americans had 
decided to design the future German organisation themselves, one of the leading 
British participants warned that caution was essential, otherwise they might 
'find themselves back on the 1923 coal level', a reference to French problems 
during the Ruhr occupation of that year. 1 
In many ways, the August 1947 Washington conference, organised by the US to 
discuss coal matters, was a turning point. The Americans persuaded the British 
to put a five year moratorium on the question of socialisation in the Ruhr. This 
removed a lot of management anxiety, particularly since denazification was 
gradually coming to an end. 2 Following the conference, the bipartite 
authorities decided to design a German organisation themselves. The outcome 
was the Deutsche Kohlenbergbauleitung (DKBL) , a body consisting largely of 
industrial representatives but with some trade union representation and which 
came into existence in November 1947. The NGCC was wound up and replaced 
by a smaller bipartite organisation, the UK/US Coal Control Group, whose job it 
was to supervise the DKBL and report directly to the Bipartite Board. The 
British interdepartmental coal production committee COPROD was replaced by 
a bipartite committee in Frankfurt, COCOM, charged with advising the Bipartite 
Board on coal matters and ensuring that the recommendations of the 
3 Washington conference were implemented. Military Government's influence 
continued to make itself felt in the mining industry for several years but the 
creation of the DKBL undoubtedly represented a considerable transfer of 
1 WWA S22 (OMGUS), CO HIST BR 3/404-1/8, Memorandum 'Re: German coal 
productlon. Summary notes of conference 13.10.1947', 13.10.1947. 
2 In line with contemporary usage, 'bipartite' always refers to the British and 
Americans, whUe the 'bizonal' administration was the German counterpart. 
3 Ibid.; BICO BISEC 11/103-2/22, COCOM M(47) 1. Minutes of the first meeting of 
the Coal Committee, 15.12.1947: BAK Z4, 58, Bipartite News Office Frankfurt, News 
release. 'German Coal Management Formed', 19.11.1947. 
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authority back to German management and reduced the scope for outside 
control. 
Renewed conjidence 
Managers began to regain lost confidence. Despite General Robertson's 
declaration to the NRW parliament in April 1948 that the industry would never 
be returned to its former owners. the possibility of socialisation ever being 
introduced was looking increasingly remote. As the US chairman of the 
UK/USCCG. Bob Estill. prepared to leave for the US. he organised a special 
luncheon with senior DKBL figures at which, as the minutes record, 'he desired to 
point out that he definitely did not agree to any plan of national1sation or 
socialisation of the coal industry and specifically referred to the bad results 
that England had experienced in the nationalisation of their coal recently'. 1 
True. there were still examples of management's nervousness; the Control Group 
criticised the fact that works councils were still sometimes being consulted on 
2 the appointment of senior management personnel. Yet there were many other 
signs that management was beginning to assert itself in relation to both labour 
and labour exchanges. 3 There was a greater willingness to carry out dismissals. 
In February 1948 the !VB's Bochum district complained about colliery managers' 
4 
'increasing aggressiveness' and in March the Union noted a disturbing increase 
in the number of pits refusing to keep to the mtn1mum wage agreement. 5 
1 WWA S22 (OMGUS), BICO BISEC, 11/104-1/38, Report on 'Luncheon Meeting of 
Hard Coal District Production Directors As Guests of AF.Marshall. Member (US),. 
2.8.1948; Special Intelligence Report, 'Some Gennan views of the political, economic and 
SOCiological aspects of Ruhr coal mining', 19.6.1948, op.cit. 
2 WWA S22 (OMGUS). BICO BISEC 11/104-2/3, UKUSCCG report, 'Review of hard 
coal production in the Ruhr', 10.6.1948. 
3 BBA 10, 594, Minutes of meeting of colliery directors in the DKBL's Bochum 
dlstIict. 25.5.1948. 
4 DGBA File 'Industrteverband Bergbau 1946-1948. Ta.tlgkeltsbertchte', Report for 
February 1948. 
5 Ibid., Report for March 1948. 
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These conditions and a more favourable food situation in which most normal 
consumers in the mining areas kept above hunger rations throughout the spring 
combined to push productivity up from 2.473t in January to 2.627t in March. 1 
That it did not go higher was evidence of the many continuing constraints such 
as the inherent limitations of the incentive schemes and the unremitting and 
2 increasingly severe shortage of mine supplies. 
ProductiDn witfwut reward: management and underpriced coal 
In addition, there was one constraint on mining output whose impact was 
actually strengthened by the DKBL's formation, namely that existing coal prices 
and supply conditions offered management no incentive to maximise 
production. 
Members of the Coal Control Group soon became aware that neither 
management nor its spokesmen in the DKBL were inclined to maximise coal 
production at any cost. The Group reported that it 'was evident that the DKBL 
had no real policy with regard to immediate production ..... The Directors are 
taking a long-term view and would appear indifferent to the necessity of 
3 immediately maximising coal production'. In confidential discussions with 
the Americans, a senior management representative admitted that the 
employers were not doing their very best to secure maximum output. He also 
revealed the reason for this. How could they be expected to maximise 
production, he asked, 'when we are only allowed to include 1.50 RM for the 
depreciation of our eqUipment per ton of coal mined for subsidy purposes, while 
our capital goods depreciate at the rate of from 2.00 RM to 2.20 RM or more per 
1 ZdKW, 7, p.45. 
2 WWA S22(OMGUS). BlCO SISEC 11/104-1/38, Verbatim Draft - Meeting of 
General Clay with SICO Starr. 14.5.1948. 
3 WWA S22 (OMGUS), SICO BlSEC 11/104-2/3. UK/USCCG report. 'Review of hard 
coal production in the Ruhr'. 10.6. 19·t8. 
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ton of coal extracted'. 1 The Americans concluded that in 'view of the fact that 
coal mining is an industry which is operating at present at a [loss]2 (which 
varies more or less directly with output) it would seem that under existing price 
and subsidy policies the board of managers should keep production at the lowest 
possible level consistent with its members continuing in office'. 3 Not only were 
the subsidies currently provided insuffiCient to meet depreciation, in some cases 
insufficient to meet even operating costs, but in addition there was anxiety that 
the subsidies might soon cease, indeed that the industry might have to pay the 
4 
subsidies back in the future. In the other words, controlled coal prices meant 
that the financial interest of the collieries was out of step with the economic 
needs of the nation. There was no material incentive to respond to the urgent 
need for coal. 
There was an inherent contradiction between the Allied policy of giving 
management greater freedom and authority on the one hand but on the other not 
restoring the economic incentives that made production worthwhile. It would 
be inappropriate in this study to dwell on all the circumstances governing the 
Allies policy towards the domestic (ie. non-export) coal price. Until summer 
1947, Britain's attempts to increase coal prices had been overridden by the other 
5 Occupying powers in Berlin because of their interests as coal consumers. In 
summer 1947, the Americans acknowledged the need to increase coal prices and 
a modest increase was implemented6 but there was much reSistance to further 
rises from within the German economic administration where it was felt that 
the inflationary consequences would destabilise the rickety price structure in 
1 Special Intell1gence Report. 'Some Gennan views of the political, economic and 
sociological aspects of Ruhr coal mining'. 19.6.1948. op.clt. 
2 Word Is missing in original. MR 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Collins. Mining memories. p.47. 
6 Ibid. 
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1 the two Zones. This fear of cost-push inflation was to be of fundamental 
importance in deteIDlining future GeIDlan policy towards the industry. 
A qualitative recruitment strategy 
The divergence between Allied and management's interests was to make itself 
swiftly apparent in the approach to new labour. In January 1948, the new 
director-general of the DKBL, Heinrich Kost, proposed to the UK/USCCG that 
recruitment in future be restricted to covering wastage and that increases in 
production be obtained only by improving productivity. 2 The Control Group 
were unimpressed by Kost's proposals which in its view contained overly 
optimistic estimates of future developments in both individual output and 
3 
absenteeism. Recruitment was therefore to go on as before except that the 
group agreed, in the interest of other industries, to limit recruitment from the 
Ruhr area to 500 men a week. 
Nevertheless, as the table shows, recruitment in the first half of 1948 was 20-25 
4 percent below 1947 levels. The effect of the drop was particularly marked 
because wastage did not decline, despite the smaller number of newcomers 
entering the industry. Taking the underground workforce on its own, the 
period July to December 1947 had seen an increase of over 27,000 men: between 
January and June 1948, on the other hand, the workforce grew by less than 
5,000. 5 As far as the underground workforce is concerned, recruitment did 
1 For a succinct statement of this view from a somewhat later date, see BAK Z 13, 
198, VfW to Direktorialkanzlei, 14.3.1949. 
2 PRO FO 1005, 1624. Minutes of 5th Meeting ofUK/USCCG, 16.1.1948. 
3 Ibid. 
4 The absolute figures are larger than figures used elsewhere in this study 
because these include workers above ground and in ancillary plants. Monthly figures for 
the underground workforce alone are not available. There is however evidence that the 
drop from 1947 to 1948 was even more marked for the underground workforce on its own. 
The sudden burst of recruitment in April is explained by the fact that that was when 
school-Ieavers were taken on. 
5 
mKW, 7, p.32. 
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indeed do little more than cover wastage. 
Table 4: Recruitment. wastage and workforce growth 1947-48 1 
Month men hired wasta~e workforce 2rowth 
~ 
July 12,400 5,700 6,700 
August 13,300 6,400 6,900 
September 10,000 5,500 4,500 
October 12,000 5,800 6,200 
November 11,000 4,800 6,200 
2 December 6,500 3,900 2,600 
~ 
January 8,274 6,908 1,366 
February 8,820 6,551 1,569 
March 8,129 5,203 2,926 
April 12,931 6,385 6,546 
May 7,200 6,100 1,100 
June 8,200 7,600 600 
In its reports to the Control Group, the DKBL argued that this low increase was 
the result of mining supply shortages which were severely limiting the collieries' 
3 
ability to absorb new labour. Whilst there was no doubting the seriousness of 
supply shortages, there is plenty of evidence that they were not the prime factor 
inhibiting recruitment. At a meeting between senior colliery representatives 
and the DKBL's manpower experts it was apparent that both mines and DKBL 
were ill-disposed to any great increases in workforce size. Indeed the mines 
wanted to close down the central reception camp in Hiltrop altogether; the DKBL 
advised caution, because it accurately predicted that wastage would rise, thus 
4 
necessitating continued recruitment to preserve current workforce levels. 
Over the following months, suspicions hardened at the UK/USCCG that no 
1 Figures compiled from the OBAD Lagebertchte in OBADA I 8010, vols 2.3&4. 
Figures have been rounded up and include all labour below and above ground and in 
ancillary works. 
2 Recruitment was temporarily reduced in view of the approaching holidays. 
3 WWA 522 (OMGU5). BICO BI5EC 11/104-1/39. 'Extract from the March 1948 
report by Gennan coal mine management', March 1948. 
4 BBA 32,741. Minutes of directors' meeting. 30.1.1948. 
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attempt was being made to maximise the number of men underground. 1 
However, the Control Group was reluctant to intervene since it wanted to give the 
DKBL a chance to prove its effectiveness. 2 
Preparation, development and the deprived face 
Not only was recruitment down on the previous period but, in addition, the 
influx of newcomers was not being used to build up workforce at the face. 
Table 5: Face productivity and face size 1938 and 1946-8 
Year Output/man shift Shifts at face as % 



















The figures in table 5 show that throughout the post -war period a far smaller 
proportion of the underground workforce was at the face than before the war. 
At first sight this is the very reverse of what one would expect. Throughout 1945 
and 1946, the NGCC gave out continual instructions that all possible labour was 
to be concentrated at the face and that developmental and and preparatory work 
6 (A us- and Vorrfchtung) was to be cut down to a minimum. This should have 
led to a higher proportion of face workers than before the war, when the mines 
1 PRO FO 1005/1624, UK/USCCG, Minutes of 8th Meeting, 27.2.1948; Minutes of 
lOth Meeting, 2.4.1948. 
2 See the remarks ofH.E.Coll1ns in WWA S22 (OMGUS). BICO BISEC 11/104-2/6. 
'DKBL. Verbatim Minutes of the Meeting of the Military Governors with Bizonal Officials. 
14.June 1948'. 
3 Abelshauser. Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland, pp.140-1. Published German 
figures for face productivity (Schtchtletstung im Abbau ) begin only in 1948 and therefore 
do not allow comparlson with the pre-war period. 
4 ZdKw. 12. p.54. 
5 My calculation using the simple fonnula:. 
~ ~!fF - mreshifts aceprOciuc - underground workforce shills. 
6 WWA S22 (OMGUS), CO HISIR BR 3/406-1/22, Undated notes by NGCC towards 
an official history of the NGCC. Section 2: History of Coal Production since the 
Occupation. 
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had been engaged in a considerable amount of development. 
A partial explanation is that during the war the proportion of the German 
labour force who were face workers had declined sharply. Many had become too 
old for contract wage work and moved into the gentler shift-wage jobs away from 
1 
the face. In 1938, for example. there were 156,908 German Gedingearbeiter. 
making up some 68 percent of the underground workforce. By 1943 this figure 
had fallen to 129.661 or 61 percent and in 1946 it was down to 106.697 or 59 
2 percent. This explains why, as the war came to an end. the face was 
disproportionately undermanned. However, the influx of new miners rapidly 
brought the number of contract workers up to the pre-war level and by mid-1948 
3 154,000 men. or 63 percent of the workforce were earning a contract wage. So 
why, in 1948. was the face still so underrepresented in relation to pre-war 
manning levels and why had the face in fact grown more slowly than the rest of 
4 the workforce in the 1946 - 1948 period? 
There are a number of reasons for this. The mines were in much poorer shape 
than they had been in the 1930's and so a fair amount of repair work was 
unavoidable. Secondly, because of the way the incentive schemes worked, face 
workers were working nearer to pre-war output norms than the shift-wage 
5 
earners away from the face. 
1 Virtually all workers employed at the face were in contract wage. Away from 
the face. there was some contract work. particularly in developing and preparing new 
seams and ways. and also considerable amount of shift-wage employment in 
maintenance. repair and haulage. 
2 Bischoff. 'Arbelterzahl und FOrderanstieg'. table 7. 
3 Ibid. 
4 As proven by the fact that the face's share of shifts worked fell. 
5 It might appear that this is not a matter of conjecture but a proven fact based on 
the o.m.s. statistics in the table. However the way the statistics are derived means that 
they are not necessarily an indication of how effiCiently the men are working. The o.m.s. is 
calculated by dividing the mines' output by the number of shifts worked. If. for instance. 
the mines introduce many new workers to do development work. then these shifts will not 
immediately contribute to production. The number of shifts worked will go up and the 
productivity statistics will fall. even though the men may be working Just as h: a~d 
effectively as before. In other words the o.m.s figures say nothing directly a ut t e 
(continued overleaf.) 
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However. a major part of the answer seems to be that Gennan employers were 
disregarding British instructions and were secretly devoting a considerable 
proportion of their manpower to rebuilding and extending the mines' capacity. 
to compensating. in other words. for the lack of development work carried out 
during the war. Managers were evidently not trying to maximise output by 
redistributing the workforce. Over the 1946-1948 period. the number of 
contract workers as a whole grew by almost 50 percent - faster than the growth 
1 in the workforce as a whole: in other words contract workers away from the 
face showed a disproportionate increase. This can only have been in 
2 development work. Since the available statistics indicate that Gennan 
3 
management concentrated the newcomers at the face. the growth in the 
proportion of contract workers away from the face can have been achieved only 
by moving experienced men to development and other work. while allowing 
newcomers to fill up the face. If more of the experienced men had been kept 
there not only would the size of the face workforce have gone up but face 
productivity might have increased as well because the balance between 
experienced and inexperienced men would have been more favourable. 
4 The Coal Control Group was well aware of this problem and in June 1948. at a 
conference with US officials. Collins argued that the Gennan managers 'have 
been prepared to restrict their development work when we have ordered it. but 
they have been able to turn it around and say that it is by order of Military 
Government. So long as it is that. they will accept orders and carty them out. 
efficiency of the individual miners and may merely reflect the deployment of labour within 
the mine. 
1 Calculated from Bischoff. 'Arbeiterzahl und FOrderanstieg'. op.cit. 
2 For the DuJsburg area see HStaD. Kalkum. Bergamt Duisburg. 236. Lagebertcht 
for February 1947. which openly linked the slow progress of production with the amount 
of development and preparatory work. claiming that the planned production increases 
made these necessary. 
3 See above. p.123. 
4 Collins. 'Progress in Rebuilding the Coal Mining Industry'. p.19. 
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but as soon as left to their own devices they are not giving these 
tnstructions ... the individual managements of the DKBL are taking the long view. 
It is a perhaps a good thing in normal times, but it has always been our point of 
view that the immediate production of coal is rather more important than the 
long-term policy ... '. 1 
Yet with its limited staff, there was little the NGCC and its successor 
organisation could do. As Collins himself argued, over 'such a large industry it 
has not been possible to exert a very profound control'. 2 This fact, as well as the 
Control Group's general reluctance to undermine the DKBL, allowed the colliery 
managers to continue pursuing their own labour policy. 
The spring crisis 
The only exception to the UK/USCCG's unwillingness to intervene more 
forcefully was a short period in April and May, when the positive trend in 
production was reversed. Daily production fell badly and the Allies began to put 
on the pressure. At the beginning of May, General Clay wrote to the UK/USCCG 
to stress that European recovery was dependant on more coal. The April 
3 performance, he wrote, might turn out to have disastrous consequences. At a 
meeting with BICD staff, Clay spelt out the position even more clearly: The fact 
remains that we have all these raw materials coming in ... If we don't get more 
coal, it is not one bit of use to bring any of it in ... The whole German economy is 
in a position for a rapid recovery if we can get more coal. Without it, it is not 
going to go anywhere. ,4 These comments indicated Just how wide the gap had 
1 WW A S22 (OMGUS), BICO BISEC 11/104-2/6, Verbatim Minutes of the meeting 
of the Military Governors with Btzonal Officials, 14.6.1948. 
2 ColI1ns, 'Progress in Rebuilding the Coal Mining IndustIy', p.6. 
3 WWAS22 (OMGUS), AG 1948/163/5, Clay to Coal co , 5.5.1948. 
4 WWA S22(OMGUS), BICO BISEC 11/104-1/38, Verbatim Draft of meeting of 
General Clay with BICO staff, 14.5.1948. 
New labour and the drive for coal 159 
become between the needs of the economy and the mines' own financial 
interests. 
The DKBL's response was a series of short-term measures such as temporary 
halts to preparatory and development work and the introduction of a new 
incentive drive, the Fettaktlon, whereby the miners received meat and fats for 
production increases attained in the May-June period. These were not without 
their success and the DKBL was thus spared from having to revise its recruitment 
strategy. 
Supplying Resources 
One key question about workforce regeneration in the controlled economy 
remains. The factors which hindered efficient deployment of human and 
material resources in the pits have been analysed in detail. Yet Just as 
symptomatic of the controlled economy as these problems of resource 
deployment were problems of resource procurement. As we have seen, almost 
every aspect of labour policy was bedeviled by the shortage of supplies. Why did 
it remain so difficult to furnish the mining industry with even the bare 
minimum of pit supplies, building materials, hostel furnishings, consumer 
goods and so on? It is to this question which the following chapter addresses 
itself. 
Chapter 4: Supplies in demand. Housing new labour in 
the pre-currency reform economy 
Supply sfwrtages 
Towards the end of 1946, men from all over Germany were flocking to the pits. 
seeing in mining a way of keeping themselves above water, if not above ground. 
The key problem of the early era had been solved. Welcome as it was, this new 
influx nevertheless presented the authorities with new tasks and challenges. 
above all the problems of housing, equipping and feeding the newcomers. 
Beyond the need to provide that minimum standard of eqUipment and 
accommodation without which it would be impossible to set the men to work. it 
was well recognised that morale and productivity of both established and new 
miners would benefit if the quality of existing housing and supplies could be 
1 improved. 
Over the following period an enormous amount of energy was spent on procuring 
resources. Yet the drive for coal was continually put in Jeopardy by missing or 
poor quality supplies. The industry lived from hand to mouth and some of the 
materials necessary to increase coal production never arrived. As chapter 3 has 
already shown, the incentive schemes were dogged by problems of delivery and 
quality. 2 Food was periodically in very short supply. Work clothing was 
sufficient only to kit out new recruits to the meanest of standards and American 
experts reckoned that the miners were getting less than half the clothing 
supplies that production demanded. Many recruits found that they had to wait 
for up to a month for their gear, during which time they could not work and were 
1 See comments of August Schmidt in 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate 
coal production 1946. Visit of Russian. French and US experts to the Ruhr.'. op.cit 
2 OGBA File. 'Gewerkschaftliches Zonensekretariat. Brttische Zone. 1947. 1'. VfW 
to Economics M1nJstIy NRWand others. 25.3.1947. appendix 11. 
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1 
required to pay for lodging and food. In summer 1947 shortages became so 
acute that recruitment had to be temporarily restricted. 2 The lack of pit 
supplies. where the newcomers' need for pneumatic picks. lamps and so on 
constituted but a small part of the mines' general demand. became increasingly 
desperate. In 1946. 1947 and 1948 the collieries received less than half the steel 
3 
required. The quality of the lubricating oils. electrical installations. 
conveyor belts and air hose delivered was so bad that many items lasted only a 
couple of days. This in turn had a deleteriOUs effect on morale. 4 In many 
cases. it was not to be until the currency reform that the quantity and quality of 
5 deliveries began appreciably to improve. 
Rather than attempt to analyse the progress and problems in procuring all these 
different commodities. some of which bore only peripherally on labour force 
regeneration. the following account focuses on one of the most complex supply 
problems of all: miners' housing. A number of the challenges thrown up by 
housing were unique. but in many respects the transfer. allocation and 
deployment of housing and building supplies in the miners' housing programme 
offer a model of the problems of resource control in the pre-currency reform 
economy. 
Housing policy in the pre-incentives era 1945-1946 
No one entering the Ruhr in 1945 could fail to be struck. even moved. by the sheer 
scale of housing destruction. Henry CollinS recalled that. 'In my early travels 
1 WWA S22 (OMGUS). AG 45-46/103/2. 'Report on Inspection Trip to the Ruhr 
Coal Mines'. 10. June 1946. p.4; Social Swvey Report No.5. op.cit. p.9. 
2 WWA F35. 493. GMSO. Circular Nr. DI991. 15.8.1947; F35. 494. GMSO. Ctrcu1ar 
DI 1864. 27.11.1947. 
3 WWA S22(OMGUS). BICO BISEC 11 / 104-1/38. Verbatim Draft - Meeting of 
General Clay with BICO Staff. 14.5.1948; WWA S22(OMGUS). AG 1948/163/5. Report by 
AF.Marshall. UK/US Coal Control Group. on Mine Supplies. 10.5.1948; PRO FO 1005.380. 
COPROD/ P(47)2. BECG Paper. Mining Supplies. 29.1.1947. 
4 As note 3. 
5 OBADA 18010. OBAD Lagebertchte. 4 Quarter 1948 & 1 and 2 Quarter 1949. 
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around the coalfield I saw just vast areas of rubble and yet, at night, pin points of 
light appeared in the ruins over wide areas. The miners and their families were 
living in the cellars beneath the ruins.,1 Before the war, there had been 
1,217,000 dwellings in the greater Ruhr area (SVR-terrttory). The war had 
destroyed 456,000 of them and left only 196,000 undamaged. 2 Of the quarter of 
a million miners' houses before the war, only a fifth were undamaged while over 
a quarter were totally destroyed.3 Even in 1947, after conSiderable repairs, 
there were still only half the inhabitable rooms in the Ruhr that there had been 
in 1939.4 
Initially, the repair of miners' housing could not be given any great priority by 
the British since it was not strictly necessary for restarting production. What 
progress there was in repairing miners' housing can be largely attributed to the 
collieries. They proved willing to allow part of the building materials 
contingent intended for pit repairs to be diverted to miners' housing, 
particularly when it was owned by the mine. This revealed once again the 
employers' unwillingness to give reviving production the urgency which the 
British wanted and their tendency to give the wishes of the established 
workforce greater priority. Even more than clothing and other supplies, 
5 building materials proved particularly hard to control. This explainS how it 
was that by the end of 1945, 37,000 miners' houses had received some sort of 
1 Collins, Mining Memories, p.28 
2 HStaO NW9, 54, Wohnungsbezlrksstelle Ruhr (WBSR) to WAM, 3.11.1947. 
Appendix: Wohnraumbewirtschaftung 1m Ruhrgeblet'. 
3 Colltns Papers, Papers from the Anglo-American Conversations regarding 
German coal production, August-September 1947, (henceforth Washington Papers'), A2, 
paper 1, 'Report on Miners' Housing. Brief for Sir William Strang prepared by Manpower 
Division'. 
4 HStaD NW9, 54, WBSR to WAM, 3.11.1947, Appendix: 
Wohnraumbewtrtschaftung 1m Ruhrgeblet'. 
5 For evidence of the scale of employers' appropriations see HStaO NW53, 643. 
Landrat Ernst to Mlnlsterpn'lsident Arnold. 17.8.1948; BAK Z40, 451. Lt.Col. H.P.Ftelder to 
Director General Housing Branch. Manpower Division, 14.5.1946, MP/48054/6/MG, p.2 & 
HQ NGCC, Memo. 'BuUdlng material for the repair of miners' housing', Essen 1947. 
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1 
repair. The British turned a blind eye to the fact that many of the repairs 
carried out made use of materials officially intended for colliery rebuilding. As 
a Manpower Division report put it. it was 'not considered advisable to interfere 
2 
with this extra source of supply'. 
As soon as it became apparent that new labour would have to be recruited from 
outside the Ruhr, the British authorities began to consider ways of increasing 
the amount of available living space. Their first step, in August 1945, was to 
prevent refugees from taking up housing that could be used by miners by 
3 declaring the Ruhr a restricted area. Most parts of the Ruhr were affected 
although in some areas refugee transports continued to arrive until 1947.4 
To make additional room available for miners the authOrities had two types of 
'resource' at their disposal: existing living space in the Ruhr on the one hand and 
building materials to create additional room on the other. Both were in very 
short supply. The speedier option of the two appeared to be the reallocation of 
existing living space, either by using it more intensively or by evacuating local 
families. In autumn 1945 various plans were mooted, including the evacuation 
5 
of some 80,000 Ruhr citizens to make way for more miners. Yet what is 
striking is how circumspect was the attempt to put it into operation. No 
coercion was to be used and in the end the few attempts to move families failed 
1 HStaD NW9. 112. Verbandsdirektor SVR to WAM. 18.11.1949. Appendix: 
'Aufstellung aller staUsUschen Angaben Ober das Bergarbelterwohnungsbauprogamm' 
(henceforth: 'SVR Aufstellung (1949)'). 
2 BAK Z40. 451, Lt.Col.Fielder to Housing Branch, Manpower Division. 14.5.1946. 
3 Falk Wiesemann und Uwe Kleinert, 'FIQchtl1nge und wirtschaftl1cher 
Wiederaufbau in der brlUschen Besatzungszone', In Petzlna and Euchner (eds). 
Wirtschaftspolttik. pp.297 - 326. here p.300. 
4 By April 1947. when a Social Ministry decree closed the entire Ruhr to refugee 
transports there were an estimated 355.000 refugees In the area. See HStaD NW9. 55, 
WAM mc' (WB) 868, Vennerk 14.2.1947; HStaD NW9.54. WBSR to WAM. Abt IIIe, 
3.11.1947. appendix: Wohnraumbewlrtschaftung 1m Ruhrgeblet unter BerOckslchtlgung 
der Bergarbelter-Belange'. 
5 Wiesemann and Kleinert. 'FIQcht1lnge und wtrtschaftllcher Wiederaufbau'. p.300 
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because the evacuees rejected the proffered accommodation. 1 As in the 
incentives question, the British were unwilling to pursue a policy of ruthlessly 
favouring the mines. 
First aid repairs 
This left the possibility of constructing or repairing accommodation to create 
space for the newcomers. In November 1945, shortage of accommodation began 
2 to interfere with the progress of recruitment and in addition 'Operation 
Clobber', which was supposed to provide 30,000 POW's, was pending. It was 
therefore with some urgency that the British Manpower staff called on Gennan 
building experts to consider ways of making more housing available for the 
miners, while the NGCC called on the collieries to do their utmost in creating 
3 
new accommodation by repairs to houses and to barrack accommodation. To 
a certain extent this was successful. British fears of an impending public health 
catastrophe led to an acceleration of housing repairs generally and within this 
4 programme of 'first aid' repairs, the mines enjoyed some priority. The problem 
was that these repairs were mainly aimed at protecting existing miners from the 
weather. While no doubt necessary, this meant that little additional space was 
created. 
What seems then to have happened is that the failure of 'Operation Clobber' was 
taCitly used as an excuse to avoid finding ways of building additional miners' 
accommodation. During the following period, as we have seen, the workforce 
1 HStaD NW9, 55. WBSR to WAM Abteilung mc. 22.4.1947. point 6. 
2 NW9. 147, Oberpra.sident der Nord-Rheinprovtnz, IIa 5203, to AbteUung Bau (1m 
Hause). 25.11.1945. 
3 HStaD NW9. 147. Ibid: Minutes of meeting with Dr. Baerlecken on 30.11.1945. 
1.12.1945; Minutes of meeting with Oberbaurat Heller on 18.12.1945. 18.12.1945: WWA 
F29. 378. HQ lRCD. Circular to general directors. 10.12.1945. 
4 The hOUSing office. Ruhr district. to Oberprnsident. Westfalen. 8.10.1945: PRO 
FO 1005. 379. COPROD P(46) 6: Manpower Division paper on hOUSing for miners. 
September 1946. 
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barely increased because of the failure to hold on to the recruits. Although new 
and better billets and hostels might have altered the situation. the slow growth 
in the workforce took the immediate pressure off the housing authorities. In 
May 1946. for example. so many of the former inhabitants had fled that there 
was room for 20.000 new recruits in the camps. 1 Moreover. most new arrivals 
did not require housing because the Manpower AuthOrities concentrated more 
than ever on recruiting local labour. Between 1 April 1946 and 2 August. for 
example. 18.000 of the 23.000 men directed to the mines came from the Ruhr.2 
Thus the repairs programme moved into a lower gear. From January 1946. the 
coal allocation for all 'First Aid' repairs was cut (the civilian housing Crisis 
being deemed to be over) and mining was not excepted. The problem was that 
there was too little coal. Because of the exports drive. secondary industries such 
as building materials production came low down the list of priorities for coal 
while civilian housing could not be given priority for those building materials 
3 that were available. In the second and third quarters of 1946. for example, 
only 4 percent of the coal allocated to British Zone use was assigned to building 
4 
materials production. Until the beginning of the year, the meagre output of 
new bricks and cement had been augmented by existing (wartime and pre-war) 
5 
stocks. By January-February 1946, those reselVes had run out. 
1 Ibid. 
2 'Minutes of the Committee to investlgate coal productlon 1946. Visit of Russian. 
French and US experts to the Ruhr.', op.clt 
3 Coll1ns Papers, Loose Paper. Report on Miners' Housing, AGC/~2,' Gen/16. 
August 14. 1947. Enclosure '8', Ruhr housing building materials, appendix A; PRO FO 
943. 184, A.C.A Committee of coal experts, Special Minutes of the 22nd Meetlng of Coal 
Experts Committee, 6.9.1946, App. A(3): Comments of French Representatlves on Survey 
of British Zone. 
4 In tum miners' housing absorbed ( In the case of bricks and cement) only 2°16 of 
those materials. ' It also received less than 1 % of available wood. Collins Pape~ .. Loose 
Paper, Report on Miners' Housing, AGC/22, Cen/16, August 14, 1947, Enclosure B, Ruhr 
housing building materials, appendix 'A'. 
5 PRO FO 1005, 379, COPROD P(46)6, Manpower Division paper, 'Housing for 
Miners', September 1946. 
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Fewer houses were repaired than before but. more than that. the mines' share 
within the overall Ruhr repairs programme actually fell. Why was thiS? 
During the First Aid programme. existing stocks of building materials had been 
administered by the Royal Engineers but at the beginning of 1946 they were 
withdrawn and the job handed over to the municipalities. 1 The Royal Engineers 
had faithfully followed British priorities and ensured that the mines received 
favoured treatment. Until the beginning of 1946 miners' housing. which made 
up about around 10 percent of the Ruhr total. had received almost 50 percent of 
2 
repairs. The municipalities proved very hostile to this uneven treatment and 
now tried to correct what they saw as an imbalance. Under pressure and 
understaffed. Military Government did not feel in a position to override them.3 
Nothing much was done to change the position until autumn 1946. In spring 
1946. it is true. Manpower Division produced a five year housing programme for 
the whole of the British Zone including Miners' Housing. Yet since the 
promulgation of the plan involved no extra supplies to the mines. its impact was 
4 
very limited. A report on miners' housing produced in May 1946 acknowledged 
that apart 'from generally and slowly improving the repair of existing houses. 
having due regard to the amount of materials available. nothing more could be 
done unless a really new line is taken relative to repairs and new housing'. 5 
The lack of progress in enlarging the available housing stock and the continued 
1 HStaD NW53. 391.Lehr to Col. Dalby. 25.2.1946. appendix: Bau 90 to HQ Military 
Government. North Rhine region. DOsseldorf. 21.2.1946: SVRAufstellung (1949). op.clt.: 
'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 1946.'. op.cit. 
2 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 1946.'. op.cit .. esp. 
comments of Colonel Fielder. 
3 See. for example. a later meeting between municipal and regional housing 
offiCials in HStaD NW9.55. 'Niederschrift Ober die auf Anordnung des 
Wiederaufbauminlsteriums einberufene Besprechung der Wohnungsamtsletter 1m 
Verbandsgeblet am 13.2.1947'. 15.2.1947. 
4 Collins Papers. Loose Paper. Report on Miners' Housing. AGC/22. Gen/16. 
August 14. 1947. Enclosure 'A': Report on Miners' Housing. 
5 BAK Z40. 451. Lt.Col.Fielder to Housing Branch. Manpower DMslon. 14.5.1946. 
'Subject: Miners' Housing". 
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reluctance to use drastic measures of evacuation and relocation were amply 
illustrated by 'Operation Suds', an ill-fated programme which had the Ruhr 
housing authorities in a lather for much of summer 1946. The Foreign Office 
had suggested that there was a chance that 12,000 Sudeten miners. along with 
their families. would soon be expelled to the US Zone from Czechoslovakia and 
1 
could be diverted to the Ruhr. Such men would clearly be an extremely 
desirable addition to the workforce and so the British authorities set to work 
trying to find accommodation for the in all 50.000 people. There was no time to 
build accommodation for the newcomers so that it would be a matter of evicting 
existing Ruhr inhabitants. Yet the British were understandably unwilling to 
incur the odium that this would involve. As the officer in charge of the recently 
created Ruhr Housing Authority explained to visiting experts, the situation was 
'nothing short of dreadful'. 2 There was no vacant accommodation for families: 
We cannot move existing miners, but we can move widows of miners and 
the mine pensioners. We can also move the butcher. the baker and other 
members of the community, but if we do this we shall upset the economic 
life of the district. The only alternative left to us is to move these 
widows and pensioners and from a preliminary account we have taken. 
there will be a conSiderable amount of trouble .... They will have to leave 
their gardens and the houses that they have patched with their own 
hands. It is very difficult to foresee the result as it will cause 
conSiderable unrest in every area. 
Some relief seemed likely when the British army offered to provide 2.000 Nissen 
huts for the miners. In fact. the Nissen hut programme made little headway. 
Though intended as an additional source of accommodation on top of existing 
supplies. they in fact required conSiderable amounts of wood to erect so that they 
3 
were often more costly in materials than repairs to lightly damaged housing. 
By June 1947, only 240 miners had been housed in Nissen huts. 
4 
1 PRO FO 943. 190. Telegram from Foreign Office to Prague. 6.8.1946. 
2 'Minutes of the Committee to investigate coal production 1946.'. op.cit.. esp. 2nd 
Meeting. 5.8.1946. Col. Fielder'S remarks on housing. 
3 Collins Papers. Loose Paper. Report on Miners' Housing. AGC/22. Gen/16. 
August 14, 1947. Enclosure 'A': Report on Miners' Housing. 
4 HStaO NW 73. 135. SVR. Miners' housing programme progress report. Mat 1947. 
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Because it reflected attitudes that were to become much more stgnti"icant later 
on, it is worth noting that the other reason for slow progress was the detenruned 
resistance to the Nissen huts from German housing experts and above all from 
Dr. Rappaport in the German Labour and Housing Agency ('Beratungsstelle fur 
Arbeit, Siedlungs- und Wohnungswesen'. later part of the Zentralamt fur Arbeit 
(ZAA)).1 Rappaport had long been closely associated with housing construction 
in the Ruhr. having been the director of the SVR from its inception at the 
beginning of the 1920's. He believed that the Nissen huts were not only wasteful 
of scarce wood, but also believed that living in them involved economic and 
2 
above all social costs that were unacceptable: 
Als behelfsmaJ3ig muJ3 ich auch neue Wohnbauten ansehen. die weder 
Keller noch Dachraum haben. Durch das Fehlen dieser Bauteile, die fur 
die Wohnbauten bei dem deutschen Klima und den deutschen 
Lebensbedingungen unerlaJ3lich notwendig sind. wird die Lebenshaltung 
so verteuert, d~ in Wirklichkeit solche Neubauten keinen normal en 
Wohnwert haben. Auch hier muj3 ich also fragen, ob sich Deutschland in 
seiner heutigen ftnanziellen Lage den Luxus nicht normaler und mithin 
vollauf brauchbarer Wohnungen leisten darf. 
It was an ingenious argument that, precisely because Germany was so poor, only 
good standard. long-lasting buildings were economical, and it was one that was 
to continue to cut right across the British attempt to achieve speedy, provisional 
solutions in the interests of coal production. 
In the event. Operation Suds was a wash-out because the Sudeten miners were 
3 held back by the Czechoslovakian authorities. A Manpower Division report 
noted with diplomatic understatement that 'from a housing point of view this is 
a relief. 4 Those billets that had been prepared for the Sudetens were eventually 
5 
made available to other members of the workforce. However, the relief did not 
1 The Beratungstelle was founded in March 1946 and became the 'Hauptamt fOr 
Arbeltsverwaltung in der britischen Zone' at the end of July. The new name, 'Zentralamt 
fOr Arbelt', was adopted in November. 
2 BAR Z40, 350, Rappaport to Joll. 11.11.1946. 
3 PRO FO 943, 190, Simpson to Gledhill, 21.9.1946. 
4 PRO FO 1005,379, COPROD P(46)6, Manpower Division Paper on housing for 
miners, September 1946. 
5 WW A F26. 782. RCD I, Circular to managing directors. 23.9.1946. 
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last long because in late autumn the accelerating pace of workforce growth put 
the Ruhr housing stock under renewed pressure. The hOUSing situation was just 
as unprepared to receive this influx as it had been in 1945. 
The only major difference between the situation in autumn 1945 and a year later 
was that in the meantime a number of important bodies had been created which 
were to playa key role in the miners' housing programme. The Beratungsstelle 
fur Arbeit, Siedlungs- und Wohnungswesen, a zonal organisation charged with 
assisting Military Government in housing and manpower questions, was 
brought into the miners' housing question some time around June and July.l 
Philip Rappaport, the head of the Beratungstelle's housing section was to be 
doubly influential because he was also director of the reestablished SVR, an 
organisation that was to be more closely involved with miners' housing than 
any other in the coming years. Another important development in the summer 
of 1946 was Manpower Division's creation of a Ruhr Housing Office (RHO) to 
2 institute a more coherent and coordinated approach to miners' housing. RHO 
and SVR were to work closely together. Finally, in August 1946 the ministries of 
the newly created Land Nordrhein-Westfalen began to take shape, including the 
Reconstruction Ministry (WAM) under the Communist, Hugo Paul. By Military 
Government decree, housing became the responsibility of the individual Land 
governments, and thus the Reconstruction Ministry was to exert a decisive 
influence in the Ruhr. 3 
1 BAK Z40, 345, Rappaport. Deutsche Beratungsstelle fOr Slediungs- u. 
Wohnwesen to Dr. WeU3er, 20.7.1946. 
2 PRO FO 1005, 1821. Manpower Interim Report for month ending 9th July 1946. 
3 HStaD NWI0, 91, Translation of a letter from ROO HQ Military Government NRW 
to Mlnlsterpra.sldent NRW, 10.4.1947. translated annex: Erla.uterung der 
Verantwortllchketten. die nach der mit Anordnung Nr.l abgeAnderten Verordnung Nr.57 
auf das Land und die Kommunalverwaltungen Obertragen sind'. 
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The half-hearted priority, September 1946 - February 1947 
In line with the general shifts in attitude detailed in the previous chapter the 
approach to miners' housing began to change. In July 1946, the Commander in 
Chief of the British Zone authOrised Manpower Division to draw up a more 
1 positive rebuilding programme. In September the quadripartite COmmittee of 
Experts' report contained the recommendation that housing conditions should 
be given the 'highest priority in any scheme for increasing coal production'. 
During the Committee sessions themselves the French and the Americans had 
been very critical of what they saw as the inadequate priority accorded to the 
2 
mines and the report recommended that a programme of 'substantial repair 
and reconstruction including temporary houses and hutments' should be 
commenced immediately and the allocation of building materials increased. 3 
In response, the British authOrities raised the coal allocation for building 
4 
materials production by 50,000t a month, or about 50 percent. At the same 
time, the priority accorded to mining was stepped up at a number of different 
levels. Though building materials production was being increased by only 50 
5 
percent. the allocation of materials to miners' housing was trebled. 
Manpower Division developed a new five-year programme for miners' housing 
which foresaw 20 percent of all housing repairs in the British Zone going to the 
1 PRO FO 1005. 379, COPROD P(46)6, Manpower Division paper, 'Housing for 
Miners', September 1946. 
2 PRO FO 943. 184. Doc. 74. AC.A Committee of coal experts, Special Minutes of 
the 22nd Meetlng of Coal Experts Committee, 6.9.1946, appendices. 
3 PRO FO 1005. 379, COPROD P(46)2, Report of the Committee of Coal Experts. 
16.9.1946. 
4 BAK Z2. 53, 7. Sitzung des Zonenbeirates. 174: Antrag Reimann/ Hoffmann. 
Annex 38: Memo from the Coordinating Office of the ZAC (Brttlscher Verbindungsstab). 
Ref: Hg/14107/1/ZAC. 'hetr.: Wohnungslage 1m Bergbau', 16.9.1946: BAKZ40, 451, DCOS 
(Policy). CCG(BE), Berlin to Standard Distrtbution Ust G Ref AHg/84oo/Sec. G., Subject 
Miners' Housing. November 1946,. 
5 BAK Z40, 451. DCOS (Policy). CCG(BE). Berlin to standard Distrtbutlon List G. 
Ref AHg/8400/Sec. G .. Subject Miners' Housing. November 1946. 
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1 
miners. At a lower level, the buUding officers of the Ruhr municipalities were 
directed to give mining greater priority. 2 
Even had these decisions been implemented, it is unlikely that they would have 
prevented a housing bottleneck from developing in the Ruhr. The Manpower 
Division housing programme, which envisaged around 4,000 repairs a month.3 
was not going to keep pace with a recruitment programme that endeavoured to 
4 bring 2,000 men a week to the mines. The volume of repairs was in itself 
modest. In addition, the programme was too heavUy orientated towards the 
repair of existing dwellings. rather than the construction of hostels. Past 
experience showed that the volume of repairs planned would result in only a 
small number of rooms becoming avaUable for additional labour. probably at 
5 
most 1,500 a month. Though some hostels were planned, these would 
6 
accommodate at most 1,700 new recruits in the first year. Possibly. Manpower 
Division envisaged a more rigorous utilisation of all repaired space for new 
labour. Yet no directives were given to this effect and it was not untU 1947 that 
7 Single men were billetted in repaired apartments. More likely, Manpower 
Division made no attempt to link its housing programme with recruiting 
targets, because it did not want to face the unpleasant chOices that a recognition 
of the true pOSition would involve. In particular, it might find itself forced to 
1 PRO FO 1005, 379. COPROD P(46)6. Manpower Division paper. 'Housing for 
Miners'. September 1946. 
2 HStaD NW53. 465, HQ MG Reg.Bez. DOsseldorfto Oberpn'isident. 12.9.1946. 
3 Calculated from the five-year plan figures given in 8AK Z40. 451, Memo. 
20.3.1947. 
4 An NGCC report in December talked of absorbing as many as 500- 600 recruits 
a day. or over 3.000 a week. PRO FO 1005,379. COPROD/P(46)21, NGCC Progress Report. 
22.12.1946. 
5 See figures of room gain in HStaD NW73. 260. Bericht Ober den 
Bergarbefterwohnungsbau nach dem Stande vom Ende M<lrz 1947. Table: 
'Instandsetzungen im Bereich des SVR'. 
6 Calculation from five-year plan figures In HStaD "NW73. 282,' ?lrector. RRPA. 
Programme for the Erection of Miners' Dwellings "Ruhr 4 7 / 48 . Appendix B. 
7 HStaD NW9.55. WBSR to WAM. 'Einweisung von allelnstehenden Bergleuten In 
mehrrnumtge Wohnungen', 28.6.1947. 
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give the miners even greater priority in relation to other repair programmes. 
Yet even the modest measures in the five-year programme had been introduced 
with great reluctance and the Division warned that the inadequate housing 
situation for other groups in the population might make the programme 
1 impossible to sustain. 
In any case, the new coal allocation did not materialise. In the fourth quarter 
of 1946, the monthly allocation to coal went up by about 20,000t and not 50,ooot 
as originally intended, while in the first quarter of 1947, it fell to little over half 
what it had been before the increase had been introduced.2 This was partly 
because coal production did not increase quite as fast as anticipated (although it 
3 had been progressing favourably), while the approach of winter increased the 
demands on coal. Yet bUilding materials' share of the available coal fell so 
dramatically that it is clear the authorities were not even attempting to honour 
4 the priority decisions of September and October. Instead, they continued to 
give exports priority, while at the same time making substantial increases to 
'essential civilian' requirements, including, for the first time, an allocation for 
domestic fuel. 5 The costs of this increased allocation were borne by secondary 
6 industries, above all building materials, but also engineering and chemicals. 
Very probably the 'civilian' allocations (which also included Military 
Government administration) were unaVOidable although they were twice as high 
as those at the beginning of 1946. Yet, sooner or later, Military Government 
1 PRO FO 1005, 379, COPROD P(46)6, Manpower DIvision paper, 'Housing for 
Miners', September 1946. 
2 Collins Papers, Loose Paper, Report on Miners' Housing, AGC/22, Gen/16, 
August 14, 1947, Enclosure 'B', Appendix 'A': Allocation of Coal for building materials In 
British Zone'. 
3 See table 2, p.119. 
4 Collins Papers, Report on Miners' Housing, Enclosure 'B', Appendix A. op,clt. 
5 Abelshauser, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland , p.144, table 43: Collins Pa~rs. 
Report on Miners' Housing, Enclosure 'B', Appendix B, op.clt. 
6 Ibid. 
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would have to accept the fact that unless it put more coal into secondary 
industries, the primary industries, above all mining would suffer. Not only 
housing but also mining supplies were becoming a serious bottleneck for coal 
production. 
What was the impact of these allocations on the volume of repairs? Statistics 
for the period are few and far between and there is good reason to believe that 
those available are not very accurate. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the 
overall volume (1e for miners and non-miners) of repairs in the Ruhr slowed 
down towards the end of 1946. Not only were few extra building materials 
reaching the Ruhr but in addition the houses now coming up for repair were 
more heavily damaged. At the end of 1946, the monthly completion rate of 
1 Ruhr housing overall was as low as 4,000 dwelling units. Within this 
diminishing repairs programme. it is true. minings' share rose considerably. 
Throughout much of 1946. about 40 percent of Ruhr repairs had gone to miners' 
2 housing. but in the final quarter this rose to between 60 and 75 percent. In 
other words. within the Ruhr. miners' housing was being given a clear new 
3 priority so that around 3.000 miners' dwelling units a month. This was still 
below the level of the (in any case inadequate) Manpower Division programme. 
and achieved only at the cost of other Ruhr inhabitants. At the beginning of 
1947. the general cutback in coal supplies and building materials production 
brought mining repairs even further down. in March to as little as 1.500 
4 dwelling units (d.u.'s). 
The tightness of coal supply given the continued commitment to exports was not 
1 Calculated from SVR Aufstellung (1949). op.cit. 
2 HStaO NW9. 112. SVR. First Aid Housing Repairs Ruhr area. reports for North-
Rhine and Westphalia. Reports Marchl947. 
3 SVR Aufstellung (1949). op.cit 
4 HStaO NW9. 112. SVR. First Aid Housing Repairs Ruhr area. reports for North-
Rhine and Westphalia. March 1947; HStaO NW9,55. Minutes of meeting on 22.2.1947. 
remarks of WAM representatJves. 
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the only reason for the slow progress of repairs. The other main constraint was 
the massive black market into which flowed a substantial proportion. 30 
percent according to one informed estimate. of the available supplies. 1 Despite 
all controls. much of the building work in the Ruhr was on shops and offices 
which by no stretch of the imagination could be considered essential bUildings. 
The system of housing licensing encouraged the black market. because 
authOrisation for repairs was generally given as long as the applicant could 
show that materials were available. Housing offiCials tended to turn a blind 
eye to unauthorised building or receipt of unauthorised building materials 
2 because the low level of fines made prosecution worthless. 
another example of the uncontrollable. 'controlled' economy. 
Here was yet 
It was therefore almost inevitable that housing should rapidly became a 
bottleneck. On 31 January. the NRW Manpower Department learned that there 
was no barrack or hostel accommodation left. 3 Suitable billets had run out and 
other types of building could not be converted for miners' use because of the 
dearth of accommodation stores - beds. cupboards. tables. chairs and blankets. 
For the previous four days. all new non-local recruits had had to be transferred 
4 
to Aachen coal field because there was nowhere to house them in the Ruhr. 
This was a major blow to the whole recruitment programme. 
Intensified use oj existing living space 
Whatever impact the crisis was to have on the repairs and reconstruction 
programme. in the short term the only measure swift enough was the 
1 WWA S22(OMGUS). Manpower 7/43-1/47. George S.Wheeler to Director. 
Manpower Division. Recruiting of workers for the Ruhr. 24.3.1947. 
2 Ibid. 
3 HStaD NW9. 55. Land Mp. Dept. NRW to WAM. 3.2.1947. 
4 HStaD NW9. 55. WBSR to WAM. Abt. VI. betr.: Unterbrtngung von Bergarbeltern. 
3.2.1947. 
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commandeering of existing living space and supplies of bedding and furniture. 
On the 1 February a crisis meeting was held at Villa Hugel. the fonner Krupp 
villa where the NGCC had its headquarters. Represented were the NGCC. the 
NRW Manpower Department. the Ruhr Housing Office. the GMSO and the 
1 Reconstruction Ministry. A whole battery of measures to achieve more 
effective utilisation of available room were proposed. Private accommodation 
should be more rigorously requisitioned and proven workers should be 
transferred from the camps into the accommodation. Miners were to be given 
absolute priority in the allocation of living space ahead of all other housing 
programmes. Housing inspection to identify inadequately used living space 
was to be intensified and buildings at present not classified as dwelling space 
were to be reviewed for possible use as temporary lodgings. The voluntary 
evacuation of non-miners was to be conSidered. Finally. the new miners 
themselves were initially to be given only a temporary residence permit which 
2 
could be revoked if they left the mines. 
Most of the policies implemented over the following months were those 
suggested at this meeting. In February. the WAM demanded a more vigorous 
housing inspection and instructed the municipalities that all rooms discovered 
3 
by the inspection were to be made available to the mining programme. A 
steady stream of instructions strengthening and clarifying the miners' priority 
4 followed throughout this and the follOwing year. At the same time. intensive 
efforts were undertaken to improve the supply of furniture and. after repeated 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid and HStaD NW 9.55. WBSR to Oberstadtdlrektoren. 'Betr.: Unterbrtngung 
von BergarbeiterzufOhrungen', 1.2.1947: WAM to Bate. 6.2.1947: HStaD NW 53. 465. 
Translation of letter from Chief Manpower Officer. Mil Govt .. NRW to WAM. 'Betr.: 
Unterbringung von auszubildenden ArbeitskrMten fOr die Bergwerke'. 3.2.1947. 
3 HStaO NW955 WAM (Wohnraumbewirtschaftung) to 
Oberstadt/Kreisdirektoren. 'U~ terbrtngung von Bergarbeitem 1m Ruhrgebiet' . 20.2.1947. 
4 See HStaO NW9.55. WAM (Wohnraumbewirtschaftung). Referat 
Bergarbeiterunterkunft. Essen. to Dept. IVC. 1.7.1948. 
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representations from the Manpower Authorities. miners were placed very high 
on the priority list for furniture allocation. preceded only by the Occupation 
Forces and certain other mandatory customers. 1 
A key development was the creation in March of a 'Coordinating COmmittee', 
founded and chaired by the head of the NRW Manpower Department. Phillip 
2 
Bate. This Committee brought British and German manpower. housing and 
mining offiCials together on a fortnightly basis to coordinate supplies and 
information. The municipal housing departments. for example. were instructed 
to phone through weekly reports on available living space to the WAM's Ruhr 
office and these were coordinated with information about labour demand and 
3 
availability. 
These measures were rewarded with considerable success. Over the year as a 
whole 23,000 bUlets for miners were found in private lodgings. An additional 
number were created in temporary accommodation such as the halls of public 
4 houses and so on. As the chairman of the Coordinating Committee observed. 
'any suggestion that the Ruhr could not accommodate the men had been 
5 disproved immediately the committee had been established'. 
In part, success was due to immanent features of the housing market: 'Die fast 
vOllige Lilckenlosigkeit, mit der die Dauernutzguter Wohnungen erfaJ3t werden 
k~nnen, die UnmOglichkett sie zu verheimlichen, zu transportieren. die 
LeichUgkeit, mit der Verwaltungsm~nahmen getroffen und durchgesetzt 
1 HStaO NW53. 465. Coordinating Committee. Minutes of 3rd Meeting. 3.4.1947: 
HStaD NW9.55. Coordinating Committee. Minutes of 7th Meeting. 2.5.1947. 
2 HStaD NW9.55. Bate. Land Manpower Dept. to NGCC, 14.3.1947. 
3 HStaD NW9.55. WBSR to Oberstadtdirektoren. 'Betr.: Unterbringung von 
Bergarbeltern'. 17.2.1947; Minutes of the meeting on 22.2.1947 in Mannesmannhaus, 
22.2.1947. 
4 HStaO NW9. 112. WAM. Dept IVC (WB). Memos. 'Betr.: Unterbrtngung der 
Ber~arbe1ter im Ruhrgebiet'. 10.1.1948 & 12.1.1948. 
5 HStaO NW9.55. Coordinating Committee, Minutes of 7th Meeting. 2.5.1947. 
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werden kOnnen ... ,I all meant that the enormous inefficiency that characterised 
attempts to control other types of resource was avoided here. 
There were two other prerequisites for the success of the operation which had 
not applied, say, six months earlier. First, it would have been inconceivable 
without the existence of a fairly well functioning administration. Until the 
establishment of the regional ministry, even modest controls over the 
municipalities had been impossible. Secondly, it was only in the new political 
climate of a public and demonstrable commitment to speedy reconstruction that 
the British authorities were prepared to take steps involving conSiderable costs 
and distress to other members of the population. That the British remained 
deeply conscious of the sensitivity of the whole operation was amply 
demonstrated by the fact that Military Government forbade all public 
pronouncements about the miners' housing programme unless endorsed by 
2 Military Government's Public Relations department. But they could be 
confident that the Gennan administration would support their endeavours. 
Within the German housing administration it is true that different departments 
showed varying degrees of willingness to engage in drastic measures of forCible 
requisitiOning and evacuation. The most hostile continued to be the municipal 
housing 3 officers. Yet the Ministry's own Ruhr housing office 
(Wohnungsbezirkstelle Ruhr) was uncompromisingly in favour of priority for 
the mines and proposed, among other measures. evacuating a local DP camp and 
transferring pensioners and widows from mining accommodation to the camp. 
1 Frtedrich Lotge. 'Kaplta1markt und Wohnungsbau. Einlge knappe Hlnwelse auf 
elnige umfangreiche Probleme'. in Deutsche Siedlungs- und Wohnungspolttik. 
Gegenwartsproblemattk und Zukunftsaspekte. Festschrift z. 25 jahrlgen Bestehen d:s 
Institutes for Siedlungs- und Wohnungswesen der Westfllltschen Wtlhelmsuntversitat 
MUnster. Cologne 1946. pp.151-175, here, p.67. 
2 HStaD NW9.55. WAM. Dept. III C(WB). Memo. 4.2.1947. 
3 Eg HStaD NW9 57 WBSR to WAM. Dept IYC (Wohnraumbewirtschaftung), 'Betr.: 
Belegung de; 1m Bergar~1te~ohnungsbauprogramm erstellten Wohnungen', 12.5.1948. 
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'eine durchaus einwandfreie Art (der Unterbrtngung)', according to the office!l 
Of course, there were still limits to the social costs or public resentment which 
the authorities were prepared to contemplate. No forced evacuations were made 
and voluntary evacuations were approached so cautiously that very few appear 
2 
to have taken place. Even in the case of mine-owned property, evictions of 
non-miners seem to have been the exception rather than the rule. An 
illustrative example happened in Dorstfeld where a mine, unusually, did try to 
evict all non-miners from colliery housing. The families refused to leave. The 
local Military Government representatives ordered the housing department to 
evict them. The department. unwilling to be dragged into the affair, pointed out 
that it had no police powers and suggested the British troops should do the job. 
The local commander, no doubt Similarly disinclined, refused and instructed 
the housing department to enlist the support of the German police. The police 
in turn would not cooperate until permission had been given from the 
responsible Military Government security offiCial. It seems that permission 
3 
was never given. 
BuUdmg castles in the air: the Miners' Housing Programme 'Ruhr 47/48' 
Even had all the rooms requisitioned gone to new miners, they could not alone 
have met new labour's reqUirements. The manpower target at the beginning of 
1947 was to bring in 1,700 workers from outside the Ruhr each week, of whom 
only 500 were to replace wastage, the remaining 1,200 representing a genuine 
4 
new requirement for accommodation. In any case, the housing programme 
1 HStaD NW9,55, WBSR. Report. Essen 6.3.1947. 
2 HStaD 9,54, WBSR to Sub-Regional Manpower Office. Essen. ·Betr.: Ausnutzung 
der In Geve1sberg fretgegebenen HAuser fOr Essener Familien', 12.7.1947. 
3 StaM Reglerung Arnsberg, 5.429, Stadtverwaltung LOnen to 
Reglenmgsprnsident Arnsberg. 28.9.1946. 
4 WWA S22(OMGUS), Manpower 7/43-1/47. OMGUS Public Relations Office. 
Statement for joint Anglo-American release at 1900 hours. 31.3.1947. 
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had to respond to the established workforce's needs as well. This might well 
improve productivity. Even if it did not. there was little doubt that 
concentrating all supplies on the newcomers would cause resentment among the 
established men and the risk of production losses. 
Thus, more housing was needed. Short of mass evictions, little more could be 
expected through inspection and requisitioning of existing property. The only 
alternative was to increase the volume of building work. Yet in the first quarter 
of 1947, the coal allocation to miners' housing had fallen to an all time low. 
amounting to only a fraction of even the Manpower Division programme's 
1 
modest requirements. 
As before, coal was the missing ingredient. The low allocations to domestic 
building materials production were being exacerbated by a general shortage of 
transport which allowed pithead stockpiles of coal to double between January 
2 
and February 1947. No one could accuse manpower offiCials or the North 
German Coal Control of not recognising the dangers of such limited house-
bUilding. They made repeated and vigorous protests at the declining 
construction rates. yet in March 1947 further cuts in the coal allotted appeared 
3 imminent. The pressure came from the urgent export programme. Both 
Britain and the US were as committed as ever to providing France with Ruhr 
coal, a policy which was as costly as it was understandable. A US manpower 
offiCial recorded a British colleague as saying that. 'in the anxiety to increase 
exports this year. the allocations were in effect establishing limits which would 
1 HStaD NW73. 481. Der Verbandsdirektor des SVR. Programm fOr den 
Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau 'Ruhr 1947/1948'. 28.3.1947. 
2 Abelshauser. Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland, p.144. table 44. 
3 PRO FO 1005. 380. NGCC progress report. 15.2.947: WWA S22(OMGUS). 
Manpower 7/43-1/47. George S.Wheeler to Director. Manpower Division. 24.3.1947. 
Recruiting of workers for the Ruhr. 
1 
operate for years to come'. 
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It was clear that something had to give. To a certain extent. the authorities 
resorted to the old solution of concentrating on local labour so as to ease 
demands on housing. 2 Yet this was an expensive solution which would 
ultimately cost more in terms of labour losses for other essential industries in 
the Ruhr than it would benefit the economy in terms of saving building 
materials. Really, the only answer was to redistribute coal and building 
supplies and accept the social, political or economic costs elsewhere that this 
would produce. 
A tentative step had been made in February when the British Manpower 
authorities invited the NRW Reconstruction Ministry to outline the 
requirements for housing the mines' present and projected labour force. The 
British brief was very general and did not stipulate a limit to the material or 
finanCial costs involved, specifying only that in order to encourage the 
3 
newcomers to stay camps and hostels were to be aVOided as far as possible. The 
Ministry asked Philip Rappaport to draw up a plan and in March, the head of the 
Building Industries Section of the US administration, RC.Hemy, met Rappaport 
4 to discuss his proposals. Henry suggested some alterations including an 
ambitious programme of pre-fabricated wooden houses to be built in the timber 
5 
yards of the US Zone and transported to the Ruhr. These were incorporated 
into a firmer version of the SVR programme drawn up a couple of days later. 
Manpower Division offiCials gave it a cautious welcome at a meeting on March 
1 WWA S22(OMGUS). Manpower 7/43-1/47, George S.Wheeler to Director. 
Manpower Division, Recruiting of workers for the Ruhr. 24.3.1947. 
2 See p.165 above. 
3 HStaD NW53. 465. Translation of a Memo from Bate. Chief of Land Manpower 
Department NRW to WAM, 24.2.1947. 
4 BAK Z40, 451, Minutes of meeting in Essen on 13.3.1947, 13.3.1947. 
5 HStaD NWI0. 91. Report on meetings concerning finance f~r new construction 
of miners' housing. 30.7.1947, section III: 'Ueferung von Fertigha.usem. 
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24th, but it was clear from their response that the proposal, which in many ways 
was rather a theoretical exercise, was very far from beCOming active poliey. One 
would be hard placed to fmd a more cautious statement than: 'In principle, the 
British officers are of the opinion that it may be correct to set up such an 
extensive programme, even if they have conSiderable doubts regarding its 
execution (as have the German agencies also).'l 
At the same time as these discussions were in progress, the Bipartite Economic 
Panel was still actively considering reducing the amount of coal for building 
supplies (among other secondary industries) in order to boost exports. 2 The 
Rappaport plan seemed destined to end up on that great unused pile of Worthy 
Memos on the Ruhr housing question. Fate decreed otherwise in the form of a 
piece of political brinkmanship by the OMGUS manpower administration. In 
effect, the miners' housing programme, like the Points System, was set in 
motion not by a carefully conSidered decision about resource allocation but by 
short-term political pressures which resulted in a complete reorientation of the 
established system of priorities. 
What happened in this case was that ever since Clay had agreed in January to 
supply 55,000 US Zone workers to the Ruhr. the OMGUS Manpower Division had 
3 been growing increasingly restive at the Ruhr housing situation. Finally, in 
exasperation at what he saw as lack of acknowledgement of the housing 
problem, George Wheeler. chief of the Labour Allocation Branch. authorised a 
press release stating that recruitment 'has had to be curtailed. despite the 
1 BAK Z40. 451. Translation No.285, 'Discussion regarding the Housin,:!; 
Programme 'Ruhr 1947/1948' on 24th March 1947'. 
2 WWA S22(OMGUS). Manpower 7/43-1/47. OMGUS Public Relations Office, 
Communiqu~ for Joint Anglo-American release. 31.3.1947. 
3 WW A S22(OMGUS). Manpower 7/43-1/47, Leo R. Werts. Memo for Chief. Wages 
and Labour Standards Branch. Subject: Housing in the Ruhr. 21.2.1947: T.AVeenstra. 
Manpower Allocation Branch to Director. Manpower Division. Subject: Recruitment 
programm for coal miners. 1.3.1947. 
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continued coal shortage, because of shortage of housing materials'. 1 This was 
not strictly accurate, because by that time the hOUSing requisitioning 
progranune had created a surplus of some 2,000 - 3,000 places for miners in the 
2 Ruhr. But in reality it was true that all attempts to bring in labour from 
outside the Ruhr and particularly the American progranune were running at a 
very slow pace because of the acconunodation shortages. Had US Zone labour 
been travelling northward at the rate it was supposed to, available billets in the 
Ruhr would have been exhausted in a couple of weeks. 3 
This press release had an immediate effect. As soon as he learned of it. the 
director of the US Economics DiviSion contacted his British counterparts to 
apologise for any damage to the recruitment drive. General Clay, at that point 
at the four-power conference in Moscow, sent an angry telegram pointing out 
that Wheeler's communique was 'absolutely inconsistent with our drive; it is a 
unilateral action completely at variance with our Bizonal Economic 
4 Agreement'. Clay instructed staff to take 'immediate steps in every possible 
,5 Th way to correct damage and to put new vigour in recruiting programme.. . e 
deputy director of Manpower Division noted after Clay's telegram that 'things 
6 have been pretty hot round here ever since'. A meeting was hurriedly organised 
in the Ruhr between the Americans Leo Werts (director of OMGUS Manpower 
1 WWA S22(OMGUS)' OM GUS Public Relations Office, For Information of 
Correspondents, Berlin 21.3.1947; R.G.Wheatley for Chief Manpower Officer, CCG(BE) to 
RG.O., 28.3.1947, Subject: Miners' Accommodation. 
2 WWA S22(OMGUS), Manpower 7/43-1/47, OMGUS Public Relations, Office, 
Communique for joint Anglo-American release, 31.3.1947; 7/44-1/38, Memo, Labour 
Force and recruitment for Ruhr coal miners', 14.6.1947 . 
3 WWA S22(OMGUS), Manpower 7/43-1/47. OMGUS Public Relations Office. 
Communique for Joint Anglo-American release. 31.3.1947. 
4 WWA S22(OMGUS). 7/43-1/47 Telegram US MllitaIy Attache Moscow. from Clay 
to Keating. 31.3.1947. 
5 Ibid. 
6 WWA S22(OMGUS). 7/43-1/47. V.C.Stevens. Acting Director Manpower DMslon. 
OMGUS, Memo for Mr.Werts, 1.4.1947. 
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Division), M.S.Szymczak and R.C.Henry and their British counterparts. 1 
Suddenly the SVR programme, from being little more than a theoretical exercise 
become the object of serious discussion. The Bipartite Economic Control Group 
convened a working party to look into the SVR's recommendations. 2 
Rappaport's programme presented a complete solution to the Ruhr miners' 
housing problem. Within two years, according to the plan, 130,000 members of 
the established workforce were to be rehoused or have their accommodation 
repaired while housing was to be found for 100,000 new miners. Through 
repairs and new construction, a total of 5,243,000 m2 additionalliv1ng space 
was to be created, almost 4 times the figure envisaged by Manpower Division's 
3 five-year programme. During the first year, the new plan would require more 
than three times as many building materials as the five-year programme, in the 
4 
second year almost five times as many. The programme had not attempted to 
make the difficult choice between improving the housing quality of the 
established men or making space for newcomers: it did both. Apart from the 
prefabricated houses rather unwillingly introduced on American advice, there 
were no provisional solutions. Neither Nissen huts nor temporary 
accommodation were envisaged and, an even more radical departure, all 
married men amongst the new miners (there seems to have been the assumption 
that two thirds of the new men would be married) were to receive family 
accommodation within the two year period. The space allocation allowed per 
miner - 9 m 2 for a single miner and 45 m 2 for a miners' familyS - was, while 
1 WWA S22(OMGUS), 7/43-1/47, OMGUS Public Relations Office Communique for 
Joint Anglo-American release, 31.3.1947. 
2 WWA S22(OMGUS), 7/43-1/47, OMGUS Public Relations Office Communique for 
Joint Anglo-American release, 3.4.1947. 
3 HStaD NW73, 282, Director SVR, Programme for the Erection of Miners' 
Dwellings 'Ruhr 47/48' (henceforth 'Ruhr 47/48'), p.4: (for Gennban 1~~ag~;:;SJ~~4~.e 
HStaD NW73, 481, Programm fUr den Bergarbeiterwohnungs au u r . 
28.3.194 7). 
ot 'Ruhr47/48', p.S. 
5 Includlng hall and kitchen. 
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certainly not being over-generous. acceptable by normal standards. 1 Thus all 
Ruhr interests would be satisfied: the houSing authorities would not be forced to 
approve sub-standard dwellings: the established miners would not resentfully 
look on while newcomers absorbed all the available supplies and the newcomers 
would not only be found a place to live but would be offered a standard of 
accommodation which they could not find anywhere else. encouraging them to 
strike permanent roots in the Ruhr. 
The other side to the programme was of course that it would create large 
inequalities and involve very heavy social and economic costs at a time of 
general scarcity. At the current level of coal allocation. for instance. the 
miners' housing programme would absorb half of all building materials in the 
2 British Zone. It would place enormous demands on the available supply of 
timber. The Bavarians had still not fulfilled their 1946 timber commitment of 
just 28.000m3 and yet the new plan cheerfully required 112.375 m3 of timber in 
the first year for repair and reconstruction and a further 180.000 m3 for the first 
3 
nine months of the pre-fabricated housing programme! Over three quarters of 
construction workers in the Ruhr would have to be directed to miners' housing.4 
It was far from certain whether this degree of resource concentration could be 
economically or socially justified. 
It was equally uncertain whether. should the necessary priorities and 
allocations be established. the programme would even then be feaSible. Peak 
bUilding performance in the pre-war period had been about 300.000 houses a 
1 Hostels for single miners would have a combined dwelling space of around 
300.000 m2 or room for approx. 35.000 new miners. 
2 Based on allocation in first quarter in Collins Papers. Report on Miners' 
Housing. Enclosure 'B'. Appendix B. op.cit. . 
3 HStaO NW73. 282. Minutes of second Meeting of the Working Party on Miners 
Housing to the Bipartite EconomiC Control Group. 14.5.1947. 
4 HStaO NW73.481. Rappaport to WAM. 'Betr.: Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau·. 
22.9.1947. 
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year for Germany as a whole or roughly 50,000 houses for the North Rhine-
Westphalia region; bearing in mind that that had been in an economy without 
comparable material shortages, with a functiOning currency and with fully 
productive labour, it becomes apparent just how ambitious was the 'Ruhr 47/48' 
target of 130,000 repairs and 65,000 new houses in two years. 1 Experts in the 
Ministry of Reconstruction believed that with the best will in the world it was 
unlikely to be completed in less than five years. 2 
These weaknesses should not be cast at the feet of the programme's author. 
Philip Rappaport. He had simply set out to show what would be required, were 
satisfactory housing for all miners within two years to be accepted as a general 
target. Perhaps the plan outline was not quite explicit enough on the 
difficulties that stood in the way of its realisation. Rappaport, as the report 
itself makes clear, was keen for the SVR to remain in charge of any plan. In 
particular, he wished to avoid the NGCC or some Similar economic authority 
taking charge which, he believed, might lead to housing that was undesirable in 
architectonic and social political terms. To that extent, he was perhaps 
overanxious to play down the problems and it was only later that he would 
3 distance himself much more vigorously from the plan. 
Whatever Rappaport's culpability, the fact is that the plan received a series of 
endorsements from the bipartite economic authorities. On 28 March the final 
plan was submitted and three days later, COPROD called on the Bipartite 
Economic Control Group (BECG) to set up a working party to investigate its 
4 feasibility . On 18 April, the working party submitted an interim report to the 
1 HStaD NWI0, 91. Unsigned Memo from WAM. 'Zur Frage des Ruhr-
BergarbeIteIWohnungsbaues'. 19.5.1947. 
2 Ibid. 
3 HStaD NW73. 481. Rappaport to WAM. ·Betr.: Bergarbelterwohnungsbau·. 
22.9.1947. 
4 HStaO NW73. 282, Minutes of second Meeting of the Working Party on Miners' 
Housing to the Bipartite Economic Control Group. 14.5.1947. 
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BECG. supportlng the plan and suggesting that the coal allocation of 28.000t be 
1 
made mandatory. The BECG and its senior Sister in the bipartite 
administration. the Bipartite Economic Panel both endorsed the report. 
Though it hesitated to introduce a mandatory coal requirement (in order not to 
reduce unnecessarily the flexibility of the coal allocation machinery), the 
Bipartite Economic Panel nevertheless called for 'strong pressure' to be exerted 
on the Executive Committee for Economics (Verwaltungsamt fur Wirtschaft), the 
bizonal German body now responsible for coal allocation, to ensure that the 
housing programme received the necessary coal and also preferential treatment 
in respect of timber and glass. 2 
A summer of discontent 
It might be expected that endorsement from the highest economic authorities 
within Military Government would suffice to ensure the plan's implementation. 
There was, however. strong reSistance to the recommendations from the 
Verwaltungsamt and its successor, the Verwaltung fur Wirtschaft (VtW).3 with 
the result that, untfl July. monthly coal allocations to the building programme 
4 
were only about half the recommended levels. In addition. the VfW was very 
reluctant to allot wood to miners' housing in anything like the amounts 
required. so that in June the BECG working party felt obliged. once again, to 
1 PRO FO 1005, 380, COPROD P(47) 21, Interim Report and Recommendations of 
working party on Miners' Housing to Bipartite Economic Control Group. 18.4.1947. 
2 WWA S22(OMGUS). BICO BIECO Series 17/8203/12 - 1947. MInutes oftbe 14th 
Meeting of the Bipartite Economic Panel. BIECO/M(47)12. 14.5.1947. 
S Except where It Is necessmy to do 80. the (ollowlng account does not dlstlDg1.dah 
between Verwaltungamt fOr Wlrtschaft and Verwaltung (ar wtrtachaft and the 
abbreviation VfW Is used throughout. The Verwaltungsamt came Into being In 
September 1946 with the creation of the blzonal area. '!be change In name In May 1947 
was part of a general restructuring of blzonal Institutions. '!be Wlrtschaftsra~ v;:a 
created and a new 'Exekutlvaussch~' acted as the link between Wlrtschaftarat an e 
IndMclual admlnlstratlons. 
4 13.300t In May. June and July. See HStaD NW53. 465, HQNGCC. MInes 
Suppbes Department. Translation of minutes of 3rd meeting of BECG working party. 
4.6.1947. 
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stress that the miners' housing wood contingent should be given top priority. 1 
It would go beyond the limits of this study to attempt a national cost-benefit 
analysis and establish whether the VfW's resistance was justified. But when it 
is borne in mind that for the whole of the bizonal area, only 160,ooot of coal a 
month were available for building requirements, and that this had to cover all 
industrial reconstruction, transport repairs and private bUilding, it is easy to 
understand why the VfW was very hesitant to provide the mines with a quota of 
2 28,000t. 
What distinguished 'Ruhr 47 / 48' from the Points System, was that the former 
impinged far more directly on established economic priorities, whereas the 
Points System could be met largely at the cost of private consumption. The 
social cost of the Points System was high, but the impact on economic 
reconstruction was limited mainly to the loss of worker productivity caused by 
their actual or relative deprivation in terms of foodstuffs and consumer goods. 
Housing was different. Even those vrw officials who were advocates of special 
measures for the miners argued that it was virtually impossible with the 
available coal to provide for a special miners' building programme 
3 
As far as 
wood is concerned it was apparent to the VfW that many recognised priority 
consumers would have to be neglected if the 'Ruhr 47/48' plan were to be 
honoured in full. 4 
The VfW's reSistance to this level of favouritism will have been strengthened by 
1 HStaO NWI0, 91. President of the ZAA to WAM, 30.9.1947: HStaD NW53, 465, 
HQNGCC, Mines Supplies Department. Translation of minutes of 3rd meeting of BECG 
working party, 4.6.1947. 
2 For the British Zone on its own, the monthly coal allocation was approximately 
100,000t, of which the miners' programme would have swallowed ~~re ,t~an a quarter. 
Collins Papers, Report on Miners' Housing, enclosure 'B', Appendices A & B, op.clt. d 
3 HStaD NW73, 458, VfW, Arbeitsgruppe Kohle, to WAM. 26.4.1947, slgne 
Deissmann. 
4 HStaD NW10, 91. President of the ZAA to WAM. 30.9.1947. 
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the knowledge that the 'Ruhr 47/48' plan went far beyond the minimum 
requirements necessary for housing new labour and was an optimum plan. in 
which few corners had been cut. The VfW might well argue that it made no 
economic sense to treat mining as though supply conditions had normalised. 
while the the rest of the economy was desperately short of coal and wood. Under 
these circumstances, the 13,300t allocated by the VfW was probably much nearer 
an appropriate figure than the 28,000t of the Rappaport's plan. 
Why were the perceptions of the VfW and the bipartite economic authorities so 
divergent? One reason must be that the latter were continually under pressure 
to increase coal exports, whereas the VfW regarded the high level of underpriced 
coal transfer to overseas countries as a major hindrance to reconstruction. 
The VfW had no interest in delaying the rest of the reconstruction in order to 
1 
maximise coal output that would only partly benefit the nation's economy. To 
a certain extent, then, both sides were making rational economic decisions 
within their own different frames of reference. Yet it is doubtful whether the 
bipartite bodies had fully considered the implications of the allocations they 
demanded. Under pressure to do something fast for miners' housing. it had 
taken only a couple of meetings for Rappaport's policy to be approved. 
Probably, the communication gap between the German administration that had 
produced the housing plan and the Allied administration that approved it 
inhibited recognition of the enormous concentration of resources and energy 
and the cost to the rest of the economy that the plan would involve. 
It might be countered that, given the bureaucratic inertia of a controlled 
economy, it made sense for Military Government to demand the impossible in 
order to attain 'the possible'. Yet there is ample evidence that the bipartite 
agencies remained for many months under the impression that the full plan 
1 Abelshauser. wtrtschaft in westdeutschland . p.143. 
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1 
could be achieved. In addition. the exaggerated demands proved counter-
productive because in the long-tenn they strengthened the resistance to giving 
miners' housing priority and because the battles over the allocation diverted 
attention from ensuring the efficient deployment of those resources that were 
allocated. 
The importance of the latter point becomes apparent if the repair figures for the 
first half of 1947 are conSidered. As already noted. the first three months of 
1947 had seen building supplies to miners' housing fall to an all time low. 
2 Repairs fell to between 1,450 and 1,850 d.u.'s a month. In the second quarter 
of 1947. the VfW increased the coal contingent by almost 13 times3 over the 
levels actually received in the first quarter. Yet the repairs' completion rate 
4 
rose only to 7.700 for the quarter or around 2.550 d.u.'s a month. That this did 
not manifest simply a delay between making a coal allocation and seeing its 
impact on repairs. was proven when in July and August repairs' progressed even 
more slowly; in August, nonnally the peak building month of the year. the 
completion rate was virtually as low as it had been at any time since the 
5 
capitulation. 
This strikingly weak performance initially went unnoticed by the Allied 
authorities, who were more concerned at the VfW's unwillingness to implement 
the full agreed allocations. That concern increased when it appeared that the 
successful room requisitioning programme was beginning to exhaust the 
1 HStaD NW73. 481, Rappaport to WAM. 22.9.1947; Collins Papers. Loose Paper. 
Report on Miners' Housing. Enclosure 'A'. op.cit. 
2 HStaD NW9. 112. SVR. First Aid Housing Repairs Ruhr area. reports for North-
Rhine and Westphalia. Feb-March 1947 . 
3 13 300t is of course more than thirteen Urnes 1,000t but the fonner figure 
included the 'allocation for the small Cologne and Aachen coal fields as well. 
4 HStaD NW9. 112. WAM. Ref. 01/314 - Bo/N .. Memo, '8ergarbelterwohnungsbau -
Wohnraurnzugang.'.21.1.1948. 
5 Ibid. 
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available supplies of private dwelling space. 1 Just as significant was the 
growing seriousness of the labour supply situation in North-Rhine Westphalia. 
where the Ruhr mining industry's reliance on local recruits was denuding other 
key industries of able-bodied men.2 In June, the Chiefs of the British and U.S. 
Manpower Divisions visited the Ruhr and subsequently requested the bipartite 
economic authorities to make the 28,OOOt of coal a mandatory requtrement.3 
The BECG acceded to this request and the VfW was thus at last obltged to comply. 
Top level endorsement of this mandatory top priority was given by the 
Washington Coal Conference'. 4 The conference also called for the BECG 
working party into miners' housing to be made into a permanent committee, in 
order to ensure that the programme was carried out.5 
The full 28,OOOt of coal was allotted to miners' housing for the first time in 
August and continued to be awarded more or less in full untll December. 6 
According to British experts, 60 percent of available building materials in the 
7 British Zone was being injected into miners' housing. Yet the amazing fact is 
that the progress of repairs actually fell (see table 6). Even more disastrous was 
the failure of the prefabricated and new hOUSing programme. In the first year. 
according to the plan 15,000 pre-fabs were to be delivered. By January 1948, 
8 just 22 had been delivered and six more called forward. Overall, the first year 
1 Collins Papers, Report on Miners' Housing, Enclosure 'A', op.dt. 
2 PRO FO 1005, 380, COPROD P(47)34, Note by Chiefs of British and 
U.S.Manpower DlvIslons on a recent visit to British Zone, June 1947. 
SIbld 
4 See chapter 3, p.149 and WWAS22(OMGUS), BICO BISEC 11/103-2/22, BICO 
Coal Committee (COCOM), Minutes of the first meeting of the Coal Comlttee, 15.12.1947. 
Annex: BIB/P(47) 112/1, 'Implementation of the report on Analc:Ameri~ : ~n :-
coal producUon'; 'Recommendations of the washington talks, annex: e or 
HOUSing. Report of the Working Par11 • , 
5 The new committee was known as the 'Standing Committee on Ruhr ~r:r 
Houstng' and met for the ftrst time on 20.8.1947. See BAK Z40. 449, BEC947 O. MJnu 
flrat meeting of the standing Committee on Ruhr MIners' Housing. 25.8.1 • 
8 HStaD NW53, 465. MInutes ofMeettng held on 15.1.1948. January 1948. 
7Ib1d 
a HStaD 9.56, Land Manpower Department. NRW to RubL WAM. 29.1.1948. 
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of the programme created 200,000 m 2 of dwelling space, or less than 4 percent of 
the two year target. 

















Trying to find wood in the bureaucratic Jungle 
The coal contingent might have been made mandatory, but the Gennan 
authorities' resistance to the plan continued to hinder progress. particularly in 
supplies of timber. Neither with respect to timber nor other ancillary materials 
did the same mandatory priority apply. The result was that the VfW simply 
maintained its resistance to the 'Ruhr 47/48' programme in these allocations 
and refused to give miners' housing any greater priority 'wegen der berechtigten 
Antrage anderer Bedarfstrager'. 2 Indeed, as the importance of the coal 
bottleneck receded in comparison with other shortages (such as transport), the 
vrw's resolve only hardened. As Dr. Keiser wrote to Rappaport. in November. 
Wichtiger als neue Anlegungen zu forcieren, scheint mir dafur zu sorgen. daJ3 die 
Reichsbahn in der Lage 1st, Kohle zu transportleren, und daJ3 die Wirtschaft in 
den Stand gesetzt wlrd, sle entsprechend slnnvoll aufzunehmen'. 
3 
In 
consequence, Ruhr repairs and particularly the pre-fabs programme suffered 
from an acute shortage of wood and other supplementary materials. 
1 HStaD NW9, 112, WAM, Ref. 01/314 - So/N., Memo. 'Bergarbelterwohnungsbau -
Wohnraurnzugang:. 21.1.1948. 
2 HStaD NW73, 47. Dr. Keiser. vew, to ZAA. '8etr.: Vorrangbel1eferung des 
Holzkontingents fOr den Bergarbelterwohnungsbau', 9.12.1947. 
3 HStaD NW73, 47. Dr. Keiser. vrw. to Rappaport. 12.11.1947. 
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Why was the VfW successful in its opposition here where it had falled on the coal 
contingent? For one thing the VfW's stance was strengthened by the resistance 
of the Southern lAnder that would be supplying most of the wood. 1 Disinclined 
to do NRW favours at any time, they grew increasingly hostile to what they saw 
as the inordinate demands of the housing programme. 2 It is hard to say 
whether it was the Southern Ulnder that induced the VfW to reduce allocations to 
the Ruhr or whether the latter Skillfully fanned the flames of Southern 
opposition as a counterweight to the bipartite muscle backing up the 'Ruhr 47/48' 
programme. There is evidence for both points of view.3 Even then, a clearer 
priority on wood might have emerged had not various elements within Military 
Government itself begun to have doubts about the advisability of the 'Ruhr 47/48' 
plan. Most Significant, perhaps, was the endorsement given by the US building 
trades' chief and original proponent of the pre-fabs programme, Hemy, to the 
Southern LAnder's resistance to the demands.4 In January 1948. the NRW 
authorities mournfully resigned themselves to the fact that 'Die gestellten 
AntrAge an die Besatzungsmacht zum Zwecke der Festlegung einer PrioritAt auch 
fdr den Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau sind ... noch Dicht genehmJgt worden: es 
5 bestehe auch wohl keine Hoffnung darauf. 
Many projects for which the bricks and stone were available were held up by the 
absence of ancillary materials. The director of the SVR reported In September 
1947 that electrical materials were In such short supply that not even the small 
1 HStaD 10.91. President of the ZAA to WAM, 20.9.1947. 
2 HStaD NW73. 47. WAM. Ref. lllA - ISO/I. Memo. 29.1.1948. sJgned Baerlecken. 
3 In October 1947. for example. when the VfW wrote to the SEC~ :pI:,ntng 
that the housing programme was being treated as offictal polley wttho d ~ 
being properly presented to the VfW for examination. it ~~!!.)ts= to :bel ':s:~ml 
letter to the southern LInder. As the WAM angrily noted. ~&, .. 2 WAM to vtw 
Llndem den Elndruck einer MlBwlrtschaft erweckt.' HStaD :i~ vrW bad acttve.y 
26.11.1947. The same Jetter contained further evidence 
dIacouraged del1verles to the housing programme. 'S tr • 
" HStaD 10, 91. President of the ZAA to WAM. 20.9.1947. e .• 
Beqarbeiterwohnungabau' • 
15 HStaD NWBl, 555. WAM. Memo. 29.1.1948. 
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supply of Nissen huts had been put in order. 1 Only a fraction of the roof tiles 
needed had been suppUed. In the financial year 1947 the repairs and new 
construction (excluding the pre-fabs) required some 58.849 m3 of wood. Yet up 
till the begtnning of October 1947. only 4.400 m3 had been delivered and over the 
year as a whole. only about one sixth of wood ordered actually arrived. 2 The 
British Manpower Department in NRW reported that. We have now all around us 
3 partially completed jobs'. 'Ideally'. continued the report. 'this job would be 
staged as a ttmajor operationtt and catered for as such in regard to every aspect'. 
As it was. every single item - coal. wood. labour. transport and so on - was 
covered by different priorities and conditions. 4 
BuUdtng, barter and the black economy 
Apart from the feeling that the plan figures were inappropriate for the national 
economy. what strengthened Henry's opposition and contributed to the VfW's 
resolve were two key weaknesses in the miners' programme. One. whose effects 
in the first months of the programme have already been noted. was the 
enormous wastage and inefficiency that characterised it from its inception. 
The fact that there were fewer repairs in August 1947 than there had been in 
February though the coal allocation had in the meantime increased by a factor 
of at least 10. was evidence that a huge amount of coal earmarked for miners' 
housing was seeping into other building projects - and indeed other econom.lc 
sectors in NRW. 
All observers in the Ruhr talked of an enormous black economy In the buildmg 
1 HStaD NW 73,481. Rappaport to WAM. 22.9.1947. vrw 
2 ibid. & HStaD NW13. 47. Copy of minutes ofmeetlng In Frankfurt at the on 
22.1.1948. 26.1.194& Dept. 
sWWAS22 (OMGUS) Blca BISEC 11/107-2/1-4. Hg NRWLand ManpoWer 
to Joint ChaIrmen. UK/USCCG. 16.4.1948. 
• Ibtd. 
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sector. The British Officer responsible for the administrative district of 
Amsberg. into which fell a substantial portion of the eastern Ruhr area as well 
as some more rural parts of NRW. reported in May 1947 that the 'German 
adminiStration seems to have completely failed to direct building materials to 
the places where they are wanted. Everywhere I go in this Regierungsbeztrk I see 
building going on except in the Ruhr areas ... Unless something is done to stop 
this tremendous leakage of building materials to the Black Market, I do not 
think. we shall ever get enough houses built for the miners.,1 By August 1947, 
the same observer noted that 'the lamentable failure of the German 
Administration to take adequate steps to house the miners in the Ruhr area 
becomes more obvious every day'. After estimating that 75 percent of building 
materials were going on to the Black Market. he reported that 'All (underlining 
in original. MR) mining Kreise say that repairs for miners' housing are 
practically at a standstill owing to lack of building material and labour'. a fact 
which he attributed to an 'incompetent and corrupt German administration'. 
2 
and to low fines for illegal building. 
The exasperation was genuine and understandable but the explanation was an 
oversimplification. Some of the problems had little to do with either 
corruption or incompetence and more with the inherent weakness of a 
controlled economy. For example. the firms responsible for transport1ng the 
building materials often demanded to be paid in kind. receiving sometimes as 
3 
much as four flfths of the contingent! 
An even more fundamental problem. as Werner Plumpe has shown recently. was 
1 PRO FO 1005. 1603. HQ Mllitaly Government. Regtenmgabezirk Amaberg. 
Monthly Report for May 1947. 
:I PRO FO 1005. 1603. HQ Militaly Government. Regterungabezlrk Amaberg. 
Monthly Report for AugU8t 1947. dlacua8 buJkUng 
s HStaD NW53. 465. Minutes of meettng held on 15.1.1948 to 
materials for mtners' houalng. January 1948. 
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the weakness of the regional administration. 1 British authOrities in NRW 
acknowledged that it was 'administratively Impossible' for the HOuSing 
Ministry rigidly to control the Kreise.2 Such inspectorates as did exist were 
hampered by shortages of personnel, transport and paper.3 Even more 
important than objective resource shortages were the vested interests, 
particularly NRW industrialists and chambers of commerce, which had been 
able to prevent the Economics Ministry from setting up an effective 
administration. 4 As a result. the authorities were simply not in a position to 
ensure that the allotted coal really did produce building suppUes. that the 
supplies really did reach the miners' hOUSing programme or that the 
5 programme's repairs really did benefit miners. When a special COmmission 
was set up to investigate the problems in the Ruhr, both German and British 
partiCipants discovered that it was virtually impossible to obtain a clear picture 
of the size of coal transports to the building industry. about the level of building 
materials production or about the amount of materials made available to 
miners' housing projects. The Economics Ministry's reports were completely 
inadequate. 6 
Partly because of this weakness, there was a wUlingness from the WAM 
downwards to accept a conSiderable amount of losses to the black market. 
Though everyone knew of the miners' importance. few beUeved that the coal 
production programme was for German benefit alone, so that many omctals 
1 Werner Plumpe, 'Auf dem Weg in die Marktwtrtsc~:f:1n O~~r~:~~ 
Industrlelnteressen. Wlrtschaftsverwaltung und BeS!~~~ seine A .. ~ nach 
Westfalen 1945-1947'. In G.Brunn (ed.), Nordrhefn-WesvUlC'u ,..tI .... .," 
1945/1946. Essen 1986. pp.67-84. Dept. 
2 WWA S22 (OMGUS) BICO BISEC 11/107-2/1-4. Hg NRW Land Manpower 
to Joint ChaJrmen. UK/USCCG. 16.4.1948. 
Slbld a HStaD NW9.55. WAM to Hg M1l1taJy aavemment. NRW, 'Betr.: UntakQnfte 
fOr Bergleute', 13.3.1947. 
4 Plump:. 'Auf clem wet. p.I7SJf. 
5 HStaD NW73. 47. Baerlecken to Paul. 'Betr.: Bauatoffe fOr den 
Berprbelterwohnungabau·. 13.1.1948. 
e ibid. 
;;:,uppnes m aemand 196 
were not completely persuaded of the houSing programme's virtues. To add to 
their readiness to turn a blind eye. the seepage on to the black market benefited 
both general population and NRW economy. At the first meeting of the BECG's 
Standing Committee on Ruhr Miners' Housing in August 1947. at which German 
offiCials were in attendance. the bipartite authorities stressed the need for 
vigorous action to eradicate illegal building. It was noteworthy that the NRW 
Reconstruction Minister pointed out not only that it was very difficult to combat 
such 'black building' but also defended it with the comment that it was not only 
the miners who needed housing. Not surprisingly. he received a very finn 
reminder of the economic reasons for giving the miners priOrity. 1 
It was at the muDicipallevel that the resistance to giving the mines priority was 
clearest. Municipal housing offices frequently allotted houses constructed in 
the 'Rubr 47 148' programme to non-miners.2 It is a plausible assumption that a 
lot of the misallocations at municipal level were del1berate. A regional official 
charged with checking municipal housing allocation procedures noted with 
barely concealed disbelief that the Dortmund housing administration had 'bis 
August 1947 angeblich Dicht ge~t. daB aus dem Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau-
programm nur fur Bergarbeiter vorgesehene Wohnungen versorgt werden 
konnten,.3 Yet. because of its lack of administrative clout. the NRW regional 
administration could do little about this even when it wanted to. 
The British were well aware of the problem yet in housing as in other areas of 
resource control4 proved unable to achieve the radical restructurtng required. 
In July 1947. at a meeting of the BECG working party on miners houstng. 
1 BAK Z40. 449. BECG. Minutes of first meeting of the Standing Committee on 
Ruhr MIners' HousIng. 25.8.1947. 
2 HStaD NW9 56. WBSR to WAM. 5.2.1948 and annex. ell 
• 2) ~cbt abel' e 
s HStaD NW9. 57. WAM. Dept IIIB 3ba- 150gramm/3 - (1 s 'In der Stadt Dortmund'. Durehto.hrung des aergarbelterwohnunga upro 
14.5.1948. 
"Aumpe. 'Auldem wet. p.I73ff. 
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questions from R.C.Henry about controlling coal allocations resulted in an 
1 
embarrassed sUence, presumably because the British did not feel in a position 
to introduce a more rigorous control of the German administration. In autumn 
1947 the wastage was so catastrophic that the pressure for a thorough 
investigation could not be resisted. Yet despite a special Coordinating 
2 Committee investigation, despite six weeks of investigations and some very 
3 tough talking enormous losses continued. 
One other source of inefficiency worth noting is the low productivity of 
construction workers. Often poorly housed, underequipped and underfed. 
construction gangs were working at only a third of pre-war productivity. 4 
Consideration was given to the idea of an incentive scheme for the construction 
workers, but the idea was rejected because of the negative impact it would have 
on other sections of labour. In reality, this was a problem that could not be 
solved untfl more food was available and enough goods could be purchased to 
5 give wages real value. 
The spectre of .finance 
Alongside the enormous wastage, the other feature of the housing programme 
which raised hackles in Frankfurt was that the question of its financing was 
never resolved. It is clear from the records that Henry's decJs10n to back the US 
ZOne LInder's reSistance came Just after the full extent of the finance problem 
1 HStaD NW73 259, WAM, DepL III Bl, Memo. 9.7.1947, 'Bezug: ~-,!~ung : 
, U1a HI\ ..... l' The notes are marked by a ,-vuaulNUD on Blp. B. von 9.7.1947 In Essen. V &oOfiJth-·fin cia1 ~rt oftbe NOCC, and Henry. 1be part of the Germans between Hembry, e an --r- Hembry' 
latter appears in the notes as 'cler amerikanische vertreter, Mr. • CommIttee 
2 HStaD NW9, 112, Minutes of the 25th Meeting of the CoordInaUng • 
27.11.1947. 1948 to c:Uacu" buOdJDg 
s HStaD NW53, 465, Minutes of meeting on 15.1. 
mater1ala for minerS' housing, Janu8!Y 1948. 
" HStaD NW5S, 643, WAM to MJntsterp'ISIdet. 4.3.1948. 
5 BAKZ13, 19& VlWtoVerwaltungaraL 15.5.1948. 
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1 
had become clear. The VfW, too, used uncertatnties about funding as one of its 
arguments against a greater concentration of material resources on the Ruhr. 
At first sight it is strange that finance should have been a problem at all. In a 
planned economy, money could be expected to have little s1gniflcance. servtng 
merely as a sort of supplementary coupon establiShing the I1ght of the reCipient 
to obtain goods. Yet in respect of finance. the economy in the Occupation period 
revealed itself to be not a planned economy at all. Finance had not been 
centralised in the same way as the allocation of material resources and money 
led an independent existence. As Theo Horstmann has written. the 'Relchsmark 
hatte zwar ihre Funktlon als ausschlie$liches TauschmlUel fur wlchUge 
Bereiche des Guter- und LeistungselWerbs schon selt IAngerer Zeit verloren, aber 
der Besitz einer Bezugsberechtigung allein war zwetfellos nur erne notwendige. 
doch keinesfalls hinreichende Bedtngung fur einen Kauf: Das zu eIWerbende Gut 
2 
m1.\6te auch bezahlt werden - mit lmappem Geld!'. 
In the case of the miners' housing programme, bizonal supplies were being 
allocated to the mines but no provision had been made for a flow of bizonal 
funds to go to the Ruhr in order that the supplies might be paid for. Coal and 
wood allocations were made at bizonallevel but housing was generally a matter 
3 
for the individual lAnder and not normally a charge on the bizOnal budget. 
Moreover, the Land's responsibility was not that clear cut either. In parttcular, 
it was not clear what its obUgations were vis a vis privately owned housing. In 
the British Zone, the LAnder and municipalities were committed to provide 
money for repairS. yet at a rate which did not rn fact cover the fuD cost. For new 
1 HStaD NW73. 458. Translation. BECG, MInutes of Srd meeUDg of Standing 
Committee. 19.9.1947. Uape Banken- unci 
2 Theo Horstmann. 'Ole An~ .. ~r d~:.r==.,r: Pe- and Eudmer 
Kredltpol1t1k In der brltlschen Zone &WIIMOA.en 
(ecIa.). wtrtschqftspoUtOc. p.215-234. here p.220. 
3 See p.l89. text and fbotnote S. 
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construction, there was no clear-cut financing arrangement. 1 
Even so, it is hard to see why finance should have been a problem when it is born 
in mind that goods were so much scarcer than money. In the pre-l948 economy. 
it rarely happened that consumers lucky enough to receive an allocation of 
suppUes were not in a position to pay. So why was it that as early as September 
1947 the whole issue of finance loomed so large that Rappaport saw it as 'die 
wichtigste aller Fragen 1m Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau,?2 Surely NRW could 
have advanced enough money to keep the programme going for quite a while? 
Failing that, could the lAnder not have put up the money? 
Indeed they could. The finance question became critical long before cash 
reseIVes ran out. By March 1948, less than half the money set aside for miners' 
3 hOUSing by the NRW Reconstruction Minister, for instance, had been spent. In 
other words, the financial problem was not a question of lack of money. 
The point was that no one wanted to set a precedent. The overall volume of 
miners' housing was so large that no one wanted to be saddled with the eventual 
bill. The cost of the envisaged new construction, for example, were It ever to be 
realised in its entirety, was getting on for ten times the entire NRW budget for 
new housing. 4 For the other lAnder there was an additional fear. TIle 
5 
Bavarian representative in the Exekutlvrat wrote in December 1947 that: 
Die Lelstung von Zuschllssen zum Bau von Bergarbe1terwohnungen 1m 
1 HStaD NWI0 91 President of the ZAA to WAM, 11.10.1947: BBA 32, 1064. 
Hibernia report. 'Bergarbelt~lWOhnungsbau 1945-1948', Febnwy 1949. 
2 HStaD NW53, 643, WAM to personal assistant of the MJnJater President. 
4.3.1948; HStaD NW73, 481, Rapport toWAM. 22.9.1947. 
s HStaD NW53, 643, WAM to personal assistant of the MJnlster President. 
4.3.1948. RM ofwblch 30 
" NRW budget alIocaUon for new housing In ~ B:;~~ ~cUon In 
mJllion were allocated to Ddners' housing. ~ C:S~ ~10, 91, Prealdent of the 1M to 
the Rappaport plan was 386 milUon RM. 
WAM, 1l.10.19476:WAMtDZAA. 17.10.1947. Daember J948. 
5 Akten zur voryeschlchte tier BRD 1945 - 1949. Band 4 JanuDr -
Munich 1983, p.18&. 
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Ruhrgebiet durch die Bizone oder deren lAnder mu~te auch unter dem 
Gesichtspunkt Bedenken auslosen. da~ sie wohl der erste Schritt ZUT 
Einbeziehung der suddeutschen LAnder in die Subventi ni d 
Ruhrkohlenbergbaus w~e. 0 erung es 
Apart from the sheer size of the potential sums involved. the other source of 
anxiety was that. by contrast with material allocations (which were seen as 
being short-term expedients). financial allocations were viewed as having long-
tenn implications. Conscious that a currency refonn would at some point 
reestablish the real value of money. every group wanted to ensure that it was not 
left holding the baby. This explains. for example. the hostility of the NRW 
Finance Minister to the idea of even a modest hOUSing programme financed 
solely by NRW. The Land would not accept sole responsibility for a task that was 
in the interest 'des gesamten deutschen Volkes' and it would not finance the 
rebuilding of hOUSing owned by the mines. 1 Neither NRW nor the other Lander 
were prepared to settle their difference for the sake of the benefits to the national 
economy. Indeed Bavaria. the most particularist of the all the Lander. went so 
2 far as to assert that the advantages would accrue only to NRW! 
Why did Military Government not settle the issue? It could either have foreed 
the Germans at blzonal level to commit funds or it could have provided money 
directly through its control of the mines. Let us start with the second option 
first which seemed not illogical since a large proportion of miners' housing was 
colliery owned. (The rest belonged to gemetnniltztge WohnungsgeseUschq/ten. 
private housing associations few of whom had sufficient funds for new building 
in the immediate post-war era.) During 1946. most buUdIng work In fact had 
been financed by the mines. although on the understanding that at least a 
proportion of their outlay would be reimbursed by the state under the general 
Zonal arrangements for financing repaIrS. In 1947. too. the financing of 
1 See HStaD NWIO, 91. W~30' 'Be7rilch94t1~: ':;;:::i~ 
des BergarbeIterwohungsneubaues, ., • • 
I A1ct.en zur Vorgesc:hlch1e. Band 4. p.I83ff. 
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repairs looked relatively secure. 
TIle real problem was the large volume of new construction envisaged by the 
housing programme. Here. as has been noted. the Land was not bound to make 
any contribution. At first. it looked as if. despite all the regional government's 
reluctance. a modus vivendi might be found whereby the Land and the mines 
would each provide half of those costs that could not be raised by normal credits 
on the capital market. NRW agreed to put up 30 million RM and the NGCC 
promised funds. a position that w~s confirmed at a series of meetings in June. 1 
TIlese figures were well short of the programme's requirements but they were 
easily suffiCient to meet the volume of construction work likely over the next 
few months. Both sides were agreed that it was important to sort out the 
question as soon as possible because the pre-fabs could not be delivered until the 
NRW housing SOCieties were in a position to put up the money. 
At the beginning of July. however. there was a remarkable turnabout in the 
NGCC's attitude. It was no longer interested in giving financial support and 
2 
certainly not until the Land had spent allits 30.000.000 RM. Indirectly. 
Hembry, the NGCC's financial director. admitted the real reason for the change. 
namely. that the finanCial experts in Berlin were growing increasingly anxious 
3 
about the amount of subsidies that were being pumped into the mines. Until 
June 1947. these subSidies had been given as credits by the Re1chsbank. but they 
were deemed to large to continue in this way and became direct subsidies from 
the Zonal budget.4 The Zonal budget was heavily in debt and the British were 
very anxious about the financial tnstabil1ty that might ensue. As a result. 
1 HStaD NWI0, 91, WAM. Report on discussions concemJDg ftnance for new 
construcUon ofm1nerS' housing. 30.7.1947. 
21b1c:L 
3 Ibid 
4 HOI'8tmann. 'DIe Angst vor dem ftnanZlellen KolIaps', p.222. 
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Finance DMsion forbade Hembry to provide any funds for miners' housing. 1 
TIle abrupt change in the NGCC's stance. announced at a meeting on 5 July, 
surprised all the other participants in the discussion: 'Die Unterhandlung stand 
in einem uberraschenden Gegensatz zu den Wheren Verhandlungen und zeigte 
ein stark zur Schau gestelltes finanzielles Nicht-Interesse der N.G.C.C. an der 
DurchfUhrung des BergarbeitelWohnungsbauprogramms'. 2 It threw the whole 
question wide open again. Now that the NGCC had withdrawn Its support. all 
NRW's anxieties about admitting responsibility came to the fore. 3 Though the 
NGCC stated that the Land should spend the 30 million RM and worry about the 
principles later. the NRW government argued that the fundamental question as 
to who was responsible for buUding had to be settled.4 
By the beginning of September the matter still had not been settled. 
Unwillingly. the Reconstruction Ministry agreed to consider financing 
individual cases on their own merits and it was on this basis that the tiny 
consignment ofpre-fabs reached the Ruhr.5 At the same time the Land applied 
to the bizonal administration for a tax on coal which could be used to finance 
the housing programme. 6 Here the resistance of the other LAnder made Itself 
7 
felt and the proposal made little progress. 
If the NGCC could not provide funds. why then did the All1es not put pressure on 
the bizonal administration to provide the requisite cash? It is possible that. If 
the NGCC's financial cUfflculties had emerged early enough. BICO would have 
1 Collins Papers. A2. Paper 5. letter from Hembay to Chief. Fuel and Power 
DivIsion. CCG(BE). et aL 8.7.1947. 
2 HStaD NWI0. 91. Rappaport to WAM. 5.7.1947. 
s HStaD NWI0. 91. WAM. '8esprechungsnoUz'. 19.9.1947. 
4 IbId. 
5 HStaD NWI0 91 WAM to PresIdent ofSVR. 2.9.1947. 
• • _ .. _ItulUl fOr Plna".,. belm ZWd-
8 HStaD NWI0. 91. FInance MtnJatIYto Hau.,..Y~--.-
Zonen WlrtachaftBrat. 16.9.1947. 
7 HStaD NWIO. 91. WAM to Head of tile Preas 0fBc:e. 14.6.1948. 
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made appropriate arrangements, yet the full extent of the problem became clear 
only towards the end of the summer. In October the BECG, on the advice of the 
Standing Committee on Miners' HOUSing, requested BICa to ensure that finance 
1 for the programme was made available. Yet BICa was slow in putting pressure 
on the German institutions to find a solution,2 POSSibly out of general fears of 
undermining the slow move towards greater self-determination in economic 
affairs. 
To add to the financial confusion, another difficulty emerged, namely that a lot 
of the land on which the houses were to be bunt was owned by the mines and that 
meant that their tenure was insecure. The future ownership of the mines was 
undecided and the NGCC was unwilling to agree to land leases (Erbbauvertrlge) 
that would have tied the hands of future owners. Without security of land 
tenure, the housing associations were unwilling to risk their money on 
3 building. 
The result of all these difficulties was that the new housing programme lJmped 
on at a pace slower even than that allowed by the VfWs modest allocation of 
wood. In fact, in January 1948 manufacturers' yards in the US Zone were full of 
completed fabricated houses which could not be brought into the Ruhr because 
the property leases obtainable were too short and because payment from the 
Reconstruction Ministry still had not been settled.4 As late as summer 1948, 
virtually no new construction apart from a small number of pre-Cabs had been 
1 HStaD NW10,91, Copy of letter from BEC~O :~ • .!;=~~:: :: 
summer reorganisation of the bipartite organisation, 
German agencies directly but through BICO. the SVR to SRMO 
2 HStaD NW73, 47, Translated copy of letter from D~ ~ to WAM. • 
Essen, 30.1.1948. enclosed wlth an undated letter from Dtrector Hen to [)Iredor. SVR. 
S HStaD NWIO, 92. 'n'euhandste1le ~~~ 
20.2.1948; WAM. Memo fbrMlnJstertaldlredO Land NRWto ROhJ. WAY. 29.1.1948. 
4 HStaD NW9. 56. Land ManpJM!S" Dept.. HQ 
1 funded. 
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The point about a lot of these issues. with the exception of the property leases. 
was that though their impact was palpable enough the t 
. Y were no genuine 
2 
problems. It would not have hurt NRW to cOmmit its 30 million RM in 
advance, any more than the Lander would have suffered by making an 
allocation of cash to help finance the new construction. It was the precedent 
that was at issue. The more imminent the prospect of a currency reform became. 
the less willing was any party to shoulder the burden. 
Revising the plan, October 1947 - spring 1948 
Because of wastage and financial shortages, the VfW took the opportunity in 
September of provisionally cutting by a substantial amount the programme's 
coal allocation for the first quarter of 1948.3 An amusing incident followed 
which surely proved. If proof were needed. the impenetrability of the 
bureaucratic jungle surrounding the housing question. On 21 October. the 
German participants of the Standing Committee on Ruhr MIners' Housing met to 
agree on common ground before the full committee met on the 30. It Is evident 
from the minutes that the NRW representatives not only did not know of the 
VfW's decision but also had not realised that the chief source of opposition to the 
miners' housing plan was the vtw Itself. Rappaport, th1nldng hfIDSelf among 
friends, 'erklArte fre1mQtlg, daB das Programm nur zu 40 percent ermnt werden 
kann' and admitted that the Allied Standing Committee members were still 
4 
unaware of this fact. He declared himself to be agaInSt a rev1s1on of the 
1 HStaD NW73, 135, Undated minutes ofOrst meeting ofDKBL houatng commlttee 
an 1.7.1948. 
2 According to Hembry, the NGCC's financial expert. the problem was 'not even 
secondarily one of Dnance'. See AG 1948/163/4, A.J.HIllhouae, Report on the RuM coal 
Industry Field Trlp, January 1948. 
s HStaD NW73, 47, Presklent of the ZAA to WAM. 22.12.1947. 
" HStaD NW73, 282, 'Berlcht aber die Besprechung am 21.10.1947 Ober daa 
8eIprbe1terwohnungsbauprogramm'. 23.10.1947. 
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programme to a more realistic target, because he felt it was important not to 
endanger the full coal contingent. This was grist to the VlW's mill and the NRW 
delegates were suddenly. shocked to hear the VfW representative declare 
'iiberraschenderwelse und sehr bestlmmt' that the coal allocation could under no 
circumstances be given in full. The absolute maximum was 20,000t a month. 1 
A day later, the vrw sent the BECG and the other lAnder a letter arguing that the 
'Ruhr 47/48' programme could not be fulfilled, had never been properly thought 
through and indeed had never, with the exception of the coal allocation. been 
fully authorised by Military Government. 2 
Now began a fight between the NRW representatives and the VfW over the 
allocations to the miners' hOUSing programme.3 NRW was hampered in Its 
demand for better allocations by the revelations emerging about the amount of 
wastage and uncontrolled building in the Ruhr. In January. the newly formed 
DKBL suggested that it and not the Reconstruction Ministry should handle the 
coal and materials contingents. a suggestion which only added force to the 
4 
criticism of existing control and coordination of suppUes in NRW. 
For its part the vrw came under increasing pressure from MilltaIy Government 
to give the miners' housing programme more support and in January a series of 
compromises were reached. The coal allocation was brought up to its old level 
again. and the allocation procedure ('EndverbraucherkonUngentierungs-
verfahren' in German officialesel) was changed, allowing NRW greater 
1 Ibid. The ftgure of 20,0001 was arrtved at by taking the ortgtnal quo:eof ~'= 
and then subtracting the 5,ooot for ~~\P~uc::.;=~~,= because the 
firms now received a coal quota d1rec
mall "3'th
an s...ft'f ..... lhr envisaged. HStaD NW7S. IS5. pre-Caba programme was much a er an O&A6U-3 
vrw. Abtetlung Planung. Memo. 2.12.1947. 
2 HStaD NW'13. 282. Copy of letter from VfW to BECQ. 22.10.1947. 
3 V''''' 26 11 1947' HStaD NW73. 47. DlreCtoI'. SVR. to HStaD NW73. 282. WAM to I". .. · :AM to VfW. 12.1.1948: Dr. 
Mtnlstertald1rector Dr. Spiecker. Exekuttvra~!.~; 15.~1~ 
Ketler. vtW. to ZAA. 9.12.1947: DIrector SVR to "nlft. .' Frankfurt on 
4 HStaD NW73. 47. Copy of mtnutea of a meeUng at the vrw. 
22.1.1948. 28.1.1948. 
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flexibility. 
1 
After a series of tough negotiations. the transport facilltles offered 
to the programme were improved.2 Yet lAnder and VfW Opposition continued. 
In April. the VfW cut the wood contingent for miners' housing by 75 percent, 
despite the fact that there was still a large backlog from 1947.3 The lAnder grew 
bolder and Bavaria openly declared itself unwilling to honour its 
4 
commitments. Notwithstanding attempts by NRW to bypass the official 
allocation procedure and barter coal for timber. the volume of wood received in 
the first half of 1948 was actually lower than it had been in 1947.5 
Thus little improvement was to be seen in the building programme. 6 True, the 
pace of repairs was somewhat faster. From February 1948 until July. repairs 
7 
and new construction proceeded at a rate of about 2.250 dwelling units a month. 
In the months leading up to the currency reform (te Aprtl..June 1948), progress 
8 
was even better; in May for example. almost 2.500 d. u. 's were repaired. Yet 
these figures had been achieved only by increasing the share of lightly damaged 
buildings in the repairs programme. 9 Such properties yielded Uttle additional 
living space once repaired so that the nominally faster completion rate was not 
really a gain at all. 
Housing and the regeneratton of the labour force 
In April 1948. Rappaport felt called upon to defend the achievements of the 
1 BAK Z40.500, ZAA. Memo. refVe/3825/48. 1.2.1948. . 
2 HStaO NW73. 457. WAM. 'Bertcht Qber den Bergarbeiterwohnungabau. 
22.6.1948. of 
s HStaD NW73. 47. Translated copy of letter from Bate to joint chairmen 
UK/USCCG. 16.4.1948. port. 
" HStaD NWSI. 520. Notes of a conversation with Mr.Bate. signed Rappa 
17.6.1948. rwohn pba' 
5 HStaO NW73. 457. WAM. 'Bertcht ::;~~~;~ 1.6.:' u. 
22.6.1948; NWSI. 520, WAM. Memo concerning vis • 
6 HStaD NW13. 47, SVR. report b' May. 11.6.1948-
7 Compiled from SVRAufsteUung (1949), op.c1t.. 
8 HStaD NW73. 479. SVR. MInenI' HouaIDg progress report b'May 1947. 
8 Calculated from SVR AufateUung (1949). op.dt. 
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housing programme against its critics (and primarily against the DKBL). 
'Immerhin diirfte es eine nicht unbeachtliche Leistung sein'. he wrote to the 
Reconstruction Minister. 'wenn trotz aller Schwiertgkeiten 1m Jahre 1947 rd. 
23,500 Instandsetzungen 1m Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau durchgefiihrt wurden.' 
'TatsAchlich', he continued, 'ist es bisher gelungen, den gesamten Zustrom an 
Bergarbeitem unterzubrtngen,.l 
TIle latter assertion was rather misleading. It was true that no one brought into 
the Ruhr found himself without accommodation, but it was not true that labour 
supply had been unaffected by the housing shortage. It had limited the number 
of people from outside the Ruhr and. to a certain extent, the overall size of the 
recruiting programme. Between August and November first clothing and then 
accommodation shortages had curtailed recruiting outside the Ruhr. To a 
certain extent, this limited the pace at which men were taken on. but to a greater 
degree it induced the authorities to concentrate more than they wanted to on 
local recruits. It was true that by dint of great efforts and not least of the 
Coordinating Committee's services, 50 percent of recruits in the second half of 
1947 came from outside the Ruhr. This was a considerable achievement but it 
fell far short of what was necessary to protect other Ruhr industries. In their 
manpower planning towards the end of 1947, British and German officials 
calculated that three quarters of new recruits ought to come from outside the 
2 Ruhr. The costs were borne largely by the other Ruhr industries thereby 
deprived of labour but sometimes by the mines themselves when. as not 
3 
infrequently happened. the nUnes' own suppliers were hit by labour shortages. 
In any case a lot of the accommodation offered. probably more than half. was 
1 HStaD NW73, 47. Rappaport to WAM. 9.4.1948. 1be repaJr8 8gure Included 
mInera' houatDg outside the Ruhr. 
I 'Secha Jahre AW5en8teDe Bergbau'. p.58. 
8 WWA F35. 494, DKBL. etrcuJar No. V 19. 1.3.1948. 
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not the result of the building programme at all. but derived from the Intensifted 
use of available dwelling space In the Ruhr. In 1947. for example. some 23.192 
miners were provided with living space in this way. By contrast the repairs 
programme over the same period produced at most 9.000 extra rooms in repaired 
housing with an additional few thousand in repaired or converted hostels. 
public halls and so forth. 1 
A lot of the accommodation offered was temporary. either because of the quality 
or because the mines would not be able to use it Indefinitely. Much of the 
private accommodation gained though room inspection and requisitioning. for 
instance, would eventually go back to the free disposal of its fonner owners. As 
the housing shortage became more acute. Increasingly low quality and 
provisional accommodation had to be used. The room requisitioning 
programme made increasing recourse to public halls and other emergency 
housing. Slow progress In housing repairs Induced the authortties to begin a 
special action 'Lager und Herbergen' in the Summer of 1947. the purpose ofwhlch 
was to convert existing unusable camps and other publiC bulldings into 
emergency accommodation for new labour. By June 1948 some 6.600 single 
2 
miners and 400 or so families had been housed In this way. 
The initial goal of offering quality accommodation had thus been abandoned. 
No new miners families were given proper family accommodation and most 
married trainees from outside the Ruhr had to leave their farona behind them. 
If they came with, then normally only because there were relattves In the Ruhr 
with whom they could stay, often In very cramped conditions. In addition, the 
3 
mines offered a few hundred fam.1lies emergency housing in camps and so forth. 
1 HStaD NW9, 112, WAM. Dept. JVC (WB). Memo. 12.1.1~ ~~ =: 
SVR. 'Em Jahr Bergarbelterwohnungsbau. Bedcht Qber daa ers 
wohn~U81m Ruhrgeblet', 31.7.1948. 
Ib1cl 
s ft*I. 
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And for the single men, though some of the worst billets of 1946 had been 
removed, much of the accommodation on offer remained extremely Primitive. 
Going against the grain 
Before making a more general summary, it is worth noting that the experiences 
of the house-building programme found close parallels in the supply of other 
resources. Food was the most critical problem, of course, and one which has 
already received detailed analysis by John Farquharson. 1 Farquharson's work 
reveals that the problems in obtaining food bore many similarities to those of 
housing and building materials. In food production the coal-cycle was much in 
evidence, since coal shortages affected the production of fertiliser and fanning 
implements. 2 The ineffectiveness of controls and the absence of incentives hit 
3 deliveries of agricultural produce just as they did the building trade. NRW 
proved to be if anything even more incapable at coUecttng grain and food than It 
4 had been at monitoring the construction indUStry. At blzonal level. Land 
opposition to central controls. particularism and the American tendency to side 
with the particularists all undermined collection and transfer of both tYPes of 
resources: 5 the Bavarians were just as Bolshy about their grain as they were 
6 
reluctant to hand over their timber. 
The uncontrolled economy: a summary 
Both this and the previouS two chapters have painted a pretty negative picture of 
the authorities' attempts at harnessing the human and material resources 
required to regenerate the Ruhr mtntng labour force. 
1 Farquharson. 7fte Westem Allies. 
2 Ibid •• p.45Jf. 
s Ibid •• p.161ft 
4 Ibid.. p.191. 
5 IbkL, p.149. 
I Ibid.. p.157. 
Could the occupying 
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powers have been expected to do better? And would a German government have 
been more effective? 
Any government in Germany would have faced the problem, as indeed every 
European govenunent did, that resources were extremely tlght. Coal and grain. 
above all, were the elusive masters of European recovery. Shortages of these 
substances, the basic energy sources for machine and man respectlvely, formed 
the dramatic and frightening backcloth against which any reconstruction 
strategy had to be developed. 
On top of these problems, Britain was confronted with enormous commitments 
overseas. It was in the unenviable position of being a bankrupt imperial power. 
presiding over an empire that in both political and economic terms had been 
profoundly affected by the war. Even without the claims of occupied Gennany. 
Britain's resources were overstretched. As well as being mortgaged to the hilt, 
it had little coal or grain to spare for its friends let alone its fonner enemies. 
These facts necessarily constrained progress in the immediate post-war period 
and Britain could do nothing about them. Perhaps America, with its 
potentially enormous grain surplus could have been expected to provide more 
food for Europe. A more effiCient grain export programme before Spring 1948, 
when large-scale imports finally did begin, might have done much to restore 
labour's motivation and efficiency. 1 Britain, however, was powerless. 
As chapter 2 has already argued, the degree of failure in the 1945-'46 coal drive 
went far beyond what could be explained by these shortages and exposed major 
contradicttons in the BritiSh approach. Both the tlghtness of resources within 
Germany and at home and the goal of progressIVe democratlSatlon encouraged a 
small staff, a non-coercive presence, considerable delegatton or authortty and a 
1 ibid., passern. 
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general approach of not applying policies that would require a police state to 
enforce. So far so good. But the drive for coal necessitated a completely 
different line. To get coal. some group somewhere had to make enormous 
sacrifices: either the labour force would have to be kept behind barbed wire and 
worked at gunpoint or civilians elsewhere held down near stmvation rations so 
that the miners could enjoy a decent meal or the French forced to wait for the 
coal they so desperately needed. 
This was a most unenviable dilemma that would have confronted any occupying 
power in the Ruhr. Not so ruthless as the French, not so well ofT as the 
Americans. the British were singularly handicapped. No occupying power 
seems to have been more nervous than they. They were nervous of Allied 
reaction if exports reduced. nervous of German reaction if more sacrtftces were 
demanded of the Zone. It would be a brave historian. however. who could 
confidently assert that the British should have depressed civilian rations 
further or told the French to expect no more coal. The conclusion on the early 
period must be therefore. that Britain's problems were not due to incompetence. 
but that because of its specific constellation of interests, ties and anxieties, 
Britain retarded recovery in a way that other occupying powers or a German 
government would not have done. 
Once they were confident of material and moral support from the Americans, 
the British found the limited freedom of manoeuvre that was all that was 
necessary to make a breakthrough in the Ruhr. The Importance of that 
breakthrough should not be understated and the winter or 1946-47 was 
undoubtedly a turntng POint in the coal supply. Nevertheless, the coal 
programme continued to operate with enormous J.nefilctency. 
Part of this was unavoidable. With the exception perhaps of temporary warUme 
Innovations. the fixed-price controlled economy has yet to be 1nYented wh1ch IS 
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not characterised by withdrawal of labour and goods from nonna! ch Is anne ,a 
lively black market and poor incentives to productivity and efficiency. A 
controlled economy is synonymous with wastage. And in the 1945-47 period 
there was no alternative to such a system. At least until the end of 1947, 
restoring a free market was out of the question. Shortages were so acute, 
communications so disrupted and the need to impose economic preferences 
alien to the Germans themselves (above all support for liberated nations) so 
obvious that central allocation of resources was inevitable. 
Having said that, the unresponsiveness of officials and managers and the failure 
to tap and divert key resources went far beyond the inherent wealmesses of the 
controlled economy. In part this was because there continued to be a 
contradiction between Military Government's (Increasingly) indirect rule and 
the fact that key Anglo-American policies were not supported by the Germans. 
Above all, the belief that Gennany should contribute to the reconstruction of the 
liberated European countries met with little sympathy In Gennany. The British 
could hardly expect the Gennans to give their full backing to a production drive 
which denied the normal consumer any coal at all and exported considerable 
amounts to France. It Is dUllcult, nevertheless, to see what the British or 
Americans could have done about this. Denying their Allles support was as 
unthinkable as halting the process of devolution within Germany. The 
Occupying Powers were therefore not being Incompetent. but they were 
responsible for Inefficiency. 
Two further forces contrived to weaken the economic admtnlstratlon in 
Germany. As we mow from Werner Plumpe's work. conservatiVe bureaucrats 
and industrialists cooperated in preventing. at local and regional level, the 
establlshment of an effectiVe admin1Stratlon. Of possibly even more cruc1al 
Importance was the fact that at central biZOnallevel the lAnder's part:tcu1artsm. 
backed by the US. hindered the creation of powerful blZOnal bureaucracies. 
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Neither the Verwaltung fur EmAbrung. Landwtrtschaft und Forsten nor the 
Verwaltung fur Wirtschaft were in a position to make the Bavarians hand over 
their grain or their timber. 
Ultimately. the Americans' commitment to free enterprise played a key role in 
preventing the controlled economy from working more effectively. Apart from 
the weakness of the Frankfurt bureaucracies. there was the fact that. from 1947 
onwards. a currency reform was hanging in the air. thus undermining 
confidence in present values and encouraging a watt and see attitude. Had the 
British been able to influence btzonal policy more effectively the btzonal 
administration m1ght have enjoyed a little more muscle. 
Does the experience of mtntng suggest that the Occupying Powers hindered 
economic reconstruction? For the 1945-46 period undoubtedly so. Thereafter. 
there is no doubt that a lot of the inefficency with which the economy operated 
was due to their presence and influence. In addition. the continued high volume 
of underpriced coal exports cost the Germans dearly. On a more general plane. 
there were many other Allied measures such as partition. denazlflcation and 
dismantling which. however Justified some or most of them were. had a very 
deleteriOUs mpact on economic recovery. 
On the other hand. the Allied sense of responsibility for their subject 
populations meant that considerable and critically needed food resources were 
imported. Both in general terms and for the coal drive in partiCular these were 
of great value. Even more important was the way the Al11ed presence eased very 
painful decisions about the transfer of resources. The concentration of scanty 
food supplies and stocks of consumer goods on the mJners. for example. was an 
essential but deeply distressing measure. Would a German government have 
carried it out? Probably it would have had to. but at stgntftcaDt political costs. 
To impose such a decision on the population would very likely have InVOlved a 
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German government in assuming dictatOrial powers and this would certainly 
have made a later transition to democracy very difilcult. 
What came to Germany's advantage was the fact that the Allied presence was not 
obtrusive enough to arouse open opposition but was suftlciently there to provide 
a scapegoat for German authorities. True, this resulted in considerable 
ineftlciency but at least it allowed decisions to be made without creating bitter 
conflicts within German society. Painful decisions of the post -war period such 
as the Points System or that other landmark of resource redistribution, the 
currency reform, were seen ultimately as Allied poliCies. German politicians 
and thus German democracy were able to emerge with their hands clean. Seen 
in these terms, as the unfortunate by-product of a system which helped steer 
Germany towards democracy. the inefficiency of the coal drive does not seem so 
serious. 
How did mining fare once the currency reform had been introduced and policy 
was firmly in German hands? Did the currency reform, the creation of a free 
market and the emergence of a more unified administration solve min1ng'S 
shortages and eliminate the problems of supply? It is to this question which we 
must now turn. 
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Chapter 5: An imperfect market. Financing workforce 
regeneration in the social market economy 
1: Weak foundations: house and hostel construction in the 
'imperfect market' 
The currency refonn and the mines 
In preparation for the currency reform, April 1948 saw an important alteration 
in the method of mine financing. Hitherto, the mines had received from the 
British Zonal budget frequent injections of cash which varied in size according 
to their operating losses. Now, these payments ceased and were replaced by a 
1 
new bizonal subsidy given on a fixed per-ton basis. Because the level of 
subsidy was fixed and not as generously calculated as the earlier ad hoc 
payments, the mines had to watch their spending very carefully. Before, they 
had at least been protected from operating losses (though not covered for 
2 depreciation); now, careful management was needed to avoid bankruptcy. 
One might have expected that the currency reform would solve this problem 
since, as is well known, the currency reform in June 1948 saw not just the 
creation of a new monetary unit, the Deutschmark, but also a thoroughgoing 
l1beralisation of the economy. 3 The neo-liberal philosophy of the VfW's new 
director, Ludwig Erhard, resulted in the rapid dismantling of price controls and 
rationing. The mines should now have been able to charge German customers a 
price in line with coal's true worth to the economy and thus to improve their 
1 BAK OMGUS BICO COALCO 17/8188/11. BIB P(48)88, Paper, 'Investment 
credits for the hard coal mining industry'. 21.6.1948. 
2 WWA S22(OMGUS) BICO BISEC 11/104-2/3, UK/USCCG. Review of Hard Coal 
Production, 10.6.1948. 
3 Erhard took over in March. 
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1 financial situation. In fact, however, the domestic coal price remained pegged 
at well below its real value,2 a sign that in the Economics and Finance 
Departments the free market was not the only household god. It vied for 
devotion with an even more fickle and awe-inspiring master. namely. price 
stability. Fear of inflation was probably the biggest single influence on German 
economic and financial policy in the post-war era. Throughout the 1940's and 
1950's, the Federal Government believed itself to be in 'einem schicksalhaften 
Kampf .. die StabiliUit in Deutschland zu bewahren und nicht. wie so viele 
3 Lander, in eine inflationare Entwicklung hineinzuschliddern.' Because of the 
multiplier effect. the German authOrities felt that the economy was especially 
vulnerable in respect to coal and there was great reluctance to allow any price 
4 increases at all. Thus mining was effectively excluded from the market 
economy and its finanCial problems continued. 
One important consequence of the new economic and financial framework was 
the change in the relationship between the Allies and the mining industry. 
Hitherto. the UK/USCCG had. through BICO. been able to influence fairly 
directly the finanCial and material resources made available to the mines. Now 
that most rationing had been or was in the process of being dismantled and the 
mining subsidy was a matter for German decision. the UK/USCCG lost a lot of its 
ability to shape mining policy. True, it could give the mines instructions as 
before, but this was in some ways rather meaningless because the Group could no 
longer ensure that the necessary resources were made available. 
1 The export price remained subject to Allied control. now exercised through the 
newly created International Ruhr AuthOrity. 
2 Abelshauser. RuhrkohIenbergbau. p.34. 
3 Ludwig Erhard talking to the Unternehmensverband Ruhrbergbau. in 
Abelshauser. 'Kohle und Marktwirtschaft'. p.504. 
4 Ibid. and BAK Z 13. 198. VfW to Dtrektortalkanzlei. 14.3.1949. 
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Inefficient as it had been, at least bipartite control had involved clear, possibly 
even exaggerated, recognition of coal's importance and the mines' needs. The 
question was whether the German authorities would be equally sensitive and 
would provide by other means the resources coal was prevented from 
commanding through its price. For there was no doubt that the collieries had 
huge and pressing investment needs. In the first place they had to modernise 
plant and eqUipment. Massive investment was required to sink new shafts. 
rebuUd and modernise installations above ground and mechanise the coal faces. 
Of greater interest for the present study, however, were the large sums required to 
build houses and hostels, for on their construction depended both continued 
workforce expansion and the integration of the existing workforce. 
Housing needs in 1948 
There was no one in summer 1948 who doubted the need for a rapid house-
building programme. According to an offiCial survey, almost half the miners 
1 
were living in inadequate accommodation. At the end of 1948, there were 
around 10,000 new miners whose wives and children were still in the former 
German territories in the east, in the SBZ or in the Western Zones outside NRW;2 
3 
many more had families in other parts of NRW itself. In all, as a DKBL survey 
at the end of 1949 discovered, 61,000 miners were separated from their 
4 families. It was in recognition of the continuing pressing need for housing 
that the SVR's new version of its housing programme, produced in March 1948, 
1 Special Intelllgence Report, 'Some German views of the political, economic and 
sociological aspects of Ruhr coal mining', 19.6.1948, op.cit. 
2 HStaD NW9, 57. WAM. Internal memo from Referat Bergarbeiterunterkunft to 
Abteilung Wohnraumbewirtschaftung. 5.10.1948. 
3 On the arrangements for settling family members of new miners in other parts 
ofNRW, see HStaD NW9. 56. WAM to NRW Labour MiniStry. 28.12.1948 and subsequent 
documents. 
4 HStaD NW9. 112. WAM I A3. Memo for Dr. Fuchs. 28.2.1950. This figure included 
miners working in coalfields other than the Ruhr. However, the great majority were in the 
Ruhr. 
An imperfect market 218 
conftnned the housing targets of the original. New in the plan was above all a 
more realistic time scale: completion was projected for October 1952 rather than 
1 the end of 1948 as before. 
In a number of respects the currency reform made house building more urgent 
than ever. Miners separated from their families were hard hit by the reform 
2 
which considerably increased the real cost of paying two rents. In June 1949, 
officials in the Reconstruction Ministry detailed the case of a new miner at the 
Minister Achenbach pit in LfInen. 'Selbst bei bescheidener Lebensweise', noted 
the officials, 'Ust es) kaum moglich .. , neben Lagerkosten seinen Haushalt in 
N eugarstedt zu bestreiten'. Despite the fact that the man had been at the pit for 
almost a year, he was only 267th on its housing list. Many of the others 
3 
awaiting housing were in the same difficult position as he. For a considerable 
proportion of the newcomers the costs were too high and the DKBL sUlVey noted 
above found that some 20 percent of those leaving the mines did so because of 
4 
accommodation problems. Even this figure understates the importance of 
housing, however. Many people for whom accommodation was a problem did 
not actually cite it as their reason for leaving because the housing situation was 
bad in all urban areas and the leavers could not expect to find better housing 
elsewhere - at least, not in areas where there was also employment. The point 
was that if good housing had been on offer, it was a reasonable assumption that 
5 
many more than 20 percent of the leavers would have stayed. 
1 HSTAD NW73, 47, Director, SVR, Draft, 'Bergarbelterwohnungsbauprogramm 
Ruhr 47/52' (the initial designation of the new programme, MR), 30.3.1948; Translated 
copy of letter from Bate to Joint chairmen of UK/USCCG, 16.4.1948; HSTAD NW73, 73, 
Translated copy of minutes of the Wlederautbauauschu6 fOr Bergarbelterwohungen 
meeting on 22.4.1948. 
2 BBA 8,384, Concordia to DKBL, Abt Arbeltseinsatz, 25.2.1949. 
3 HStaD NW9, 56, WAM, Internal memo from Referat Bergarbelterunterkunft to 
Gruppe Wohnraumbewtrtschaftung. 11.6.1949. 
4 WWA S22 (OMGUS), BICO BISEC 11/104-1/39, Combined Coal Control Group 
(CCCG) report to BICO for April 1949. 
5 This was certainly the view of the CCCG, see WWA S22 (OMGUS), Manpower 
7/50-2/9, Labour Allocation Branch. Weekly report for week ending 18.5.1949. 
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For refugee miners with families still in the SBZ, the creation of two different 
currencies in West and East Germany and the increasing problems in conducting 
financial transactions between the two made it almost impossible to give family 
and relatives financial support. It was no surprise therefore that August and 
September 1948 saw an influx of families from the SBZ. Often there was no 
suitable housing and squalid overcrowding resulted. 1 
As well as its direct financial implications, the currency reform also engendered 
amongst the population a feeling of returning to normal. Many people were now 
looking for some more permanent place to settle. This provided a challenge but 
also a great opportunity for mining. If it could provide decent family housing at 
a time when accommodation was generally in desperately short supply in 
Germany, it might well create the stable workforce for which it was hoping. 
House building and the currency reform 
How did the construction programme respond? In one respect the situation was 
now much more favourable for rapid building. For within a few months of the 
currency reform the supply problems so characteristic of the preceding era had 
all but disappeared. By November 1948, the Reconstruction Ministry could 
2 
report that procurement of most building materials was no longer a problem. 
3 Yet the same report noted that progress was actually slower than before. Why? 
1 HStaD NW73, 457, IVB to WAM, 18.8.1948: IVB to Wirtschaftsm1nister, NRW, 
6.8.1948: HStaD NW9, 56, AA Oberhausen to NRW Labour M1n1sby, 29.10.1948. 
2 PA 2, 271, WAM to Dr. Hartmann, 15.11.1948, annex: Memo, 
'Bergarbetterwohnungsbau'. It was true that the Reconstruction Ministry nevertheless 
complained about social housing's difficulties in obtaining building materials and 
requested the Department of Economics (VfW) to force suppliers to give social housing 
priority. Not surprisingly, given the determInedly pro-market atmosphere in Frankfurt, 
the request met with little sympathy and within a short while the difficulties seem to have 
sorted themselves out. HStaD NW81, 520, WAM 111-150/2 (1), Memo, 10.11.1948 and draft 
of a letter from WAM to Wtrtschaftsmtnlsterium NRW: OBADA 18010/1238/49, OBAD 
Lagebertcht for 1st quarter 1949. 
3 PA2. 271. WAMtoDr. Hartmarm, 15.11.1948. 
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During the pre-currency reform period all the German authorities had been 
keenly aware that the introduction of a revalued currency would make it very 
difficult to fund housing construction. Within a very short period their fears 
proved more than justified. As early as August 1948 the Coal Control Group 
noted that building had fallen 'very much in arrears' due to financial 
1 difficulties. Since the reform, lack of funds had led to the workforce employed 
on miners' housing being cut by about 30 percent.2 In January 1949, despite 
good weather, completed repairs amounted to less than one third of the SVR's 
target monthly figure and, as the WAM report suggested, were also far below the 
3 pre-currency reform levels. 
1 WWA S22 (OMGUS), BICO BISEC 11/104-1/38, UK/USCCG Paper, 'Present 
position with regard to the hard coal mining industry'. note for British M.G. by British 
chainnan. August 1948. 
2 WWA S22 (OMGUS), BICO ERP SEC 11/94-2/11. UK/USCCG report to BICO for 
August 1948; HStaD NW73, 259, WAM. Memo, 15.11.1948. 
3 WWAS22 (OMGUS), Manpower. 7/51-1/3, UK/USCCG report to BICO. January 
1949. Comparison is complicated by the fact that the standard of repair had probably 
risen since June 1948, although a GHH report suggests that normal standards were being 
applied even before the currency refonn. See BBA 30,145, GHH Paper, 'Entwicklung des 
Wohnungsbaues des GHH Steinkohlenbergbau MUte 1945-Mitte 1950', 9.9.1950. 
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Fig .2: Housing repairs 1948-1949 
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Part of the underlying financial problem was that rents were not sufficient to 
pay for construction. Rents had, for price and social policy reasons, been frozen 
since the 1930's. Yet because of costly raw materials and low labour 
productivity, construction costs were far higher than in the pre-war period. In 
June 1948, they were in fact double what they had been ten years earlier.2 So at 
existing rents, it was not profitable to build new houses and often not 
3 financially possible even to repair existing ones. Thus much of the finance 
could not be raised on the capital market but required subsidy from owners, 
employers, the state or some other source. The need for subsidy was enhanced 
in the immediate post-currency reform period because the general capital 
shortages meant that even the profitable part of house construction was hard to 
1 Figures are taken from WWA S22 (OMGUS). BICO BISEC 11/104-2/2. CCCG 
Report to BICO. March 1949. 
2 O.LObcke. Dte Subventtonterung des Wohnungsbaues tnsbes. sett 1945. MOnster 
1951. p.54. 
3 Ministerial-Blatt Nordrhetn-Westfalens. Ausgabe A. 6.4.1948. 1. 12. p.121; HStaD 
NW53. 465. Land Manpower Department. Housing & BuUdlng Branch to Chairman of 
Housing Reconstruction Committee. 5.5.1948. 
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raise on the market. Public money had repeatedly to be substituted for missing 
market loans. 1 
This discrepancy between rents and building costs was a general problem in 
post-war Germany, but applied particularly to mining, where rents were even 
lower than average. Low rents had long been a way in which mining employers 
had tried to hold on to their workforces.2 Between 1930 and 1949, the state had 
given house owners several opportunities to make legal rent increases, yet the 
mines had availed themselves of none of them.3 
Empty coffers and closed purses 
In the pre-1948 period, housing subsidies had come from the Land and the 
mines. But now, neither felt in a position to continue. The mines faced a severe 
financial crisis because of the changes in subsidy procedure. State subsidies 
received barely sufficed to meet normal operating costs, so that the UK/USCCG 
4 forbade the collieries from using the money to pay for housing. Even so, the 
5 industry began to go into debt. The DKBL wrote to the VfW in May 1948 
describing the very precarious state of finances. As a temporary measure the 
Uinder agreed to give aid but in general were of the opinion that investments 
6 
should not burden the public budget. 
1 Particularly in 1949 and again in 1951. See below and also HStaD NW 10, 15, 
W AM, Circular to Regierungspnlsidenten, 18.6.1951. 
2 BAK-ZwSt.H B102, 3304, Fehlemann to Hensel, 25.11.1949, annex: 'Auszug aus 
einem Vortrag anlC\6lich der Siedlungsbautagung des bayerischen Bergbaus'. 
3 See Julius Brecht, 'Die gemeinnOtzigen Wohnungsuntemehmen in einer 
marktwirtschaftlichen Wohnversorgung', in Deutsche Stedlungs- und Wohnpoltttk, 
pp.151-175, here p.l64. 
4 WWA F35, 3554. DKBL, Circular No. IV 1 - 6 to mining companies and collieries 
19.3.1948. 
5 WWA S22 (OMGUS), CO Hist Br 3/404-1/6. UK/USCCG paper. 'Financial 
Problems in the coal industIy' , 27.8.1948. 
6 BAK (OMGUS) SICO COALCO 17/8188/11. BIB/P(48)88. Bipartite Board. Memo. 
'Investment Credits for the hard coal mining industry', 21.6.1948. 
An imperfect market 223 
Following the currency reform the situation deteriorated further. Up till 
December, the UK/USCCG encouraged the mines to make capital expenditure on 
the assumption that Marshall Plan funds would be made available through the 
Reconstruction Loan Corporation. By the end of 1948, the failure of the 
Corporation to take shape and the severity of the financial crisis forced the 
Control Group to take the extreme step of ordering the mines to desist from all 
further capital expenditure and even to discontinue inessential work in 
1 progress. In March 1949 the Group reported that 'every week the finanCial 
situation gets tighter and tighter'. 2 Even the GBAG, the wealthiest of all the 
mining companies, was forced to bring its housing operation to a virtual 
standstill. 3 
For its part, the NRW government argued that the burden of financing miners' 
housing was such that the other Lander or the Bizonal government should help. 
Unless there was outside support, the SVR's miners' hOUSing plan 'Ruhr 48/52', 
4 
with its total cost of around 1.5 bn DM, would mean that, even after allowing 
for modest contributions from the mining industry and for the share which 
could be raised on the market, all of NRW's 200 Million DM annual housing 
budget would go to the miners, leaving nothing for other sections of the 
population. The NRW government did not believe it could justify this. For 
the population of NRW as a whole, less than a third of war-damaged houses had 
been repaired: for the miners, on the other hand, three quarters of damaged 
1 WWA 522 (OMGU5), BICO BI5EC 11/104-2/2, UK/USCCG report to BICO for 
December 1948; PA 2, 550, BIB/P(49)43, Bipartite Board, Report on financial problems 
. in the coal mining indUStry, 16.3.1949. 
2 WWA 522 (OMGU5), BICO BI5EC 11/104-2/2, Minutes of 3rd Meeting of the 
CCCG, 23.3.1949, Appendix: Report byW.E.Fourqurean. 
3 BBA 55,12200, Nr.l 0, Bergaussch\.t6-5itzung, 23.9.1949. 
4 WWA 522 (OMGU5), BICO BI5EC 11/107-2/1-4. Joint Chairmen UK/USCCG to 
Joint Chairmen BICO, 9.12.1948, Appendix F: 'Finance for Non-Mine owned Miners' 
Housing'. 
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housing had now been put right. 1 Non-miners in NRW could reasonably expect 
a greater share of housing grants in the future. As the SVR director. Philip 
2 Rappaport (himself a supporter of special programmes for the miners) argued: 
Innerhalb des Ruhrgeblets sInd schon z.T. dieserhalb allerstarkste 
sozlale Spannungen aufgetreten. die slch verstarken und bis zur 
Unertragl1chkeit steigem mussen. wenn immer weitere Millionen !ll!I 
einer Arbeiterklasse zukommen. wahrend die ubrigen notleidenden 
Bevolkerungskreise mehr oder minder leer ausgehen. 
It was to avoid this that, in the first months after the currency refonn. NRW 
restricted itself to keeping existing projects going and would not fund new 
3 
construction work for miners. Even then, mining still absorbed three times as 
much Land funds as the miners' share of the population would have entitled it 
4 to. 
In the perIod following the First World War, when a similar problem had 
applied, a special coal tax had been introduced, the proceeds of which had gone to 
finance miners' housing. Both NRW and the DKBL advocated the reintroduction 
of such a coal tax and in July 1948, the NRW cabinet voted to apply to the Bizonal 
5 
authorities for the appropriate legislation. At the same time, NRW requested 
funds from the bizonal budget to provide interim cover until the coal levy was in 
operation. 6 Concurrent with these efforts, BICO called upon the vrvv to draw up 
1 HStaD NW9, 112, WAM, Memo, 'hetr.: MittelverteUung 40 MUlionen-Programm', 
25.1.1949. 
2 HStaD NW73,259, 'Darlegungen des Verbandsdirektors Dr.lng. P.Rappaport, 
Essen, gelegentlich der BesichUgungsreise des bizonalen Bauwirtschaftsausschusses 
am 7.1.1949im Ruhrgeblet', Janucuy 1949. 
3 WWAS22 (OMGUS), Co Hist Br 3/404-1/7, Minutes of the 13th Meeting of the 
UKjUSCCG, 21.5.1948. 
4 HStaD NW9, 112, WAM, Memo, 'Mlttelverteilung 40 Millionen-Programm', 
25.1.1949, annex 1. 
s BAK Z13, 198, DKBL to vew, 15.7.1948: 'Die benOUgten Mittel aus den 
ordentlichen Etats der IAnder bzw. den Zweizonenc\mtem bereltzustellen, erschelnt bel 
dem derzeltigen Zustand der Offentlichen Flnanzen ausslchtslos'; HStaO NW53, 643, 
Memo, 12. 7.1948; Mlnlsterpr~sldent NRW, 'Antrag des Herrn Mlnlsterpr~sldenten 
Nordheln-Westfalen auf Bereltstellung von Mitteln zur DurchfOhrung des Bergarbelter-
wohnungsbauprogramms', 13.7.1948. 
6 HStaD NW53, 643, M1nlsterpn'lsldent NRW to vtF, 24.7.1948. 
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proposals on how the mines' operating costs and investment needs. including 
miners' housing. might best be met. 1 
Though they accepted the importance of housing in mining's regenerative 
strategy, the bizonal authorities were loath to accede or respond to any of these 
initiatives. The key change from the post-1918 reconstruction era was that in 
that period little priority had been given to stemming inflation. indeed inflation 
had consciously been preferred to the politically potentially explosive 
consequences of a post-war deflation. However, the experience of economic 
chaos in 1922-23 changed all that for succeeding generations and for the post-'45 
policy-makers in particular. Thus, hostile to increases in the price of coal. the 
vrvv would not entertain the idea of a sales tax. 2 
There was also hostility to other types of capital transfer towards heavy 
indUStry. Partly because of his anxieties about freeing the coal price, Erhard 
believed that recovery would best be encouraged by supporting the consumer 
goods industries and allowing the German people's huge demand for clothing 
and household goods to fuel economic growth. He was therefore unwilling to tax 
growth in these areas by charging a levy to help the mines. 
On the housing question itself, the authorities could take refuge behind the fact 
that housing was formally a responsibility of the individual LAnder and this 
was indeed the argument used by the VtF when in September 1948 it turned down 
3 NRW's claim for bizonal funds. As later developments were to show, however, 
this argument was somewhat disingenuous, since the formal responsibility of 
1 BAKZ4, 59, BICO M(48)/52. 23.7.1948. 
2 A letter from the VfW argued that an increase in the domestic coal pIice 'kann 
angesichts der schwerwiegenden RQckwirkung auf die slch anbahnenden 
Preissenkungstendenzen und das Kosten- und Preisniveau der kohleverbrauchenden 
Industrie unter keinen Umsta.nden empfohlen werden'. See BAK Z13. 198, VfW to 
DlrektoIialkanzlei, 14.3.1949. 
3 HStaD NW53, 643, VfF to Minlster-Pra.sident NRW, 7.9.1948. 
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the LAnder did not preclude federal support. It was a mark of how bad relations 
between NRW and bizonal authortties were on the issue that in June 1948 two 
separate conferences on mining's problems and needs were held in the Ruhr 
simultaneously, one chaired by NRW and one under the auspices of the vrw, the 
1 
representatives of both organisations refusing to attend the other's conference. 
The fight for central funding 
Because of the Allies' interest and because not even Erhard could allow the 
mining industry to be totally starved of funds, the Economic Councll did resolve 
in June 1948 (following the VfW's conference) to set up a special committee which 
would investigate the financial problems of the industry with particular 
2 
reference amongst other things to miners' housing. Yet it was noteworthy that 
the first meeting of the committee did not take place until November. 3 The lack 
of interest of the vrw and VfF in the committee's proceedings was striking. In 
March 1949, for example, the committee invited Erhard and a senior 
representative of the VfF to take part in the discussions. Erhard notified the 
committee that he was elsewhere on business but that a Mtnistertaldtrektor 
would appear in his place. In the event, the Ministertaldirektor did not appear 
either, but sent a subordinate. The behaViour of the VfF was even more 
offenSive: they sent along a representative who had been in the department for 
only a few weeks and was unable to answer even those questions that had been 
4 
agreed in advance. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the 
1 See the file HStaD NW53.736 which deals with the NRW conference and PA 
2.549, President of the Economic Council to Minister President Karl Arnold. 2.6.1948. 
2 PA 2. 549. W AM to the President of the Economic Council. 11.6.1948; BAK Z4. 58. 
Wtrtschaftsrat des Vereinlgten Wirtschaftsgebtetes. Drucksache 19149 Nr. 1606: 
'Zusammenfassender Bertcht des Sonderausschusses zur Behandlung von Fragen der 
Kohlerill}rderung'. 5.8.1949. 
3 PA 2, 223. Minutes of the first meeting of the Sonderausschu6 zur Behandlung 
von Fragen der KohlefOrderung. 3. 11.1948. 
4 A similar perfonnance had already taken place in November of the previous 
year. See, PA 2.271. Dr. Georg Berger to the President of the Economic Council. 7.3.1949. 
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committee's progress was slow and the minutes show no evidence of the 
committee being under pressure from the German side to produce speedy 
conclusions. 
For their part. the Allies continued to apply pressure to the Gemlan authorities 
for a speedy solution to the mining industry's capital requirements. In August 
1948. the Coal Control Group proposed to BICO a number of measures including 
price increases. payment of the full export value of coal to the mines and further 
subsidies from the bizonal budget. 1 It also suggested using Counterpart funds 
from the Marshall plan to meet the capital needs of the mines including housing 
2 
and also to fund non-mine owned housing. Some of these measures could be 
implemented by the Allies directly or were carried out at their behest: (on the 
question of exports. there was disagreement amongst the Allies themselves as to 
3 
whether the mines should receive the full export price so that as an immediate 
measure only a limited export rebate was offered). But the provision of a larger 
bizonal subsidy lay in German hands and continued to be opposed by the bizonal 
authorities. who tended to use delaying tactics. rather than outright opposition 
as a means of defeating Allied intentions. In August 1948 BICO sent a stiffly 
worded memo to the Executive Committee (Venvaltungsrat), directing it 'to give 
urgent attention to the problem of financing miners' housing which has become 
4 
acute'. There was little response and in October 1948. the two Military 
1 Under the Marshall Plan. the Germans received free imports of goods and 
eqUipment from the US. The value of these shipments was paid by the reCipients into a 
special account. the counterpart funds. whence it was invested in economic sectors 
suffering from capital shortages. Investment decisions were made jointly by Allied and 
German experts. 
2 WWA S22 (OMGUS). CO Hist Br 3/404-1/6. UK/USCCG paper. 'Financial 
Problems in the coal industry'. 27.8.1948; UK/USCCG to Joint Chairmen BICO. 9.12.1948. 
Appendix F: 'Finance for non-mine owned miners' housing'. 
3 Months later. Allied discussions on this question had still not reached a 
conclusion. See PA 2. 223. Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Sonderaussch~ zur 
Behandlung von Fragen der KohlefOrderung. 3.3.1949; by the end of 1950. Germany was 
still not receiving the full proceeds for its exported coal. See Volker Bahl. Staatltche 
Palilik am Beispiel der Kahle. Frankfurt/New York 1977. p.73. 
4 BAK Z13. 198. BICO M(48)71. BICO J.Sec to Chairman. Executive Committee, 
27.8.1948. 
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Governors once more requested the German officials to develop plans to 
subsidise miners' housing and tried to facilitate a solution by pointing out that 
the problem was short-tenn and would therefore not set pennanent and binding 
1 precedents. 
In November 1948 there appeared, for the first time, to be an encouraging 
response from the German side. The director of the bizonal Executive 
Committee, Hennann Piinder, proposed to the Allies that the LAnder provide 
12,000,000 DM a month to help finance miner's housing. However, the LAnder 
ministries (apart from NRW!) rejected this proposal and, given earlier 
statements by the regional representatives, it is unlikely that the Executive 
2 Committee had expected anything else. The 'refugee LAnder' in particular 
resented the idea of giving NRW special support and tended to argue that 
providing homes for their refugees was at least as important as building homes 
for miners. 3 
By 1949, the Allies had become extremely impatient with the delays in providing 
4 the mines with funds for investment and house building. In March, a major 
paper from the Bipartite Board on the financial problems of the mining 
5 industry, the so-called Schumacher report, began with the following statement: 
'Military Government has had bold plans for the rehabilitation of the 
coal mining industry. The Gennan mining technicians have proved 
enthusiastic co-planners and implementers. Bold physical planning 
and execution, however, has not been matched by equally bold financial 
measures. A Reconstruction Loan Corporation (with limited resources) 
was planned immediately prior to currency refonn. After eight months, 
1 Akten zur Vorgeschichte der BRD 1945 - 1949. Band 4, Munich 1983, p.858: see 
also BAK Z13, 198, Memo from VeIWaltungsrat des VWG, 6.12.1948. 
2 POnder to BICO, 29.11.1948, In Alden zur Vorgeschichte der BRD 1945 - 1949. 
Band 5, Munich 1981. p.261. note 54: Z13, 198, Ftnanzminister NRW to Vorsltz, 
Verwaltungsrat, 10.1.1949: WWA 522 (OMGU5), BlCO BI5EC 11/109-1/7-8, POnder to 
BICO Chairmen, 20.1.1949. 
3 Akten zur Voryeschichte, Band 5, p.73, footnote 29. 
4 BAK Z13, 198, BICO J.Sec, Memo(48)l02 to President of the Economic Council, 
15.12.1948. 
5 PA 2, 550, BIB/P(49)43, Bipartite Board, Report on financial problems in the 
coal mining industry, 16.3.1949. 
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however, the corporation is not yet in complete operation. N or have the 
Germans come forward with other effective means of providing much 
needed long-tenn credit resources.' 
The problems were, as the report noted, not restricted to mining: 1 
'The larger context of the problem is that what is happening in the coal 
mining industry is not peculiar to that indUStry. Military Government 
wants, and the ERP plans require, the stepping up of production. Yet 
since currency refonn, only meagre long-term capital funds have been 
available even for the most essential capital development proJects. 
ConSiderable investment had been made, but only by unorthodox short-tenn 
means and this could not continue. At the same time a BICO paper specifically 
on miners' housing urged that 'this is too important a problem to become snarled 
by some of the old conflicts, such as whether this is a Gennan problem or an 
Allied problem; whether this is a problem for the British Zone La.nder as 
opposed to the Southern La.nder; whether this is a problem solely of welfare or 
morale versus a more business-like approach' and argued that the poor progress 
of 1948 made it necessary now to build twice as fast as over the previous two 
2 years. The Allies believed that housing was absolutely essential if the 
workforce was to be expanded and productivity improved. Without adequate 
housing facilities, it is doubtful whether the present labor force and the required 
rate of recruitment can be maintained. The problem of housing is more than 
one of morals [sic! - presumably 'morale' was meant, MR); it is one of the most 
serious bottlenecks to increasing production and reaching target goals'. 3 
On the basiS of the Schumacher report, BICO suggested that 400 million DM be 
provided for Ruhr miner's housing, of which 150 million DM should come from 
Btzonal funds and 160 million DM from the Reconstruction Corporation, 
1 Ibid. 
2 WWA 522 (OMGU5), BICO BECG PA Br 11/122-3/3. BICO paper. 'Miners' 
Housing Programme'. March 1949. 
3 PA 2. 550, BIB/P(49)43. Bipartite Board, Report on financial problems in the 
coal mining indUStry. 16.3.1949. 
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alongside 50 million DM from NRW and 40 million DM from private sources. It 
had thus largely accepted the arguments of NRW. 1 
However. the bizonal authorities were no better disposed than before. Unlike 
the Schumacher report. which had advocated new taxes to finance the payment 
to the mines. they argued that such taxes appeared 'weder notwendig noch 
2 
wirtschaftlich tragbar'. They reiterated their suspicion that an increase in the 
coal price would trigger inflation.3 They suggested that 300 million DM was the 
maximum that could reasonably be spent on miners' housing in all regions. 
given that no more than l.5 bn DM was being spent on housing as a whole. Once 
again. it was argued that housing was a Land matter. No doubt under the 
influence of the Southern Lander. the bizonal authorities suggested that the bulk 
of the money should come from NRW. The VfW proposed that NRW should put up 
175 million DM. most of it in the financial year 1949-50: 30 million DM should 
come from the other Lander while the remainder of the 300 million DM could. it 
argued. be raised by normal financing methods. In order to avoid delays. 
however. it suggested that 50 million DM of Counterpart funds might be used as a 
4 bridging loan until the capital market had properly revived. Predictably 
enough. NRW declared itself unable to come up with 175 million DM. a figure 
which after all corresponded to over 85 percent of its housing budget. and 
5 
repeated its demand for a coal tax. 
1 Ibid. 
2 PA 2. 550. Hennann POnder to BICO J.Sec. 30.5.1949. 
3 BAR Z13. 198, VfW to Direktoria1kanzle1. 14.3.1949. 
4 WWA 522 (OMGU5). BICO BECG PASr 11/134-3/15. Undated copy of memo 
from VfW, Abt. I A. 'InvestlUon und Ftnanzierungsplan des Vert Wirtschaftsgebiets fOr das 
HaushaltsJahr 1949/1950'; BAK Z4. 58. Wirtschaftsrat des Vereinigten 
Wtrtschaftsgebtetes. Drucksache 19149. Nr. 1606: 'Zusammenfassender Bertcht des 
Sonderausschusses zur Behandlung von Fragen der KohlenfOrderung', 5.8.1949; PA 2, 550. 
Hennann POnder to BICOJ.Sec. 30.5.1949. 
5 BAK Z4, 58. 'Kurzprotokol1 der 8. 5itzung des Sonderausschusses'. 22.6.1949: 
Z13. 198. WAM to Sonderausschu6. 8.6.1949. 
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In June '49, the Sonderausschu~ met again. The minutes record a pithy 
summary of the situation from the chairman, the SPD delegate Dr. Berger, '1) Die 
Zustandtgkeit der Lander im Wohnungsbau ist gegeben. 2) Das was die Lander 
tun konnen ist nicht ausreichend. 3) Es kommt darauf an, die Fehlmenge 
zumindest zu iiberbriicken. ,I Presumably because it was aware of both 
ministerial and Lander resistance to any more extensive measures, the 
committee limited itself to recommending that 30 million DM be made 
available from bizonal funds. 2 It also recommended that at least one fifth of 
total investment in the mining industry should be spent on mine-owned 
3 housing. 1\vo days later, the EconOmic Council endorsed these proposals. 
This aid, though welcome, fell far short of what was required, as a comparison 
with the figures above makes clear. The 30 million was not even just for the 
4 Ruhr but had to be shared out with the other mining regions. Even if some 
extra money were to be available from the Lander and some intermediate 
finance gained from the counterpart funds, the sums envisaged did not cover a 
fraction of what was necessary for a speedy solution to the mines' housing 
shortage. In any case, up till autumn 1949 no money at all had been received 
from either Lander or counterpart funds (an earlier GARIOA payment of 135 
million DM to the mining industry had been expressly reserved for industrial 
5 
and not housing use). 
It is hard to establish exactly what impact the lack of funds had on building 
progress, since the building statistics for the 1948-1949 period are (for reasons 
1 BAK Z4, 58, 'Kurzprotokoll der 8. Sitzung des Sonderausschusses', 22.6.1949. 
2 Ibid. 
3 BAK Z4, 58, Wirtschaftsrat des Vereinigten Wirschaftsgebietes, Orucksache 
1949 Nr. 1606: 'Zusammenfassender Bericht des Sonderausschusses zur Behandlung von 
Fragen der Kohlen~rderung', 5.8.1949. 
4 The Ruhr received about 25,000,000 OM. BAK-ZwSt.H B134, 1367, OKBL table: 
'Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau', no date (October 1949). 
5 Ibid., note 4. 
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that are pursued below) particularly misleading and contradictory. It will not 
be far wrong. however. to assume that only half the intended number of dwelling 
units had been provided. In the second half of 1949. progress was no better. 
indeed probably worse. than the pre-currency reform performance. 1 It was 
clear that at this rate it would take years to satisfy the housing demands of even 
those miners who were already in the industry. let alone to provide decent 
housing for future recruits. 
The Economic Council's decision to provide 30 million DM and temporary 
uncertainties in the coal market brought a brief halt to the lobbying in Bonn but 
in 1950 it began once more in earnest. Once again. NRW made its own financial 
support conditional on Federal aid. though realistically it limited its immediate 
demands to a repeat payment of 30 million DM. It seemed quite likely that 
Bonn would agree to this and so building in the Ruhr was allowed to begin. In 
the event. however. Bonn put up resistance despite the fact that even with the 30 
million DM the housing programme would only be about half of what was 
2 
necessary. as the DKBL pOinted out to the Federal Economics Ministry (BWiM). 
The BWiM was sympathetic. but the Federal Finance Minister (BFM) refused to 
3 
countenance a repeat of the previous year's subsidy. 
Since NRW had made further support contingent on a Federal contribution. the 
BFM's decision dealt a heavy blow to housing actMty in the Ruhr. By the end of 
1950. NRW had put up only 28 million DM or slightly more than one third of its 
4 
envisaged total commitment. 'Dadurch ist der Zustand entstanden'. 
1 In alIB.633 d.u.'s were repaired in the Ruhr from 1.7.-31.12.1949, see HStaD 
NW73,73, WAM, Referat IA 304, table: 'Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau. SolI ab 1.1.50-
30.9.1952'.22.2.1950: for the share of light repairs see HStaD NW73, 120. SVR Quarterly 
report for IVth quarter 1949 (Unless otherwise stated, all future SVR monthly/quarterly 
reports referred to can be found in the above file). 
2 BAK-ZwStH B 134. 1365, DKBL to BWiM, 4.B.1950. 
3 BAK-ZwStH B134, 1365, BWoM, Memo. 15.B.1950. 
4 HStaD NW10.83. WAM III B 1. Memo. 10.1.1951. 
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complained the SVR, 'da.J3 eine Reihe der aus ERP-Mitteln gegebenen 
1.Hypotheken, ffIr die auch Arbe1tgebennittel der Zechen zur Verfugung stehen 
(Umsatzsteuerruckflusse) letzten Endes nicht fur Wohnungsbau-Zwecke 
verwendet werden konnen, weil hierfur Landes- bzw. Bundesdarlehen fehlen.'1 
The Federal Economics and Housing Ministers continued to press the DKBL's 
case and finally, in December 1950, the cabinet resolved to provide 36 million 
DM for miners' housing as long as an equivalent amount were forthcoming from 
2 
counterpart funds. Yet even after this decision, the Finance Minister 
prevented the money from being allocated. He argued that the oil tax revenues 
that were supposed to cover the subsidy were in fact lower than expected. By 
September 1951, the funds still had not been released and indeed were never 
transferred. 3 
1950-1951: Korea and the Miners' Housing Law 
Though the industry had been unsuccessful in obtaining greater Federal support. 
the discussions in Bonn revealed that a different political climate was emerging. 
It was noteworthy, for example, that the BWiM had consistently endorsed the 
industry's demands and had pleaded the industry's case in discussions with 
4 
other departments. In December 1950, the NRW cabinet made a renewed 
application for a coal levy; though no more successful than its predecessors this 
was the first to enjoy support from the Economics Minister. It was hostility 
from the BFM and the La.nder representatives in the Bundesrat that had 
1 HStaD NWI0. 83. SVR to WAM. 16.10.1950. 
2 BAK-ZwSlH BI34. 1365. BFM to BWoM. 12.9.1950. 
3 BAK-ZwSlH B134. 1365, copy of letter from Adenauer to SchMler. 7.9.1951: 
HStaD NWI0, 83. WAM to BWoM, 23.2.1951: Minutes of 117th cabinet meeting on 19th 
December. in Hans Booms (ed.), Kabtnettsprotokolle der Bundesregterung. Vol 2. 
Boppard am Rhein. 1984. p.898. note 23: HStaD NW73. 100. extract from G1UckauJ 1952: 
'Der Wiederau1bauminister zum Wohnungsbau fOr 8ergleute'. 
4 BAK-ZwSlH BI34. 1365, BWoM. Memo. 25.8.1950. 
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1 prevented it. A sign of this new mood was that when in the cabinet discussions 
about a possible coal levy Finance Ministry representatives argued that it was up 
to the L~nder to give aid to miners' housing. the Minister for Economics was 
joined by the Labour Ministry. the Minister for the Marshall Plan and the 
Minister for Justice in refuting this. In 1949. by contrast. none of the btzonal 
departmental directors had opposed the notion of ~nder responsibility. 2 As 
another sign of his support for miners' housing. Erhard wrote to the President of 
the Hauptamt fur Sofort-Htlfe (HafSH), the body responsible for allotting aid to 
refugees. asking if it was possible to make a contribution to the housing 
3 programme. 
In part. this new mood was the result of a growing awareness within the BWiM 
that the contradiction between the laisser-faire approach to capital movements. 
on the one hand. and the continued price controls in capital goods. on the other. 
meant that heavy industry and particularly mining was being starved of capital. 
thus undermining the entire economy's prospects for growth. Outside the 
Economics Ministry. too. cabinet colleagues and senior Christian Democrats 
showed growing impatience with Erhard's failure to ensure sufficient capital 
4 flows to the capital goods sector. 
However. much more important than such shifts in domestic opinion was. as 
Abelshauser and Adamsen have documented. the new pressure from the US. 
Throughout 1948 and 1949. the Allies had (as the example of miners' housing 
has shown) grown increasingly concerned about the fallure to direct investment 
towards heavy industry. about the lack of response to the Federal Republic's 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H B134. 1365. BWoM. Memo. 11.12.1950 and letter to WAM with same 
date; BWoM. Memo. 6.12.1950. 
2 Minutes of 115th cabinet meeting on 5/6 Dezember. Point 13. in Booms (ed.). 
Kabtnettsprotokolle. Vol 2. p.871. 
3 HStaD NWI0.83. copy of letter from Erhard to President. HAfSH. 27.2.1951. 
4 Abelshauser. Wtrtschajtsgeschtchte. p.66ff. 
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growing unemployment and. in 1950-1 particularly. about West Germany's 
burgeOning trade deficit. 1 Nevertheless. until 1950. Erhard was largely able to 
keep his freedom of action. It was the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 
that transformed the situation. Suddenly. America ceased to be the slightly 
overbearing uncle. concerned to see the investment in his nephew's education 
well spent and became now the stern father. set on steering an errant son in the 
right direction. In the view of the United States. Gennany had to accept its 
responsibilities in the protection of the free world against Communism; its role 
was to supply raw materials and capital goods to those Western economies now 
hard at work producing ann aments and it was therefore vital for the American 
2 
war effort that Germany use its resources effectively. Though American 
pressure reached its high point only in 1951. the last months of 1950 saw the 
West German government increasingly resigned to the necessity of a more active 
management of the economy. 
As well as heralding a new urgency in American representations. the Korean war 
also initiated a new phase of growth in the West Gennan economy and this too 
exposed the weaknesses in coal mining. In December 1950 the government was 
forced to initiate temporary power cuts in order to husband scarce coal 
3 
supplies. The coal shortages increased public awareness of the mining 
industry's investment needs. 'Erst die seit Mal 1950 einsetzende Verknappung 
der Kohle'. noted Fehlemann. the DKBL's housing expert. 'hat in der breiten 
Cffentlichkeit den Bergarbeiter-Wohnungsbau als das Problem Nr.l. des 
Kohlenbergbaus und somit der deutschen Wirtschaft in den Vordergrund 
1 Abelshauser. Wtrtschaftsgeschtchte. p.65fI & p.76ff; Werner Abelshauser. 
·Ans.Uze "korporaUver Marktwirtschaft" in der Korea-Krise der When fOnfziger Jahre. 
Ein Brlefwechsel zwtschen dem Hohen Kommlssar John McCloy und Bundeskanzler 
Konrad Adenauer'. Vterteljahreshefte.filr Zettgeschichte. 1982. 30. 4. pp.715-756. here 
pp.734-5. 
2 Abelshauser. Wtrtschaftsgeschtchte. p.76ff; Abelshauser. 'AnsAtze "korporativer 
Marktwtrtschaft· ... p.722ff. 
3 Abelshauser. Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau sett 1945. p.70. 
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geruckt,.1 Quite apart from the general goal of offering good quality housing. the 
accelerated pace of recruitment meant that the mines began to run out of any 
dwelling space at all. 2 
In housing policy, the first direct response to the new situation came not from 
Bonn but from the American Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA. later 
MSA). the body which supervised the allocation of Counterpart funds. Ever 
since Korea, noted the Federal Housing Ministry (BWoM), the Americans had 
shown 'sUirkstes Interesse fur den Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau,.3 Hitherto. the 
limited ERP funds given to miners' housing had been offered at market rates. as 
a substitute for other types of market loan and had therefore not been a genuine 
subsidy.4 Now, however, the ECA proposed more positive measures. 5 The 
immediate stimulus here was a press release issued by the DKBL in October 1950 
which conveyed the danger of the present slow pace of building. A few days 
later, the ECA organised a fact-finding mission to the Ruhr and in November. 
the DKBL was requested to outline a housing programme based on 35 million 
6 DM, later revised to 45 million, of ERP funds. Though the negotiations as to 
the form of the building programme were to prove very complex and involved, 
7 
work on the building projects began in late Spring 1951. 
1 Ges.Verb File 'Wohnungswesen 4 Bergarbeiterwohnungsbauprogramm 41 
Programme 1951-1953', Paper from Fehlemann, 'Das Gesetz zur F~rderung des 
Bergarbeiterwohnungsbaus im Kohlenbergbau und sein Einflt.Jj3 auf den 
Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau'. 12.11.1951. 
2 See HStaD NW62.386, LAA NRW. Report for December 1951 and NW45.207. 
Report for October 1951. 
3 BAK-ZwSt.H B134. 1365. BWoM. Memo 'fOr die Ressortbespr. am 1.2.1951 betr. 
Sonderprogramm BergarbeiteIWohnungsbau 1951', 31.1.1951. 
4 Except in the limited sense that, given the prevailing capital shortage. the 
'market rates' charged by ERP were stllliower than the mines would have had to pay to 
obtain loans from other sources. BAK-ZwSt.H B134. 1365. BWoM. Memo. 7.11.1950. 
5 BAK-ZwStH BI34. 1365. BWoM. Memo. 28.9.1950. 
6 BAK-ZwSt.H B134. 1367. copy ofleUer from SVR to WAM. 16.10.1950; B134. 
1365. BWoM. Memo, 13.10.1950; Memo. 7.11.1950, 'BergarbelteIWohnungsbauprogramm 
1951 '; Memo 'far die Ressortbespr. am 1.2.1951 betr. Sonderprogramm 
Bergarbelterwohnungsbau 1951 '. 31.1.1951; HStaD NWI0, 90. DKBL to WAM. 12.6.1951. 
annex: 'Zusammenfassung der wtchttgsten VorgAnge Ober die Verhandlungen betr.: ERP-
Programm 1951'. 
7 HStaD NWI0. 90. DKBL to WAM. 12.6.1951. 
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On the German side, the pressure grew for a greater national commitment to 
miners' housing. Initially, the ECA tied its support to the condition that at least 
as much money be forthcoming from Bonn. 1 (Later, however, the failure of the 
Finance Minister to comply did not lead to ECA support being withdrawn). NRW, 
too, renewed its lobbying in Bonn. In December 1950, as already noted, it again 
mooted the idea of a coal levy. In January, all the major parties in the NRW 
parliament united to pass a motion calling upon the Land government to 
undertake all possible steps to promote the building of miners' housing and to 
2 persuade the Federal Government of the necessity of further support. In 
February, the WAM wrote to the Federal Housing Ministry expressing its dismay 
3 
at Bonn's failure to endorse a miners' housing levy. The mining employers 
kept up the pressure too, with the Federal Coal Commissar, Martin Sogemeier, 
declaring in June 1951 that an accelerated housing programme was the only way 
4 to prevent a dangerous drain of labour away from the mines. In addition, 1951 
saw two major international commitments to improve the productivity of 
German coal. In August the Council of Ministers in the OEEC agreed on a broad 
programme of productivity increases in Western Europe with special emphasis 
on German coal production. At the same time, the ECA in Washington outlined 
a Similar productivity programme - again with special emphasis on coal. The 
ECA reckoned that there was an annual shortfall of 30-50 million tons of coal in 
Europe. 5 As a result of these initiatives, a special committee was set up in 
Germany, headed by the Minister for the Marshall Plan, to look into ways of 
6 increasing productivity in coal mining. 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H BI34, 1365, BWoM, Memo, 25.10.1950. 
2 HStaD NWI0, 83, Landtag NRW, '2. Wahlpertode, Bd.l, Drucksache Nr.142'. 
3 HStaD NWI0,83, WAM to BWoM, 23.2.1951. 
4 BAK-ZwSt.H BI02, 4391, Hensel to Kattenstroth, 5.6.1951. 
5 IOBEA T4, Bundesminster fOr den Marshallplan to lOB and DOB, 2.10.1951. 
6 Ibid. 
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The combination of American pressure, regional and industrial lobbying and 
the coal shortages was irresistible. By summer 1951, both the majority of 
Bundestag delegates and the cabinet acknowledged the need for major 
investment measures in the mining industry, including miners' housing. In the 
case of housing, it was clear that neither the mining industry nor the Lc1nder in 
which the mines were situated were in a position to provide adequate funding. 1 
As is well known from Abelshauser's and Adamsen's work, a package of 
investment measures was accepted, the most important element of which was 
the Investitions-Hilfegesetz (IHG) of 1952. For miners' housing, however, the 
breakthrough came in October 1951 with the acceptance of the Miners' Housing 
2 Law which finally, three and a half years after the currency reform, introduced 
a coal levy to pay for housing. 
The law raised for a period of three years (extendable if necessary) a levy of 1 DM 
on every ton of coal sold. The revenue was to flow into a central fund 
(Bundestreuhandvennagen) whence it would be allotted to the mining regions by 
the Federal Housing Minister and then to indiVidual building projects by special 
regional committees created by the law. The money was to be given in the form 
of low-interest loans, as a supplement to loans raised on the capital market. 
employer contributions and regional subsidies. In exceptional cases, non-
repayable subsidies could be made. Though some of the other clauses of the Act 
were not to the liking of the NRW Reconstruction Ministry, its financial tenns 
fulfilled all NRWs wishes. Henceforth, NRW was able to restrict mining's share 
of its housing budget to a level equivalent to the miners' share of the regions' 
popula Hon. 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H BI02, 4391.164. Sltzung des Deutschen Bundestags, 26.9.1951: 
B134, 1372, Extract from the 'Kurzprotokoll Ober die 175. Kablnettsltzung der 
Bundesregterung am 26.9.1951'. 
2 Cesetz zur FOroerung des BergarbetteIWohnungsbaues im Kohlenbergbau, BgBl 
1951. Nr.50, p.865ff. 
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Miners' housing, investment and economic recovery 
Why had the mines had to wait so long for funding? Was it simply short-
sightedness on the part of the government? The Federal Government wanted 
coal to grow with the rest of the economy without central help, yet at the same 
time it maintained tight price controls. Out of fear of inflation it shrunk back 
1 from introducing a truly free market, without seeming to recognise that this in 
turn necessitated a break with free market principles of capital allocation. 
Erhard's position was not quite as irrational as it appears. It is very possible 
that he was counting on more Marshall Plan aid being forthCOming than was 
2 
actually the case. In addition. his policy of favouring consumer industries at 
the cost of heavy industry was not simply a strategy for growth. It is a little 
remembered fact that Erhard was quite prepared to accept some retardation of 
the growth process as the result of favouring the consumer industries if by doing 
so he could strengthen popular confidence in the economy. It was Erhard. after 
3 
all, who announced before the currency reform that: 
Ich persOnlich wiirde keinen Zweifel dariiber lassen, d~ man das 
bishertge M~ an Opferfahigkeit dem Volke einfach nicht mehr zumuten 
kann. Ich wiirde lieber ganz bewuJ3t eine gewisse RiicksUindtgkeit, einen 
Hingeren Nachholzeitraum innerhalb der Produktionssph~re 
hinnehmen, wenn wir d urch eine Steigerung und Ausreicherung des 
Konsums eine Besserung der sozialen Lage erreichen kDnnten. 
It would go beyond the limits of this study to determine whether, if there had 
been no Korea boom, Erhard would have been able to continue neglecting heavy 
industry and mining in particular. It seems unlikely. What is certain is that 
for miners' housing. as will be seen. the change in policy came rather late. 
1 Of course, there were good reasons for not totally freeing the coal price. Quite 
apart from the question of coal's impact on general price stability, there was no 
competition between the mines. sales being organised centrally by the DKBL. so that the 
Industry would have been In a position to take monopolistic advantage of a market still 
heavily wedded to coal as a source of energy. 
2 The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Werner Abelshauser 
for this insight. 
3 Adamsen. Inuesttttonshllfefiir die RuM, p.41. 
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Mining had partly wasted the best opportunity of the post-war years to win a 
stable workforce. 
Alternative sources of finance and buUdfng progress, 1948-51 
Exactly what impact did the lack of central funding have on the housing 
programme? To answer this it is necessary to look at the available statistics on 
miners' housing. 
These present some problems of interpretation. The best figures available are 
the monthly, later quarterly, reports from the SVR (most of which have been 
preserved) on the progress of repairs, extensions, reconstruction and new 
1 building throughout the 1948-51 period. The reports have the value that, 
unlike many of the mining employers' statistics, they include the so-called 
'private' sector, i.e. miners' housing owned neither by the mines nor by housing 
2 
associations. The problem with the SVR figures is that they were substantially 
revised half way through 1949 as a result both of checks in the municipal 
building departments (which revealed that a lot of completed building had never 
been properly reported) and possibly also of political pressure to match the 
3 
employers' figures. 
1 See p.232, footnote 1. 
2 In any case, there Is no complete, continuous and detailed record of employers' 
statistics. It is very possible that the release of the DKBL's files held in the Mining 
Archive will result in such figures becoming available. 
3 HStaO NW73.120, SVR reports for July 1949 and 4th g 1949. For the political 
pressure on the SVR see NW73,73, W AM 0004 (13) to Director of SVR. 28.9.1949. 
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Table 7: Repairs and new construction completed according to SVR reports l 
D.u.'s completed from 1.2.1948 
Until end of: repairs new and re- new/recon/sub-div 

























As is evident from table 7, the revisions resulted in a massive jump, particularly 
in the repairs figures but also in new construction, for the second half of 1949. 
By the end of the year, the cumulative repairs figure was double what it had been 
at the end of June, whtle new butldtng had more than quadrupled. From other 
sources, we know that the actual number of repairs completed in the second half 
of 1949 was in fact only about 8,600, or roughly one third of what the SVR's 
figures seem to suggest, whtle the volume of re- and new construction lay around 
4 3,700 d.u.'s - less than half the SVR figure. Clearly this adjustment introduces 
5 
a measure of uncertainty into the statistics. However, if, as seems a reasonable 
assumption, the previously unreported housing was evenly spread throughout 
6 the Feb 1948-July 1949 period, then the following table provides a fair guide to 
the changing pace of house-building: 
1 Source: SVR monthly and quarterly reports in HStaD NW73,l20. 
2 Includes a small number of Nissen huts and prefabs. 
3 Mostly Nissen huts and prefabs. 
4 See HStaO NW73,73, WAM IA-304, table 'Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau. SoIl ab 
1.1.50-30.9.52', 22.2.1950. 
5 A reassuring point. however, is that the UVR evidently believed the revised 
figures to be accurate. See the figures in UVR (ed.). Jahresbertcht 1953/1954. Essen 1954, 
pp.32-33 which match those of the SVR vety closely. 
6 It may well be, although the SVR did not acknowledge the posslbUfty, that a 
number of the unreported houses actually stemmed from the pre-Feb. 1948 period. It Is 
not surprising that the SVR. concerned to bolster the Image of Its current plan, did not try 
to backdate the houses In this way. The result Is that the table below is probably 
somewhat on the generous side. 
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Table 8: Pace ofhous~ construction 1948-51 1 
In half year repairs new Irecon2 
ending: (d.u.'s/month) (d.u.'s per month) 
July 1948 2990 383 
Dec 19483 2040 393 
June 1949 1760 524 
Dec 1949 1440 613 
June 1950 1030 770 
Dec 1950 930 n.a. 
June 1951 810 11604 
Dec 1951 350 1398 
The most important fact revealed by the table is that though, as we know, the 
miners' housing programme had to wait until the end of 1951 for a major central 
subsidy, it began recovering earlier from the depths to which it plummeted in the 
aftermath of the currency reform. True, the number of repairs continued to fall 
but this reflected the dwindling number of properties available for restoration 
rather than a shortage of resources. New construction and total rebuilding 
(,reconstruction'), both of which involved far more resources than repairs, 
increased substantially. Over the period June 1950 - June 1951, for example, the 
monthly completion rate for new and rebuilt houses was almost three times as 
high as it had been at the end of 1948. 
Where did the money for this building come from? Unfortunately there are no 
satisfactory, consistent compilations before 1952 and probably will not be until 
the DKBL records are made available. A UVR report notes the following total 
expenditure on miners' housing, but does not give the source of the funding. 
1 Figures up to June 1949 calculated from the adjusted SVR cumulative figures: 
Dec. 1949 calculated from WAM figures In HStaD NW73,73, WAM IA-304, 
table'Sergarbelterwohnungsbau. Soli ab 1.1.50-30.9.52', 22.2.1950: remaining figures 
calculated directly from SVR reports. 
2 Excluding subdlv1disions and attic conversions. 
3 Five month period. 
4 Twelve month period. 
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Expenditure (mill DM) 
Overall Housin~ Mine-owned housin~ alone 
71,500 .()()() 
160, ()()(), ()()() 
160, ()()(), ()()() 
333, ()()() ,()()() 
After intro of Miners' Housing Levy: 
1952 500. ()()(). ()()() 
1953 445, ()()() ,()()() 
n.a. 
74, ()()(), ()()() 
61. ()()(), ()()() 
87, ()()() ,()()() 
79, ()()(), ()()() 
42,000,000 
With the aid of various Land and DKBL reports it is however possible to paint a 
more detailed picture. For 1948-1949, we can make a comprehensive 
breakdown of all funding and, for the following years. of public subsidies (see 
figure 3 and table 10). 




Total spending 247,476,000 DM 
UVR (ed.), Jahresbericht 1953-4. pp.30 and 4l. 
Currency refonn to end of year. 
• Unemp.Ins.Fund 
III Export Rebate 
II NRWfunds 
~ Federal Funds 
o Mines' funds 
Calculation from WAM and DKBL figures for NRW. See HStaD NW73, 136. WAM 
IA203, 'Obersicht Ober die Vertetlung der WohnungsbaumiUel des Landes selt der 
Geldordnung' and BAK-ZwSt.H 8134,1367. DKBL table. 'Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau', 
October 1949. The two sets of figures match each other closely when allowance 15 made 
for the fact that the DKBL did not include privately owned housing. while the Land 
authoriUes only ltsted public subsidies. The overall sum is higher than the UVR total 
above because It includes the Cologne and Aachen area. 
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Table 10: Public subsidies for miners' housing in NRW 1948-1951 1 
Year Total Land & Unem12. Marshall 
expenditure Federal insurance Plan funds Qn hQusin~ 6!rants funds ~ 2 UNR fi~ureS1 
1948/9 231.5 111.4 45.0 
1950 160.0 38.23 23.1 
1951 333.0 35.04 38.05 145.06 
The first and most obvious point is that even before the levy was introduced, 
sizeable public subsidies were received. Public subsidy for house building was 
an accepted part of the Social Market Economy. Rents were controlled by law 
and the main brunt of housing expenditure fell on the LAnder. The Federal 
Government gave assistance in as much as it provided funds to enable refugees 
build a new home or find accommodation near a place of work 
(Aujbaudarlehen). More unexpectedly. the labour insurance funds 7 turn out to 
have played an important role. In the early years after the currency reform the 
insurance funds formed one of the few sources of capital available at interest 
8 
rates affordable for social housing projects. 
But perhaps the most striking aspect of housing expenditure is the way in which 
its composition changed from year to year. In 1948-9. aware that the housing 
programme would collapse without its support, NRW diverted a large part of its 
1 Source UVR and WAM as above. 
2 Ruhronly. 
3 Figure taken from a different WAM table so as to include the funds reaching the 
mines via the refugee relocation plan (Umsiedlungsprogramm). Without the relocation 
funds, the figure would have been around 28 million. See HStaD NW10,83, IIIB 3-348. 
'Obersicht Ober die fOr den Bergarbetterwohnungsbau durch NRW berettgestellten 
Wohnungsbaumittel',6.6.1951. 
4 As at 20.6.1951. It is possible that additional funding was voted later in the year. 
5 Source - as note 3. 
6 Source: BAK-ZWSt.H B102, 21258. BWiM III A 2. 'Zusammenstellung alIer fOr 
den Kohlenbergbau sen der Wclhrungsreform durchgefOhrten Kreditma.l3nahmen·. 
19.8.1955. 
7 Arbeitslosenstockmittel. 
8 See for instance BBA 55, 12200, Nr.10, Minutes of Bergausschu6 meeting on 
23.9.1949. 
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housing budget to the mines. In 1950, it resolved to reduce this contribution 
substantially. As a result of some astute manoeuvering from the DKBL, the 
Reconstruction Ministry found itself committed to in fact a very sizeable 
subsidy for the miners' housing programme. However, when it transpired that 
no aid would be forthcoming from Bonn, the Ministry used this as an excuse to 
bring its commitment down to something nearer the originally envisaged 
1 
levels and public subsidies ran to less than half the levels of 1949. 
Nevertheless, overall spending did not fall and this was undoubtedly the result 
of the new income tax law introduced in April 1949? The new law introduced 
the notion of accelerated depreciation while (§7c) allowing the employers to 
include spending on house construction as capital spending. 3 For those mines 
making a profit this was, as the DKBL itself commented, 'eine au13erordentliche 
Begiinstigung' which provided a major incentive to proceed with new house 
4 building. According to calculations made in the early 1950's by the Friedrich 
1 HStaD NWI0,83, WAM, Memo, 3.4.1951; BAK-ZwSt.H B134, 1365, BWoM, Memo, 
19.3.1951. In 1949, the DKBL had applied for a tax rebate for exported coal and in 
December, the finance minister of NRW agreed to a rebate of 38.5 Million DM with the 
proviso that the mines devote it exclusively to miners' housing. Discussions about the 
degree of additional support that could be expected from the Land stretched over the 
following months because of uncertainty about the amount of the tax rebate that would 
be spent on public utility housing. The Land wished to encourage the mines not to to 
devote their funds exclusively to mine-owned properties; the profitable mines were in any 
case inclined not to concentrate on Werkswohnungsbau, because the new tax law 
favoured those companies which sponsored public utility - rather than company -
housing. On the other hand, the DKBL pointed out that there were many company 
houses in need of repair or rebuilding and in February 1950, the NRW finally agreed that if 
the mines were to devote more than 50016 of the tax rebate to public utility housing, the 
Land would put up an equal amount for repair of company properties. The DKBL was 
now invited to draw up a programme based on the available finance which it did at the 
beginning of April. At that time the First Federal Housing Law was due to come into 
operation in a few weeks and the mines were keen to begin building before it did so as to 
avoid being bound by its provisions, particularly the rule that the link between 
employment contract and tenancy in company housing should expire after the tenant 
had been in the house for five years. This pressure explains why the WAM hastily 
approved the DKBL's programm, only afteIWards discovering that the plan would involve 
the Ministry in conSiderably more spending than originally anticipated. Originally, 
NRW had expected its contribution would be around 17 mUlion DM. Now it appeared that 
It would be 66-68 m1ll10n DM. In May, NRW agreed to advance an Initial 26 million but 
said that Federal aid of at least the same level as the previous year should be forthcoming. 
UnUl it was, NRW refused to advance more cash. 
2 2.Gesetz zur vorlAufigen Neuordnung von Steuem. 
3 L.Falk & W.BIOmich (eds), Etnkommenssteuergesetz. Kommentar, Munich 
1982, Introduction; Abelshauser, Wtrtschajtsgeschichte, p.74. 
4 WWA F35,3522, DKBL, Circular to Nr.CJ 43 mining companies, 31.8.1949. Annex: 
VorlAufiges Merkblatt Ober die steuerUche Behandlung des Wohnungsbaues. 
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Krupp mines in Essen, the tax incentives meant that from the 5,000 DM put up by 
employers for each new apartment, they had to pay effectively only 1,500 DM. 
(For the many mines which were only breaking even or running at a loss. 
however, §7c was a poor substitute for the missing state subsidies.) 1 Finally, in 
1951 there was a change again, as the Americans' new drive for coal led to a large 
injection of resources from the ECA, for which both NRW and the Insurance 
Funds provided additional capital. Thus by dint of normal social housing 
support, a little refugee aid, tax relief and US help, mining had been enabled to 
make sizeable advances in the housing programme. 
Housing progress, 1948-51 
The SVR plan 'Ruhr 48/52' had envisaged a total outlay of around 1,400 million 
2 DM between the currency reform and the end of the plan in September 1952. 
Although, for reasons explored below, the SVR plan had become increasingly 
notional, it does at least provide a useful yardstick with which to evaluate 
progress. By the end of 1951, Le., nine months before the planned completion 
date, total expenditure lay at around 720 million DM. This was more 
favourable in relation to the original plan than appears at first sight because 
3 building costs had fallen by over 10 percent during the 1948-51 period. 
If the SVR's building figures are taken as reasonably accurate, some 66,000 
houses had been repaired and a further 46,000 re- or newly built by the end of 
1951. This was just under two thirds of the 173,000 dwelling units planned to be 
completed by the end of summer 1952.4 In terms of new and reconstruction, the 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H BI02, 21574. 'Finanzielle Opfer der Fried. Krupp Bergwerke Essen 
im Wohnungsbau selt dem WAhrungssUchtag'. 3.7.1953; BI02, 4391. Kost to Erhard. 
4.7.1951. 
2 HStaD NW73.47. Director, SVR, Draft of 'Bergarbelterwohnungsbauprogramm 
Ruhr 47/52'.30.3.1948. 
3 LObcke, Die Subuenttonterung des Wohnungsbaues. p.54. 
4 A comparison in summer 1952 itself is not possible as the SVR plan figures 
were abandoned at the end of 1951 in favour of the DKBL's statistics. 
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plan had actually already been exceeded. Progress in repairs was less 
favourable than the statistics suggest because many more lightly damaged 
houses and far fewer heavily damaged properties had been repaired than was 
originally envisaged. The amount of dwelling space created through repairs was 
probably only about one third of plan levels. 1 This was offset by the 
increasingly good progress of new bUilding so that. all told. between one half and 
two thirds of the additional living space originally envisaged had been created.2 
This was far from being a disaster. In effect. the depreciation allowances of §7c 
had at least partly compensated for the fact that public subsidies were lower 
than originally anticipated. 
Nevertheless. achievements were not only well short of plan targets and but even 
further short of the workforce's needs. The SVR plan itself proved an 
increasingly inadequate guide to the miners' true requirements. This was 
because of a discrepancy between the basis of the SVR's calculations and the way 
housing was actually allocated. The SVR had calculated its bUilding targets by 
estimating not the number of apartments required but instead the amount of 
3 living space that needed to be rendered inhabitable. It had set out a modest 
ratio of dwelling space to occupants as the basis for its calculations and had then 
worked out how much dwelling space would be needed to house the Ruhr 
workforce as a whole.4 Yet when it came to repairing houses in practice. these 
notional averages had little meaning. There is no record that. when houses 
were repaired, the existing occupants were then forced to take on lodgers or 
vacate rooms simply because. according to SVR norms. they were occupying too 
1 Author's estimate based on the original plan figures and statistics for the 2nd 
quarter of 1951 showing the typical dwelling space gained through dlfferent categgories 
of repairs. See SVR report for 2nd quarter 1951. appendix 1. 
2 Estimated as above and bearing in mind that a proportion of the new buUdlng 
was actually created through subdividing existing apartments. 
3 HStaD NW73, 47. Director of SVR, Draft paper, 'Sergarbeiterwohnungsbau', 
30.3.1948. 
4 Ibid, 
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much living space. It was understandable that this was so, but it meant that 
the SVR plan was inadequate to meet the workforce's needs. At the end of 1949. 
therefore, the DKBL produced its own estimates of housing requirements and 
these were increasingly used as the basis of the housing programmes. 1 
We do not know how many miners were seeking accommodation at the time the 
SVR's plan was drawn up. But we do know that at the end of 1949 the DKBL 
believed there to be around 57,000 miners in the Ruhr who were separated from 
their families, a further 3,500 families in emergency accommodation and 
2 10,000 more in cramped conditions. In addition. extra housing was needed to 
compensate for the expected retirement of a fairly large number of miners 
(whose housing would thus be lost to the active labour force for a while). for 
general ageing and decay of part of the mines' housing stock and to meet the 
needs ofmarrted men who would be hired over the next couple of years as part of 
the mines' expansion programme. In all, the demand at the beginning of 1950 
was for 112,379 dwelling units over the next two years, relatively few of which 
3 
could be supplied by repairs to partially damaged property. Yet between then 
and the beginning of 1952, only 31,000 houses were newly constructed and a 
further 2.800 heavily damaged houses repaired. Again, a number of the former 
were rather temporary affairs, created by subdividing existing accommodation 
or by attic conversions. On this basis it can be estimated that the housing 
programme up to 1951 provided a permanent good quality house or apartment to 
less than half those on the housing lists. Since the established miners tended to 
come first, it is not surprising that the reminiscences of former new miners 
1 See DKBL. (ed.), Uberbltck Uber den UmJang. die btshertge Abwtcklung uncI die 
wettere Durch.fi1hru.ng des Bergarbettenvohmmgsbau.es, Essen 1950. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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suggest only a small proportion of the newcomers had obtained a decent 
appartment by the end of 1951. 1 
Housing and workforce regeneration 
How important was the slow pace of building? A later chapter will look in 
more detail at the link between housing and workforce stability. There was no 
doubt that many of those who left the mines would not have done so if provided 
with decent accommodation. Workforce stability and productivity would 
therefore have benefited. Because of the housing shortages. the mines were 
2 
unwilling to hire married men. and the single men they did take on proved to 
be a highly mobile source of labour. The result was that many mines found 
themselves caught up in a vicious circle of recruitment and wastage from which 
they could not escape throughout the 1950's.3 
In addition. there were a limited number of years after the currency reform when 
many people not normally inclined to occupational mobility. and certainly not 
inclined to making a sideways jump into the mines. were looking for an 
occupational and physical home and were prepared to settle somewhere 
4 
unfamiliar for the sake of striking roots. These included many married men 
who had come to the mines before 1948 for the Care Packets and were now 
1 In the Hibernia mine Shamrock 3/4. for instance. 65% of those who had received 
housing up to the end of 1951 were members of the established workforce. despite the fact 
that new miners made up 70016 of the workforce I See BBA 32. 3055. Minutes of Beleg-
schaftsausschtt6 Meeting. 3.10.1951. The new miner Helmut Berger began working in the 
pits in 1947 and obtained his first decent house only in 1953. Despite the six year delay 
he believed himself lucky to have gained it then. See Helmut Berger. Der PUtt hat mich 
ausgespuckt. Etn Ruhrkumpel erzdhlt aus setnem Leben. Oberhausen 1981. p. 11 Off. 
2 StaM Arbeitsamt Dortmund 46. ABB. Circulars. 19.2.1949 and 7.11.1949. 
3 A detailed analysis of this vicious circle (in which mines with a high demand for 
labour were forced to take on men who were unlikely to stay. thus engendering further 
wastage. continued high demand and so on) is given in Instltut fQr Sozialforschung. 
Frankfurt University. 'Die subjektiven und obJekUven Abkehrgnlnde bel sieben Zechen 
des westdeutschen Stelnkohlenbergbaues In threr Auswirkung auf die Sicherung des 
Belegschaftsstandes unter Tage'. mimeographed Ms. Frankfurt 1955. passim and esp. 
p.230-1. 
4 For stattsttcal proof of this. see chapter 7. p.335ff. 
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wondering whether to stay. What made them willing to embrace a long-tenn 
career in the mines was the double legacy of the currency reform: on the one 
hand, economic conditions seemed at least to be normalising, so that one could 
think on a more long-term basis; on the other, unemployment was on the 
increase and it looked to many people as if they would not find employment in 
their chosen profession. Ullrich, the most senior official in the DKBL 
manpower department and a shrewd and realistic observer of the manpower 
situation, wrote in early 1949 that if good hOUSing were not available to replace 
the Care Packets, the refugee new miners would quit the indUStry. 'Der Bergbau 
wurde damit gerade den Teil seiner Neubergleute verlieren, bei dem sein 
Bestreben eine bodensUindige Belegschaft zu gewinnen, die beste Aussicht auf 
1 Erfolg bietet'. By the mid-1950's, when ample housing was finally available in 
the mines, many of the 'unwillingly mobile' had found their occupational home 
elsewhere. Those people who were coming on to the labour market in the 1950's 
did so in a climate of rapidly diminishing unemployment and expanding 
opportunities. By 1953, the mines' attempts to recruit refugees from the 'refugee 
La.nder', for example, were running into difficulties for lack of willing 
2 
candidates. Recruits tended to view mining work as a stop-gap measure or as a 
stepping stone to something better. 
It is of course hard to say whether scarce capital would have been better 
employed in investment in miners' housing than it was elsewhere. It is, after all. 
possible that the productivity and other advantages accruing to the mining 
industry would have been outweighed by the opportunity costs to other sectors of 
1 Ges.Verb. File 'SBZ FIOchtiinge Arb 130.30-132.15', copy of memo from Ullrich. 
'Beitrag des Ruhrbergbaus zur LOsung des F10chtlingsproblems'. 4.3.1949. 
2 See ego BAK-ZwSt.H BI02.21395. BWIM to Ehmke, BAM. 31.10.1952 which talks 
of Hibernia's problems In finding occupants for refugee housing and HStaO NWI0.32. 
WAM. Memo, 15.9.52 [siclit should be 1953J which, in a neat reversal of the post-1948 
situation, complained that in the refugee relocation programme from Schleswig-Holstein 
'die Anwerbungsma.6nahmen der LandesarbeitsAmter mit dem BaufortschriU nlcht 
Schritt halten kOnnen'. 
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the economy. What the previous remarks do suggest. however. is that it would 
have been a lot more profitable investing in a big houSing programme in 1948. 
than it was to be in 1952. It was an expensive delay. 
Apprentices' hostels 
Because of the importance attributed to them by the employers. it is worth 
noting that the construction of apprentices' hostels. as indeed of all types of 
hostel building. was also held up for lack of finance. Prior to the currency 
refonn. a number of mining companies had been hard at work making existing 
camps and hostels suitable for apprentices. In 1945 there had been only three 
apprentice hostels in the Ruhr but by the end of 1947 there were already 25 with a 
1 total of 1359 places. Here too. the currency refonn retarded progress (though 
the availability of hitherto scarce supplies did at least ensure that the hostels' 
standard of fittings. furnishings and eqUipment rapidly improved) so that in 
2 July 1949 the number had risen to only 29. The specific finanCial problem for 
hostels was they did not qualify for NRW housing grants. and in 1948-9 the only 
public funding received was some very limited support from the NRW SOCial 
3 Ministry. 
The change of fortunes came somewhat earlier than for the rest of the housing 
programme when. as a result of the DKBL's and particularly the BWiM's 
endeavours. the HAfSH agreed in 1950 to provide five million DM out of refugee 
4 
money towards the cost of building additional hostels. The breakthrough 
1 Hans-Georg Erzmoneit. Was tut der Ruhrbergbau fOr seinen Nachwuchs?'. 
Bergbau. 1956. 7. pp.168-175. here p.172; OBADA 16303/3163/47. GMSO to OBAD. 
28.11.1947. 
2 Erzmonelt. Was tut der Ruhrbergbau·. p.172. 
3 Ges.Verb File '240.0-242.0 (JugendpIAne) (ab 1954),. OKBL to BWIM. 11.2.1954. 
In 1948 and 1949 the Social Ministry support amounted to 36.500 OM. which was so small 
it was presumably meant for cultural and welfare poliCies alone. 
4 Around 4 .5 million was for apprentice hostels and half a million for Knappen. 
BAK-ZwSt.H BI02. 33189. HAtSH table. 31.3.1951 and report from ImhAuser (SWIM lllA3) 
to Mln.Ogt Classen. 30.5.1951. 
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came soon after the Korean War began and, as with the later housing law, the 
BWiM's new willingness to give the mines support was a key factor behind 
obtaining the loan. Apart from the growing willingness to transfer resources to 
heavy industry, the HAfSH's involvement in hostel funding was the result of a 
marriage of interests which did not apply to hOUSing, or at least not to the same 
extent. As part of its integration and compensation programme, the state was 
very keen to see young refugees offered the chance to gain an apprenticeship (a 
point that will be developed in the next chapter).l 
Whatever the motives behind it, the new state support transformed the situation. 
Between 1948 and 1950, the DKBL had received less than 60,000 DM in public 
grants for all youth hostels. In the next three years it obtained from refugee 
funds a total of 5,478,820 DM for apprentices and a further 1,303,350 DM for the 
2 Knappen. An additional 10 million DM of slightly higher interest loans was 
3 
made available by the BWiM within the framework of the German Youth Plan. 
By 1954, there were no less than 118 apprentices' hostels in the Ruhr and a 
4 further 24 youth villages. 
As with housing, the state support could easily have been given earlier, namely 
directly after the currency reform, when the mines' financial plight was at its 
greatest. At a time when the mining industry had no serious competitors on the 
labour market, its capacity to take on outside apprentices was severely limited. 
However, the costs of the delay were probably less serious than for adult housing. 
In April 1949 there had in fact been few school leavers to take on. because 
several Uinder introduced in that year a 9th school class in order to limit youth 
1 See chapter 6, p.276ff. 
2 Ges.Verb. Ftle '240.0-242.0 (Jugendplcme) (ab 1954)', DKBL to BWiM. 11.2.1954. 
3 BAK-ZWSt.H BI02-21574, BWiM IIIA3fto NRW Arbeitsm1nlstertum, 14.1.1954. 
The Youth Plan funds from which the mines were supported were generally used to help 
finance apprenticeship places. Since, In mining, this was not necessary. the mines 
received the help to build hostels Instead. 
4 On these villages see chapter 8, p.399ff. 
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1 
unemployment. The biggest opportunity to win recruits from outside the 
ranks of the mining community came in the 1950-55 period, when the number of 
2 
school leavers was at its highest and when the mines were increasingly well 
placed to respond. 
2: Fixed prices and free markets. The coal price. the miner's 
wage and the labour market in the 1950's 
The inability to compete 
The capital transfers of 1951 and 1952 created all the investment capital the 
mines needed. It was true that the money was less effective than it would have 
been had it been made available in, say, 1948, but for all that, acute shortages of 
investment capital were now a thing of the past. What the gentlemen in the 
Economics Ministry had not banished for ever, however, was the discrepancy 
between the coal price and coal's true value. After all, the investment funds 
transferred to the mines in 1951-52 had been generated either (in the case of 
capital for technical modernisation) through a special, one-off industrial levy 
or (in the case of housing) through a tax whose proceeds were tied strictly to 
housing uses. The coal price itself remained fixed and thus the mining industry 
had not been granted any greater powers to determine its own revenues than 
before. 3 
This pOSition was not changed by the admission of the FRG into the European 
Community for Coal and Steel (EGKS) in 1952. True, it was the EGKS's avowed 
policy to achieve gradual price normalisation and Germany's entry was preceded 
1 OBADA 16301/856/50. lOBE Hauptverwaltung to OBAD, 19.11.1949. 
2 UVR (ed.), JahresbeTicht 1958 - 1960, p.30. 
3 Indeed in 1950 the Allles had actually lowered the export price. bringing it 
further than ever from its true value price. See Bah]' Staatliche PoUtik. p.73. 
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1 by a sizeable price increase for Ruhr coal. Nevertheless, both the EGKS and in 
particular the BWiM remained committed to cheap energy. Because of the 
German government's fear that higher priced coal would unleash an upward 
price spiral, German coal remained the cheapest in the Community. 2 
Initially, this loss of potential revenue did not have a major impact on the 
industry. Capital investment was after all taken care of through the IHG. And 
until 1953 or so, the mines were able to foot the wages bill without too many 
problems. During the Korea crisis the mines had been granted a new split price 
arrangement to allow them to offer some hefty wage increases. Then a two-year 
3 period had elapsed during which the industry was able to get by without making 
any wage increases at all (although an ill-fated bonus scheme in 1952 did 
4 temporarily augment the collieries' wages bill). 
However, wastage grew progressively more serious during this period and the 
industry found itself under pressure to make wage rises it was ill-placed to 
afford. There were pay increases in both 1953 and 1954 and in addition a steady 
growth in welfare expenditure of one sort or another. New inducements were 
offered to potential recruits. Charges for the first months' board and lodgings in 
5 
mining hostels were now generally suspended and often waived altogether. 
Despite rising costs, hostel charges barely increased and became one of the 
biggest items in the mines' social budget. 
These inducements were unable to prevent the mines from falling behind the 
6 
wage offers of the competition, particularly the iron and steel industry. For, 
1 Ibid., pp.73-4. 
2 UVR (ed.), Jahresbertcht 1955-1957, p.34. 
3 From spring 1951-Aprll 1953. 
4 EGKS (ed.), Entwicklung der LOhne unci die Lohnpolitik in den lndustrten der 
Gemel.nschajt 1945 - 1956, Luxemburg 1960, Section on Gennany, p. 16fT. 
5 OBADA 18007/520/55, ABB, Annual Report 1954. 
6 EGKS (ed.), EntwtcklU11(J der LOhne, pp.26-27. 
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hard coal mining suffered from two key disadvantages. On the one hand, it 
enjoyed annual productivity increases of only 3 percent, whereas its competitors 
saw their productivity go up in some cases by as much as 15 percent a year. 1 On 
the other hand, the share of total production value accounted for by wage costs 
(in German parlance, Lohnquote) was more than three times as high in mining 
as in iron and steel and indeed in most of mining's maj or industrial competitors 
2 
on the labour market. In early 1952. average male earnings in iron and steel 
surpassed that in the pits and was to stay ahead for the following four years.3 
This was by no means the only reason for the collieries' labour losses and a great 
many former miners actually chose to move to employment which offered lower 
pay. The fact remains. however. that wage offers in other sectors put the 
collieries under increasing pressure. while price controls prevented them [rom 
responding. 
The crisis oj 1955 and state support 
The crisis point came in 1955. The mines had been sparing in their 
recruitment during the previous year because demand for coal had been poor. 
4 During 1954 overall workforce size had fallen considerably. Now. with 
demand for coal booming. the collieries were desperately trying to restore the 
number of face workers. Yet in the January-March period. despite a heavy frost 
which limited the building trade's competition on the labour market. despite 37 
special recruitment campaigns in three months and despite the employers' 
willingness to take on applicants who would previously not have got past the 
5 
colliery gates. the mines obtained less than half the men they required. It was 
1 UVR (ed.). Jahresbertcht 1955-1957 .p.53. 
2 Ibid .. p.33 facing. 
s Ibid .• p.60 facing. 
4 See table 16. p.328. 
5 Calculated from OBADA 18007/1310/55, ABB quarterly report 1.1.-31.3.1955. 
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a sign of the struggle for labour that the employers' solidarity began to break 
down. Companies vied with each other for recruits, some offering three months 
free lodging rather than the one month laid down in joint gUidelines, others 
subsidising the costs of moving house and some recruiting in areas reseIVed for 
1 
other mines. In an effort to stem the rising tide of inducements and subsidies, 
the UVR repeatedly urged the collieries to obseIVe greater discipline .2 
Seizing the initiative, the 1GB demanded a large wage increase to reduce wastage 
and improve recruitment. To underline the point, it balloted its members for 
strike action. The employers' response was that they simply could not afford 
it. 3 On top of mining's general inability to keep up with iron and steel, the 
minor recession of 1953-1954 meant that in 1955 the mines were looking to 
4 improve their margins. In other words, the 1GB's demands could be financed 
only by a substantial price increase - something that did not lie within the 
employers' control. The onus lay on the Federal government and the EGKS. 
Mining thus found itself in a similar position to the 1948-1951 period. Then as 
now, the controlled coal price deprived it of the resources it needed. Whereas 
prior to 1951 the major problem had been finding capital for investment. 
mining's main difficulty now was footing the wage bill. And in 1955, just as five 
years earlier, there was little doubt that the government would have to give 
support. If it did not do so, German industry would be forced to turn to imported 
coal or alternative energy sources, thus adding more to its energy bill than would 
the very coal price increase the government was trying to avoid. So, despite 
1 Ges.Verband. File '300-30.1 Ausbildung von Neubergleuten', Memo. 8.1.1955. 
concerning telephone call from Dr. KOker; Hibernia to UVR. 14.12.1954; Memo, 12.7.1955. 
signed Ullrich. Hibernia (for whom Dr.KOker worked). was particularly alanned because 
of the danger that its own mines would end up competing with each other. thus driving its 
costs up astronomically. 
2 Ges.Verband. File '300-30.1 Ausbildungvon Neubergleuten', UVR. Circular No.16 
to mining companies and collieries. 15.2.1955; Ullrich to Stein, 14.7.1955. 
3 EGKS (ed.), Entwtcklung der L6hne • pp.26-27. 
4 UVR (ed.), Jahresbertcht 1955-1957 • p.34. 
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their reluctance, both EGKS and Federal Government agreed to modest increases 
in the price of German coal. 1 
Any illusions that the mines' problems might, even temporarily, have been 
solved by these modest measures were shattered within weeks. The 9 1/2 percent 
wage rise that the employers felt able to offer should theoretically have brought 
mining to the top of the earnings scale, but in practice the iron and steel industry 
and the construction industry continued to outbid the mines.2 This was partly 
because the collieries did not payout the full increase to contract wage earners -
the wage scissors effect was particularly noticeable this time round - and also 
because of steady increases in the wages of minings' competitors.3 In the April-
June period, the colliery workforces actually fell by over 5,000 men. Daily 
production always dropped in the summer months, but the fall in 1955 was the 
4 biggest since the currency reform. 
The pressure was on the state to offer more substantial relief. Beginning in 
5 March 1956, the NRW government introduced a temporary incentives scheme 
for miners, pending the conclusion of a Federal scheme. The Federal measure 
came into effect at the end of the year. Under the Miners' Bonus Scheme, as it 
was called, contract wage earners received DM 2,50 per shift, tax free, on top of 
6 
their normal earnings. Shift workers received a bonus of DM 1,25. Coupled 
with a number of other measures introduced at the same time, this was a major 
1 EGKS (ed.), Entwtcklung der LOhne, pp.26-27. 
2 Ie, though minings' official wage rate lay above those of the buUdlng workers, the 
ABB found in summer 1955 that the construction Industry was in fact offering better rates 
than contract wage earners could expect to earn and in addition more generous 
separation allowances for migrant workers. - see OBADA 18007/2142/55, ABB quarterly 
report 1.4-30.6.1955. 
3 1GB (ed.), Jahrbuch 1955, p.78ff. 
4 Workforce figure is underground only. ABB quarterly report 1.4-30.6.1955: 
ZdKW 34, p.3. 
5 Though backdated to Febunuy. 
6 BAK-ZwSt.H 8102, 33133, lNR, Circular No.29 to mining companies and 
collieries, 10.3.1956, annex: lNR (ed.), Jahresbertcht 1955-7, p.56. 
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financial commitment on the part of the state. As a result, recruitment 
increased by almost one quarter over the previous year. while wastage barely 
rose. By the end of 1956 the underground workforce had attained and narrowly 
surpassed the size it had reached prior to the 1954 recession. 1 
The true price for coal 
One of the problems in assessing how far the controlled coal price deprived the 
mines of resources they could legitimately have expected is that it is hard to say 
2 
at any time what coal's 'true' value was. Certainly. if there had been no price 
controls, the Ruhr could have sold its coal for more than it actually received. 
But since there was no competition within the Ruhr, the price which the industry 
3 
could have extorted from its customers would. as Ludwig Erhard knew, have 
been a monopoly price. overstating coal's value to the economy. Another source 
of uncertainty in any calculation is that world energy prices fluctuated 
conSiderably. For a brief period in 1954, for example. American coal reached 
4 German shores at considerably less than the Ruhr's prices. During the Suez 
crisis, however. US costs lay far above the Ruhr's. Thus it is hard to estimate 
how much potential (non-monopolistic) revenue was withheld from the mines. 
It seems reasonably certain. nevertheless, that in the years preceding the 
introduction of the Miners' Bonus Scheme the mines could have earned 
significantly more than they did. even if one discounts the monopoly profits to 
be earned through the absence of internal competition. Workforce 
regeneration suffered as a result and employers were. both in 1948-51 and 1953-
55. hampered in their attempts to rebuild the workforce. 
1 See table 16. p.328. 
2 The debates surrounding the 1983-1984 miners' strtke in BrttaIn show that this 
continues to be a problem. 
3 Abelshauser. 'Kohle und Marktwtrtschaft'. p.496. 
4 Bahl. StaatUche Polittk. p.78. 
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Whether it was to the national advantage that this was so is a different question 
and can not be answered here. The main argument for holding the price down 
was not very convincing since by the 1950's coal's inflationary potential was 
probably very limited. 1 The government may well have been over-cautious. 
On the other hand, cautious monetarism seems to have stood the Federal 
Republic in good stead over the years. It may be that the general emphasis on 
price stability, of which the approach to coal was a symptom, was beneficial to 
economic growth. Whatever the case, the fact is that the industry's attempts to 
achieve a stable workforce were rendered more difficult by government policy. 
Price nonnalisation and the end oj the post-war coal boom 
As a result of the Bonus Scheme and associated measures recruitment picked up 
and the mines found themselves for a while in 'einer befriedigenden Assiette', as 
2 the UVR itself acknowledged. Yet within months, the industry found itself 
faced with labour problems again. Even in 1956, wastage was higher than adult 
intake and the workforce grew only because of the large number of apprentices 
being transferred below ground. Since apprentice rolls were falling rapidly, 
these transfers would soon begin to diminish. In 1957, though earnings in 
3 
mining continued to remain above those in iron and steel, wastage was more 
4 5 
than 10 percent higher than recruitment. Production actually fell. These 
6 
were clear signs that, even allowing for heavier use of foreign labour in future, a 
major wage increase was needed. 
1 See for instance the comments of Walter Tengelmann and Heinrich Kost in 
Abelshauser, 'Kohle und Marktwtrtschaft', p.517 & p.522. 
2 Comment by Werner S6hngen at an extraordinary UVR meeting wtth Ludwig 
Erhard in Ibid., p.504. 
3 UVR (ed.), Jahresbericht 1955·1957, p.GO facing. 
4 See table 16, p.315. 
5 ZdKW, 39, pp.4-5; UVR (ed.), Jahresberlcht 1955-1957, pp.64-65. 
6 See chapter 7. p.350ff. 
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In one way, therefore, the situation in 1957 was merely a revival of the problems 
that had been temporarily alleviated by the Bonus Scheme. Once again. the 
mines found it impossible to generate the resources necessary to consolidate 
workforce growth. Once again, production targets were threatened by labour 
shortages. And, as before, the mines were prevented from increasing the coal 
price. In April 1956, it is true, the EGKS removed controls on coal prices but. 
through a sort of gentlemen's agreement between UVR and Erhard, informal 
controls persisted in the FRG until October 1957. 1 
On another plane, however, the nature of the problem was gradually changing, 
although it is impossible to say exactly when this occurred. It was ceasing to be 
'government-induced' and becoming a sign that coal was too expensive to mine. 
The gap between the Ruhr's tariffs and those of its competitors began to decrease 
as a result of underlying changes in world energy supply. Between 1956 and 
1960, mineral oil prices fell by 50 percent, as the international oil companies 
struggled to increase their market share in Europe. American coal, which 
during the Suez crisis had been expensive to ship, fell in price by around 14 
2 percent from 1957-60. It is true that there were distortions in the world 
3 
market and that the mines were subject to some unfair restrictions, but the fact 
was that the Ruhr faced ever stiffer competition. At the same time, the Ruhr's 
own production costs were rising and it was clear in 1957 that wages would soon 
have to rise even further. Increases in child benefit and employer payments to 
the social insurance schemes only added to the industry's costs and many mines 
4 
which had made a profit in 1956 were in the red a year later. In other words. 
the Ruhr's long-term competltiveness problem - apparent in the 1920's but then 
1 Bahl. Staatltche Politik. p.SI: Abelshauser, 'Kohle und Marktwirtschaft', p.49Iff. 
2 lNR (ed.), Jahresberlcht 1958-1960, p.IS. 
3 Ibid., pp.19-20. 
4 Abelshauser, 'Kohle und Marktwtrtschaft', p.491 & p.509. 
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suppressed by the autarchy drive. war and reconstruction - was beginning to 
reemerge. 
The point was not that the mines had in 1957 lost their market. On the 
contrary. controlled prices ensured that they were still cheaper than the 
competition. But. had the mines charged a genuine price that would have given 
them a full profit margin and allowed them to pay an attractive wage. they would 
have found alternative sources of energy making rapid inroads into the German 
market. Germany's balance of payments could now comfortably absorb the 
costs of sizeable energy imports so that oil as well as coal from America. Russia 
and Poland would have been able to compete successfully against realistically 
1 priced German coal. The more efficient mines would have been able to cope 
with this but not the Ruhr industry as a whole. Government pricing policy was 
therefore in a way protecting the mines. It reduced their revenue but shielded 
them from competition. 
The real cost of price controls in the period 1956-1958 may well have been that 
they blinded the industry to the changing shape of the energy market. The 
mines were in a sort of limbo. The offiCial coal price was still less than coal's 
value on the market; on the other hand. the price the market would support was 
sinking below the point at which the less efficient mines could make a profit. 
Yet the industry did not see this. Because they could not charge a realistic price 
and were being forced to sell cheap. the employers were protected from the 
knowledge of their declining competitiveness. So. output and workforce targets 
remained as before and no attempt was made to remove the marginal pits from 
production. The transformation from coal shortages to a coal glut at the 
I See tables in UVR (ed.), Jahresberfcht 1955-1957 ,p.S, and facing. 
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beginning of 1958 came as a complete surprise (though not. interestingly enough. 
I to the 1GB). 
It was only in the early months of 1958. that the new realities of the energy 
market became apparent to all. So confident had the employers been of Ruhr 
coal's continuing competitiveness that in October 1957 they had broken from 
the gentlemen's agreement and imposed a hefty price increase. 2 Within a few 
weeks. coal began stock-piling in the Ruhr. The effects on demand of the price 
rise itself had been exacerbated by a temporary down-turn in iron and steel 
production and even more by the end of the Suez criSis. The Suez canal had 
become navigable again and American coal was able for the first time to exploit 
recent cost improvements in shipping. Suddenly. American coal was on the 
3 German market at a price close to home production. Another problem for the 
Ruhr producers was that many German coal consumers had committed 
themselves to long consumer agreements with American exporters. The Ruhr 
here suffered from the EGKS policy which had forced them to export a 
considerable proportion of their coal in the 1955-1957 period even though the 
German market was undersupplied. Now that the domestic market's demands 
had fallen. the German coal producers found many potential customers 
4 
contractually tied to US suppliers. 
From spring 1958 onwards. mining's main problem was not where to obtain new 
labour and how to retain it. but how to reduce the workforce in response to the 
shrinking demand for coal. The mining industry's 'reconstruction conjuncture' 
had. almost overnight. come to an end. 
1 Baht Staatltche Polttik. p.82. 
2 Baht Staatltche Polttik. p.81: Abelshauser, 'Kohle und Marktwirtschaft'. passim. 
3 Abelshauser. Ruhrkohlenbergbau. p.89ff. 
4 Ibid. 
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Resources and regeneration, 1948-58 
The essence of this chapter has been that in the years between currency refonn 
and coal crisis the mines were for the most part faced by a tricky combination of 
high demand for coal on the one hand and a shortage of resources on the other. 
Initially this was because they were held back by the government. Towards the 
end it revealed that demand was being kept artificially high by low prices. Such 
a situation naturally made any attempt to rebuild the workforce more difficult. 
Yet the lack of funds was, for much of the time at least, not so pressing or 
constraining as to preclude the formulation of a coherent regeneration strategy 
or to deny the mines any chance of building a stable and productive workforce. 
It was simply the difficult and sometimes confining framework within which 
managers and other interested groups had to operate. 
Rebuilding the workforce was after all not simply a question of providing 
resources. In the first place, high wages alone would not suffice to create 
workforce stability. Many of the key barriers to the integration of new labour 
had nothing to do with money. In fact, it will be seen that the mines' 
vulnerability in relation to the wages offered in the steel mills was as much the 
result as the cause of the failure to integrate the newcomers. Secondly. many 
dimensions of new labour policy were determined not by the level of resources 
available but by the goals. aspirations and interests of the groups involved in 
formulating policy. It is therefore time to look in more detail at the goals and 
strategies which shaped workforce regeneration in the social market economy. 
This is the task of the following four chapters. 
Chapter 6: The reluctant elite. 'Starnmesbildung' and the 
apprentices. 1948-58 
Rebuilding the workforce in changed economic conditions 
In spring and summer 1948, the rapid changes in the economic and financial 
situation allowed the employers to impose their wishes in place of the Allies' 
former policies. In the first place, the Coal Control Group accepted that the 
mines' most pressing goal now was to reduce their operating costs. As financial 
resexves became tighter, it was clear that the industry could no longer allow 
itself the luxury of producing coal no matter what the cost. Above all, labour 
productivity needed to be increased. Whereas in the peak year of 1936, miners 
underground were bringing 2,199 kg of clean coal to the surface and 1,970 kg in 
1938, output per man/shift ten years later lay at just 1,286 kilogramms.1 Just 
how committed the industry was to attaining rapid improvements in efficiency 
was made clear by the DKBL's five year production programme (Plan A), which 
envisaged a 56 percent increase in production on the basis of only 7 percent 
2 growth in the workforce. Underground output/man/shift was supposed to rise 
from its 1948 level of just over 1,200kg to 1,850kg in 1953. 3 
Secondly, currency stabilisation and the normalisation of market conditions 
convinced both Allies and management that the time had come to think more 
seriously about long-term investment. It was evident that a whole packet of 
measures such as sinking new shafts. expanding preparatory and development 
4 
work, mechanising productlon and so on were required. 
1 ZdKw. 12, p.54. 
2 Calculated from BAK (OMGUS) BICO COALCO 17/8186/30. DKBL to 
J.Chalrmen US/UKCCG. 2.11.1948 and attached Plan A figures. 
3 DKBL (ed.), Entwtcklung des Kohlenbergbaus in den Veretntgten Zonen (plan AJ. 
Essen 1948. 
4 Abelshauser. Ruhrkohlenbergbau. p.66ff. 
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The new emphasis on capital expenditure and efficiency made it inevitable that 
the employers would not give workforce expansion the same priority as had the 
Allies before 1948. Nevertheless. the recruitment and integration of new labour 
continued to be accorded conSiderable significance. In the first place. Plan A 
foresaw hiring some 20.000 additional miners by 1953. Secondly. rejuvenation 
2 
was recognised to be vital for improving efficiency. Despite the massive 
recruitment since 1945, the workforce was still vety much overaged. Indeed. the 
average age of the Hauer was actually higher in 1948 than it had been at the end 
of the war (see table 11). A Sizeable influx of young labour was necessaty to 
solve this problem. Finally. the employers were well aware that conSiderable 
effort and attention was required to tum the newcomers already in the mines 
into permanent and productive additions to the workforce. 
1 Source: BAK (OMGUS) BICO COALCO 17/8186/30. Hard Coal Production, Plan 
A 
2 WWA S22 (OMGUS) BICO ERP SEC 11/95-2/3-4. DKBL paper 'Plan A', E en 
20.2.1948. 
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Table 11; Avera~e a~e of male workers in Ruhr mini~ 1 
2 















To some extent, rebuilding and reshaping the workforce were now more 
interesting than ever for the employers, since they were at last in direct control 
of labour policy. Military Government was no longer breathing down their 
necks, telling them what to do. Thus, as well as strengthening the commitment 
to productivity and profitability, management could also allow social and even 
political conSiderations greater weight in relation to the immediate demands of 
increasing output. 
Another factor which ensured that the employers had a relatively free hand was 
the favourable labour supply. Though the Points and IK-Marken lost most of 
their value soon after the currency refonn, the modest but decent mining wage 
continued to prove a powerful attraction. This was not surprising given that 
unemployment rose steadily from June 1948 onwards, peaking at 12 percent in 
1950.3 At the end of the 1948, the OBAD noted that there were more men asking 
for work in the pits than there were jobs to be had. A couple of months later, the 
stream of applicants at the colliery gates was still growing. 4 For the time 
being at least, the mines could afford to be selective with regard to newcomers 
and finn towards the existing labour force. 
1 Source: OBAD (ed.), Jahresbertcht 1957. 
2 As of 30 June of each year. 
3 Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p.64. 
4 OBADA 18010/386/49, Quarterly report 4th Q. 1948 & 18010/1238/49, Quarterly 
report 1 st Q. 1949. 
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Revived interest in apprenticeships 
How would the employers respond to this opportunity? They had already had 
plenty of time to outline their plans. since their lack of influence prior to 1948 
had not precluded giving thought to the industry's longer-term needs. 
Proposals. ranging from formal documents on how to reorganise the industry 
down to mutterings in the Kasino about those terrible British,l were in the air 
almost from the start of the occupation. By the time the Bergassessoren were 
firmly back at the helm. there was. certainly as far as workforce regeneration is 
concerned. an informal Ruhr consensus. embracing employers. state 
administration and. on some questions, the unions. about what the priorities 
and strategies should be. 
This informal consensus (whose main components will be explored in this and 
the following chapters) was quick to emerge and required little discussion 
because most of the poliCies were not new ones. The mines were after all no 
strangers to the problems associated with rapid workforce growth and the 
absorption of a large number of unskilled workers. A whole repertOire of tried 
and tested responses and remedies was at hand. Even more important. the 
employers had been discussing since the 1930's ways of regenerating the 
workforce and (as chapter 1 has already shown) a number of measures had 
2 
already been outlined and discussed during the war. 
The policy which by 1948 enjoyed almost universal endorsement in the Ruhr 
was that of promoting apprentice recruitment and training while reducing adult 
recruitment and. indeed. ultimately removing it altogether. Almost from the 
first days after 1945, there had been calls for apprentice recruitment to be 
1 See chapter 'Neubergleute'. In Breder. Geschichten uor Ort. 
2 See chapter I, p.53. 
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expanded. In November 1945, just a few weeks after its creation, the GMSO sent 
the collieries a circular reminding them of mining's long-standing efforts to 
upgrade training within the industry and expressing the hope that the training 
programme would enhance the industry's status and the size and quality of its 
1 
young intake. Initially, adult recruitment had to be given priority, but by 1948 
employers and unions were already talking of adult recruitment as a temporary 
2 
stop-gap measure. 
What was the logic behind the call for more apprentices? Young labour was 
cheap, of course, and this was attractive to the mines on a number of counts. It 
meant that apprentices could be used to do menial Jobs above ground, such as 
sorting coal at the picking belt. 3 And it meant that the mines could afford to 
give them good training. Yet the finanCial argument should not be given too 
much weight. It was cheaper to take on youngsters as Juvenile trainees 
(Bergjungleute) with their lower wage and more rudimentary training 
programme than as apprentices (Berglehrlinge). The fact that apprentice 
recruitment was given such priority proved that the wage costs were not the only, 
indeed not the main argument in their favour. In addition, apprentices in 
mining were extremely well paid in comparison with their counterparts in other 
4 industries, receiving 2 1/2 times as much as the average. 
Nor can the undoubted need for rejuvenation explain the specific stress on 
apprentices as opposed to Juvenile trainees or, indeed, to young adults. The 
1 OBADA 16300, GMSO, Circular No. 138, November 1945, annex 2. 
2 Cf. the calls for the mines' reception camp in Bochum Hlltrop to be closed. BBA 
32,741, Minutes ofOtrectors' Meeting, 30.1.1948. 
3 IGBEA, Handakten Rudi Quast. File 'Arbeitskreis-Arbettsdirektoren 1952 -
1956', Minutes of meeting of Essen/Gelsenkirchen district, 13.5.1954; Minutes of meeting 
of Recklinghausen district, 1. 12.1954. 
4 OBADA 18006/36/53, DKBL (ed.), Berglehrlingshetme zur Behebung von 
Berufsnot und Arbettslostgkett unter den Jugendltchen, Essen, (1953), table 
'Gegentlberstellung der Erziehungsbeihilfen der Berglehrlinge und der 
HandwerkslehrUnge' . 
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latter would bring just as much youth and physical strength to the mines as the 
apprentices. Yet the preference given to apprentices over hiring young adults 
1 
was virtually universal. As Herr Mittelviefhaus, managing director of the 
Concordia mine argued to senior trade union members, the recruitment of even 
young adult trainees could only be a 'Notbehelf. Der Bergjungmann mu~ stets 
bevorzugt werden ... '. 2 
A plausible explanation would seem to be that the apprentices' lengthy training 
made them more productive members of the workforce. Yet there was little 
evidence that this was so. It was true that the very inadequate training given to 
adult trainees made them more susceptible to accidents and less able to cany out 
difficult jobs like properly erecting supports after the coal had been mined.3 
With their all-round training, apprentices were better placed to adapt to new 
conditions. But it was noteworthy that neither the mines nor the DKBL 
produced any statistics comparing the efficiency of former apprentices and adult 
trainees. Good evidence that the lengthy training period was not really 
necessary, at least from the point of view of the work itself, was that the mines 
4 
were often hard put to it to find things for the apprentices to do. Indeed a 
number of mines tried, particularly in the early post-war period when training 
procedures were still rather in flux, to reduce the actual training period and to 
5 get the apprentices into production at a much earlier stage. 
1 See, for Instance, the ABS's comment on the mines' preferences, In 'Sechs Jahre 
AuI3enstelle Bergbau', p.76. 
2 AZG File '} 1 26 Zuweisung von Arbettskraften aus anderen Sezirken', Memo 
concerning meeting of the NRW mines' Tarifaussch uI3, 28.1.1949. By Bergjungmann. 
Mittelvie1haus meant all juveniles and was not making a distinction between juvenile 
trainee (the Bergjungmann proper) and apprentice. 
3 BBA 10, 135, Mine Friedrich d Groj3e. Memo for Herrn Bergrat Helntzmann, 
4.4.1955. 
4 As is graphically manifest in Hans Dieter Baroth·s autobiographical account of 
his apprentlce years. See Baroth. Aber es waren schOne Zetten. pp.1l7-126;pp.132-138. 
5 See OBADA 16303/ 1004/46. ~ Werden to OBAD. 10.7.1946. 
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Status and recruitment 
As in the pre-war period, the real attraction of the apprenticeship was the hope it 
would alter both the miner's position in society and his perception of his own 
profession. The emphasis on the apprentices showed that, as far as labour 
policy was concerned, the employers continued to regard the attainment of 
workforce stability as the most intractable and important pre-requisite for 
long-term improvements in productivity and profitability. 
The apprenticeship, so the theory ran, would persuade potential recruits and 
their parents of mining's status and worth and would thus solve mining's 
1 
recruitment problems. An early expression of this view came in October 1945. 
The LAA Westfalen-Lippe was faced with a Military Government instruction 
that, in order to ensure a good supply of youngsters to the mines, directions 
2 
should be used if necessary. The LAA agreed to issue directions to youngsters 
for one year, arguing that, in the immediate future: 3 
Es ist weder im Rahmen der Einzelberatung noch mit den Mitteln der 
bisher iiblichen Werbemethoden moglich, die in den weitesten Kreisen 
der Jugend und deren Eltern bestehenden Vorurteile gegen den 
bergma.nnischen Beruf auszura.umen. 
On the other hand, continued the LAA, ' .. steht zu erwarten, da.Z es erfahrenen 
und pa.dagogisch geschickten Kraften gelingen muj3, im Rahmen einer Hingeren 
Ausbildungszeit diese Vorurteile zu iiberwinden,.4 
Again and again, discussions about the apprenticeship were dominated by its 
'public relations' aspect; considerations of status, not productivity prevailed. 
1 See 'Das Nachwuchsproblem 1m Bergbau', Bwu:i.esarbettsblatt, 1950,9, pp.331-
333, here p.332f: 'Zur P11ege bergmannischer berufsethischer,Gesinnung', Arbeitsblattfilr 
dte brtttsche Zone, 1947, 1. pp.259-262: 'Manner von Morgen, Junior Magaztn, 1952, 12. 
pp.474-476. 
2 OBADA 16301/1339/45, LAA Westfalen-Ltppe, Circular to labour exchanges 
No. 165/ 45, 28.10.1945. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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In early post-war debates about the proper length of training, for example, the 
main difficulty was to find a balance between not over-qualifying the 
apprentice, on the one hand, and on the other not giving rise to the impression. 
'daJ3 die bergma.nnische Lehre im Vergleich mit anderen Lehrberufen 
mindeIWertig set. .. '. 1 It was to avoid this impression that the OBAD strongly 
resisted any attempt to offer shorter training. 2 
The possibility of dramatically increasing labour intake by altering the 
profession's status seemed in 1947/8 larger than ever because in the next few 
years a very large number of youngsters would be leaving school for whom 
training opportunities would be limited. 3 Indeed, untn well into the 1950's, 
NRW was to be the only Land in West Germany with a surplus of apprenticeship 
4 places. Refugees, in particular, found themselves in the position of neither 
having the contacts to obtain scarce apprenticeships for their children, nor the 
money to pay for their upkeep were a tratneeship offered. If such parents could 
be persuaded of the worth of mining training, they might well wish to avail 
themselves of the undoubtedly good earnings and possibilities for upward 
5 
mobility in the mining industry. Thus the post-war situation presented the 
mines with a perhaps unique opportunity to achieve a large influx of new blood. 
It was a sign of the mines' determination to take advantage of the situation, that 
by the end of November 1947 there were already 25 apprentice hostels in the 
6 Ruhr with 1,359 places. 
1 OBADAI6303/1004/46, BA Werden to OBAD, 10.7.1946. 
2 OBADAI6303/85/48, OBAD toMGe1senkirchen, 21.1.1948. 
3 OBADA 16301/969/47, ABB, Circular to colliery managements and labour 
exchanges. 17.3.1947. 
4 Injormattons-Rundbrtej zur sozialen Lage der Jugend, 1952. 4. 12. p.12. Obis 
was a semi-official Journal. published in association with the Bundesarbeltsgemein-
schall Jugendautbauwerk. copies ofwhtch are preserved in HStaD NW45. 210). 
5 OBADA 16301/927/46. LAA Westfalen-Ltppe. Circular. signed Dr.Herwegen, 
25.4.1946. At the beginning of 1947. refugees were already by far the biggest group 
amongst the mining apprentices haUlng from outside the Ruhr. See OBADA 
16301/969/47. ABB. Circular to colllery managements and labour exchanges. 17.3.1947. 
6 OBADA 16303/3163/47. GMSO to OBAD. 28.11.1947. 
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At a fairly early stage, the drive to win apprentices from outside the Ruhr gained 
added impetus from the view that the outsiders, or at least a proportion of them, 
were of a particularly high quality. In part this was based on purely 
educational criteria. Within the Ruhr region, school-Ieavers with good results 
tended to avoid the mines and go into more desirable trades. But outside the 
Ruhr, the mines faced little competition on the juvenile labour market. In the 
1949-1952 period, between one third and two fifths of inter-regional apprentice 
movements were accounted for by the mines. 1 So it was not surprising that the 
collieries soon found they were able to obtain youngsters with very good school 
results. The outsiders' performance in the apprentice exams, particularly in the 
2 theoretical parts, was correspondingly better than the locals'. In a 1949 report 
to the OBAD about the general development of training since the war, the DKBL 
3 took pains to note the refugee apprentices' 'besonders hervorstechende 
Beteiligung an der betrieblichen und schulischen Ausbildung'. 4 
However, the attraction of the outsiders went further than this. At the 1GB's 
first youth conference, which took place in 1950, a miner wlth the memorable 
name of Roman Mrug stood up and complained at what he saw as the 
favouritism being given to youngsters from outside the Ruhr. What the 
employers were arguing, Mrug moaned, was that it was better to recruit 
5 youngsters: 
die aus Hmdlichen Gegenden kommen [i.e., from outside the Ruhr - MR1, 
weil dlese im allgemeinen ein welt hOheres Niveau an den Tag legen, eine 
andere Erziehung hatten, zum anderen seien sie schulisch mehr auf der 
HOhe und es sel deshalb welt mehr mit ihnen anzufangen. 
1 lrifonnatlDns-RundbTie!zur sozialen Lage derJugend. 1952,4, 1. p.1ft'. 
2 Manfred Oaberkow, 'Ole Se.6haftmachung der vom westdeutsche~ 
Stelnkohlenbergbau aus bergfremden Gebleten angeworbenen Berglehrllnge, 
(Exame nsarbe It. Sozlalschule Gelsenkirchen, 1955), p.15. 
3 The majority of hostel occupants were refugees. See below, p.282. 
4 OBADA 16301/2448/49, OKBL to OBAD, 5.11.1949, annex: 'Stellungnahme zu 
dem von der Verwaltung fOrWlrtschaft erbetenen Bert ch t.. '. 
5 OGBA Protokoll-Sammlung, 'Protokoll des 1.VerbandsJugendtags der 1GB', 
Bochum 1950. 
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Often from non-working class or small town backgrounds. 1 the outsiders were 
seen by the employers as bringing desirable values and attitudes to the mines. 
Above all, they would remove the low behaviour and negative attitudes which 
the culturally and racially inferior Poles2 had brought in at the end of the 19th 
century. The Abb's Dr.Herwegen, for instance, observed that because of 'die 
Anlegung der in den meisten Fallen kulturell tiefer stehenden Personen von 
au.13en, .. hat sich im Bergbau-Milieu ein Umgangston entwickelt, der vielen 
Arbeitswilligen als untragbar erscheint'. 'Geistig geeignete' outsiders could play 
a key role in introducing new standards of behaviour. 3 There would thus be a 
virtuous Circle whereby the status of a proper qualification would attract 
outsiders and the outSiders' standards and behaviour would, in turn, enhance 
mining's standing in the community. 
The new elite and the miner of yore 
The hopes attached to the apprentices from outside the Ruhr lead us on to the 
second part of the employers'vision. Alongside raising the miner's standing in 
the wider community, the apprenticeships were intended to increase his self-
esteem. This in turn would strengthen the bond between the miner and his 
4 industry, thus reducing wastage, and improving industrial relations. At a 
1 
HStaD NW41, 768, Sozialwissenschaftliche Arbeltsgemeinschaft zur 
Erforschung von Jugendproblemen (ed.), 'M~nahmen zur Behebung der Not der 
berufslosen und heimatlosen Jugend in NRW', (unpublished Ms., no date (1951)); 
Daberkow, 'Die Sd3haftmachung', p.50ff. 
2 One does not have to scratch very far beneath the surface In the post-war years 
to find this type of attitude. See, for instance, Edwin C.Abe and Alfons Echterhoff, Das 
Vest - ein dynamischer Wtrtschaftsraum. Die soztalwtrtschaftltche Entwtcklung und 
Struktur des Vestes Reckltnghausen und seine wohnungs- und stedlungswtrtschaftltche 
Problemattk, Recklinghausen 1955, p.55 and pp.93-4; see also the more cautious but 
similar account in the pseudo-sociological 'SchmelzUegel Kohlenpott', in DKBL (ed.), 
Ruhr-Almanach. VomBergmann und Bergbau. Cologne 1950, p.95ff. 
3 HStaD NW41, 746, Minutes of a meeting of the 'Aussch~ zur Ausarbeltung elnes 
Lehrganges fOr Heimlelter' on 16th December 1948, 27.12.1948. 
4 It was the employers' aim. 'durch z1elbe~te Werbung urn die Jugend .. eine 
Stammbelegschaft aufzubauen, die den Bergmannsberuf aus innerer Verbundenheit 
ausObt und 1m Kohlenrevier verwurzelt bleibt'. See 'Das Nachwuchsproblem 1m Bergbau', 
p.332; see also Hansgerd Friedhoff, 'Die Bedeutung der berufltchen BHdung fOr die 
Fluktuation 1m Ruhrbergbau', Bergbau-Rundschau. 1957,9, 1, pp.48-50. 
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major conference of colliery training directors in 1953, Heinrich Kost, the 
DKBL's general director and one of the individuals most closely associated with 
promoting apprenticeships since the early 1940's, listed what he saw as the most 
important virtues of the traineeship. In first place. according to Kosi. was not 
training's contribution to productivity but its potential for creating a stable 
1 
workforce. In addition, Kost believed the apprenticeship could have an 
important political function, namely protecting youngsters from the dangers of 
2 political radicalism. 
The hopes and expectations which the industry attached to the apprenticeship 
drew strongly on a romantic myth about what the miner had once been. In a 
1948 article for the mining industry's Journal, Gluckauf. Karl Bax evoked this 
3 image when he wrote: 
Fur die Berufe der Urproduktion reichen Kenntnisse und Fertigkeiten 
nicht aus. Bauer, Hochseefischer und Bergmann verdienen ein hartes 
Brot, und sie bedurfen einer besonderen Einstellung zum Leben: einer 
berufssUindisch bestimmten Weltanschauung. AIle Urerzeugung ringt 
mit der Natur. Sie lauscht der Natur ihre Geheimnisse ab, wagt den 
Kampf mit ihren Gewalten. 
The miner of yore was thus bound to his profession by deep inner ties to the 
earth and an almost mystical desire to unlock its secrets and bring its treasures 
to the surface.4 In addition, he was a man with a clearly defined social position. 
The works newspaper of the GBAG's Hamborn Group, for instance, bemoaned the 
passing of the 'in sich geschlossenen, hannonischen und von Berufsethos 
5 
erfullten Menschen' of past generations. The miner of the past was a man at 
1 HStaD NW41, 761. Senft. Report on the conference of training directors at the 
OKV Haus Essen, 15.1.1953. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Karl Bax. 'Die Nachwuchssorgen des Steinkohlenbergbaus. Grande des 
Nachwuchsmangels und Versuche zu ihrer Behebung', Gliickauf, 1949,85,27/28, pp.477-
485, here p.78. 
4 See also 'Zur Berufsethik des Bergmanns', Arbettsblatt.fi1.r die brtttsche Zone. 
194 7, 1. pp. 170-172, here p. 171. 
5 Der FOrderturm , June 1948, pp.I-2. 
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peace with the world, secure in his social position, loyal, respectful and 
dependable. 
In one form or other, this image continually resurfaced in discussions and 
poliCies about rebuilding the workforce. At times the employers seem to have 
operated with the idea that this 'true miner' was really there already, if one only 
1 looked hard enough. More widespread was the feeling that a number of forces 
had contrived to weaken the miners' pride and spirit and that the mines' task 
now was to rekindle that spirit. The apprentices were seen as the new elite that 
could achieve this. A perceptive correspondent from the Neue Zeitung noted in 
1951 that both union and employers were trying to create out of the young 
miners members of: 2 
eines Bergmannstandes mit ausgepragtem StandesbewuJ3tsein, wobei fur 
viele die fast legendare Gestalt des alten Bergmanns auftaucht, fur den die 
Arbeit 1m Piitt nicht bloJ3es Mittel zum Geldverdienen war, sondem 
Gliick und Abenteuer eines standigen Ringens mit der Naturgewalt des 
Berges. 
For many employers, the necessity of workforce rejuvenation was thus also a 
key opportunity: the chance to revive that lost mining tradition and allow the 
old miner to be born anew. Following years of diminished managerial 
authority, a massive influx of outSiders and high wastage, the old goal of 
creating a stable, disciplined and loyal workforce now seemed more attractive 
than ever.3 
The state, the unions and the apprentices 
It was, in the last analysis, the employers who had set in motion the drive to 
turn the miners into a qualified profession, but the state too played a key role in 
encouraging and expanding the apprentice programme after the war. 
1 'Zur Berufsethik des Be rgmanns , . p.171. 
2 'Der "Lager Mensch" - Symptom einer Entwtcklung', Neue Zettung . 7.8.1951. 
3 'Das Nachwuchsproblem 1m Bergbau', p.331. 
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Initially, not all employers stood unqualifiedly behind the notion of the 
apprenticeship and, particularly at the level of colliery managers. there was 
considerable scepticism about the value of formal training. 1 In any case. no 
great initiatives of any sort could be expected from colliery officials in the pre-
1948 period. Confronted with Military Government policies they did not like. 
many managers adopted a rather passive and resigned attitude and devoted their 
energies mainly to fending off the efforts of the NGCC.2 
In this situation, various state bureaucracies did a lot to revive the apprentice 
strategy. The Mining Inspectorate was one of its most enthusiastic proponents. 
partly for reasons of safety but also because of a strong commitment to 
improving the miner's 3 status. The labour administration too and. in 
particular, the Au.13enstelle Bergbau played an active role in creating a more 
positive attitude towards apprentice recruitment and the construction of 
4 
apprentice hostels. The Abb's Dr. Herwegen was a passionate advocate of the 
Berglehre. His circulars, written in a unique style of what one can only call 
'Bergarbeitervermittlerdichtung', were full of poetic and romantic statements 
calling on the mines to build more hostels for apprentices or improve the ones 
they had already, and urging the labour exchanges' careers advisors to take 
mining seriously, recognise its advantages and send the mines top quality 
5 youngsters. 
1 See Herwegen's comments in OBADA 16301/969/47. ABB. Circular to colliery 
managements and labour exchanges, 17.3.1947. 
2 Ibid; Breder. Geschtchten oor Ort. chapter 'Neubergleute'. 
3 Eg. see OBADA 16303/273/48. OBAD toAA Gelsenkirchen. 31.1.1948. 
4 OBADA 16300/1289/45. Memo signed by Oberbergrat Hentrtch, 19.11.1945: 
OBADA 16303/568/47. ABB to OBAD. 25.2.1947.; HStaD NW73. 458. Arbeitsmlnlster NRW. 
Hauptabt. LAA. Memo. 8.2.1949. 
5 OBADA 16301/969/47. ABB. Circular to colliery managements and labour 
exchanges. 17.3.1947; 16301/927/46. LAA Westfalen-Llppe. Circular. signed Dr.Herwegen. 
25.4.1946; 16301/628/47, ABB. Circular. 22.2.1947. 
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The eagnerness of these administrations was a reminder that both Mines' 
Inspectorate and Labour Administration had been involved from the 1920's in 
the formulation and development of the apprenticeship strategy. Another. 
more general reason for state involvement was that, in Germany as a whole, the 
1930's had seen the state involved in a general strategy of 'deproletartantsation 
through qualification'. The hope was that. by obtaining a skill. workers would 
also gain a stake in society and a sense of social position and social worth. 
This broad integrative strategy was much in evidence in the post-war era. Both 
state and church believed that by fostering the 'Berufsethos'. they could remove 
the workers' 'Berufsminderwertigkeitsgefiihl' and a potential source of 
1 
radicalism. Thus the state was more than willing to support the goal of using 
mining apprenticeships to create. as Herwegen put it. 'einen qualitativen 
2 Bergmannsstand' . 
A further, related motive for state involvement derived from the moral and 
political imperative of integrating the refugees. Providing good training 
opportunities was seen as vital if young refugees and other uprooted or 
3 dispossessed groups were to be integrated into post-war society. In 1948-9 it 
was already clear to the mines that the Federal Refugee Administration might 
provide conSiderable subsidies if it could be proven that the mines were offering 
4 
refugees a sound training and a good educational environment. Well before 
the currency reform. there was a recognition in Ruhr circles that state and 
5 industry's interests might run in parallel here. In 1949. the DKBL produced an 
1 HStaD NW41. 761. Heinrich Werth to Weber, 21.6.1951. Annex. 
2 OBADA 16303/568/47. ABB to OBAD, 25.2.1947. 
3 See the article 'ObJektlve und subJekUve Berufsnot der Jugend', lriformattons-
Rundbriej zur sozialen Lage der Jugend. 1952, 4, 4, p.lff. (In HStaD NW45, 210): 
'Ma.6nahmen zur Behebung der Not der berufslosen und hetmatIosen Jugend in NRW. 
op.ctt.: NW41. 769. Report on an interministerial meeting at the BWlM, 6.6.1950. 
4 HStaD NW41, 769, Report on an interminlsterial meeting at the BWiM, 6.6.1950. 
!5 See OBADA 16301/969/47. ABB. Circular to collielY managements and labour 
exchanges, 17.3.1947. 
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impressive public relations booklet, entitled 'Die Berglehrlingsheime des 
Steinkohlenbergbaus der N ordzone ... im Dienste der Beldimpfung von Berufsnot 
1 
und Arbeitslosigkeit unter den Jugendlichen', the primary aim of which was to 
elicit state funding for hostel construction. Subsequently revised and reprinted 
2 
many times, the booklet drew attention to the economic, social and pedagogical 
virtues of mining apprenticeships and the comparatively good opportunities for 
youngsters from poor families to rise up within the industry. 3 It was these 
arguments that persuaded the German refugee administration to give support. 
The union too gave its unqualified support to the attempt to tum mining into a 
4 
skilled profession and to increasing apprentice recruitment. One reason for 
this was that adult new labour was seen as hard to organise, partly because of the 
high wastage rate and partly because of a lack of understanding for the union 
5 
movement. The 1GB's reports in 1948 and 1949 contain continual references 
6 to problems with adult trainees. In addition the union was one of the 
strongest advocates of increasing mining's status and encouraging the public to 
7 
see mining as a skilled profession. According to 1GB representatives, as OBAD 
minutes record, 'Der bergmannische Berufsstolz verlange es, die f>fIentliche 
Meinung dahingehend zu beeinflussen. daB nicht jeder ohne weiteres Hauer 
werden kf>nne,.8 
1 OBADA 16301/2448/49, DKBL (ed.), Dte Berglehrltngshetme des 
8tetnkohlenbergbaus der Nordzone... tm Dtenste der BeklimpJung von Berufsnot und 
Arbettslostgkett unter den Jugendltchen. Hambom 29.10.1949. 
2 See OBADA 18006/36/53, Revised version of the above, [19531. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See, for instance, Johann Platte, 'Die Nachwuchsfrage im Kohlenbergbau.', 
Arbeitsblattfiirdte brtttscheZone. 1948.2. 11. pp.399-400. 
5 Eberhard Kadow. 'Jugendwohnheime und Jugendheimleiter', Bergbau und 
Wirtschaft, 1952,5,4, pp.88-90. 
6 DGBA File 'IGBergbau. MonatsberIchte der IGBergbau 1949', Monthly reports 
for April, May and June 1949, esp. reports from Bochum District. 
7 Platte, 'Die Nachwuchsfrage', p.400. 
8 0BADA 118.10/4/56, Memo concerning a meeting to discuss the draft directive 
on miners' training of 2.8.1956,2.11.1956. 
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The pace of apprentice recruitment 
Even before 1948, a considerable number of apprentices had been recruited (see 
table 12). The NGCC itself was persuaded of the apprentice's virtues. being well 
aware of the mines' general need for rejuvenation and accepting. at least in part. 
the employers' arguments about the importance of status. 1 However. since the 
NGCC's main efforts had to lie in finding adult recruits who could make an 
immediate contribution to increasing coal production. juvenile recruitment 
remained but a small fraction of overall intake. 
After 1948, expansion of juvenile recruitment was initially retarded by the lack 
of finance for apprentice hostels and by the small number of school-Ieavers in 
1948-9. Nevertheless. the growing amount of energy and resources committed 
to the task soon began to pay dividends. In 1949 an experiment was undertaken 
with the Gruppe Dortmund of the GBAG. whereby the group and the ABB selected 
a target area, Lubeck in Schleswig-Holstein. and developed an intensive 
2 
advertising campaign involving local schools. careers advisors and parents. 
In 1950, the experiment was widened and a number of collieries were assigned 
'Patenbezirke', or foster-areas. in which they were the only mine recruiting 
youngsters.3 Good relations with local schools and careers advisors were 
aSSiduously cultivated and the collieries encouraged frequent trips to the mines 
for officials from the Patenbezirke. 'Die eingeladenen PAdagogen werden 
wAhrend dieses Besuches erstklassig bewirtet. haben keinerlei Unkosten und 
brauchen sich nur dadurch zu revanchieren. daB sie moglichst viele Jungen 
uberreden, in den Bergbau zu gehen', as Manfred Daberkow wrt1y obseIVed in 
1 See OBADA 16301/1339/45. Pn1sldent oflAA Westfalen-Uppe to AA. 28.10.1945. 
On status see PRO F0942. 509, NGCC. 'Stelnkohle production in the British occupied 
Zone of Gennany. RevIew of production'. May 1946. 
2 'Sechs Jahre Au6enstelle Bergbau .. .'. p.63ff. 
3 Ibid. 
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1955. 1 This combination of intensive recruitment campaigns and propitious 
labour market conditions secured the mines a stream of apprentices which 
continued to grow after adult recruitment ran into difficulties. 
In the early 1950's, the employers seemed well on the way to removing the mines' 
negative reputation. As well as mobilising reserves of young labour from far 
flung regions, the mines appeared to have changed attitudes within the Ruhr too. 
In Dortmund in 1952, more boys put down mining as their first choice than any 
other trade.2 In Rheinhausen in 1951, 20 percent of male schoolleavers went to 
the mines and the proportion was even higher in the following year. 3 An 
impressive community study carried out by the SoFoSt argued that general 
perceptions of the miner in the town were improving. 4 Local girls, it was 
argued, no longer had any negative feelings about marrying a miner. 
5 Table 12: 1uvenile intake 1946-58 






































1 Daberkow, 'Die SeJ3haftrnachung .. .', p.63. 
2 IGBE Presse-Archiv, Vol. 'ArbeltskrAfte fOr den Bergbau. Neubergleute. Bis 
1952' Untitled excerpt from Westdeutsches Tageblatt, Dortmund, 7.10.1952. 
, 3 'Bergbau zieht auch BergmannssOhne wieder an', WAZ, Moers edition. 
25.10.1952. 
4 Croon and utennann, Zeche unci Gemetnde, p.l 09fT. 
5 Juvenile trainees and mining apprentices taken on by hard coal mines in NRW. 
Ii 1946 1949 OBADA 16301/2448/49 DKBL to OBAD, 5.11.1949. annex: Source: or - , h be • ba F 1949 1957 OBADA 16303 
table 'Einstellungen von Jugendl1chen im Ru r rg u. or - 7 ABB An al 
vols. '1 and 2, ABB Monthly reports on Juvenile hirings: 18006. vol 2 & 1800 . nu 
reports. 
The supply dries up 
Yet, in reality. the mines' achievements fell far short of expectations. The 
employers had calculated that around 12,000 apprentices a year would be 
needed, making an overall apprentice population of about 35-40,000.1 For a 
brief period, this figure was actually obtained (see figure 5), but by the mid-1950's 
the apprentice population was already on the wane. 
Part of the explanation was that school rolls were falling. In the school year 
1953-1954,485,070 boys left school, whereas in the period 1957-58 there were 
2 
only 360,244 male school-Ieavers. a drop of 25 percent. Yet over the same 
period, the number of mining apprentices hired fell by almost 60 percent, 
indicating that there were other problems too. It was evident that the growth of 
other opportunities on the labour market was drawing potential recruits away 
from the mines. 











• juvn1. trainees 
1 'Das Nachwuchsproblem im Bergbau'. p.331: BAK BI02. 33189. BWlM. Internal 
memo from ImhAuser to Classen. 30.5.1951. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Source: UVR (ed.). Jahresberichtfiir die Jahre 1958 bis 1960. p.89 facing. 
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The collieries had never really succeeded in establishing min1ng as a desirable 
profession, despite appearances. The mines' ability to draw young labour. 
conSiderable though it was, was based on the temporary exigencies of the post-
war period. This applied particularly to the substantial recruitment from 
outside the Ruhr. Between 60 and 70 percent of hostel occupants were refugees. 
suggesting acute material pressures were the main reason for sending youngsters 
1 
to the mines. Few established citizens of West Gennany were willing to send 
their sons to mining even if for a well paid apprenticeship that offered good 
accommodation. It was clear from the start that once the expellees were more 
settled and more prosperous the same would apply to them. An even more 
revealing aspect of the apprentices' social background was that almost one third 
of hostel occupants had lost at least one parent, in most cases the father. 2 This 
was proof that the mines were benefiting from the acute but temporary finanCial 
difficulties in which a significant proportion of the population found itself after 
the war. 
Within the Ruhr, too, the mines had never succeeded in transforming 
perceptions of mining. A lot of the references to change in the SoFoSt study, for 
instance, were exaggerated. The Dortmund team felt they had a mission to help 
the miner lose his proletarian status and this influenced their Interpretation of 
the material. Through an interview with one of the study's originators the 
present author was able to ascertain, for example, that many of the girls who 
had made such comforting statements about the miner's eligibility in fact 
proved to have no miners in their circle of acquaintances. 3 And another piece 
of evidence that never made its way into the study: one of the field workers lived 
1 'M~nahmen zur Behebung der Not der berufslosen und he1matlosen Jugend 1~ 
NRW. op.clt.; Daberkow. 'DIe Sd3haftmachung'. p.50fT; 'Sechs Jahre Au6ensteUe Bergbau. 
p.l09. 
2 Ibid. 
s InfonnaUon In an InteIView with Professor Helmut Croon, 9.4.1984. 
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with a local craftsman's family and though there were plenty of conversations 
about family. friends and the changing nature of the town. it was never 
mentioned that a sister of the family was living in the 'Kolonie'. the miners' 
estate. The fieldworker discovered her existence only by accident.l 
In his writings about the Ruhr in the 1950's and 1960's. the former miner Hans 
Dieter Baroth conveys clearly the feeling in the Ruhr that to leave mining was a 
major status Jump. The follOwing extract from the semi-autobiographical 
collection 'Streuselkuchen in Ickern' comes from an account of the Woetke's. a 
mining family who. with the earnings of father and older brothers to carry them 
through. have managed to get the youngest boy a place as a craftsman's 
apprentice. The passage concerns the attitude of the other brothers towards the 
family's only craftsman:2 
Sie akzeptierten seine besondere Stellung. Es wurde auch nie in seinem 
Beisein oder w~hrend seiner Abwesenheit. wie bei anderen. daruber 
diskutiert. und sie trumpften auch nicht auf. er bekomme spAter in 
seinem Beruf keine Deputatkohle und musse sich deshalb 1m Winter 
teure Kohlen kaufen. er bekomme keine Werkswohnung wie die anderen. 
so daJ3 er sich eine viele teuere privat mieten musse und weniger auf der 
Hand habe als die. die zur Zeche gingen. Seine Arbeitszeit sei auch nicht 
so geregelt. denn mehr als acht Stunden musse er doch oft machen. Er 
komme auch nicht. wie die anderen MAnner aus der HerbertstraJ3e. schon 
gewaschen und umgezogen nach Hause. er komme noch 1m blauen 
Arbeitsanzug und ungewaschen und musse sich erst in der angebauten 
WaschkUche saubern. 
Es wurde uberhaupt nicht dariiber gesprochen. da.6 Hans Woetke morgens 
zwei Stunden spAter als die anderen aus dem Haus ging. dann aber in 
seinem Arbeitsanzug. daJ3 er auch erheblich spAter zuruckkam. wAhrend 
die Bruder schon am fruhen Nachmittag nach der schweren Arbeit unter 
Tage am Mittagstisch saJ3en. daJ3 er eigentlich an den Wochentagen 
tagsuber uberhaupt keine warme Mahlzeit einnahm. denn nach dem 
Fruhstuck zu Hause nahm er sich ein paar Butterbrote in Zeitungspapier 
gewickelt mit. wenn er am sp~ten Nachmittag zuruckkam. setzte ihm 
seine Mutter eine gro~e Tasse mit Kaffee auf den Tisch. dazu Brot. 
Margarine und Marmelade. gelegentlich auch Wurst oder Schinken. denn 
das Mittagessen wollte sie nicht so lange warm halten. 
All these disadvantages were as nothing to the single vital achievement of 
having made it out of the pits. 
1 Ibid. 
2 Hans Dieter Baroth. streuselkuchen tn Ickem. Cologne 1980. p.I88. 
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The status campaign 
During the war, the employers had already recognised that transfonnmg public 
perceptions of mining would be a difficult task. To complement the impact of 
the apprenticeships themselves, the employers had proposed a massive public 
relations campaign to be carried out in the post-war period. 1 Soon after 1945. 
this idea was revived. Hanns W.Brose submitted a number of proposals along 
the lines of the Wirtschaftsgruppe's plan.2 Karl Bax, another member of the 
war-time public relations team, produced a major article in the industry's 
prestigious periodical, 'Gluckauf, arguing that only propaganda and public 
relations could change perceptions inside and outside mining so as to create the 
3 
right kind of workforce. The labour administration too, endorsed vigorous 
public relations work. 'Au fkHlrung , AufkHlrung uberall' was Dr.Herwegen's 
recipe.4 
Bax, Herwegen and others portrayed the contemporary aversion to mine-work 
as something irrational, or at least something divorced from the reality of 
mining life. If only the true facts about mining were known, or if only miners 
themselves would not always concentrate on the negative aspects of their 
5 
occupation. mining would once again enjoy popularity. There was clearly a 
strong measure of double-speak or self-deception to this, perhaps even a resigned 
view that the realities of mining could not be changed, only its image. But as 
the Baroth piece above shows in all clarity, there was also a real truth, namely, 
1 See chapter 1, p.40; Zimmermann, 'Ausbruchshoffnungen', p.114; Brose. Etne 
Gemetnschajtswerbung, passim. 
2 DGBA File 'Industrteverand Bergbau 1946-1948. Tc'ltigkeltsbertcht'. Memo, 
'Werbung fOr den Bergbau', 6.5.1947; Hanns W.Brose, Die Nachwuchsnot tm deutschen 
Bergbau.. Frankfurt 1945; Brose, Etne GemetnschaftswerblUllJ'· 
3 Karl Bax, 'Die Nachwuchssorgen des Steinkohlenbergbaus als Aufgabe der 
Au1klArung und Werbung', GlrJckatif, 1949,85, pp.513-520. 
4 OBADA 16301/927/46. LAA. Circular, ref 6301/6410. 25.4.1946. 
5 See also Karl Bax, 'Die Nachwuchssorgen des Steinkohlenbergbaus. GrOnde 
des Nachwuchsmangels und Versuche zu ihrer Behebung', GlUckatif, 1949, 85. ppA 77 -485. 
The reluctant elite 285 
that the hostility to taking up mining as a profession was greater than the sum 
of mining's disadvantages - real and considerable though the negative aspects of 
mining were. The positive side of this for the mines was that there was a 
chance to improve their labour position without putting more money on the 
table. If the 'irrational' element in the way in which mining was generally 
perceived could be removed or made more positive, then the existing wage and 
social conditions could be expected to exert a stronger pull on the labour market. 
The main problem about the sort of campaign envisaged by Brose was its cost, 
estimated by Brose himself before the currency reform to be around 14 Million 
RM.l This was the main stumbling block for the employers. In 1947, Heinrich 
Kost had suggested that a special committee be created to look into advertising 
and publicity and the result was the Ausschu~ fur bergbauliche 
Nachwuchswerbung, a body containing representatives from mines, the !VB, the 
ZfA and the ABB. The idea was to develop some sort of central recruitment 
strategy, but when Brose raised the idea of carrying out the wartime project, the 
2 
mining experts rejected the idea as being too expensive. Aside from the costs. 
the employers never liked entrusting any project to an outside company. In 
1950, Brose tried again and was again rejected. The DKBL informed the 
collieries that it had not yet developed a central advertising strategy.3 
It is impossible to establish from the records available what the industry's 
advertising budget was, let alone to ascertain the proportion of that budget 
devoted to enhancing mining's image. There is no doubt that a conSiderable 
amount was done - special articles and features in magazines for young people, a 
short film ('Mein Freund wird Bergmann') for schools use, as well as a series of 
1 DGBA File 'IVBergbau 1946-1948'. Memo. Werbung fOr den Bergbau'. 6.5.1947. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ges Verb. File 'Rundschreiben AusbUdung 1946-1950'. DKBL. Circular No. I 60. 
26.9.1950. 
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slides for illustrated lectures. There was even a card game. 'Bergbau-Quartett' 
which offered infonnation about mining. 1 Yet. it seems fairly clear that no 
attempt was made to mount a large. central campaign to transform mining's 
image. Even for the SO,OOODM necessary to deSign the originals for a major new 
poster campaign the mines tried to get outside funding (from the ECA) and. when 
it was not forthCOming. dropped the project. 2 
This was probably in part simple conservatism. Some of the collieries' own 
attempts at public relations remained distinctly amateurish.3 suggesting that at 
least at some levels in the industry, public relations was not yet taken all that 
seriously. The UVR's manpower experts believed that the British National Coal 
Board had developed a much more active campaining strategy than the German 
mines.4 
Probably more decisive than conservatism per se was that the employers 
themselves did not quite believe they could reverse the general trend towards 
less physical, more technical occupations. They would have a go if the money 
came from another source. but they were not prepared to risk millions of marks 
on a public relations campaign. It is noteworthy that their recruitment 
propaganda. insofar as it concentrated on the physical conditions at all. always 
tried to show the latest technology and was. in a way, selling something that did 
not yet exist. 5 The coal plough was already in the illustrated broschures at a 
time when over 90 percent of coal was still mined with the pneumatic pick.6 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H Bl19. 1519. BAM Hal Unterausschu.6 I. Memo. Vorschlag fOr die 
Ausgestaltung der Werbemittel...'. 28.3.1952; OBADA 18006/1192/53. DKBL. Circular No. V 
5, 1953. 5 
2 Vorschlag fOr die Ausgestaltung der Werbemittel...'; BAK-ZwSt.H 8119, 1 19. 
BAVAV. Memo. 6.3.1954. 1m 
3 OBADA 18006/3290/55. ABB to OBAD. 6.12.1955, annex: Director of AA Neu U 
to President of South Bavarian Labour administration. 11.10.1955. 
4 BAK-ZwStH 8102.30091. 8W1M. Memo. 25.4.1955. 
5 See discussions in BAK-ZwSt.H 8119. 1519. President ofNRW lAA to President 
BAVAV.2.4.1954. hal ( d) 
6 See. for instance. the advertising brochure Zeche Hannover and Hanni e .. 
Bergbau uncI Jugend. Bochum 1950. 
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This was an understandable technique but too much of the reality of mining life 
stood in conflict with it and it was probably in awareness of this that the 
employers did not embark on anything bigger. It was only much later, in the 
1960's and 1970's, when mining did become largely mechanised and an 
increasing proportion of the workforce consisted of skilled mechaniCS and 
electricians, that the strategy could really work. In the meantime, the 
employers shrank back from selling mining work's real qualities. They were 
neIVOUS of stressing the fact that because mechanisation was underdeveloped, 
the miner had a far more varied and far more independent job than many other 
trades and instead chose to emphasise the way in which mining was Similar to 
other professions, namely, through advancing mechanisation. 1 Were the 
employers too timid in their attitude to the real world of mining? This is 
impossible to say, but their reticence was certainly understandable. 
Training and status 
The failure to persuade the broad public of the miner's status derived also from 
inherent features of the training scheme itself. 
In the first place, a lot of the training period was training in name only. Most 
boys started at 14 and, for health and safety reasons, the state allowed them 
underground only at age 16. Thus two years of their apprenticeship were 
generally spent above ground. The mines created special training faces on the 
surface ('Lehrstollen'), but, even so, were hard put to it to occupy the youngsters 
for the full period. There were simply not enough formal skills to fill up the two 
2 years. Of course, the mines could have taught more advanced work in the 
1 Vorschlag far die Ausgestaltung der Werbemittel...': Another aspect of the same 
dilemma was that a test with a placard showing young miners standing near some 
advanced machinery resulted in almost 80% of those looking at It not realJslng it was Just 
about the mines. BAK-ZwSt.H B119. 1036. M MOnster. Memo. 3.7.1955. 
2 OBADA 16303/1004/46. Essener Steinkohlenbergwerke to BA Werden. 
18.6.1946. cited In SA Werden to OBAD. 10.7.1946. 
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mechanical workshop or in electrtcs and so on, but they were understandably 
hesitant to impart skills that would not then be used in occupational life. 1 It 
was bound to lead to dissatisfaction if skills were taught that were not then 
2 
used. On the other hand, shortening the apprenticeship would downgrade 
mining and undermine the attempt to improve its status. 
111 us the mines had to think how usefully to employ the apprentices. The 
answer, invartably, was to put them at the picking belt, sorting coal. Here was 
an unpleasant job that needed to be done and one not easUy mechanised. As a 
comparatively low-paid group, the apprentices were a cheap source of labour. Of 
all the complaints raised about the apprenticeship, the one about lengthy stints 
at the picking belt was the most common.3 For years, the labour directors tried 
to reduce the time spent by apprentices there and with time they seem to have 
had success. But as late as the mid-1950's it was stUI a frequent topic of 
4 
complaint and discussion among the labour directors. 
The cost of this type of work was not that apprentices left in droves during their 
5 
training. On the contrary, wastage during the apprenticeship was low. But it 
was detrtmental to the general goal of enhancing the industry's status. It was 
widely recognised both inside and outside the industry, that the training offered 
by mining fell short of that offered by other trade apprenticeships. A 
confidential paper on training in the mines produced by one of the industry's 
leading experts concluded, 'da13 die Knappenprufungen den handwerklichen 
Gesellenpriifungen, Industriefacharbeiterprflfungen und kaufm~nnischen 
1 OBADA 16303/1004/46, SA Werden to OHAD, 10.7.1946. 
2 OBADA 16303/1004/46, Rheinische Stahlwerk.e, Essen to SA 8ottrop, 4.7.1946. 
3 See, for instance, BAK-ZwSt.H BI02, 33091. annex to minutes of AM meetting 
on 10.4.1956: Paper. 'Jugendarbeitsschutzaktion der 1GB', October 1955. 
4 IGBEA, Handakten Rudl Quast, File 'Arbeltskrels-Arbeltsdlrektoren 1952 -
1956', Minutes of meeting of Essen/Gelsenkirchen district, 13.5.1954: Minutes of meeting 
of Recklinghausen district. I, 12,1954. 
5 Ges.Verb. File 'Arbeitsausschu6 1948-1958', Minutes of Arbeltsausschu6 fl1r 
AusbUdungsfragen (Arb.aus.f.A) meeting, 17.3.1955. 
'1 ne reluctant elite 289 
GehilfenprfIfungen in ihren Anforderungen im allgemeinen nicht voU 
entsprechen,.1 Th t a was one reason why the apprenticeship strategy could only 
be partially effective in enhancing mining's status. In addition, few youngsters 
developed any great respect for their occupation and a great many left soon after 
completing their apprenticeship. 
An even more serious challenge to the status of the mining apprentices was the 
fact that, once qualified, they did the same work and were paid little more than 
the unskilled adult trainees who had received only a few months training. It 
proved impossible to introduce anything more than a symbolic differential 
between the remuneration of adult trainee and skilled Knappe. 
This became apparent in the negotauons over the trainees' wages at the 
beginning of 1949. The employers entered the negotiations keen to reduce the 
more costly privileges offered the trainees and to strengthen the differential 
between skilled and unskilled miners. 2 Hitherto, the trainees were guaranteed 
employment in contract wage work, rather than on the less remunerative time 
3 
rate jobs away from the face. Secondly, they received special training 
supplements during their first months in contract wage. The mines objected to 
these provisions on cost grounds, but also because they seemed to favour adult 
new miners in relation to apprentices and juvenile trainees.4 After all, former 
apprentices or juvenile trainees did not receive a supplement when they 
graduated to contract wage work. In addition, the fact that adult trainees had a 
1 Ges.Verb. File 'Arbeitsausschu6 1948 - 1958', Annex to minutes of meeUng on 
21.3.1957: Steffen, 'Grundsatzfragen der bergmc'1nnlschen BerufsausbUdung'. Hamborn. 
no date. 
2 AZG FUe 'I 1 26 Zuwelsung ... .'. Memo concerning meeting of the NRW mines 
Tartfausschu6, 28.1.1949- comments of MitteMefuaus. Janus. Rauhut and others. 
3 AZG Ftle 'I 1 26 Zuweisung .. .', GMSO, Circular NrAl. 4.2.1947. annex: 'Merkblatt 
fOr die Anwerbung von Arbeitskn'1ften fOr den rheinisch-westfiUischen Steinkohlenberg-
bau'. 10.1.1947. h 
4 Ie recruits taken on as boys but without an apprenticeship. Despite t e 
introduction of the apprenticeship. many youngsters continued to enter the industry on 
this basis. often because they lacked the educational qualifications for an appenUceship. 
Virtually all JuvenUe trainees at this time came from the locality. 
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right to be employed in contract wage work meant that the mines had to find 
another source of labour for the lower paid fixed-wage jobs away from the face. 
In to this breech stepped the juvenile trainees and Knappen, some of whom found 
themselves stuck for lengthy periods in low paid jobs because the Collieries had 
too few replacements to allow them to move into contract wage. l The unions 
particularly objected to this because nearly all of the youngsters at that stage 
were local boys. It seemed as if local lads were being disadvantaged so that 
'outsiders' could earn a good wage.2 
The regulations which emerged from the 1949 negotiations did remove the 
training supplement and the right to the contract wage.3 Yet they were 
noteworthy for the very limited way in which they favoured apprentices and 
Knappen at the cost of adult trainees. During their first year in contract wage. 
adult trainees received 90 percent of the full wage, 92.5 percent in the second year 
and 95 percent until they became Hauer. Previously the Knappen had been on 
this scale too, but now they were made 2.5 percent better off, beginning with a 7.5 
percent deduction and attaining the minimum 5 percent deduction already in 
their second year. This small advantage was a sign that in practice the two 
groups did the same work but even more of the industry's awareness that it was 
going to need adult trainees for a while yet. Even in the present favourable 
4 labour supply conditions, a decent incentive had to be offered. 
In practice, there was often no difference at all between the two groups' earnings 
5 because the mines frequently did not make these deductions. The reason was 
1 AZG File 'I 1 26 Zuweisung ... .', Memo concerning meeting of the NRW mines 
Tartfausschu6, 28.1.1949. 
2 Hence Gutermuth's stress at a March meeting of the wages commission that 
henceforth local new miners must be at least as well paid as outsiders. See AZG File '''61'' 
1=1 1 61] Bezahlung der Neubergleute bzw Umschaler', Minutes of meeting of 
Tartfausschu6 on 11.3.1949. 
3 Minutes of meeting of Tarlfausschu6 on 11.3.1949. 
41GB (ed.) Jahrbuch 1947, p.99; Jahrbuch 1950/1, p.238. 
5 See KOker's complaint In BAK-ZwSt.H BI02, 33091. Minutes of AAA meeting. 
14.12.1953; also BBA 32,741. Minutes of Hibernia directors' meeting, 4.6.1948. 
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the increasing number of men employed under the one-man contract wage 
1 
system. Under the older collective contract. the wage contract was worked out 
for the group on the basis of the full Hauer rate (Hauerdurchschnttlslohn). The 
wage earned was divided up between the men. the Hauer receiving a full share 
each. and the less experienced men receiving their share minus the appropriate 
percentage. A new trainee would thus receive a full share minus 10 percent. In 
other words. the smaller wages for the newcomers had never benefited the 
employers and instead were designed to compensate the experienced men for the 
lower output of newer colleagues. 
In faces where the one-man contract wage was introduced and wages were paid 
individUally. rather than to the group. the situation was quite different. Here 
the newcomer was entirely dependent on his own work rather than receiving his 
share of a wage achieved by group output. He enjoyed no benefit from the higher 
output of experienced colleagues and. equally. did not depress their wages either. 
There was thus no justification for taking a percentage off his wage - his lower 
output and thus lower earnings penalised him for his inexperience enough 
already. 2 Though some employers still made the deductions. many did not and 
it became increasingly general practice to pay all men in one-man contract wage 
the same. Consequently. even the small status difference laid down in the wage 
regulations disappeared. It was therefore difficult to take the apprenticeship 
all that seriously. 
These questions of comparability would not have arisen in the same intensity. 
if. as the mines had intended. the apprentices had indeed become the main 
source of new labour for the pits. Yet wastage remained such that the pits were 
1 Ibid. 
2 BAK-ZwStH BI02. 33091. BWiM. Memo concerning MA meeting on 14.12.1953. 
17.12.1953. 
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forced to hire 50,000 or more new adult recruits each year. 1 This dwarfed the 
apprentice intake and, given the fact that adult recruits and apprentices did the 
same work, made nonsense of the notion that mining was a skilled profession. 
Apprentices and 'Stammesbildung' 
Apart from leaving public perceptions largely unchanged, the other major 
disappointment to the employers was that they failed to create out of the 
apprentices a new type of miner with greater stability, or loyalty than their 
established or adult compatriots. The Knappen (miners who had completed 
their training but had not yet had the further working experience necessary take 
2 
the Hauer exam), were not much more likely to stay in the mines than other 
young adults. 3 
The full dimensions and causes of this failure will emerge only later in this 
study, after other chapters have examined the employers' attempts to shape the 
apprentices' living environment, leisure activity and thinking. Nevertheless, 
the analysis of apprentices' induction has already offered a number of reasons 
why the Knappe's own working experience did not persuade him of his special 
status. Even more Significant, however was the experience of working in the 
adult faces after qualifying. A great many Knappen left soon after passing their 
exams. 4 True, some had planned this in advance, the idea being to gain a 
qualification from an industry that paid what were for an apprentice extremely 
good wages and then to use this qualification to obtain a more agreeable job 
elsewhere. But for many others, it was the shock of transition from the 
1 Ges.Verb., StdKw., Table: 'Belegschaftswechsel - Arbeiter untertage. Ruhr'. 
2 Strictly speaking, they were 'Knappen' only for the first year of employment after 
training and then became 'Lehrhauer'. However the tenn is used here as a useful way of 
distinguishing between former apprentices and former adult trainees. 
3 See Hibernia Konzern (ed.), Soztalbertcht 1957, p.24; Ges.Verb. File 
'Arbeitsausschu6 1948-1958', Minutes of Arb.aus.fA meeting, 17.3.1955 and 5.4.1955. 
4 OBADA 16301/774/50, OBAD to Vtw[siclJ, 13.3.1950 
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relatively protected world of the apprentice to the harsher environment outside 
that stimulated their departure. Even after employers made greater efforts at 
easing the transition. for instance by creating special faces where output norms 
were set below those of the adult faces. it proved very difficult to square the two 
worlds of apprentice and adult miner. I 
All the problems associated with creating a young mining elite derived from one 
fact: the apprenticeships had been grafted on to the industry not because the 
production process required them but because of wider social goals. The work 
process itself undermined attempts to create a special class. In addition. the 
managerial style prevalent in mining made the transition from apprentice to 
miner a hard one. These conditions limited what the apprenticeship strategy 
could achieve both in terms of the number of recruits and the willingness of 
qualified youngsters to stay. 
Ultimately the point was that the apprentice strategy could not be expected to 
achieve workforce stability on its own. It could succeed only if the mines 
managed. at least partially. to create a hospitable environment for their adult 
labour. The high levels of wastage among both adult trainees and qualified 
former apprentices suggests that the industry failed to do this. And the longer 
the collieries were forced by wastage to maintain high levels of unskilled adult 
recruitment. the more suspect appeared their claim that mining had become a 
skilled profession. In many respects. therefore. the mines' response to adult 
new labour held the key to the success of the apprenticeships - much as the 
industry had hoped that the relationship would be the other way round. It is 
therefore to the employers' management of adult labour and the way in which 
1 Ges. Verb. File 'Arbeitsausschu6 1948-1958', Minutes of Arh.aus.f.A meeUng. 
5.4.1955. 
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the adult trainees were inducted and integrated into the mines that we must now 
turn. 
Chapter 7: 'Pit militarism' and insubordinate recruits. 
Adult new labour in the mines. 1948-58 
1: New labour and the pursuit of efficiency 1948-50 
Strategies of tntegratinn 
Agreed though they were on the superior virtues of the apprentice, the employers 
were in no doubt that for some time to come adult labour would remain 
essential, both to expand and rejuvenate the workforce and to replace wastage. 1 
The priority was thus not to eliminate adult intake but to make it more cost 
effective and productive. 
What were the best ways to achieve this? Some steps were so obvious and 
uncontentious that they would have figured in any strategy. The mines began, 
for example, to demand a higher standard of fitness from would-be recruits. 
During 1948, the ABB and the DKBL agreed on new medical requirements, which 
in 1950 were made even stricter at the behest of the OBAD.2 The new 
3 
standards were rigorously enforced and their success was clearly manifest in 
the declining numbers leaving the mines due to unfitness for mining work (see 
table 13). 
Another obvious step was to concentrate on younger labour in order to accelerate 
rejuvenation. In 1948, the upper age limit for recruits was brought down from 
40 to 25.4 A small number of older men continued to be taken on but the under 
25's made up 86 percent of the recruits entering the Ruhr mines via the Hiltrop 
1 OBADA 16301/774/50, OBAD to Vtwlslcl), 13.3.1950: Ullrich's comments in BBA 
32,741, Minutes of DireCtors' Meeting, 30.1.1948. 
2 'Sechs Jahre AuJ3enstelle Bergbau', p.75: OBADA 13873/809/51. OBAD. 
Vorlcluftge Richtlininen fOr die c'lrtzl1chen Anlegeuntersuchungen ... , 1.3.1951. 
3 'Sechs Jahre Au6enstelle 8ergbau', p.75. op.clt. 
4 Ibid., p.74. 
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(later Essen-Heisingen) reception camp. 1 Over the following years, average 
workforce age dropped steadily as a result (see fig.6). 
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Beyond such obviOUS measures, there were two main questions that any new 
labour strategy had to answer. In the first place, there was the problem of how 
best to turn the newcomers into safe and productive workers and where the 
1 Ges.Verb., Heislngen papers, Log book of Heisingen camp. 
2 Source: Ges.Verb., StdKW, Table: 'AufteUung des Abganges nach Grunden -
Arbeiter untertage. Ruhr.', column 3, 'Berguntaugltchkeit'. 
3 Author's calculation. 
4 OBAD annual report 1957. 
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trade-off between productivity and safety should be made. The difficulty. here. 
as ever. was that the productive jobs in mining required few fonnal skills yet 
involved a high degree of danger and often demanded a whole range of aptitudes 
and talents. The other issue. and one that in the long tenn was likely to be even 
more critical. was the problem that had emerged in the 1930's. namely how to 
retain new labour without offering wages that the industry could not afford. 
The traditional approach to productive and social integration. employed in the 
great days of the Ruhr's expansion. has already emerged in chapter 1. At work 
the employers had relied on a rigid authoritarianism to lick the newcomers into 
shape. There was little or no emphasis on fonnal training. with established 
men expected to impart such skills as were required. To bind the men to the 
mine and to the locality, the collieries had developed a number of social policy 
initiatives, the most important of which was the provision of company housing. 
This traditional package had not been substantially revised since the turn of the 
century. Between the beginning of the 1920's and the Second World War, there 
was, after all. no major influx of adult labour. True, thought was given in the 
1930's to workforce regeneration, but the solutions found involved apprentices 
and did not bear on adult intake. Indeed, part of the apprenticeship's raison 
d'~tre was that it would allow the mines to do without adult labour altogether. 
During the war too. the traditional pattern of induction had been modified only 
to the extent that a limited amount of fonnal group training was offered to the 
conscripts. Otherwise it was business as usual. only more so. since the racially 
inferior foreigners could count on blows and kicks as part of the disciplinary 
procedure. 
The vigorous endorsement of the apprenticeship strategy after 1945, however. 
suggested that the employers might be willing to try a new approach to the adults 
as well, once it became clear that they could not rely on juvenile labour alone. 
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In the first place, the continuous pronouncements that mining was skilled work 
seemed to indicate that employers would now insist on careful training for their 
new recruits and would see productivity as being more the product of qualified 
labour than of iron discipline. Secondly, the apprentices had been created in 
the belief that a careful introduction to mining work would lead to workforce 
stability. From here it was surely Just a small step to acknowledging this link 
for adult new labour, making the working experience more integrative and not 
relying solely on external bonds and inducements. such as housing, to cement 
the newcomer to his profession. Thirdly, the apprentice strategy had arisen 
because of the recognition that the unfavourable labour market trend against 
mining necessitated a new approach to labour integration. Did not the same 
logic suggest the need for innovations in response to adult labour too? 
Selecting Jor stabUity 
One way of identifying the employers' priorities and, in particular, how 
seriously they were taking the problem of workforce stability, is to look at their 
selection criteria. What sort of men were they selecting and for what reasons? 
In fact, the employers' room to impose a particular strategy on to adult 
recruitment was small. One of the problems faCing the mines was that recruits 
likely to prove permanent additions to the mines were hard to identify. In 
spring 1948, for instance, the DKBL introduced a new procedure at the central 
reception camp in Bochum-HUtrop, whereby appUcants coming from outside the 
1 Ruhr were subjected to an impromptu interview. Through a carefully designed 
and seemingly random series of questions about previous employment and 
future intentions, the employers tried to identify which recruits would prove 
1 See OBADA 18006/2386/48. Otto Brass. Report on the selection of 'charakterltch 
ntcht geetgneter' new miners from May to July 1948. August 1948. 
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long-term additions to the workforce. 1 But it proved very difficult to make any 
very certain assessment and the experiment does not seem to have been 
continued The mines generally restricted their selection to weeding out 
applicants who had a criminal record or had left previous employment in 
breach of contract. 
Another factor impinging on the mines' ability to choose stable recruits was the 
housing shortage. Married men, especially men with young families, were 
potentially less likely to change Jobs than unattached bachelors, as the mines 
2 
were later able to confirm. However, in the short term this was negated by the 
absence of suitable apartments. The collieries' experience was that under the 
existing conditions, married men, especially if they came from outside the Ruhr. 
were less likely to stay in the mines, because they could often not afford or stand 
living apart from their families. That was one reason why the employers tended 
3 to favour bachelors and or recruits from the locality. 
Though their room for manoeuvre was limited, there are slight indications that 
the employers were not thinking realistically about wastage. Even beyond the 
dictates of the housing shortage, the mines seem to have gone for young 
bachelors and particularly for local men, ignoring the large number of the 
dislocated and dispossessed in the provinces who were looking for a secure 
4 profession. There were moves afoot to close down the reception camp in 
Hiltrop (later Essen-Heisingen) altogether, indicating that employers expected 
5 
soon to be able to do without outsiders and rely exclusively on local labour. 
1 Ibid. 
2 'Neue Heimat am POtt', Handesblatt. DOsseldorf, 21.11.1952. 
3 OBADA 18010/1238/49, OBAD Lageberlcht for 1st Q. 1949, April 1949: 
18010/1914/49, OBAD Lagebericht for 2nd Q. 1949, July 1949. 
4 It Is hard to prove this with certainty, but an indication is gtven by OBADA 
18010/1238/49, OBAD Lageberlcht for 1. Q. 1949. 
5 See BBA 32,741. Minutes of Hibernia directors' meeting, 30.1.1948. 
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Though the DKBL was able to prevent this, the labour administration continued 
to complain about the mines' unwillingness to take on outsiders. 1 
At one level this was Simply a narrow cost calculation. Local men were cheaper 
to hire; single men did not need housing; very young men would have a longer 
2 
working life. At a deeper level, these moves betrayed a hope of returning to 
'normal' conditions, in which the special expedients of the post-war period could 
be done away with. Indeed, even senior DKBL spokesmen were to be found 
talking about a 'normalisation' of the labour market, and meaning the 
emergence of one more favourable to the mines before. 3 One cannot avoid the 
impression that in their day-to-day labour policy, the mines were not thinking 
about their difficulties at the end of the 1930's and had a mental image of 
normality that had more to do with the labour surplus of earlier years. 
Training and induction 
The real test of the employers' policy, however, came when the newcomers 
arrived at the mines. Early in 1948, it became apparent that a new wind, or 
perhaps better, a new, old wind was blowing through the collieries, altering the 
approach to new labour as well as to the established workforce. While 
discipline became tighter, training was taken less seriously than ever. Many 
mines used the fact that new miners were now arriving in dribs and drabs 
(rather than in the large transports of earlier years) to ignore the OBAD 
guidelines altogether. 4 Colliery offiCials put their trust not in careful training 
but in aggressive management. Unions noted a growing number of cases where 
1 HStaD NW73, 458. LAA. Memo concerning meeting with Generaldirektor Kost on 
7.2.1949.8.2.1949. 
2 OBADA 18010/386/49. OBAD report for 4th Q. 1948. 
3 See. for example. H.H.81schoff. 'Arbeiterzahl und Arbelterwechsel 1m 
Steinkohlenbergbau'. GliickauJ. 1949.85.49/50, pp.911-913. 
4 OBADA 16307/2420/48. OBAD, Circular to sA. 16.9.1948. 
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mines were paying the newcomers less than the mintmum wage in order to force 
1 
up output. The Ruhr wage arbitrators (Gedinge-Inspektoren) reported many 
instances where newcomers were being set to work in conditions which 
completely outstretched their abilities, despite the availability of experienced 
2 
men working in easier conditions, and complained repeatedly that the 
newcomers were not being given enough training. 3 
However, the drive to assert managerial authority was not the only new current 
in 1948. Both unions and OHAD pressed for greater emphasis on training and 
safety than in previous years. In autumn 1948, the Inspectorate argued that any 
additional hirings would constitute an unacceptable threat to mine safety. 4 In 
September, it sent out a Circular to the local offices of the Inspectorate urging 
vigilance in the training question and reminding them that the training 
directors could be prosecuted for failure to ensure adherence to the OHAD 
5 gUidelines. In some cases, the Inspectorate had already felt obliged to take this 
step. (Though this was in some ways unfair, it was also quite a shrewd move, 
Since it effectively forced the mines to give the training director more 
6 
responsibility.) The unions themselves were growing increasingly concerned 
about mines safety (though it is not always possible to distinguish between 
genuine fear of accidents and use of the safety argument as a way of restricting 
unwanted recruitment)? 'Es geht nicht', wrote Siegfried Schroeder in the IVB's 
information sheet for union offiCials and works councillors, 'da.J3 man 
1 DGBA File 'Industrieverband Bergbau 1946-8. TAt1gkeitsbertcht', Monthly 
report for March 1948; File 'IGBergbau. Monatsbertchte der IGBergbau 1949', Montly 
report for April 1949. 
2 IGBEA BR5. Reports by the Wage Arbitrators for August & September 1948. 
3 Ibid .• October 1948. 
4 OBAD report for 3rd Q. 1948. 
5 Ibid. 
6 OBADA 16307/3264/48. DKBL Direktortum to OBAD. 23.12.1948. annex. 
7 AZG File 'I 1 26 Zuweisung ... .'. Memo concerning meeting of the NRW mines 
Tartfausscht..t6. 28.1.1949. see comments ofIGB representative Jarrek; IVB (ed.), Jahrb~ch 
1947. section 'Grubensicherheit'; 1GB (ed.), Jahrbuch 1948/9. section 'Grubensicherhelt. 
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vollkommen berufsfremden Menschen zumutet, nach 3-4 verfahrenen 
Schichten selbstandig und ohne jegliche AnleUung zu arbeiten.,l 
From Autumn 1948, the OBAD was involved in negotiations with employers' 
representatives and the union about introducing new training provisions. 
Quite apart from the interests of safety, the Inspectorate was very conscious that 
the status of the profession could be enhanced only if all entrants were required 
to run through a more thorough training programme. 2 As far as the existing 
regulations were concerned, their main weaknesses were, first and 
fundamentally, that the prescribed training was too short and covered too little 
of the miners' work. Thus, when trainees were assigned to a new workplace they 
often found themselves confronted with jobs or environments for which they 
3 
were totally unprepared. Secondly, the fact that training could take place 
anywhere in the mine and that the underground manager (rather than the 
training director) was responsible for carrying it out, meant that the training 
was often purely notional. Trainees frequently found themselves working at a 
4 
normal productive face within days of having been taken on. 
The new regulations, issued in May 1949, made good these earlier weaknesses 
and for the first time since the war really bound the mines to certain clear and 
reasonable minimum standards. This was proven by the great chorus of 
opposition with which the works managers greeted the new code. Its basiC 
elements were that the new miner had to spend at least a month getting to know 
the environment as a general labourer underground, during which time he was 
1 Report from IVB Referat Neubergleute, Bochum, 27.9.1948 in 1GB 
lrifonnattonsblatt 1948. 
2 OBADA 16307/374/49, OBAD, Memo concerning a meeting of the Oberbergamt 
on 25.10.1948: HStaD Kalkum Bergamt Duisburg 181, OBAD to Betriebsfahrer-
Vereinlgung Hamborn-Oberhausen. 15.8.1949. 
3 OBAD to Betriebsfahrer-Vereinigung Hamborn-Oberhausen. 15.8.1949: OBADA 
16307/450/49. IVB to OBAD. 10.2.1949. 
4 OBAD to Betriebsfahrer-Vereinlgung Hamborn-Oberhausen, 15.8.1949. 
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to be supervised by experienced miners. Then he was to be trained for at least 
three months during at least two of which the trainee was to be employed on time 
rates. Special training faces were now compulsory for both the time-rate and 
the contract wage stages of training. The new miners were to be given a broad 
training covering all the face Jobs - coal getting, packing and shifting the 
conveyors. Special attentions was to be paid to the particularly dangerous job of 
packing and recovering props. During the two months on time rates there 
should be no more than four miners to each experienced hewer, a ratio which 
could be increased to six during the training in contract wage. Perhaps the most 
significant provision, certainly the most controversial was that the training 
director was now fully responsible for the whole training period and answerable 
directly to the managing director Ue not to the underground or works manager). 
Both training director and works council were to be involved in drawing up a list 
1 
of newcomers and making sure they got the proper training. 
2 Even though it enjoyed union backing, the OBAD would probably not have been 
able to push this code through against colliery opposition had it not been for the 
support given by influential circles within the DKBL. For the DKBL's Manpower 
3 
and Training committee (AAA) there was much to be welcomed. The 
committee had long believed that the changed conditions of 1948 provided 
employers with the opportunity to improve the training and induction of new 
labour. In its earliest versions of Plan A, the DKBL stressed the need for the 
1 OBADA 16307/1316/49, BesUmmungen tlber Anlernung und Einsatz von 
Neubergleuten 1m Steinkohlenbergbau. 
2 OBADA 16307/1918/49, OBAD to BA ReckUnghausen 1. 29.4.1949: 
16307/1720/49, Minutes of meeting in dining room of Mine Friedrich-Heinrich. 11.7.1949. 
3 Unfortunately the minutes of the committee for the period prior to 1953 are 
among the records which remain unreleased at the Mining Archive. Luckily. the records 
of a sort of pre-committee. the Arbettsaussch~ fOr AusbUdungsfragen (Arb.aus.f.A). 
which considered many training and manpower issues in advance of the main ~mmittee. 
have not been given to the Mining Archive and so are accessible. For the post- 53 period. 
the main committee's minutes can be found among the Federal Economics Ministry 
papers. 
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'assimilation [sic] and a planful [sic] training of the non-miners'. 1 The very 
large number of accidents involving new miners provided further economic and 
social grounds to induct the newcomers more carefully. Many of the ObaD's 
suggestions in fact derived from proposals which the DKBL. in recognition both 
of the need for tighter controls and of the impracticality of some of the 1947 
provisions, had submitted in December 1948.2 
The real opposition to the code came from the collieries' works managers. In 
district meetings of the DKBL, in the Verband Oberer Bergbeamten (VOB) and in 
specially convened works managers' committees. the colliery managers vented 
3 
their spleens. The new code, they argued, 'solI unter allen Umsta.nden zu Fall 
gebracht werden'. 4 The tone adopted was unusual enough to make it clear that 
something fundamental was at stake. The regulations contradicted some of 
the managers' most cherished assumptions. They objected to the notion that 
induction was primarily a matter of transmitting knowledge and skills and 
argued that 'eine Erziehung zur Disziplin, Arbeitseinsatz und Letstung,5 was at 
least as important. It was surely an indication of the mines' management style 
and their attitude to new labour that in defending the emphasis on discipline 
1 
The fate of the DKBL's translator Is not known! See WWA S22 (OMGUS). BICO 
ERPSOC 11/95-2/3-4, DKBL document, Plan A Essen 20.2.1948. 
2 OBADA 16307/374/49, OBAD to DKBL & 1GB. 14.2.1949, annex Memo 
concerning AAA meeting on 1.12.1948. 
Some of the OhaD's conditions went further, however. and the DKBL was a little 
worried about possible conflicts of interest between training director and works manager 
and felt that the scope of the former'S responslb1l1ties would have to be very tightly 
defined. The DKBL's training experts were most disappointed by the deadline for the 
creation of special training faces which. they felt, was so clearly unrealistic as to throw 
the whole code into a bad light. See Ges.Verb. File 'Arbeitsausschu.6 1948-1958'. 
Arb.aus.f.AMeetlngs, 12.4.1949.21.7.1949. 
3 BBA 10,594. Report on meeting of DKBL Bochum District. 18.6.1949; HStaD 
Kalkum BA Duisburg 181, correspondence between BetriebsfOhrervereinigungen 
Hambom-Oberhausen and 'lfnker Nlederrhein' and OBAD; OBADA 16307.1720/49. 
Minutes of meeting with Betrlebsft1hrervereln1gung 'Linker Niederrhein'. 11.7.1949; VOB. 
'StelIungnahme zurn AusbUdungsplan'. BergfreiheU. 1949. 14. 11. pp.23-24. 
4 BBA 10.594. Report on meeting of DKBL Bochum District, 18.6.1949. 
5 HStaD Kalkum Bergamt Dulsburg 181. Draft of a letter from 
BetrtebsfOhrervereintgung Hambom-Oberhausen to OBAD. (eventually sent 25.7.1949). 
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they made no distinction between the wartime experiences with conscript labour 
and the approach to the adult trainees of the post-war period: 1 
Die ~rfahrungen der letzten 10 Jahre, die an den Grubenbeamten durch 
die Uberweisung der verschiedenartigsten Arbeitskra.fte einmal1ge 
Anforderungen stellten, haben gezeigt d~ die Menschenfuhrung ebenso 
wesentlich bei der Erziehung zum Bergmann ist wie die praktische 
Unterweisung. 
Because they put their trust in the heavy hand rather than the training session, 
managers objected to the costs the OBAD rulings would incur. This applied 
particularly to the compulsory training faces. Managers argued too that they 
were unable to supply the necessary supervisors, thereby clearly but perhaps 
unwittingly revealing that they had failed to comply with the 1947 regulations. 2 
Apart from committing the mines to what they saw as an expensive and 
overindulgent training programme, the OBAD had also assaulted another 
cherished notion, namely that the Betriebsfuhrer had complete freedom to 
dispose of labour as he Wished. The OBAD was heavily criticised for the 
responsibility it gave the training director. Decisions about the length of 
training necessary and whether adequate supervision was being provided 
3 
should. it was argued, be left with the works manager. In part what was at 
stake here was the deSire to maintain complete flexibility so that the short term 
needs of coal production would always have priority. But it was also a question 
of prestige 4 . It was seen as an unacceptable infringement of the works 
manager's status that he should have to inform training directors of new miners 
5 
taken on by the mine. The training director should inform himself. The 
1 Ibid. 
2 HStaD Kalkum BA Dulsburg 181, OBAD to BetrlebsfOhrer-Verelnlgung 
Hambom-Oberhausen, 15.8.1949. 
3 Draft of a letter from BetrtebsfOhrerverelnlgung Hambom-Oberhausen to 
OBAD. 
4 StaM BA Bottrop A18, 176, Arenberg to BA Bottrop. 15.10.1949. 
5 OBADA 16307/1720/49. Minutes of meeting In dining room of Zeche Frtedrtch-
Heinrich, 11.7.1949. 
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works council should also not be involved as this represented an equally 
unacceptable extension of its prerogatives. 1 
The AAA's largely favourable stance on the one hand and the works managers' 
condemnation on the other revealed the existence of two schools of thought 
within mining. Mining's long-established authoritarian style with its sink-or-
swim approach to new labour continued to dominate at the level of overseers and 
underground and works managers. They had nothing but contempt for a softer 
more safety-conscious approach and condemned the 'nebensc1chl1cher 
UnterausschuJ3' of the DKBL which, without consulting the 'mit der 
Kohlenforderung betrauten Kreise', had had the temerity to agree to the ObaD's 
2 proposals. 
On the other hand, a new breed of training and manpower manager such as the 
Hibernia training director Dr Koker, the Gruppe Hamborn training director 
Senft and even more his successor, Dr.Steffen, and others, were looking for a 
different approach with greater emphasis on qualification and better man-
management. For their part, they condemned the VOB's failure to listen to the 
3 training directors and to respond only to the wishes of works managers. The 
DKBL's top manpower expert. Dr. Ullrich continued to argue that the regulations 
4 
were basically acceptable and at a conference of training directors in June 
1949, the new code was praised for its clarity and simplicity in contrast with the 
old regulations. 5 Both viewpoints often existed within the same management. 
Thus at the same time as Senft from the Gruppe Hamborn was one of the 
1 HStaO Kalkum BA Duisburg 181, Memo from Inspektton II. (Gruppe Hambom). 
4.7.1949. 
2 BBA 10, 594, Minutes of meeting ofBochum district ofDKBL. 18.6.1949. 
3 Ges.Verb. FIle 'Arbeitsausschu6', Minutes of Arb.aus.f.A meeting 18.11.1949. 
4 Minutes of meeting in dining room of Zeche Friedrich-Heinrich. 11.7.1949: 
Minutes of Arb.aus.f.A meeting 18.11.1949; OBADA 12107/3231/49. Minutes of a meeting 
with directors of localinspectorates. 6.10.1949. 
5 BBA 10, 594. Mine Friedrich der G~e to Bergassessor Lange, 28.6.1949. 
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strongest supporters of the new code, it was a Gruppe Hambom director, 
Schloms, who was one of its most militant opponents. 1 In the neighbouring 
mining company Diergardt-Mevissen, the training director found himself 
permanently at odds with the works managers. 2 
3 Because of DKBL and 1GB backing, the OBAD was able to ride out the storm and 
adopt a much tougher tone towards its opponents than it was wont. The 
4 
regulations remained in force. Within the collieries, however, it was clear that 
the training directors and other members of what might be called the 
progressive wing would have difficulties asserting themselves in the face of the 
established management style. 
In practice, the newcomers continued to receive a very cursory preparation to the 
work. True, the newcomers were now obliged to spend at least one month as 
general labourers underground. However, many newcomers spent the month or 
two of general labouring without any proper supervision at all, with the result 
5 that they were exposed to accidents and learned very little. True, the mines 
were now obliged to train the youngsters in special training faces, but in fact 
6 these were often run suspiciously like their productive counterparts. 
One factor which made it hard for the mines to offer a more satisfactory 
induction programme was that they suffered from a shortage of training 
1 He was the chairman of the outspoken BetrtebsftlhrelVereinigung Hambom-
Oberhausen. 
2 HStaD Kalkum SA Duisburg 181, BA Duisburg VerfOgung 417/272, 16.8.1951 
concerning training of new miners in Diergardt-Mevissen company. 
3 The IVB was renamed the 'Industrtegewerkschaft Bergbau' at the end of 1948. 
4 They were, however, somewhat vitiated by the many concession which the 
OBAD extended to mines who claimed it was impossible to lmplement them fully in the 
short term (even in August 1951, the OBAD was sUll prepared to express 
'sttllschweigendes EinversUlndnis' towards mines who had not yet established training 
faces). See HStaD Kalkum BA DUisburg 181. SA Duisburg to Gelsenberg 28.6.1951 and 
subsequent memos. 
5 See, for instance. BAK-ZwSt.H BI02, 33091. annex 5 to III A 1 - 10934/56, 'Alann 
im Bergbau'. 
6 Ibid. 
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personnel. Even with their expanded number of classes, it would take the 
Mining Schools years to train all the deputies that the collieries needed. 1 But 
the poor training represented far more deep-seated attitudes towards industrial 
relations and production. There was an almost total lack of awareness of 
pedagogical and human relations issues. 
In 1956 a young theology student produced a report based on his experiences in 
mining, entitled 'Alarm im Bergbau,.2 The report begins by describing the 
typical newcomers' entry into the mine. Neither the new colleagues nor the 
foremen show much sympathy for the newcomer, who finds himself entrusted 
with moving coal tubs around at a staple shaft and cannot quite cope with the 
pace with which they are coming at him, particularly as one of the pOints is 
sticky. 3 
Mit seiner armseligen Grubenlampe steht der Neue im Scheinwerferlicht 
des Blitzers, der von der Brust des Rutschenbass's auf ibn herableuchtet. 
1m Scheinwerferlicht sieht der Rutschenb~ die Wagen neb en den 
Schienen liegen und nun ist es vorbei. "Sag mal", brullt er los, "lemst Du 
das hier denn uberhaupt rucht. bist sicher auch nur hierher gekommen, 
weil sonst keiner etwas mit Dir anzufangen wei.6. Hast sicher geglaubt, 
hier wAre Platz fur so blode Hunde wie Du einer bist. So etwas kann auch 
nur aus Bayem kommenf" 
Hardly has one foreman disappeared. then another surfaces. and screams at the 
newcomer for not having got enough coal tubs together. The account is then 
interrupted and we rejoin the trainee some weeks later when he has begun to 
come to terms with the work. His problem now is that. though working in moist 
conditions. he is not given a chit for a rubber suit by the deputy. By the time the 
suit finally arrives. the hapless recruit is already ill. It is enough to drive him 
4 from the mines for good. 
1 WBKA. WBK (ed.). 'Verwaltungsbertcht 1.1.49-31.12.49'; BBA 55. 12200. Nr.11. 
Minutes of BergausschtU3 meeting. 22.B.1950. 
2 BAK-ZwSt.H B102, 33091, BWiM. Memo. refIll A 1 - 10934/56. annex 5. 
3 Ibid .. p.B. 
4 Ibid .. p.1l. 
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Leaving the fate of this particular individual, the report goes on to consider more 
general problems in the approach to the new miners. Apart from the personality 
of the deputies, the whole system is not geared up to taking the newcomers' needs 
seriously. The lack of preparation is overwhelming. The newcomers have 
themselves to ask for protective clothing and no one tells them that they should 
have it. Because high output is demanded from on high, the instructers, even 
when well meaning, have no time to respond to the inexperienced newcomers' 
difficulties. Packing, coal-getting, recovering props - all these jobs are 
demonstrated in a few minutes at the beginning of the shift and the newcomers 
then left to get on with it. And when the newcomer finally finds himself in the 
productive faces, kiimmert sich erst recht keiner mehr urn den Neuen'. 1 
Probably the most impresive thing about this report was not its content, but the 
fact that no one disputed its veracity. At a meeting of the Manpower and 
Training Committee in 1956, no one present - as far as we can tell from the 
minutes - criticised the paper. No one even said that it was exaggerated. Instead 
there was a consensus that 'Alarm im Bergbau .. ohne Zweifel fiir einen gro~en 
Tell der Zechen zutreffen (durfte)'? Other accounts from new miners certainly 
3 
confinn the general picture. 
The available accident statistics suggest strongly that the newcomers were not 
being adequately prepared for mining work (see fig. 7). Any improvements in 
the safety of the first few months of employment as a result of the OBAD code 
were being more than outweighed by a higher rate of accidents among the 
4 
trainees in their second and third year of employment. probably because of 
1 Ibid, p.26. 
2 BAK-ZwSt.H 8102, 33091, AM Meeting, 30.5.1956. 
3 See, for Instance, Herbert Berger. 'Als Neul1ng 1m Ptltt'. in lOBE (ed.), Bergleute 
erzdhlen. (Bettrlige zur Geschlchte der IGBE), Bochwn 1982, pp.29-35. 
4 BAK-ZwSt.H BI02. 21395. Memo, 'New miners and invalidity problems', table 10, 
new miner share of accidents. 
more intensive working and more one-man contract wage employment, 1 In 
1952. a greater proportion of Hibernia new miners were involved in accidents 
2 
than in 1948. The failure to protect the new miners came out even more clearly 
in the figures of another company which established that new miners in their 
first five years of employment were four times more likely to be involved in 
accidents than apprentices with equivalent m1n1ng experience. 3 










New miners as % 
• of workforce 
II of accidents 
As well as being a danger to themselves. the new miners' lack of knowledge also 
impinged on mine safety as a whole. Wie wenig KOnnen zum Beispiel ein 
gewtsser Prozentsatz der Strebbelegschaften noch aufweist'. observed the 
management of the mine Friedrich der Gro~e. 'zeigt wtderholt das Einbrtngen 
des Ausbaues (falsche Lage der QuetschhOlzer. Fehlen von Bolzen. schiefwtnklige 
Neigung der Stempel zum Etnfallen. verzOgertes Stellen der Baue usw),.5 
1 IGBEA T4. Dr.KOker lecture Jan 1953. 
2 Ibid. 
s BBA 10. IS5. M fbr Ham Bergrat Helntzmann. Heme 4.4.1955. 
So1;m:e: Hlbe Konzem (eel.). SozfQIberlcht 1958. annex 14. 
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In effect. the new miners were learning the bare minimum necessary to enable 
them to mine coal. The face. where the trainees were most heavily concentrated. 
approached 1938 productivity levels far faster than other parts of the mine. By 
1952. coal getting (Gewinnung) in the Hibernia company was more efIicent than 
it had been in 1938; face work as a whole (Abbau) was 90 percent as productive as 
it had been pre-war but for the underground workforce as a whole the figure was 
1 
only 73.5 percent. Trainees who stayed in mining were therefore not 
depressing productivity (although the high wastage and the resulting large 
number of trainees in training at anyone time continued to be a negative 
2 factor). But they were a danger to themselves and to others and were ill 
equipped to cope with problems. interruptions or other unexpected 
eventualities. 3 
It was symptomatic of management attitudes that accidents were frequently 
attributed to defects in the newcomers' character. There was something of a 
consensus among colliery managers that the 'charakterlichen Eigenschaften der 
Neubergleute ... nicht sonderlich hoch zu bewerten Sind,.4 A Concordia 
memorandum attributed the high accident level to the new miners' 'mangelnde 
5 Arbeitsmoral' and complained that the newcomers: 
sich nichts sagen lassen wollen. Wenn Sie kurze Zeit 1m Bergbau 
gearbeitet haben. kommen sie sich als alte Bergleute vor. glaub_en nach 
eigenem Ermessen handeln zu konnen und lehnen Ratschlage und 
Belehrungen von Kamaraden. aber auch Anordnungen von Vorgesetzten 
abo oder lassen sie unbeachtet. 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H BI02. 4363. lecture from Dr.KOker given to members of the 
Arbeitsausschl\6, 19.1.1953. 
2 Ibid. 
3 BBA 8/448. Memo about discussions between CCCG and mine directors of 
DKBL district Niederrhein. 19.9.1949. Discussions before arrival of CCCG reps. 
4 HStaD Kalkum BA Dulsburg 181. Copy of memo from Inspektion II to Dlrektion 
III (Gruppe Harnbom). 4.7.1949. 
5 BBA 8. 352. Memo from ArbelterpersonalbOro. 12.7.1952. 
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No doubt, there was something to this. Young men are more likely to take risks 
than older colleagues, newcomers less knowledgeable than long-established 
workers. But in truth the new miners could not be expected to behave in any 
other way when they were given so little proper training and expected to work 
independently, almost from the beginning. The collieries' perfunctory 
approach to induction encouraged the notion that the trainee did not have all 
that much to learn. What should the newcomer think when, for instance. 
travelling on the conveyor was forbidden by mine safety rules and yet everybody 
1 from the overman downwards did it? In addition. the newcomers were often 
informed about safety regulations only after an aVOidable aCCident had taken 
2 place. 
Ultimately, the biggest cost of this approach was the high wastage among the 
newcomers. Management had, just as in earlier times, not tried at all to make 
the experience of work more acceptable to new labour. Efforts to integrate new 
labour were restricted almost exclusively to housing and other measures outside 
the work process. Yet in the labour market conditions of the post-war period. 
3 this was not enough. 
New labour between management and the established workforce 
In 1948 and 1949, however, it seemed as if colliery managers had largely 
succeeded in imposing their will on the conditions of entry for new labour. The 
recruits entering the mines were now young, fit men who found themselves in a 
much tougher working environment than had their predecessors a year earlier. 
1 Cf.'Alann im Bergbau'. 
2 Ibid. 
3 See below. p.328ff. 
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Even the problem of wastage seemed to be being solved: losses in 1949 were lower 
than at any time since the end of the war. 1 
Were colliery managers successful also at using new labour and the 'reserve 
army' beyond the factory gates as a means of disciplining the established 
workforce? In the 19th century. the constant influx of new labour had. at least 
in the short term. been a key factor in depreSSing wage levels and weakening the 
workforce's power to resist management. Did this apply also to the period after 
1945? 
Union and new labour 
Ever since 1947. the NB had grown increasingly concerned at the impact new 
labour wa1baving on its own pOSition and its members' interests? Above all, the 
presence of thousands of outsiders to the Ruhr. perched in their hostels and with 
few contacts in the workforce. appeared to the union to create a potential 
3 division in the workforce. which employers would be able to exploit. Trade 
union organisation was lower in the hostels than among any other group of 
miners. According to one survey in 1948. barely more than 50 percent of hostel 
4 
occupants were unionised. 
Moreover. there was ample evidence that even without employer intervention. 
new miners were endangering the interests of the established workforce. 
1 Gliickauf, 1949.85.49/50. pp.911-913. here p.913. 
2 For the growing concern about Neubergleute, see 1GB Bezirk I (ed.), 
Geschdftsbertcht for das Jahr 1948, Oberhausen 1949; IGBergbau Bezirk IV Bochum 
(ed.). Jahresbertchte 1947-1948 zur Beztrkstagung 1949, Bochum 1949: IGBergbau Bez1rk 
V (ed.), 3.BezirkskonJerenz der IGBergbau, Bezirk V, in Gelsenktrchen Buer, 13.3.1949. 
Jahresbericht 1948. Gelsenkirchen 1949. 
3 For a succinct. though somewhat later statement of this anxiety, see the speech 
of Siegfried Schroeder in IGBEA Pressearchiv, File 'ArbeitskrMte fOr den Bergbau. 
Neubergleute. Bis 1952', Minutes of the 3rd conference of new miner hostel reps. 
17.7.1950. 
4 IGBEA BR4. H.Gutermuth. Report of the works councils dMsion for the 1948 
annual report. no date. 
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Several cases of newcomers found smoking underground graphically illustrated 
the threat presented by undiscipUned, ill-informed recruits. 1 Group earnings 
were affected by newcomers' absenteeism and under-production? Yet the IVB 
believed the importance of avoiding a permanent split in the workforce to be so 
great that it refused to sanction punitive action against the newcomers and was 
at pains to stress educational work and persuading the newcomers to alter their 
behaviour. 3 
These problems and anxieties manifested the fact that the miners were in many 
ways a group particularly vulnerable to the impact of new labour. More than 
almost any other working group, their lives depended on the maintenance of 
certain safety standards. Whilst it was true that misbehaving young trainees 
tended to endanger themselves more than anyone else, misdemeanours such as 
smoking in the mines put all their colleagues at risk. Secondly, the absence of 
formal skill barriers meant that the earnings, status and job security of the 
established workforce was easily affected by new recruitment. The capacity of 
new men to act as a reserve army was much greater than In industries where 
unskilled labour could be marginal1sed and the union could protect the 
privileges of core occupational groups. Ftnally, the exiStence at the faces of the 
group contract wage, in which the earnings of up to fifty men were dependent on 
their joint output, meant that even small groups of newcomers could upset the 
rhythms and norms of working life and the eamtngs of their colleagues. 
The union's response to this situation was twofold. On the one hand, It began a 
much more energetic campaign to Integrate new miners. A specJal offlcer was 
created to respond to the needs and wishes of new miners, particularly of those 
1 See chapter 3, p.147. 
2 BBA 32. 882, Report on meeting of producUon committee deputy-chalrmen, 
25.6.1947; F01lmer-Ec:Wng. 'DIe PoliUk des IVB', p.SO. 
s BBA 32, 882. Report on meeUng of producuon committee deputy-chatrmen. 
25.6.1947: chapter 3, p.134, en 2. 
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1 living in the camps. Trainees who had found lodgings or came from local 
towns 'galten als verschmolzen' and were not the object of the same degree of 
2 
interest. The local branch secretaries received a series of instructions to take 
3 
the newcomers more seriously. The union press was full of exhortations to the 
locals to take a greater interest in the outsiders.4 The !VB encouraged the camps 
to elect camp representatives and organised a first conference of the 
Lagersprecher at the end of 1947.5 
On the other hand, it became progressively more open in its opposition to 
additional recruitment. In May 1948, the union published a statement on this 
question on the first page of the main union journal, 'Die Bergbau-Industrie,.6 
The statement was remarkable for avoiding making a single clear point. 
nevertheless the fact that it was there proved that the union was already 
worried. In June, an American investigating team commented that 'it is 
reliably reported and quite apparent that considerable resentment is felt against 
the "outsiders" ... There is a very real fear of the possible future competition for 
jobs by those who can remember former periods of unemployment and low 
7 
wages'. Towards the end of the year, the NB's pronouncements were more 
8 
clearly - though not yet decisively - hostile to large-scale recruitment. By 1949. 
1 Interview with Siegfried Schroeder, 18.2.1984: IVB (ed.), Jahrbuch 1947, section: 
'Neubergleute' . 
2 Interview with Siegfried Schroeder, 18.2.1984. 
3 Witness the new attention devoted to new miners In the local district reports. 
See p.313, th.2. 
4 'Ole Aufgaben der neugewAhlten Betriebsn'lte. Vordrtngl1ch 1st die Sicherh,elt -
HUn den Neubergleuten', Die Bergbau-Industri.e 1948. 1. 18. pp.I-2: Dahlmann, Der 
Sozlalbeauftragte 1m Bergbau . .', Die Bergbau-Industrte. 1948,1.2,p.2: Usa Hess. 
'Kameradschaft - das Gesetz unserer Zeit .. .', Die Bergbau-Industrte, 1948. 1. 1. p.3. 
Weihnachten 1948. Kameradschaft und Gastfreundschaft 1m Kohlenpott . .', Die Bergbau-
Industrte. 1948.1.22.p.l. 
5 IVB (ed.), Jahrbuch 1947, section Neubergleute: 'Schulung der Neubergleute'. 
Die Bergbau-Industrle. 1949, 2, 9. p.l. 
6 'Stellungnahme des Vorstandes des IVBergbau zur Anwerbung von 
Neubergleuten', Die Bergbau-Industrte. 1948. 1. 7. p.l. 
7 Special Intelligence Report, 'Some German views of the political. economiC and 
sociological aspects of Ruhr coal mining'. 19.6.1948. op.clt. 
8 Weitere 200.000 Bergleute notwendtg?', Die Bergbau-Industr1e. 1948. 1. 19. p.6. 
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with the future market for coal temporarily very uncertain,l the union had 
moved to outright opposition. 2 
Because the union was unable to influence the collieries' recruitment policy 
directly, it tried to find indirect means to restrict entry to the workforce. One 
such method was to reduce the incentives offered to new labour. It was 
noteworthy that the main renegotiations of adult trainees' pay took place at the 
beginning of 1949, just after various experts, among them the NRW Economics 
Minister, had predicted that the market for German coal might soon contract. 3 
The prospect of mass redundancies came a little nearer. To deter adult recruits 
and create the climate for a change in recruitment policy, the IGB4 organised a 
press conference in February proclaiming that the day of mass recruitment was 
5 
over and to warn of imminent changes in the energy market. At the same time 
it wrote to the OBAD calling for new and more restrictive conditions for the 
6 induction and deployment of adult trainees. 
When it came to the negotiating table, however, the union proved, as we have 
seen, unable to make any fundamental changes to the wage incentives offered 
new trainees, not only because of the employers' stance but also because the 
union found itself hampered by the recognition that it could not afford to ignore 
the newcomers' interests.7 In the first place, the union wanted to integrate 
1 OBADA 18010/1914/49, OBAD Lageberlcht for 2nd g. 1949. 
2 'Bergarbeiter-Werbung OberflOsslg', Wtesbadener Kurler, 10.2.1949; 'Gestern zu 
wenig - Obermorgen viellelcht zu viel Kohle', Rhein-Ruhr Zeitwlg, 11.2.1949. 
3 'Bergarbeiter-Werbung OberflOssig'; 'Gestern zu wenig - Obennorgen vtellelcht 
zu vtel Kohle'. 
4 The IVB changed its name to Industrie-Gewerkschaft Bergbau at the end of 
1948. 
5 See the two newspaper reports above and 'Neubergleute nicht mehr gefragt. Ole 
Wunde des Ruhrgeblets: 15,000 Arbeltslose', Welt am Sonntag, 13.2.1949. 
6 OBADA 16307/450/49. 1GB to OBAD. 10.2.1949. 
7 I k eetlng on 11 March, for example, the union felt obliged to ensure that 
, enO end r;.;re~:as offered the newcomers. See AZG File "'61" (=1 1 61)'. Bezahlung der ~euJrgleute bzw UmschOler', Undated memo concerning meeting of Tarlfausschu.6 on 
11.3.1949. 
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existing new labour and could not afford to leave it unprotected. Secondly. any 
wage ruling affecting new labour was also likely to impinge on the workforce as 
a whole. The absence of a skill barrier meant that it was impossible to 
discriminate against the newcomers. The best example of this came when the 
employers, led by Mittelviefhaus, opposed retaining the tra1n1ng supplement for 
trainees. The supplement was indeed discarded in the new ruling but the union 
ensured that the newcomers were now covered by the minimum wage clause from 
the very beginning of their contract wage employment, so that protection was 
1 
very nearly as good. 
The union therefore had to find another means of limiting newcomers' access 
and it saw this in new training regulations. The 1GB saw a lengthy training 
period as a powerful means to reduce the number of willing recruits and the pace 
at which they gained access to the workforce. It would in effect create a skill 
barrier, protecting the established workforce from the reserve army beyond the 
pit gates. Accordingly the 1GB wrote to the OBAD in February 1949 arguing, 'daB 
das gesamte Bergumschulerwesen einer Neugestaltung bedarf, schon allein urn 
dafur zu sorgen, da.J3 der ortsansAssfge Bergarbeitemachwuchs nicht gegenuber 
den Umschulem schlechtergestellt wird. ,2 The union made the suggestion that 
all newcomers should spend an entire year in the mines as general labourers 
before being allowed to train at the face. 3 Here too, however, the 1GB was unable 
to assert its wishes. It found much to welcome in the new tra1n1ng code but it had 
not been able to establish a genuine skill barrier. 
1 Ibid. 
2 OBADA 16307,450.49. 1GB Abt Angestellte to OBAD. 10.2.1949. 
3 OBADA 16307/1918/49. OBAD to SA Recklinghausen. 29.4.1949: 16307/1720/49. 
Minutes of meeting in the dining room of Mine Friedrtch Heinrich. 11.7.1949. 
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Sources of union power 
The fact is, however, that despite the very favourable labour supply pOSition and 
despite the absence of entry barriers for new recruits, the established labour 
force did not really suffer from the reseIVe anny of unemployed. 
At central level a key reason for this was that both the state and the employers 
had good reasons for courting the 1GB, reasons that were barely affected by the 
labour market situation. The state, in the form of the labour administration 
and the NRW regional ministries proved in many different circumstances to be 
very concerned to win the support of organised labour. Relations between the 
NRW government and the DKBL, which Karl Arnold and his colleagues seem to 
have regarded as a state within a state, usurping powers rightly belonging to 
1 2 
regional government, were poor. When they took these disputes to Frankfurt, 
3 later to Bonn, the NRW ministries wanted to know they had the union's support. 
Since the cabinet was in a number of areas more socially minded than the 
employers, there was a natural basis for agreement, despite the fact that the 
cabinet was largely Christian Democrat, while the union was dominated by the 
SPD.4 
For its part, the DKBL had equally good reasons not to drive the 1GB into open 
opposition. For a start, there were union nominees within the DKBL itself, who 
had some influence on the organisation's poliCies. Far more important, 
however, was the importance of maintaing a closed front vis a vis the Allies. 
1 On disputes In the housing question, see HStaO NW53. 643. WAM to NRW 
Minister-Pr~sldent, 14.7.194B; Minister-Pr~sident to Bishop. NRW Regional 
Commissioner, 24.7.1958; Landrat Ernst to Arnold, 18.8.1948. 
2 BAK Z13, 198. 'Protokoll Ober die von der VfW - Abt. Bergbau - elnberufene 
Sitzung'. 15.6.1948. 
3 See for instance HStaD NW73, 47. WAM to IVB. 2B.10.1948. 
4 Again housing provides a good example, here. with cabinet com~ltment to 
ending the link between house and Job contract in conflict with the employers desire to 
retain this addlttonal hold over the workforce. See HStaO NWI0,B3. WAM III B 5 305, 
Memo, 3.4.1951 and chapter 9. 
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The DKBL was in a different pOSition to colliery managers. The managers. 
growing more secure in their positions by the day, were prepared to take an 
aggressive line against labour. The DKBL leadership, on the other hand, though 
sympathising with the managers, needed 1GB support if it was to prevent Allied 
proposals for a reorganisation of the m~ning indUStry. From the middle of 
1949, the 1GB was closely involved in the formulation of alternative German 
1 proposals. In other words, at the local level, the Allies ceased to represent a 
threat; at higher levels, the employers (and indeed the Federal government) still 
needed union cooperation to have a stong hand in negotiations. 2 
New labour for old 
The best example of the effects of this situation was the question of mass 
redundancies. The approach of the currency reform and the worsening of the 
collieries' financial situation in summer 1948 induced many employers to draw 
3 
up plans for mass redundancies. The pressure on them to do so came not only 
from their own balance sheets but also from the UK/USCCG. Conscious of the 
industry's financial problems, the Coal Control Group urged the collieries to cut 
4 back on unproductive elements in the workforce. Apart from such finanCial 
considerations, the employers may well have believed that showing their 
readiness to engage in mass sackings would make the remaining members of the 
established workforce more compliant and effiCient. Evidence that the colliery 
managements felt ready to adopt aggressive and unpopular poliCies is provided 
by the contract wage negotaUons at the time of the currency reform, when with 
1 Abelshauser. Ruhrkohlenbergbau. p.52fT. 
2 A fact clearly demonstrated in the government's deCision to support 
codetenninaUon in iron and steel. See Abelshauser, Ruhrkohl.enberybau, p.61. 
3 'Sechs Jahre Aussenstelle Bergbau', p.71. 
4 Eg. BBA 35.51. Meeting of the Bochum Dlstrlct of the DKBL on 29.4.1948. 
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the sanction of Military Government, many mines tried for the first time to 
force wage/ output norms back to their pre-war levels. 1 
The question was whether the unions would be able to do anything about this, or 
whether the reserve army of willing labour had undenntned union power. There 
was little doubt that few miners wanted to take retirement. Though wages had 
been increased in June 1948, Knappschaft payments had not, so that pensions 
stood in no relation to earnings. 2 
Mass sackings were prevented, however, by two factors. In the first place, labour 
exchange approval continued to be required for redundancies and the labour 
administration remained conscious of its responsibilities towards the labour 
3 force. Secondly, the DKBL proved willing to compromise on the issue. A 
special committee was set up by the ABB, !VB and DKBL to conSider how the 
employers should react to the changed labour market situation since the 
currency reform. The committee agreed that mass redundancies should not be 
undertaken. In cases where they seemed necessary, the committee had to be 
4 involved. The ABB advised all labour exchanges in mining areas of their 
powers to prevent mass redundancies. 5 
As a result the number of redundancies remained within limits, though it is 
hard to identify exactly how many workers were affected. The mines' statistics 
listing those retired from the mines for reasons of old age or ill health (see table 
14), were probably not comprehensive, but do at least indicate that the post-
1 See BBA 10, 594. OKBL, Bezirk Bochum. ClrcuJar to mining directors. 26.6.1948: 
IVB Hauptvorstand, Circular. 7.7.1948. 
2 Willy Siebert. 'Oer Umschichtungsproz~ der Belegschaften im westdeutschen 
Steinkohlenbergbau·. (Dissertation. MOnster University. 1953). p.120tT. 
3 'Sechs Jahre Aussenstelle Bergbau', p.72; the DKBL itself pointed out in 
response to Mil. avt. pressure that it was proving very difficult to sack miners. See BBA 
35.51. Minutes ofmeetJng ofOKBL Bochum Oistrlct. 29.4.1948. 
4 'Sechs Jahre A~enstelle Bergbau'. pp.72-3. 
5 Ibid. For an example of the labour exchanges' intervention. see BBA 55. 12200. 
Nr.lI. Minutes ofmeetlng on 24.2.1950. 
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currency refonn period was not characterised by exceptional redundancies. 
Only 1950 was well above the average for the following period. One reason for 
the increase in that year seems to have been the modest improvement in 
Knappschaft payments in mid-1949 which made both miners and employers 
more willing to consider retirement. 1 The other was the large pay rise 
negotiated by the 1GB at the beginning of 1950 which put pressure on collieries to 
reduce their wages bill and perhaps also inclined them to disregard union 
sentiment in the redundancy question. 2 
Table 14: Losses due to ill health and old age 3 


































Another piece of evidence supporting the idea that losses remained within 
reasonable limits comes from the annual statistics on the workforce's age 
structure. The industry's records divide the workforce into five-year cohorts so 
that by comparing the numbers in, say, the 51-55 age group in 1946 with the 56-
60 cohort five years later, we can calculate what proportion of the 51-55 year 
olds had been removed or had left the underground workforce in the intervening 
period (see table 15). 
1 'Sechs Jahre Aul3enstelle Bergbau'. p.92. 
2 BBA 55. 12200. Nr.11. Minutes of Bergausschu6 meeting. 27.1.1950. 
3 Source: Ges.Verb .. StdKW. table 'AufteUung des Abganges nach GrOnden -
Arbeiter insgesamt. Ruhr' and same for workers underground. Figures untll 1954 include 
deaths at work. which averaged about 1.000 a year. 
4 The slgnlftcance of losses above ground was that few underground miners were 
made redundant directly. Normally. as they got older. they were transferred to less 
demanding and lower paid Jobs above ground. This had a knock-on effect. forcing other 
older miners above ground Into full retirement. 
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Table 15: Wastage and retention among selected ~e groups 










































This table confirms the view that attrition amongst the higher age groups was 
not abnormally high at the end of the 1940's. For example, 67.91 percent of the 
men who had made up the 51-55 cohort in 1946 were still working underground 
in 1951 (- now, of course, in the 56-60 group). The attrition was actually lower 
2 then than durtng the 1950's. 
Thus workforce rejuvenation was prevented from being an explosive issue and 
the employers accepted that rejuvenation would take place more slowly than 
direct cost and productivity conSiderations made desirable. For their part. 
union representatives and works councillors generally took a balanced view and 
3 
accepted the need for some redundancies. The cost of this consensus was the 
slower pace at which the workforce was regenerated. In particular, the jobs 
away from the face came to be heavily occupied by older miners and the mines 
faced a perSistent problem of increasing productivity outside the core area of 
4 
contract wage employment. 
This is not to say that the labour market situation had no influence on the 
union's position. Between June 1948 and the beginning of 1950 there were no 
pay increases in the mines. It may well be that the 1GB felt the price of the 
1 Calculated from 7LlKw. 7,p.38;16,p.47;26,p.47 & 39,p.50. 
2 These calculations depend on the assumption that no new labour Joined the 
mines in this age range. However, In 1946-7, a small number of former miners who had 
been POW's and were in their 40's, some perhaps in their 50's, did rejoin the mines. The 
numbers involved are unlikely to make much difference to these calculations. 
3 Eg BBA 35, 237. Minutes of union meeting at mine Emscher Lippe. 3.4.1949. 
Comments of branch chaJrman BOing. 
4 See, for Instance. Hibernia's productivity figures, in Hibernia Konzern (ed.), 
Soztalbertcht 1958, annex 14. 
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compromise in the redundancy question was restraint on pay. Even if that were 
the case, however, the fact is that the 1GB was in general terms not radically 
affected by the labour market. Moreover, the 1950 - 1952 period saw several 
Sizeable pay increases. 
At the colliery level, the situation was somewhat different, since the recognition 
that union support was necessary to deal with the Allies did not impinge on 
labour relations within the mine. There are in fact a number of signs that a 
major shift of power away from the workers' representatives and back to 
management did take place in the mines between 1948 and the early 1950's. 
After the war, works councillors had managed to achieve powers of 
codetermination or veto over a very wide range of affairs; in some mines they 
1 
even had a say in the appointment of senior management. These powers were 
progressively reduced after 1948 and communications from management to 
2 
works councils reveal a progressively more self-confident and aggressive tone. 
As early as February 1948, the union began to complain that the managers were 
3 
'zunehmend aggressiv in ihrem Vorgehen gegen Arbeiter'. But there were a 
whole host of other reasons why works councillors were unable to stand in the 
way of management's renewed self-confidence, not least the end of 
denazification, the withdrawal of Allied influence and the power to the deputies' 
4 
elbows provided by the restoration of a stable currency. At most the labour 
market was a minor contributory factor in shifting the balance of power. 
1 See IGBE Bezlrk Ruhr Nord, Recklinghausen (ed.), Jahre die wtr ntcht verges sen 
1945-1950. Reckltnghduser Bergbaugewerkschajtler ertnnem stch. Recklinghausen 1980: 
BHA 32,740, Minutes ofd1rectors' meeting, 8.8.1947. 
2 See the lament of the works' council at Friedrich der Gro~e colllery, in BBA 10, 
507. 8etriebsrat to Verwaltung, 29.4.1949; 
3 DGBA Ftle 'Industrieverband Bergbau 1946-1948. TAtlgkeitsbertchte', Monthly 
report for February 1948. 
4 In Its first report after the currency reform the OBAD was already able to report 
on the miners' Increased commitment to higher earnings and output. See OBADA 
18010/2924/48, Report for 3rd Q. 1948. 
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The unreserved anny 
What about the newcomers themselves? Were they prepared to accept worse 
conditions than the established men? In the years immediately following the 
currency reform some new miners were accused of willingness to accept 
whatever the deputies cared to give them and a sociological investigation into pit 
life in 1950 found that the small group of individuals who claimed to be 
completely indifferent to the way management dealt with them were, without 
exception, new miners. Older expellees, in particular, were often anxious not to 
lose their jobs and consequently kept their heads down. 1 
It was not just a question of lower standards. New labour's lack of ties to local 
community and profession often made it hard for unions or the established 
workforce to transmit the norms of working life. As in the pre-currency reform 
period, there continued to be a youthful element among the newcomers 
determined to do as little work as possible, which naturally aroused 
2 
resentment. At the same time there was also a Sizeable group who worked too 
hard. The men responsible either were thinking of spending only a couple of 
years in mining and so were not concerned about long-term effects on their 
health, or had lost everything in the war or its aftermath and were now hell-bent 
3 
on building up a home. There were two ways in which this could have a 
deleteriOUs effect on the workforce. In the first place there was the so-called 
wage scissors effect: higher output led to renegotiation of the piece- or contract-
rate by management so that, in future, earning the same wage would require 
more effort. 4 Secondly, the other workers on the face came under pressure to fit 
1 Jantke, Bergmann unci Zeche, p.57. 
2 Ibid. p.4B, p.75 and appendices. 
3 Rudolf Schmitz, 'Das Gedlnge, seine Bedeutung und seine Wirkung auf die 
zwlschenmenschl1chen Beziehungen im Ruhrkohlenbergbau, (Dissertation, MOnster 
University, 1952), pp. lBO-I. 
4 Helmut Hohmann, 'Lagerleben und Elnzelgedtnge', In IGBE Bezirk Ruhr-Nord 
(ed.), Jahre die wtr ntchl vergessen. pp.165-171, here p.170. 
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in with the higher work-pace or to leave the face for lower paid work elsewhere 
in the pit. Older men in particular faced an agonising choice between taxing 
their health by working harder or accepting loss of earnings for the sake of 
easier work. 1 
All these processes are obseIVable and were commented on at the time. There is 
no doubt however, that the main impact of new labour was in the opposite 
direction. The newcomers generally forced standards up rather than down. 
Contemporaries may have complained about the compliant expellee; but they 
were just as likely to point out the contrary tendency amongst the younger 
expellees, namely that they stood up to the deputies and management with a 
resolution and an effectiveness that had been lacking in the community. 2 An 
investigation of the contract wage in the post-war period discovered that not 
infrequently it was new miners who through their self-confidence and ability to 
put across their point of view became the spokesmen of the entire face. 3 
Where did the confidence come from? The newcomers' standards were different. 
As outsiders they were less accustomed to the tone current within mining. Older 
miners were more resigned to the treatment handed out, and, on the positive 
side, showed more understanding for the deputies' difficulties and were often 
4 
aware that behind a sharp word there was little real animosity. Many new 
1 The resentment of many older men at what they felt was inadequate union 
protection here emerges clearly in Bernd Partsius, 'Arbeiter zwischen ReSignation und 
Integration. Auf den Spuren der Soziologie der 50er Jahre', In Niethammer (ed.), 
"Hinterher merlet man..", pp. 107-148. 
2 See Walter KOpplng, 'Als Betrtebsobmann auf "Julia" 1947-1949', In Walter 
KOpplng (ed.), Lebensberichte deutscher Bergarbeiter, Oberhausen 1984, pp.404-407. 
GOnther Eckerland, 'Lagersprecher', In Ibid., pp.407-410; Arbeitskrels Stadttellgeschlchte 
Hochlarmark, 'Neubergleute In Reckllnghausen-Hochlarmark 1945-1950', in Ibid., 
pp.391-401. esp. p.398. 
3 Schmitz, 'Gedlnge', p.I58f. The point was indirectly confirmed by Hans Walter. a 
senior wage arbitrator, who drew attention to the fact that young i~experlenced 
newcomers frequently became face spokesmen. See Hans Walther. Zehn Jahre 
Gedlngeschllchtung 1m westdeutschen Steinkohlenbergbau', GlUckauf, 1958, 94, 43/44, 
pp.1537 -1546. 
4 Jantke, Bergmann u Zeche cited in Fronz & Peter, Der Steiger. p.22ff. 
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miners and, in particular, many expellees came from non-working class 
backgrounds. According to SoFoSt records, around 20 percent of expellees 
taken on in the '45-48 period had formerly been in white collar, managerial or 
professional occupations or self-employed. 1 and they were used to a quite 
different approach to human relations. 2 Their unwillingness to put up with the 
rough, patriarchal treatment of the mining industry was shared by the not 
inconsiderable number of new men who had held positions of responsibility and 
3 
authority in the army. 
Far more important than their willingness to stand up and fight, however, was 
the newcomers' willingness to leave. As young and often single men they were 
less tied to the mines than the established workforce and for the reasons 
outlined above were often less willing to put up with the conditions in mining. 
In addition, at no point in the post-currency reform period does there seem to 
have been any great anxiety about obtaining employment elsewhere. This is a 
reminder that, although much higher elsewhere, unemployment in NRW never 
4 
went above 5 percent. In addition, many newcomers probably drew strength 
from the sort of wartime and post-war experiences described by Lutz 
Niethammer.5 Many had made the most incredible odysseys, first as retreating 
soldiers, then as discharged soldiers or ex-POWs trudging hundreds, sometimes 
thousands, of miles till they found their families, then further great treks with 
or without the family westwards in search of work. No doubt there were plenty 
1 Calculation from Croon, Zeche uncI Gemetnde, p.296. 
2. Interview with Walther KOpping, on 16.8.1983; Eckerland, 'Lagersprecher'. 
3 Arbeitskrels StadtteUgeschichte Hochlarmark, 'Neubergleute'. 
4 Calculated from Stattsttsches Jahrbuch.filr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
1955, pp.1l4-5. 
5 Nlethammer, Lutz, 'Helmat und Front. Versuch, zehn Krtegse~.nnerungen aus 
der Arbeiterklasse des Ruhrgeblets zu verstehen', In Nlethammer (ed.), Die Jahre weW 
man nicht .. ", pp.I63-232. 
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who now hankered after stability. indeed it is hard otherwise to see why so many 
stayed in the mines. but they were. by and large. not frightened of moving. 
In 1949. the mines had believed themselves on the way to workforce stability. 
But within 12 months. the level of labour losses was causing widespread anxiety 
within the industry. True. there was until 1952 little problem in finding 
replacements. but few of those replacements seemed ready to stay long once they 
had experienced mining at first hand. In 1950. the mines found for the first 
time that in summer months they lost contract wage workers faster than they 
1 
could prepare trainees and apprentices. By then, with the Korea boom 
beginning. the mines needed every man they could get. If there had been a 
'reselVe army' effect in mining at all. it was certainly over by summer 1950. 
It should be noted. however. that this wastage was far from suiting the miners' 
union. Certainly. the unwillingness of newcomers to stay strengthened the 
1GB's hand at the negotiating table. But the costs for safety and morale. the 
problems of organising the newcomers and persuading them of the virtues of the 
union and the costs. too. to mining's status all deeply disturbed the union 
leadership and made them more committed than ever to apprentices rather than 
adults. 2 
1 Anton Gro.,6e Boymann. 'Zur Frage der Lelstung 1m Stelnkohlenbergbau', 
GlQckauj1951. 87. 17/18, pp.420-423. here p.421. 
2 See chapter 9, p.439ff. 
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2: The struggle for labour 
Table 16: Under~round workforce size. intake and wasta~e 1948-581 
Year workforce size intake labour loss Movement from 
(on Jan 1st) (excluding movement pit to pit 














































By 1953, mining's high labour demand was caused almost exclusively by 
wastage. The UVR made an advance calculation of labour requirements for the 
following year and reckoned that in order to increase the workforce by 3,000 
2 
men, 61,000 recruits would be needed! At the end of 1953, the general 
downswing in economic activity temporarily reduced the flight from the mines 
but in autumn 1954, wastage resumed its upward path and consistently outpaced 
3 the level of hirings. 
The costs of this wastage were enormous. About 1,000 DM spent on each man 
4 for recruitment and training went to waste. Productivity suffered, both because 
1 Ges.Verb., StdKW., Table 'Belegschaftswechsel - Arbeiter untertage. Ruhr'. 
Workforce growth cannot be directly calculated from the net effect of intake and wastage 
because the transfers from above ground to below ground (and vice versa) have to be 
taken Into account. 
2 OBADA 18007/520/55, ABB annual report 1954. 
3 Excluding apprentices. Apprentices were counted as part of the hirings above 
ground because that was where they were Initially employed. After two years training. or 
reaching the age of sixteen. they were transferred underground. This explains the 
apparent anomaly in table 16 - that the workforce continued to grow despite net losses 
in adult recruitment and wastage. Workforce growth was accounted for by the transfer of 
apprentices underground. 
4 According to one report. the full cost was nearer 1.200 OM, but 1.000 was the 
figure usually given. See 'Oer ?att darf nicht Ourchgangsstation bleibenl', Industrlekurter. 
25.11. 1952. 
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the number of Inexperienced men in the mines was higher than it needed to be 
and because more experienced men were tied up supervising - albeit 
perfunctorily - the newcomers. Accidents increased, both because of the high 
proportion of newcomers and because the continual appearance of new gaps in 
the workforce forced deputies to keep transferring labour from one face - and one 
set of working conditions - to another. l In addition, as will be seen, 
management was wasting its best chance to create a stable workforce. As time 
went on, the mines found themselves hiring new recruits who were less and less 
likely to stay. 
Wastage was also a key reason why selective recruitment was slow to have a 
really transformative effect on workforce age structure. Mining experts 
continually bemoaned the shortfall in the age range 25-40, generally regarded as 
2 the most productive group. Table 17 shows that this group's share of the 
underground workforce had been reduced by 50 percent since 1939 and grew only 
3 
slowly after the war. 
Table 17: Age structure of underground workforce (cohorts as %1 4 
~ ~ liM:Q ]Jill liMB .liMa ~ .llru ~ ~ li!QZ 
CQhQrl 
16-24 1l.3 15.39 19.52 22.36 26.23 29.42 30.96 33.15 32.15 3l.65 
25-39 56.1 29.54 29.90 30.71 29.92 29.50 29.68 32.04 34.59 37.64 
40+ 32.6 55.08 50.58 46.93 43.85 4l.08 39.36 34.81 33.26 30.71 
It may seem strange, In view of this, that the mines had, as noted earlier, 
deliberately excluded new recruits above the age of 25. The point is that the 25-
40 group was traditionally regarded as the most productive not because of its 
1 Max Oberschuir, 'Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Ausblldung des bergmAnnischen 
Nachwuchses'. Berg.fre1.hett. 1957. 22. pp.437-445. here pp.438-9. 
2 See Hans Heinrich Bischoff 'Die AltersgUederung der Arbeiter 1m 
Stelnkohlenbergbau'. GliickauJ. 1952.88.41/42. pp.l009-10l2. 
3 Another factor was the employers' Willingness to restrict the pace of 
redundancies. 
4 Calculated from ZdKW, 7.p.38;l6,p.47:26.p.47 & 39.p.50. 
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physical strength alone, but because of the combination of strength and 
experience. Even if the mines had been able to hire many more newcomers in 
the 25-40 age range, this would achieve little, since the real problem was that the 
experienced men were lOsing strength faster than younger experienced men were 
coming up to replace them. It made sense to recruit younger men and wait for 
them to mature, or rather it would have made sense had not wastage attained 
such proportions that a significant share of younger recruits left before they ever 
1 
reached the optimal age range. 
Problems at the pits and trouble at the mill 
What were the causes of these labour losses? It is worthwhile confirming at the 
outset that wastage was to an overwhelming extent caused by miners voluntarily 
seeking employment elsewhere. As figure 8 shows, losses due to natural causes -
deaths, invalidity or unfitness for mining work, were only a small and indeed 
diminishing proportion of labour wastage. Though the statistics do not allow us 
to distinguish between voluntary losses and dismissals until 1955, it is known 
2 that sackings made up only a small proportion of wastage. 
From 1952 onwards a great deal of time and effort was spent studying wastage in 
the mines. In 1952, a subcommittee on workforce and production questions 
3 (subcommittee 1) of the Marshall Plan coal production committee set up a 
special working party to look into it. In 1953, the DKBL's Manpower and 
4 Training Committee set up its own special committee on the subject. In 1954, 
1 The relationship between high wastage amongst the under 25 year olds and the 
slow growth of the most productive group was not lost on the employers. even if they 
falled to combat some of the prtnlcpal causes of wastage. See BBA 8,384, Conc to OKBL. 
25.2.1949: 8,448. Memo of meeting between CCCG and mines in lower Rhine district. 
Discussion before arrival of CCCG, 19.9.1949, see comments of GHH director Nebelun~. 
2 Ges.verb .• StdKW .. table 'Auftellung des Abganges nach GrQnden - Arbeiter unter 
Tage. Ruhr'. 
3 See chapter 8. p.371. 
4 BAK-ZWSt.H 8102.33091. Minutes of AM meeting. 19.10.1953. 
the Federal Labour Ministry considered commissioning a special investigation 
into wastage, but the mines, nervous about letting an outsider look into the 
industry, forestalled this by carrying out their own investigation. 1 In 1955. 
however, the Labour Ministry did commission a study, which resulted in a 250 
page manuscript produced by the Institut fur Sozialforschung, Frankfurt. 2 In 
the 1960's, another, even more detailed. study was commissioned by the EGKS 
and carried out by Infas. 3 The information that we have on mining is thus 
probably unrivalled by any other occupational group. 
4 Fig. 8: Cause of underground wastage 






1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 
Year 
• Voluntary 
III Nat. Causes 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H Bl19, 1519, I.AA NRW. Minutes of2. Meeting of Bergbau-AusschuJ3 
on 10.2.1954. 12.4.1954. 
2 Instltut far Sozialforschung. 'Die subJekUven und obJektlven Abkehrgrunde bel 
sieben Zechen des westdeutschen Steinkohlenbergbaues in ihrer Auswirkung auf die 
Sicherung des Belegschaftsstandes unter Tage', (Unpubl1shed Ms. Frankfurt/M 1955); 
Ludwig v. Frledeburg. 'Zur Fluktuation 1m Steinkohlenbergbau. Ergebnisse einer 
lndustriesozl010gtschen Untersuchung ... .'. Bundesarbeitsblatt 1957. pp. 705-721; Rudolf 
Petz 'Ole subJektlven und obJektiven Abkehrgrunde 1m Kohlenbergbau. Bemerkungen zu 
der lndustriesoziologischen Untersuchung .. .'. in Ibid .. pp.721 -734: Rudolf Petz, 
'FluktuaUon 1m Stelnkohlenbergbaul Was kann noch dagegen geschehen? .. ' 
(Unpublished Ms. Bonn. no date [1958]). 
3 Institut fOr angewandte Sozia1wissenschaft. 'Untersuchung Cber die Fluktuation 
d r ArbeltsknUte 1m Steinkohlenbergbau. Ergebnisbericht'. (Bad Godesberg 1966). 
4 Ibid. 
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Despite all this attention to the problem, it proved extremely hard to reach firm 
conclusions. There seem to have been considerable variations between 
su bregions within the Ruhr. There is clear evidence that patterns of wastage 
were continually in flux, as social and economic conditions and the structure of 
the industIy's intake changed. In any case, the exact weighting of different 
factors in producing the decision to leave was often impossible to determine. 
Probably many Ie avers were not really sure themselves as to exactly what had 
precipitated their departure. In addition, many left without giving notice, and 
thus could not be asked why they were leaving. Then there was the difficulty of 
identifying which groups were more likely to leave: straight comparisons 
between a particular group's share in the workforce and its share amongst the 
leavers were often misleading, since they did not take into account how long the 
group had been in the mines and other factors which might impinge on the 
1 
number who had departed. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of pOints can be made which help to 
understand the wastage faced by the mines and to determine the limits to what 
they could have done. 
Wastage and the economic climate 
As one would expect, the gradual improvement in job opportunities outside the 
mines encouraged many new miners to seek employment elsewhere. The iron 
and steel industry proved a particularly powerful draw on mining's recruits. 2 
1 The latter problem proved so complex that in Its comparison of the leaving rates 
of different groups, the Institut fOr Sozlalforschung study chose to Ignore the question of 
their strength In the workforce altogether, a fact which considerably undermined Its 
results. It made little sense to say, as the study did, that refugees accounted for 10% of 
one mines' wastage and 20% In another pit. without measuring the respective 
proportions refugees made up of the workforces as a whole and of recent 1ntake. 
2 OBADA 18010/2924/48, OBAD Lagebertcht for 3rd Q. 1948. 
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Table 18: Wasta2e amon2st all new miners hired by Hibernia 1 
Wlr New % l~av1nfi! min~s in Numb~r ?& 
Miners 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th remaining after 
hired year after being hired five years 
1945 732 9.84 30.87 6.56 3.69 2.46 341 46.582 
1946 3209 36.58 16.39 5.86 2.71 2.43 1156 36.02 
1947 5227 27.87 19.23 6.18 4.23 2.60 2085 39.89 
1948 3052 24.38 18.48 7.54 4.16 2.16 1321 43.28 
1949 2430 19.38 17.45 8.35 3.50 2.06 1197 49.26 
1950 2521 17.73 22.53 6.82 4.40 7.77 1027 40.74 
1951 2554 22.44 23.10 9.87 7.64 3.60 852 33.36 
1952 2750 29.02 26.47 11.85 3.89 1.89 739 26.87 
1953 2749 31.32 25.14 7.78 2.33 1.46 879 31.98 
1954 302 29.47 30.79 7.95 6.95 2.65 67 22.19 
1955 1292 27.32 31.27 
1956 2105 42.91 
1957 2330 
1958 1121 
As table 18 reveals, the real problem was less that early recruits drifted away 
than that new miners hired in the 1950's were far less likely to become 
permament additions to the workforce than those taken on in the 1947-51 
period. Between 1947 and 1950, Hibernia laid on 13,230 adult trainees of 
3 
whom 5,630 or 43 percent were still there five years after having been hired. 
Between 1951 and 1954 the mines laid on 8,355 men of whom 2,537 or only 30.37 
percent were still there at the end of their first five years. Results for the 1954-
56 period were clearly shaping up to be far worse. A different set of Hibernia 
figures confirms this picture and shows that, from the beginning of the 1950's 
onwards, each year's intake of new labour was less likely than its predecessors 
4 to be still there at the end of three years (see figure 9). Statistics from other 
mining companies tell a similar story. 5 
1 HIbernia Konzern (ed.), Hibernia Sozialbericht 1956 & 1958, annex 8. 'New 
Miners' means in thIs case adult men who came to Hibernia with no previous experience. 
Percentages are author's calculation. 
2 
the year. 
FIgure dIstorted by the fact that recruItment of new miners began only late in 
3 Calculated from above. 
4 Calculated from HibernIa figures in Hibernia Konzern (ed.), Hibernia 
Soztalbertcht 1958, annex 4: Wechsel und Stand der Neubergleute untertage'. 
5 At the Gneisenau mines, for instance, 4/5 of the workforce in 1956 had been 
there for more than five years. In other words little of the considerable recruItment 
(Continued overleaf.) 
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1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 
-0- Proportion of workforce accounted for by trainees hired in last 3 yrs (and still in pit) 
-+ Proportion of trainees hired over last 3 yrs who have not left pit 
This was a clear sign of changing perceptions of the job market. Men hired 
before 1952 were taken on at a time when there were only limited well-paid 
alternatives to mining. By the time alternative employment was available, 
they had often got so used to mining or tied to the locality that a change no 
longer seemed attractive. This did not apply to those hired after 1952. When 
the initial crises of mining employment came - a first accident, unpleasant 
treatment by a deputy, the cash shortage of the first weeks and so on - there was 
every incentive to quit the mine and take on another job. 
Within that period had led to permanent additions to the workforce. See the figures in 
AZG, rue 'I 1 26 Zuweisung von ArbeitskrMten aus anderen Bezirken (Umschaler)', 
Gruppe Gnelsenau table, 'Zusammensetzung der Untertage-Belegschaft nach 
bergmAnnlschen Erfahrungsgraden', 26.10.1957; File 'I 1 28 Verteilung von 
ArbeltskrMten', Table 'aber die Zu- und Abga.nge an 'Bergfremden' in der Zeit vom 
1.9.1945-31.8.1947; F1le'l 1 13 Gedinge Regelung 1.1.1945-31.12.1953', Memo 4.3.1948. 
1 Source: Hibernia figures in Hibernia Konzem (ed.), Hibernia Soztalbericht 1958, 
annex 4: Wechsel und Stand der Neubergleute untertage'. 
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From the unwillingly mobUe to seasonal labour 
The other reason for new recruits' changing behaviour was rather different and 
revealed both the opportunity with which the mines were presented in the late 
1940's and the difficulties they faced by the mid-1950's. In the 1940's and early 
1950's, the mines drew on the 'unwillingly mobile', men who by dint of 
cirumstance were set in motion - be it as a result of expulsions, the effects of the 
currency reform or whatever. Increasingly, however, the intake 'normalised' to 
young, single men out to maximise their earnings for a few years before settling 
down to some reasonably convivial occupation. 
This shift is evident if we look at the new miners' age and occupational structure. 
Table 19: Age structure of Heisingen intake l 
~ PrQ12QrtiQn Qf wQrkfQr~e in fQIlQwin" a"e ~a1e"Qrie~ (O4); 
:.l8 19-25 26-30 31-35 ~ 
1946-7 7 47 22 10 15 
17-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 a5± 
(official age limit for recruits = 25) 
1948 36 35 15 7 7 
1949 45 41 9 3 3 
1950 42 44 8 3 3 
(o1ficial age limit 32) 
1951 40 40 13 5 5 
1952 37 37 15 8 3 
1953 35 36 17 8 3 
1954 41 33 16 7 4 
1955 37 34 18 8 3 
1956 38 35 17 6 4 
1957 39 34 18 7 3 
In the pre-48 period, when men up to 40 years of age were being taken, a 
conSiderable proportion of new miners were not of the age at which men 
nonnally moved into mining. Almost 50 percent were over 25. Amonst the 
expellees in the 1945-48 period, the proportion of over 25's may have been higher 
1 Source: Ges. Verb., Helstngen papers, Reception camp log book. 
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1 than 60 percent, with almost 40 percent being over 30. In 1948-49, the average 
age fell dramatically as the result of management's determination to rejuvenate 
the workforce. It was therefore not a sign of the older age groups' unwillingness 
to take on mining work. What it did mean was that many of the 'unwillingly 
mobile' who would have been prepared to make a go of mining were prevented 
from doing so. By the 1950's, the mines could not attract older married men 
even when they were willing to do so. 
The shift can also be observed in occupational structure. In the period up to 
1948-49, the mines absorbed occupational and social groups from which they 
would never normally have drawn labour. According to SoFoSt records, around 
20 percent of expellees taken on in the 1945-48 period had formerly been in 
2 
white collar, managerial or professional occupations or self-employed. This 
was an indication of the degree to which necessity rather than personal volition 
played a role in migration. Over the following three years, this shrank to less 
3 than 10 percent. In 1949, the first year for which we have detailed records 
from Essen-Heisingen, unskilled labour still made up a relatively low 
proportion of labour intake - less than 50 percent. This changed the following 
year, first as the result of a rapid influx of agricultural labour and later as 
unskilled industrial labour came to dominate the recruitment picture (see table 
20). 
The point is not that skilled or white collar workers were necessarily more 
likely to remain miners than unskilled. Indeed none of these factors - age, 
marital status or occupation were necessarily signs that recruits would stay. 
What they are, however, is indices of the degree to which dire necessity overcame 
1 Croon and Utermann. Zeche und Gemetnde, p.296. % is author's calculation. 
2 Calculated from Croon and Utermann. Zeche uncI Gemetnde, p.296. 
3 Ibid .. 
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the nonnal promptings of personal volition. If older men with a background in 
white collar work flock to the mines, then this is a sign that one is dealing with 
mobility that was the product of necessity and not a personal wish. Of course, 
account has to be taken of those changes in the compositon of the recruits that 
were caused by management deCision rather than by the changing circumstances 
of the population. But once allowance has been made for policy changes, it can 
be seen that at the beginning, men came for whom the personal and 
psychological barriers to mobility in general and to taking up mining work in 
particular were very large. They were the 'unwillingly mobile'. By the end of 
the period this was no longer the case. 
Table 20; Fonner profession of new miners in % 1 
~ unskilled skilled white 
Agric. Industrial total engineerg. other total collar 
& buildg. 
1949 18 31 49 28 15 43 4 
1950 27 40 67 13 15 28 4 
1951 24 39 63 14 17 31 4 
1952 22 33 55 18 19 37 4 
1953 23 35 58 19 18 37 4 
1954 20 39 59 21 14 35 3 
1955 18 44 62 20 13 33 2 
1956 17 44 61 21 12 33 3 
1957 12 48 60 22 12 34 2 
This latter point is reinforced when we note a further feature of the mines' 
recruitment in the mid-1950's, namely that new men with no previous 
experience provided an ever smaller proportion of the industry's labour intake. 
For one thing, the mines' were forced into poaching labour from one another 
and movement from pit to pit increased substantially, averaging 35 percent of 
total wastage in the 1954-58 period.2 The other main reason was that the mines 
1 Calculated from from Ges. Verb., Heisingen papers, Log book. Former miners 
and mining apprentices have been excluded. 
2 See for instance the changing Gneisenau figures in AZG File 'I 1 28 Verteilung 
von Arbeltskrluten'. Table 'fiber die Zu- und Abgmge an 'Bergfremden' in der Zeit vom 
1.9.1945-31.8.1947'; File '11 3, Einstellung und Entlassung von Arbeltem. 1.10.1953-
31.12.1963'. Gruppe Gnelsenau to director Stodt. 18.8.1955 + appendices. See also 
Ges.Verb .. StdKW .• table 'Belegschaftswechsel - Arbeiter untertage.Ruhr'. 
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were increasingly hiring men who were oscillating between mining and other 
employment. 1 Most collieries were now even prepared to accept miners who had 
previously left the industry in breach of contract.2 Thus by the mid-1950's, the 
mines were caught up in a hiring- and wastage cycle, poaching labour off one 
another and hiring men who were clearly not going to stay long in the mines. 
'Pit militarism' and the 'unreserved anny' 
One thing that applies right through the period is that though the wages on offer 
in the steel mills and on the building sites put the mines under a great deal of 
pressure, the wastage problem was not purely one of money. The repeated calls 
for mining to stand at the top of the wages ladder suggested that all mining had 
to do was offer a few Marks a week more than the competition to solve its labour 
problems. This was both more and less than the truth. It was less than the 
truth because even when the mines' wages were higher than iron and steel - as in 
1956-7 after the introduction of the Miners' Bonus Scheme 3 - the collieries 
continued to lose more men than they hired. In 1957, though earnings in 
4 
mining were well above those of iron and steel, wastage was more than 10 
5 percent higher than recruitment. And it was more than the truth, because - as 
the 1955 investigation discovered - most of those who left the mines moved to a 
6 Job where they earned less than they had in mining. Not only that, but they 
rated their new pay better than they had the higher earnings in the pits. The 
point was that there was a trade-off between the negative characteristics of the 
work on the one hand and the wage and other inducements on the other. 
1 See ABB report for 1955, op.clt. 
2 OBADA 18006/1664/52, ABB report 1.4.-30.6.1952; 18007/1370/55, ABB report 
1.1-31.3.1955. 
3 See chapter 5, p.257fi". 
4 lNR (ed.), Jahresbertcht 1955-1957. p.60 facing. 
5 See table 16, p.328. 
6 Institut fOr Sozla1forschung, 'Ole subJektiven und obJektiven AbkehrgrOnde', 
p.208. 
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Lack of light, the unhealthy atmosphere, the deafening nOise of a long face full of 
pneumatic picks, the exertion of working at the coal in a confined space, the 
danger of falling stone - these were all features of mining that (given the existing 
technology) the employers could do little about. Yet, the striking fact is, as the 
1955 study was able to ascertain by interviewing fonner mining employees, that 
poor treatment by lower management figured almost as frequently as working 
conditions in explanations for quitting the indUStry. 1 All other complaints, 
even those about inadequate pay, were of secondary significance. In other 
words, a substantial proportion of mining's wastage was at least partially, 
sometimes even wholly motivated by the experience of mining's management. 
This is a striking result and there is widespread evidence outside the survey that 
would support it. The one caveat that one must make is that, by the mid-1950's, 
2 
mining's management problems were a common newspaper subject. Phrases 
3 
such as 'Mensch nicht Markennummer' were common currency and gave those 
who left the mines a ready made explanation for their behaviour which they 
could, without thinking particularly, serve up to sociologists keen for a decent 
answer. Thus, not every complaint can be taken at face value. 
Nevertheless, the negative perception of management and human relations is 
overwhelming if not universal. In 1952, when the Sozialforschungsstelle 
carried out a survey of new miners at the Victor-Ickern mine, it included the 
question Wie kommen Sie mit den Vorgesetzten aus'. The first respondent 
complained that the deputy had refused to allow him holiday leave and he had 
had to go to the manager to get it: the second could not stand his present 
1 Ibid., p.228. 
2 Jantke, in Zeche uncI Gemeinde , for example, makes it clear that there was a 
widespread (though often inaccurate) awareness of what working relations in mining 
were like. - cited in Manfred Fronz & Gerd Peter (ed), Soztalwissenschaftltche Forschung 
tm Steinkohlenbergbau. Vol. 2: Der Steiger. Ausztige aus emptrLschen Untersuchungen 
1950-1982, Bochum 1983, pp.15-53, here p.44. 
3 See, for instance 'Hier hat der Bergbau versagt', Rheinische Zettwlg, 31.10.1950. 
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supervisor, a fact which influenced his whole perception of working in the 
mines and the third, a highly intelligent and articulate character who made a 
good impression on the interviewer, produced a scathing critique of the mining 
deputies. Though some were reasonably positive, many more of the thirty odd 
intelViews on record were in the same mould. 1 Of course, the Ruhr was not 
unifonn and there were considerable variations between pits, indeed differences 
within a mine from one coal district to another. For example, a study based on 
another SoFoSt survey demonstrated that relations between men and 
management at the Emscher-Lippe mine were generally good, a result out of line 
with most Ruhr mines. Within the Emscher-Lippe mine, however, there was 
one district where the men were as critical of their deputies as they were likely to 
2 be anywhere. 
As far as new labour was concerned there were four main things wrong with 
management. First, few miners felt that they had been properly inducted into 
the work or looked after during their initial employment period. Wastage was 
particularly high during that initial period. In 1948-9, when the labour market 
situation was highly unfavourable for job seekers even in NRW, losses in the 
first few weeks and months of employment were striking. The Concordia mine 
hired 807 men in 1948 of whom 260 were gone by the end of the year. Of those 
260,42 had moved to other mines, but the rest had left the industry. 12 percent 
of this wastage had taken place by the end of the first month of employment: 40 
3 
percent by the end of the second and 60 percent by the end of three months. 
The Hibernia company's record was somewhat better but even in the 
comparatively low wastage year of 1949, 20 percent of new recruits had quit 
1 SoFoStA File 'Neubergleute- Befragung. Untersuchung Vtncke Lager' (Lager 
belonging to mining company Vlctor-Ickem). 
2 Jantke Bergmann und ~he, Part 2: Vorgesetzte unter Tage, passim. 
3 BBA 8, 384. Concordia, Circular from Direction 1, 15.2.1949, annex 1. 
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1 
within a year of being taken on. By the early 1950's, when employment 
opportunities elsewhere were better, the mines were losing 20 percent of their 
trainees in the first four weeks and up to 70 percent in the first five months.2 
Lack of understanding, lack of instruction, poor communication and the 
accidents that resulted from these other factors all combined to drive the new 
miners out in droves. 
The problems were not restricted to the period of induction itself. A frequent 
cause of bitterness was that deputies tried to deceive the workforce in the 
contract wage calculations. Even after the calculation had been agreed, the 
3 deputies and overmen often made changes to the calculations - a problem so 
widespread that the Gedingekommission frequently called on employers to root 
4 it out. In addition, the arbitrariness and vindictiveness of offiCials who had 
taken some personal offense to a miner, was another recurrent complaint. The 
one-time new miner, later cultural director for the IGBE, Walter Kl>pptng, a man 
well in excess of six foot, recalled being deliberately consigned to work in a low 
5 
seam by a hostile deputy. Hans Dieter Baroth turned his back on the mines for 
good when, after failing to stand up when the overman approached, he found 
himself permanently consigned to one of the most unpleasant loading jobs at 
6 the pit bottom. Finally, the deputies' general tone and approach were 
frequently condemned. At a church convocation for the Siebenburger Sachsen 
in 1955, for example, one of the men declared that he had left mining because of 
1 Calculated from Annex 8in Hibernia Konzem (ed.), Sozialbericht 1958. 
2 AZG 1 1 26 File 'Zuweisung von ArbeltskrAften aus anderen Bezlrken 
(UmschOler), Minutes of 2 meeting of Arbeitsgemeinschaft Arbeltsamt-Bergbau. 8.5.1953. 
here p.3 - report on SoFoSt investigation into wastage. 
3 Untersuchung Vincke Lager. op.cit.. interview 3. 
4 See. for instance. AZG File 'I 1 13. Gedinge-Regelung. 1.1.45-31.12.1953', DKBL. 
Circular to district representatives, 25.11.1948; BBA 32. 870. DKBL, Circular No. V 103 to 
minlng companies and collieries. 6.12.1949. 
5 Walter KOpplng. Bildungsobmann auf "Julia"·. p.404. 
6 Baroth. Aber es waren schOne Zef.ten. p.187ff. 
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the 'rauhe Ton' there, while another had been on the point of resigning over the 
'unfiAttge Schimpfworte' which the deputy had directed at him. 1 
Employers' responses to wastage 
In some respects, the employers had always taken workforce stability very 
seriously. The logic behind the apprentice strategy was ultimately that it would 
generate a stable and therefore productive workforce. The attention devoted by 
the industry to housing and hostels revealed a similar dedication to encouraging 
the newcomers to strike roots in the Ruhr? 
However, the approach to the induction of adult labour, and to human relations 
generally, betrays very little sign of this. Management seems to have operated 
with the assumption that apart form housing there were two main sources of 
wastage. In the first place there was the environment underground which they 
were well aware was a deterrent to many. That was something the industry 
could do nothing about. Secondly, there was the inadequacy, the lack of 
3 
steadfastness and character of the labour force. Therefore integration policy 
concentrated on two main areas, namely on creating a positive compensatory 
environment outside the mines and on forging a new steadfast labour force with 
the apprentices. Neither of these poliCies were Unintelligent. Housing could 
playa powerful role in tying men to the pits. But the fact was that one of the key 
problem areas, man management in the production process was, for a long time, 
simply not seen as part of the problem. 
There are many indications that managers saw wastage primarily as evidence of 
the inadequacy of the recruits. After noting that the bulk of new recruits after 
1 Ges.Verb. File 'SBZ Arb 130.0-130.25', Confidential memo for Dr.Ullrich, 
31.8.1955. 
2 See chapter 8, passim. 
3 See chapter 9 for a deeper examination of the assumptions behind this view. 
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1945 left within a short period, a DKBL survey intended for public consumption 
could not refrain from adding the parenthetical comment, 'die Schwere der 
Arbeit hatte fur aIle halben Charaktere ihre wohltuende Schockwirlrung getan. ,I 
And at a meeting of mine directors in September 1949, almost all present 
complained about 'wenig oder gar keine Disziplin bei den Neubergleuten, d1e in 
groJ3en Scharen wieder abwandern'. 2 
The mines knew no better answer to this wastage than to try and cleanse the 
workforce of the sort of 'work-shy elements' who were likely to leave. Accord1ng 
to the labour administration, there were more men sacked without notice in 
3 
mining than in any other major industry. At a Dortmund conference at which 
labour exchange, union and employer representatives and other interested 
parties met to discuss ways of reducing wastage, a number of different 
partiCipants suggested better man-management and a better induction 
programme were needed. The employers, however, argued that the costs would 
be prohibitive and suggested that the ideal solution would be sack 3,000 - 4,000 
4 
miners (in the Dortmund area) and let the apprentices gradually rul the gap! 
Despite criticism from many outside groups, the employers were not prepared to 
give the newcomers the benefit of the doubt and test whether a better induction 
programme or more favourable conditions might produce better results. A good 
example of this was the demand for bridging loans that would help the 
newcomers from out of town deaI with the first few weeks of employment. Often 
arriving with no funds, the newcomers had to wait ten days for their first 
1 DKBL (eel.), Ruhr Almanach. Yom Bergmann unci Bergbau. Cologne 1950, p.95. 
2 BBA 8/448, Memo about discussions between CCCG and mine directors of 
DKBL district Nieelerrhein. 19.9.1949. Discussions before arrival of CCCG reps; see also 
BBA 8. 352. Memo from Arbeiterpersonalboro. 12.7.1952. 
3 OBADA 18006/1792/51. WlM NRW to OBAD. 30.7.1951. annex: copy ofm1nutes of 
4th lAA NRW executive board meeting on 25.6.1951. 
4 AZG File 'I 1 26 Zuwelsung von Arbeltskra.ften aus anderen Bezlrken 
(Umschaler). Minutes of 2 meeting of Arbeitsgemelnschaft Arbeltsamt-Bergbau. 8.5.1953. 
Pit mU1tartsm &. tnsubordtnate recruits 344 
payment and then found themselves confronted with hostel charges. deductions 
for work clothing and other expenses which reduced the first pay packets to a 
level on which it was hardly possible to live, a problem that was particularly 
acute for married men who were trying to support their families at the same 
1 time. In the early years after the currency reform. getting by with the earnings 
paid for general labouring was hard enough anyway. The mines refused to offer 
su bsidies, despite continual requests from the labour administration that they 
do so. Indeed, they were so little prepared to acknowledge the newcomers' 
genuine difficulties that an attempt by the Economics Ministry to get the labour 
administration to give some sort of bridging loan failed due to lack of mining 
2 
support. 
Not unrelated to the belief that wastage was a sign of lack of discipline and the 
mark of the work-shy was another assumption which also initially deterred the 
employers from taking new miners' problems seriously, namely, the view that 
as labour conditions 'normalised', wastage would continue to decline. In 1949, 
underground labour losses dropped by almost 20 percent from the previous year. 
Equivalent to about 17 percent of the underground workforce. it was the lowest 
3 proportional loss of manpower since the end of the war. Though the more 
perceptive members of the industry knew that the underlying long-term trend on 
the labour market was against mining, many colliery managers believed that 
the reduced wastage in 1949 was part of a 'normalisation', a return to famUiar 
conditions, and foreshadowed even greater falls in the years to come. In 
December 1949. for example, the DKBL's expert in labour and production 
1 OBADA 18006/1792/51, WiM NRW to OBAD. 30.7.1951, annex: copy of minutes of 
4th LAA NRW executive board meeting on 25.6.1951: 'Neubergleute verlassen das Revier'. 
Deutsche Woche. Muntch 21. 1.1951. 
2 BAK-ZwStH 8102.21395. 8WiM III A 1, Memo. 11.12.1952. 
3 Calrulated from figures in table 16, p.315. 
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statistics. Dr.Bischoff. predicted that wastage would continue to fall and 'sich so 
die ArbeitsverhIDtnisse auch qualitativ gesehen. immer mehr nonnalisieren'. 1 
Initially. the wastage did not force the mines to undertake any particular 
measures to prevent it. True. the costs of hiring and training and also the costs 
in terms of productMty were considerable. but the labour supply was suffiCient 
2 to replace it. This changed for the first time in 1952 when some mines reported 
serious difficulties in obtaining labour in the summer months. Seasonal 
losses to agriculture and the building trades were traditionally high in the late 
spring and early summer period and these were now being compounded by the 
steel mills' labour demands and a general increase in NRW employment 
opportunities. By summer 1953. most mines were finding it hard to replace 
labour.3 For the first time they began to encounter serious competition outside 
NRW. In part this was because the NRW iron and steel industry itself was 
recruiting in the mines' hunting grounds. but it also reflected the increase in 
economic activity in hitherto depressed regions.4 The result was not only that 
the reseIVoir of suitable labour began to dry up but also that by 1955. at the 
latest. mining had lost a lot of its earlier backing from the regional labour 
administrations in these areas - at least as far as adult labour was concerned. 5 
The mines were now forced to begin thinking more seriously about labour 
problems within the mines. After years of labour administration pressure. the 
employers finally acknowledged the problem that many newcomers and 
particularly married men found the initial period of employment finanCially 
1 H.H.BischotT. 'Arbeiterzahl und Arbeiterwechsel'. 
2 In 1953. for example. the total cost ofrecruttment and induction was around 1.5 
million DM. Ges.Verb. File 'Arbeitsausschul3' Arb.aus.f.A meeting. 17.5.1954. 
3 ABB. Annual report for 1954. 
4 OBADA 18007/2142/55. ABB quarterly report 1.4.-30.6.1955. 
5 A fact which can be gleaned by reading ABB reports between the lines. See 
OBADA 18007/2932/55. ABB report 1.7-30.9.1955. 
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vety difficult. By 1953, most mines had agreed to suspend charges for the first 
months' board and lodgings and, after a year's employment at the same mine, to 
1 
waive them altogether. Despite rising costs, hostel charges barely increased. 
Some mines even introduced additional subsidies for younger miners. 
In addition, two areas of working life in particular received attention. One was 
the newcomer's first few weeks. It had long been well known that wastage at this 
2 point was particularly high. A number of mines responded to this by 
appointing advisors to help the newcomers adjust and to deal with any 
problems arising. The HBAG set up a special unit to coordinate all questions 
relating to newcomers, the EOA (Einsatz orstfremder Arbeitskriifte). It ensured 
that there was a personal continuity, whereby the same individual involved in 
recruiting a new miner also accompanied the newcomer on his first day at the 
3 
mine and maintained contact during the first few weeks at work. The other 
aspect of working experience to receive some amelioration was the progression 
4 
of the qualified apprentice, now Knappe, into normal productive labour. 
And yet, at least until 1955, the main problem of working life - the character of 
management and human relations - seemed to be so intractable that little was 
undertaken to change it. There were a number of reasons for this, some which 
we will return to in the conclusion. But it also reflected the fact that those 
figures in the industry who were most aware of the need for a new style of human 
relations - labour directors, training personnel, manpower experts and so on -
were not or not yet in a position to assert themselves against the colliery 
1 ABB Annual Report 1954. 
2 Budde, 'Grande undAuswtrkungen', appendix. table. 13. 
3 Terhorst, 'ZehnJahrtge Zusamenarbelt', op.clt.; Ges.Verb. File '300-301.,1 
Ausblldung von Neubergleuten', copy, 'Merkblatt fOr die Werbung von Neubergleuten, 
Hambom 20,12.1954. 
4 See chapter 6, p.293, fn.l. 
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1 
managers. It was no accident that the two areas given special attention were 
both problems of transition into the production process. It was easier in such 
cases for training personnel and manpower specialists to wrest some control 
from the works' manager than it was on the issue of the factory 'climate' in 
general. 
The struggle Jor labour 
Since they were unable to reduce wastage, the mines were continually under 
pressure to obtain new labour. From the early 1950's this became more and 
more difficult. Apart from the gradual growth of alternative employment 
opportunities, one other brake on labour supply was the sealing of the GDR's 
borders in 1952. Prior to that date a fair number of GDR migrants had crossed 
the borders illegally and made their own way to the pits. From 1952 onwards 
this became impossible. Refugees and migrants wishing to enter the Federal 
Republic had to be transported there by train or plane from Berlin. All now 
went through the procedure laid down by the Notaufnahmegesetz from 1950, by 
which they were assessed for refugee status and its attendant privileges (priority 
social housing and so forth). Migrants who failed to obtain refugee status spent 
long periods in the so-called 'Stammlager' in Berlin, until through obtaining 
employment or by some other means, they gained the right to remain in the 
2 Federal Republic (though not to the special aid for refugees). 
These new conditions reduced the number of GDR citizens coIIling to the Ruhr 
mines. Those who had attained refugee status often felt secure enough to walt 
for a better offer, while those without It had difficulty getting into the FRG. In 
1 Of course a lot of this is invisible to the outsider. Dr. Steffen. the former deputy 
to the HBAG's labour director and one of the industry's leading training experts. 
deSCribed in an interview the battle between Terhorst. the labour director. and the 
BetriebsfOhrer. Interviews 1. 12.1982/ 24.5. 1983. 
2 Bgb' 1950, 36. p.367ff. Gesetz Qber die Notaufnahmen von Deutschen In das 
Sundesgebiet. 22.8.1950; ABS annual report 1955. 
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1950. refugees amounted to 17.694. or almost 70 percent of all new miners 
coming through the Heisingen reception camp but by 1953. despite the growing 
numbers entering the FRG via Berlin. this had fallen to 12.840 or 31 percent. 1 
The mines devoted a lot of energy to improving and intensifying their 
campaigning strategy. Until 1952-53. all recruitment of adult men from outside 
the Ruhr was done by the labour administration rather than the mines 
themselves. The labour exchanges did not conduct actual campaigns, but 
instead restricted themselves to advising those who sought employment of the 
opportunities avaUable in mining. In 1953. as unemployment in the refugee 
Lander began to decline. the mines called for a more active policy. Together 
with the ABB and the local labour exchanges in the regions. the mines carried 
out campaigns across the length and breadth of Gennany. In 1954. the bulk of 
2 labour obtained from outside the Ruhr came by this means. The approach 
became increasingly professional. and campaigns were carefully coordinated 
with all the relevant administrations in advance. 
Alongside the organisational changes. the difficulties of attracting labour forced 
a major rethink in the approach to potential recruits. Works counclllors and 
sometimes former new miners now accompanied the campaigns to provide 
3 
convincing accounts of mining life. A major change came in 1955. when the 
UVR deCided to replace 'Du' with 'Sie' in its campaign propaganda. This was 
probably the first time that existing or potential miners had ever been addressed 
as 'Sie' by Ruhr mining employers. An ABB circular in October 1955. offered a 
sample of the sort of invitation issued prior to a local recruiting event. 
Beginning with a 'Sehr geehrter Herr!'. the invitation contained amongst other 
1 Ges. Verb., Helslngen papers, Helslngen annual reports and file 'StaUsUk'. 
compilation of refugee statistics. 
2 OBADA 18007/520/55, ABB annual report 1954. 
3 ABB. annual report 1954. 
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things the suggestion. 'Brtngen Sie doch Ihre Ehefrau oder Ihre Braut mit', a tone 
and indeed an idea that would have been inconceivable in 1950.1 By 1955, 
however. it had become standard to suggest to recruits that they bring their wives 
or fiancees along to the information evenings. 2 In many cases. the potential 
miner and his partner had a face to face chat with mines' representatives and 
local labour administration officials. 3 In effect, senior employers' 
representatives were introducing here the sort of personal relations approach 
they failed to institute within the works themselves. 
New sources oj labour 
As the competition within the Ruhr intensified. the mines came to rely ever 
more heavily on the provinces. where expectations and wage standards were 
lower and the industrial competition more limited. But as competition 
intensified here too. the mines began to look for a new hinterland where 
expectations and opportunities were lower than in the FRG. At least initially, 
the mines seemed also to have hoped that they might encounter that older. 
simpler and more loyal mentality whose passing they so bemoaned in the 
Federal Republic. Certainly such expectations were apparent in the campaign 
4 to recruit 'Siebenbiirger Sachsen' from Austria and the employers devoted 
5 
conSiderable ingenuity and energy to obtaining and integrating these men. A 
whole series of campaigns followed. designed to draw labour from the pockets of 
1 StaM Arbeitsamt Dortmund 46, ABB, Circular No. 6/55 to labour exchanges. 
26.10.1955. 
2 Ges.Verband, File 'Arbeitsaussch~', 'Merkbatt fOr die Werbung von 
Neubergleuten', Hambom, 20.12.1954. 
3 ABB annual report 1954. 
4 Ges.Verb. File 'SBZ Arb 130.0-130.25', Copy of memo from Dr. Niehues. 
12.5.1952. annex; Notes of a meeting In the Foreign Office. 22.8.1952; Hibernia to DKBL. 
17.10.1952; Ullrich. Memo. 17.9.1952. 
5 See BAK-ZwSt.H BI02, 21395. Memo. 28.10.1952.; BWiM IIIA4 to ~AM. 
31.10.1952.: BAM to BWiM. 28.4.1954: Pres. BAVAVto BAM. 3.12.1952: Ges.Verb. File SBZ 
Arb 130.0-130.25'. Memo 9.2.1953: 'Batschka Dorf 1m Kohlenpott', Rheinische Post · 
OaseldOIf. 8.8.1955. 
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ethnic Germans dotted around Europe. Other groups from Austria, German 
speaking communities in the Italian Tirol, former German POW's who had 
remained in France and many more were recruited by the mines. 1 
All this ingenuity was not enough to secure the mines a plentiful supply of 
labour. When the crisis came in 1955, and even the most intensive campaigning 
proved unable to mobilise the labour required, the mines had to think again. 2 
By now, the mines faced two possible strategies. Either the wages and 
incentives offered the miner could be improved so substantially as to create a 
stable workforce. That would depend on governmental help. Or a more modest 
package could be offered and the mines progressively shift to using foreign 
labour. 
Many collieries recognised that the available sources within the Federal 
3 Republic were drying up, but the problem was that no one really wanted to bring 
in foreign workers. The unions were hostile. fearing a source of cheap labour 
that would be hard to unionise. create a permanent division within the labour 
4 force. keep wages down and endanger mine safety. All groups felt that 
admitting foreigners would undermine the attempts to improve the industty's 
status. The employers believed Italians and other mediterranean groups to be 
unproductive workers. inclined to sully their hostels and politically as well as 
productively unreliable. 5 The OBAD feared the implications for mines' safety. 
while the Federal ministries were anxious about the political implications of 
admitting large numbers of foreigners. There was still conSiderable 
1 Terhorst. 'ZehnjAhrige Zusammenarbeit'. chapter Werbung von Erwachsenen', 
passim: OBADA 140.12/334/56, quarterly report of ABB, 1.10-31.12.1955. 
2 See chapter 5. p.255ff. 
3 Terhorst. 'Zehnjahrige Zusammenarbeit'. chapter Werbung von Erwachsenen·. 
passim. 
4 OBADA 18006/2262/55, 1GB to OBAD, 17.8.1955. 
5 On the political fears see Ges.Verb., File 'Arbeitsausschul3', Meeting of UVR 
Training Subcommittee, 31.8.1955. 
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unemployment and in addition there were many ethnically German groups in 
Austria and elswhere, trying vainly to gain admittance into the Federal 
1 Republic. 
Nevertheless, during the summer of 1955, the mines began seriously to consider 
recruiting foreigners and the press was full of speculation on the subject.2 In 
effect, the mines used the threat of foreign labour as a means of levering more 
support out of the state. At a meeting in September, attended by the 
representatives from the Federal and Economics Ministries, the BA VAV and the 
NRW LAA, mining representatives warned that foreigners would soon be 
flooding into the Ruhr. The Labour Ministry was aga1nst the idea and, in order 
to avert it, various alternatives were offered the mines.3 The BA VAV said, for 
instance, that it would consider denying unemployment benefit to ex-miners 
employed in the bunding trade and laid off in winter, thus forcing them to work 
in the mines. Of greater significance was the Federal Labour Ministry's 
promise to give the mines assistance in recruiting migrants and refugees from 
the GDR 4 The mines were given privileged access to refugee camps in Berlin 
5 
and Sandbostel and refugee intake improved as a result. 
More stgntftcant was the Miners' Bonus Scheme, but even this could not prevent 
wastage from outpacing recruitment. It is therefore not surprising that 1957 
1 OBADA 18006/3534/54, UVR to Obad, 21.12.1954 and annex President ofBAVAV 
to UVR. 25.11.1954 & BAM to UVR, 9.12.1954. 
2 OBADA 18006/2262/55, 1GB to OBAD, 17.8.1955; OBAD to 1GB, 24.8.1955; 
Ges.Verb. File 'Arbettsausschu.6', Meet1ng of UVR Training Subcommittee (Arb. aus.f.A), 
31.8.1955. 
3 Ges.Verb. File 'Arbeitsaussch~', Meeting of UVR Training Subcommittee 
(Arb.aus.f.A). 31.8.1955; Ges.Verb. File 'SBZ Fhlchtl1nge Arb 130.30-132.15', Meeting with 
BAM. 13.9.1955. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ges. Verb File 'SBZ Fl.Arb. 130.30-132.15', 'Ergebnlsprotokoll Qber die 
Besprechung vom 21.11.1955; File 'SBZ Fl.Arb. 133.00-134.0', lNR to BVM, 23.8.1956: 
Keyser to Ullrich 28.9.1956; AZG File '1 1 26 Zuweisung von ArbeitskrAfien aus anderen 
Bezlrken (Umschaler)'. Report on Recruitment campaign HBAG Dortmund in Youth Camp 
Sandbostel. 7-12.10.1957. 
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was the year in which foreign recruitment made its first major breakthrough in 
the mines. The first applications for permission to hire non-German speakers 
had in fact been presented to the OBAD in November 1955. 1 At that time the 1GB 
had been very hostile and workforce pressure had induced one of the companies 
2 
to withdraw its request. In the course of 1956. however. agreement was reached 
between UVR. 1GB and OBAD on the terms under which foreign language 
3 
speakers could be employed in the mines and in 1957. after negotiations with 
the Italian authOrities. 1.679 Italians and also 272 Hungarian refugees were 
4 brought to the Ruhr mines. 8.6 percent of the Heisingen intake consisted of 
foreigners. 5 
The end of an era 
6 Table 21: Labour intake 1955-68 
Year Workforce Undeq~round 
size on 1 Jan intake 7 
1955 300.308 43.834 
1956 300.166 53.233 
1957 308.162 51.602 
1958 312.185 28.316 
1959 296.080 7.867 
1960 260.523 14.661 
1961 238.288 14.700 
1962 224.231 10.742 
1963 207.336 11.777 
1964 195.840 10.055 
1965 188.719 7.098 
1966 174.374 4.906 
1967 148.061 2.017 
1968 124.391 4.693 
1 OBADA 18006/3006/55. BA Dinslaken to OBAD. 5.11.1955. 
2 OBADA 18006/3006/55. Memo 19.3.1956 and 4.5.1956; 'Hambomer Bergbau will 
kelne Ausla.nder anlegen'. Neue Ruhr Zettung Dulsburg edition. 3.8.1955. It was 
Concordia which withdrew Its request. 
3 0BADA 140.11/2304/56. 1GB to OBAD. 18.6.1956. 
4 Ges.Verb .• Helsingen Papers. Helslngen annual report 1957. 
5 Ges.Verb .• Helslngen Papers. Miscellaneous statistics. table 'Herkunftsgeblete 
1946/7-1965'. 
6 Source: Ges.Verb .• stdKW. table 'Belegschaftswechsel - Arbeiter Untertage. 
Ruhr'. 
7 Excluding movement from pit to pit. 
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It is hard to say what the industry would have done had the coal crisis not begun 
in Spring 1958. Probably the employers would have begun to import foreign 
labour on a large scale. for most of their fears in respect of hot-blooded. work-
shy southerners had already proved to be groundless. The Italians were no more 
1 inclined to wastage than their German counterparts. And indeed the mines did 
bring in a considerable number of foreigners over the following years. By 1960, 
for example. 60 percent of workers taken on from outside the Ruhr were 
2 foreigners. But the most notable aspect of the 1960 intake was not its 
composition but its size - just 5.648 miners or less than 20 percent of the 1957 
3 figures. This was clear proof of the dramatic change in coal's fortunes that had 
taken place over the last three years. 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H 8102.33092. MA Meeting. 20.9.1956. The point is co~ftrmed in. 
Institut fOr angewandte Sozialw1ssenschaft. 'Untersuchung Ober die Fluktuation, p.90. 
2 Ges.Verb .. Heisingen Papers. miscellaneous statistics. table'Herkunftsgebiete 
1946/7-1965'. 
3 Ges.Verb .. Heisingen Papers. Annual report for 1960. 
Chapter 8: Settlin~ the miner. Housing and hostels for 
new labour. 1948-58 
1: A hearth. a home. a plot of land. Miners' housing and 
integration 
A qualitative solution to the housing problem 
If a judgement had to be made purely on the approach taken to new recruits at 
work, one could easily conclude that the employers did not take the task of 
settling the adult newcomers very seriously at all. Short-term cost 
considerations, rigid discipline and the 'I shout therefore I am' mentality seemed 
always to take precedence over any concerted effort to create links between the 
trainees and their new profession. 
Outside the workplace. however, it is clear that conSiderable thought and energy 
were devoted to this task. The employers evidently felt they had more scope 
away from the work process itself to forge the right conditions for integration 
and regeneration. The mines themselves would be dirty and unhealthy places 
whatever the employers did: but a positive living environment might 
compensate for the negative aspects of the work. 'Ausgleich', compensation, is a 
word that crops up in almost every piece ever written about miners' housing. 
And it is a mark of the importance ascribed to creating the right living 
1 
environment that there were a great many such pieces written. 
Naturally enough. the decisions about what sort of hOUSing to offer were 
influenced by the desire to build as fast and as cheaply as possible. Social 
lIn 1947. a senior ctvtl servant in the Reconstruction Mintstly could already refer 
to the 'countless publications' on miners' housing produced since the war. Mtnlsterlalrat 
Dr. Fatterer. 'aergmannswohnstAtten 1m Ruhrgeblet', Arbettsblatt.fOr die brU1sche ?ale. 
1947, I, pp.460-1. 
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housing in the post-war period was generally less generous in its proportions 
than earlier building, and certainly far smaller than the 'Altbauten' from before 
the First World War. But in fact there was from the very beginning a consensus 
on the part of almost every one involved in building miners' hOUSing, from the 
Reconstruction Minister down to the housing associations, that a quality 
solution was called for. 
To a degree, this can be seen as a feature of Ruhr housing policy generally. The 
region was fortunate in having few tenement buildings or big city slum areas and 
the city planners and above all the SVR were keen to preserve this open semi-
urbanised qUality. When, in the course of the ECA building programm, an 
international commission of architects visited the Ruhr, the head of the 
Reconstruction Ministry defined the goal of rebuilding as 'die kleine Stadt', the 
1 
small town. For instance, the SVR was very effective at limiting the amount of 
2 high-rise building, discouraging even four-storey building where possible. 
Beyond this general commitment, the clear recognition that the function of 
miners' hOUSing was to create a stable workforce meant that only reasonable 
standard housing could be offered. This consensus was so strongly established 
that even in February 1946. when the Ruhr cities were little more than piles of 
rubble. the director of public works for the North Rhine Province argued that 
good quality. though modest. hOUSing was essential if newcomers from other 
professions and other regions were to be become productive and permanent 
members of the workforce.3 Even so. until 1948 the struggle to find recruits 
1 HStaD NW73.55. WAM. Copy of untitled speech dated 4.12.1952. signed 
Dr.FQtterer. 
2 Eg. BBA 10.137. Memo of discussion on 6.12.1951 with Oberbaurat Zahn and 
Memo of d18cu881on on 6.4.1952 in Heme; BBA 30.145. GHH paper 'Entwtcldung des 
Wohnungsbaues des GHH Stelnkohlenbergbaues MUte 1945-Mltte 1950', Oberhausen 
9.9.1950. 
s HStaD NW53. 391. Dr.Lehr. Bau 90. Obelplls. d. Nordrhe1n-Provtnz to Col Dalby. 
25.2.1948. annex: 'Bau 90 to Hg MJLReg. DQssetdort. 21.2.1946. 
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any liv1ng space at all forced the integrative aspect into the background. But 
after 1948, in finance discussions in Bonn just as much as in planning debates 
in the Ruhr, the emphasis was placed firmly on providing qualitative rather 
than quantitative solutions and on promoting workforce stability rather than 
1 
simply finding space for new recruits. As the !VB's housing expert, Mattern, 
told the Special Connnittee appointed in 1948 to look into the financial state of 
the mining industry,2 'es konnnt darauf an .. die Neubergleute durch Beschaffung 
von Wohmaum bodenstAndig zu machen'. 3 
Designing the miner's house 
What was the optimal living environment for the miner and particularly the 
new miner? A useful starting point to the views of the policy-makers is a short 
paper, written by Professor Franz Knipping, which exemplifies in concise form 
many of the demands, images and hopes that gave impetus and shape to the 
4 
miners' housing progranune. Knipping was director of the Treuhandstelle fur 
BergmannswohnsU\tten 5, the housing association set up in connection with the 
miners' hOUSing levy of 1920 and, ever since then, a central participant in the 
construction of miners' dwellingS. The paper was written in October 1951, when 
the miners' housing act was becoming law and it was apparent that a major new 
building initiative was about to begin Sent to the WAM, the paper's main 
purpose was to ensure that the NRW government's bulldtng policy took into 
account the Treuhandstelle's wishes. 
1 See for Instance BAK-ZwSt.H BI34,1365, BWoM 1326/4933/50, Memo, 
4.10.1950. 
2 See chapter 5, p.226. 
3 PA 2, 270. KuJ2protokoll of 8th meeting of the Sonderausschuss. 22.6.1949. 
"HStaD NW73.136. Professor Knlpplng to WAM. 30.10.1951. annex: Knlpplng. 'Der 
BergarbeJterwohnungsbau', Essen. October 1952. 
5 1be Reconstruction Mlnlster was In fact a member of the TreuhandsteUe's 
controWng execUve. 
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The actual architectural and architectonic demands made in the paper are very 
simple and can be summarised in a couple of sentences. The ideal house, argues 
Knfpptng, should have plenty of light and a good sized garden with a stall built in 
to the house so that the miner can keep small animals. The need for light and a 
garden in tum calls for a semi-detatched, two storey building style. 1 Whilst this 
is more expensive than multi-storey fiats, Knipping argues that the miners' 
house would not fulfill its function if the only criterion were to be low building 
costs. In any case, the higher costs of this design can be considerably offset by 
keeping the level of amenities fairly simple.2 As far as the internal structure of 
the house goes, the most important feature is the combined living room-kitchen 
3 (Wohnknche'), a traditional feature of mining homes. 
More significant, for our purposes, than the actual design proposed were the 
reasons for choosing these specific features and the hopes and expectations 
attached to them and the miner's house in general. The first thing that strikes 
the reader is the confidence with which Knipping speaks for the miner. The 
author has no heSitation in defining the miners' needs 4 and without a trace of 
heSitation or embarassment deSCribes the miners' daily rhythm, even the 
mental state with which he returns home from work. 'Nach getaner Arbeit 
kommt der Bergmann nach Hause, koperlich sehr ruhebediirftlg, geistlg aber mit 
dem Wunsch, s1ch zu unterhalten. Er will seine Frau und seine Kinder urn sich 
haben ... ,.5 
The author's assurance is all the more strfldng when 1t is born in mind that at 
the tlme of writing. more than 50 percent of the hOUSing lists were composed of 
1 Knipptng. 'Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau', pp.1-2. 
2 ibid, p.S. 
s ibid, p.2. 
4 ibid. 
51bld. 
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men who had been in mining for six years or less, most of whom had spent their 
1 formative years in other occupations. This confidence was a pelVasive feature 
of the housing establishment. There were hundreds of articles talking about the 
wants and needs of the miner, but until the Americans came and COmmiSsioned 
one, there was not a single survey of miners' wishes and preferences. 2 The 
German housing offiCials were ostensibly privy even to the deep-seated wishes of 
the miners' wife. The ECA representatives in the Ruhr noted Wrily that 'der 
Bergmann hat viele Sprecher, vom Zechendirektor bis zum 
Gewerkschaftsvertreter. Es sind dies natiirlich alles Menschen [sic! It should be 
'MAnner', MR], aber sie haben keine Hemmungen einem zu sagen, was die 
Bergmannsfrau haben mOchte'. 3 It was evident that Knipping and many other 
writers were operating with a mental image of the miner so finn that it allowed 
them to utter apodictical truths without the need for market research. 4 Indeed 
market research would be almost irrelevent, since the policy makers were 
aiming to satisfy the miner's deep and unconscious needs rather than his mere 
5 
subjective wishes. 
The most important of these unconscious needs relate to the garden, to the soil. 
At one level the garden provides a necessary compensation to mining work. 
The noise, the poor air and the articifial light at work make it 1mperative that 
1 Based on the sample In SoFoSt, 'Sozlologtsche Erhebung zum Bergarbelter-
WOhnUDfsbauprogramm. SchluBbertcht' (Unpublished Ms., Dortmund 1952), p.5. 
SoFoSt, 'Schlu.tJbertcht'; EUsabeth Pren, Die WohnwUnsche der Bergarbel.ter. 
Soztologf.sche Erhebung, Deutung und Krittk der Wohnvorstellungen etnes Berufes, 
TObtngen 1954. 
s HStaD NW73,55, Translation (into German) of an MSA Housing Dept paper, 
dated 17.10.1952, German title 'Deutsches Kohlenbergarbelter-WohnungsbauprogramDl. 
2.Fortschrittsbertcht', p.14. It Is striking that in this German translation, the Engltsh 
'men' was mistranslated as 'Menschen'. It Is evident that in the cUmate of the day, the 
Idea of male officials making these decisions was so much part of the order of things that 
the translator did not even notice the point the text was trying to make. 
, Even the composite nouns used (BergmannswohnstAtte and 'Bergmannssofat). 
indicate the strength of the notion ofa timeless 'Ur-Bergmann'. transcending the vagaries 
of labour fluctuations and the Changes of generations. 
5 Knippfng. 'BergaIbelterwohnungsbau', p.3 and p.1 and even more pronounced in 
Franz Knlpplng, tOle Treuhandstelle far BergmannswobnstAtten 1m rhelnlscb-
weeUlltachen SteJnkohlenbezlrk', GliJckaqf. 1949,85.31/32. pp.57G-573. 
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the miner received fresh air and the sun outside it. 1 At a deeper level, garden 
work confirms and sustains that close relationship to nature and the earth 
which is the mark of the true miner. 2 An urban way of life and the 
disasSOCiation from the soil ('Grund und Boden') always bring the wish to change 
occupation and the miner does not remain a miner, or at least not one whose 
heart and soul are committed to mining. 3 A little earlier in the text, another 
passage also conveys the importance of maintaining a close link with the soil. 
Knlpptng writes that it Is particularly important that miners with children have 
this type of house 'in which the children will grow up and then, in turn, be 
4 
acquainted with work in the garden'. 
These images reoccur In countless other places. In 1948, when miners' hOUSing 
was just beginning to move from repairs to new construction, the Reconstruction 
Minister, aware that this was the first major new housing project in the whole of 
North Rhine-Westphalia, commiSSioned a number of architects to come up with 
new housing designs. There were, however, several features deemed too 
Important to be left up to the whim of the architects and the ministry therefore 
spec1f1ed them in advance. They were, almost without exception. precisely the 
points Knlpping outlined above, again with special stress on low buildings, large 
5 gardens and the outhouse. The notion of the link between fanner and miner, 
of the symmetry between two different types of battle with nature continually 
resurfaces. The miners, the Reconstruction Ministry's Dr. FUtterer was glad to 
say to a group of foreign visitors, are not really 'StAdter' at all and 'haben noch 
1 Ibid., p.l. 
2 Ibid, p.2. 
Slbtd. 
• Ibid, p.1. 
s HStaD NW73.260, WAM. Memo. 'Der Wohnungsneubau fOr die Bergarbetter-
famJlIe', 4.10.1948: for the untversal endorsement ofJarge garden and pigsty, see also MSA. 
'2.Fortachrlttabertcbt'. passfm. 
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etn gesundes, ein unmitlelbares Verhrutnis zum Boden. zum Gartenbau'. 1 Even 
the miners' union shared a similar vision. Wohnen 1st mehr als bloj3er 
Aufenthalt innerhalb vier Wanden'. wrote the 1GB's housing specialists in a 
letter to the DGB in 1953. Wohnen ist fur uns der Ausdruck einer 
Weltanschauung. Gerade unser Bergmann erstrebt das Eigenheim mit einem 
kleinen Garten, in dem er etwas Gemuse zieht. seine Huhner. Tauben und 
Kantnchen hiilt und nach der Arbeit sich entspannt. .. ,2 
Other planning proposals introduced an additional though related. 'romantic' 
vision, namely the idea of 'rooting' (verwurzeln) the newcomer. The simple 
house. the semi-rural atmosphere and the large garden were seen as vital 
ingredients in settling the newcomers and tying them to mining and the Ruhr. 
When tn 1948 the Reconstruction Ministry. laid down that every house should 
have a vegetable garden and an integral stall. he did so not only to meet the 
wishes of the established miners, but also explicitly to help root the newcomers 
in local sol1.3 In 1952. in a discussion of how to treat the youngsters in the 
hostels. the j oumal of the KfSA. 'Als Ziel sollte stets vor Augen gehalten werden 
die Erziehung des jungen Menschen zum eigenstandigen Bergmann. zur 
Familiengriindung. zu einem Leben mit Garten und zur Verwurzelung in der 
Umwelt,.4 
Here. the image of the simple miner at peace with nature is fused with that of the 
newcomer 'growing roots' through work in the garden. a mixture present in 
Kn1pping's own work too. in his vision of the youngster being acquainted with 
1 NW73.55. WAM, Copy of untitled speech dated 4.12.1952. signed Dr.Fntterer. 
Abtellungslelter I. 
2 DGBA File 'IGBergbau (1949-1966)'. 1GB Hauptverwaltung to DOB Vorstand. 
21.S.1953. See also J.Tdem. Wohn- und Lebensstll unserer Bergleute', In Bervbau wu:f 
~ 1953, 6, pp.98-100, here p.98. 
HStaD NW73,260, WAM IA/SOO, Memo, 4.10.1948. 
4 MfttBClurwender l(/SA 1952,1/2,p.S. 
1 garden work. 
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Sometimes this image was linked to a belief that many 
newcomers had their own rural, stable qualities that needed to be protected. 
When Dr. Flltterer argued that the miners were not really urban folk, he 
extended this praise to the newcomers too, and no doubt had in mind the many 
refugees from small town and rural environments who numbered amongst the 
new miners. 2 
Of course, it would be wrong to underestimate the (perhaps unconsciously) 
tactical element in Knipping's lyricism and other similar broadSides. The 
housing SOCieties in general and the Treuhandstelle in particular were worried 
about a loss of influence. The specific problem for the Treuhandstelle was that 
it was already clear that the new Miner's Housing Law was not going to give it the 
same special function as had the earlier law of 1920. Knipping was trying to 
make sure his organisation was nevertheless closely involved in the building 
3 programme. Thus the notion that the miner had unconscious needs and that it 
was necessary for experienced experts to transform them into architectural 
reality was at the same time an argument for the continued involvement of the 
Treuhandstelle, which 'aufgrund ihres gesetzlichen Auftrages sich einzig und 
allein mit dem Bau und der Verwaltung von Bergarbeiterwohnungen befa6t 
hat,.4 
All of the Ruhr hOUSing SOCieties were on the defensive in the early 1950's 
because the American ECA administration was leading a concerted attack on 
traditional building practices.5 The housing associations were worried that the 
1 See also Walter Forstmann's comments in 1949 about the function of the 
Pestalozzi villages. HStaD NW41,764, Forstmann, 'AusfOhrungen in der Aufslchtsrat-
sltzung am 21.11.1949 Qber den Zweck und den Bau der Pestalozzlsledlungen in 
D1nslaken-Lohberg', 21.11.1949. 
2 NW73,55. WAM. Copy of untitled speech dated 4.12.1952. signed Dr.FOtterer, 
Abtellungslelter I. 
s HStaD 73, 136. Knlpplng to WAM. 30.10.1951. 
4 Ibid. 
5 MBA. '2.Fort8chrtttaberlcht· 
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ECA's idea of an architects' competition would result In outsIders taking over 
Ruhr building. would bring in new ideas and force the assocIations to make 
complicated and expensive revisions In their building methods In order to 
1 
compete. To a certain extent, therefore, the talk of the miners' needs was 
SimPly an attempt to legitimate existing practices. It was no accIdent that so 
many officials were agreed on the same housing design. 2 It was precisely this 
type of house that the Treuhandstelle and many other housing socIeties, 
particularly those building outside the densest urban areas, had traditionally 
built. There was more than a little disingenuousness In Franz Knipplng's 
lyrical ode to the Wohnkiiche: the point about the living/room kitchen was that 
if the whole family congregated there, the cooking stove could double as the 
heating and the rest of the house could remain unheated. In most miners' 
houses until then the Wohnkiiche was the only heated room. 
Nevertheless, there was clearly much more than tactics Involved. The three 
related images - the simple miner with basic but modest needs, the miner 
reaffirmed through working the soil, and the newcomer rooted in the locality by 
the right house and especially the right garden - go a long way to explalnlng not 
3 
only the strong commitment to established patterns of house construction, but 
also the hopes and expectations which the employers had of housing. Werden 
die vorher skizzlerten Bediirfnisse des Bergmanns beriickslchtigt', Knipping 
assured the Minister, 'dann erftillt seine Wohnung neben der Unterbrtngung 
noch einen anderen Zweck. Sle macht den Bergmann zufrteden, erfiiIlt seine 
von der Natur als Folge seiner beruflichen TAtJgkelt gegebenen Notwendtgkelten, 
1 In his paper, Knlpplng expllc1t1y critlclsed the concept of a co~pet1tlon or 
bullding In the cheapest way possible. Knlpplng, 'Bergarbelterwohnungsbau, p.3. 
2 For other voices with a similar visions, see for example HStaD NW73, 100, WAM, 
Internal memo from Gruppe IA to Gruppe IDS, 7.2.1951: NW73,55, WAM, Copy of untitled 
speech dated 4.12.1952, signed Dr.FQtterer, AbteUungsletter I. 
S When the ECA had the temerity to suggest some new designs, It found Itself 
confronted by an angry choir of housing establlshment VOices all singing the pralse8 of 
the ltvtng room/kitchen and the ptgaty. See MSA paper, '2.Fortschrlttsberlcht'. passim. 
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ibm selbst meist unbewu~t, und laBt den Wunsch des Berufswechsels erst gar 
1 
ntcht aufkommen'. But if the wrong house were built, if the link to the land 
were broken, then the miner will be lost to his profession, 'er bleibt nicht mehr 
Bergmann, sicher nicht mit Lust und Uebe'. 2 
AU 'mod cons': the challenge to romantic conservatism in housing deSign 
In addition to the romantic-conservatives there were also, initially in small 
numbers, the 'modernisers' who believed that the miners should be given the 
chance to raise their standard of 'living-culture', as it was termed. Very often 
the 'modernisers', be they in the 1GB or in the WAM, shared many assumptions 
with the romantic conservatives. But they challenged the image of the simple, 
rustic interior and called for such features as a separation of kitchen and living 
room, the introduction, where possible, of modem equipment and so on.3 
The strongest challenge to the romantic-conservatives came from the 
Americans. The head of the ECA's (later MSA) department for industrial 
buUdmg, James Butler, organised a veritable crusade against what he saw as 
'buUdmg by committee'. Butler believed that 'die bescheidenste deutsche 
Wohnung (ist) eine teuere, solide aussehende, aber unpraktische Angelegenheit' 
and that the conselVatism of the German buUding administration and housing 
aSSOCiations was hindering the development of more modem building methods 
4 
and houses with more modem amenities. In 1951, in an initia145 mUlion OM 
programme, the ECA failed to get many of its proposals adopted, partly because 
5 
the programme was co-financed with Gennan money. It therefore resolved in 
1 Knlpptng, 'BergarbeltelWOhnungsbau', p.3. 
2 Ibid., p.2. 
3 HStaD NW73,260, WAM 1A/300, Memo, 4.10.1948.: HStaD NW73,10, WAM, 
Internal memo from Ref. IA2 to Mtntstertaldtrektor, 7.10.1952: 1GB (ed.), Jahrbuch 1953, 
p.740. 
4 MSA. '2. Fortaclu1ttsber1cht' • pp.8-11. 
IS On the negotiations see HStad NWI0,90, DKBL to WAM 12.6.1951 and annex. 
Settling the miner 364 
1952 to finance its own programme fully so that it would be able to control the 
conditions. Butler commissioned a major survey of miners' hOusing 
preferences, which at one stroke abolished a great many myths about the 
miners' supposed conservatism. The 1952 programme was for example 
preceded by a fully open competition between architects whereas in 1951, the 
ECA had only succeeded in achieving a very limited competition. 1 
Both the survey and the MSA housing project which followed it gave the 
'modernisers' a decisive boost.2 The ECA buildings were mainly large estates 
composed of long rows of two storey houses each with a large garden. Apart 
from the generally unpopular long row, adopted for money saving reasons, new 
about the houses' design was the modern kitchen with built-in cooker and in 
some cases, an unheard of lUXUry, a fridge, central heating and modern 
3 bathrooms. Though there were a number of protests afterwards, the buildings 
were really a triumph for the MSA since they cost no more to build than the 
4 traditional miners' house. Within four years of the first MSA project, 
virtually all houses in the Miners' Housing Programme were being built with 
5 
seperate or semi-seperated kitchens and mainly with built in cookers. 
The Americans saw the strength of the opposition to the programme as a sign 
that vested interests were being undennined. Certainly, there was anxiety that 
6 provision of fridges. for example. would force other builders to do likewise. But 
1 Ibid and HStaD NW73.55. BWoM D56/51. Memo, 20.12.1951. 
2 See for example the WAM's responses to the survey in HStaD NW73.10, WAM, 
Internal memo from Group lAo IA2 to Mtntstertald1rektor. 7.10.1952: Group lIlA 4, Memo, 
18.12.1952. 
s MSA. '2.Fortschr1ttsbertcht' • p.l0tl'. 
" Ibtd. and 'Es tst gepfuscht worden. ECA-Stedlung Essen mit nassen Kellem und 
gertssenen WADden'. extract from DIe BergbauIndustrte 1953. Nr.4: Ferdinand Stmonett, 
'Die Axt' in Deutscher Bau-Markt 1953. 52. 42. p.II43: HStaD NW73.55. Copy of BWoM 
memo. 2.11.1953. 
5 P.Chrtstoffel, 'Bergarbelterwohnungsbau tm rheintsch-westfAllschen Stein-
kohlenbez1rk' in Deutsche Stedl.ungs- und WoIuwngspoUtOc. pp.343-346. here p.344. 
8 HStaD NW73.55. Min. f. Arb. 50%. u. W. 'bau VIA2 to MSA-Houstng Mission. 
81.12.1953. 
Settling the miner 365 
at a deeper level, by challenging the myth of the simple miner with his simple 
unchanging tastes, the Americans were also challenging the myth of the house's 
power of integration. The Americans themselves saw housing purely in tenns of 
a subjective incentive. As modernism spread during the 1950's, some of the 
initial hopes of miners' hOUSing disappeared. 
On the other hand, the acceptance of a modern interior did not necessarily mean 
acceptance of a purely functional attitude towards the house. There is 
conSiderable evidence that many of the German advocates of the new designs 
linked to their demands the hope that by raising the status and self-esteem of the 
miner they would create a settled and contented social class. This applied to the 
1GB, which, from having been lined up with the romantic-conselVatives, became 
an enthusiastic adherent of housing 'durch die die Wohnkultur unseres 
1 Berufstandes gehoben wird.' Yet, as this formulation implies, the union did 
not relinquish its belief in housing's socially integrative powers. Some of the 
2 
new labour-directors seem to have made it their personal mission to raise the 
miners' social standing and self-esteem through better housing, as Walter Wille 
3 
wrote in 1954: 
Ganz besonders wurde die Wohnkultur nach neuen Richtlinien 
durchgefiihrt. Es kam mir besonders darauf an, der Wohnung des 
einfachen Menschen die persOnliche Note zu geben, vor allen Dtngen ibn 
aus dem "Arme-Leute-Milieu" herauszureJ.6en. 
1 Quote is from 1GB (ed.), Jahrbuch 1953, p.740. For examples of earlier stance, 
see the then !VB's hostlllty to the Idea of a house without a cellar (HStaD NW73, 135, SVR 
to Reconstruction Mtntster, 15.12.1947). For the importance of the ECA programme in 
changing union's attitude see Schulz's comments in MSA. '2.Fortschr1ttsberlcht'.p.21 and 
1GB (ed.). Jahrbuch 1954. p.662. 
2 1he 'Arbe1tsd1rektoren' were the labour nominated members of the management board (Voratand). 'lbe d1r'ecto1'8 were introduced by the 1951 Codeterm1nation Law. but 
generally were not nominated in the mines unUllate 1952/53, because of the company 
restructuring going on. 
s IGBEA Handakten Rudl QUast. me 'M.Asslstenten TagUngen (AIt)', Walter WUle 
to HeInrIch ImIg. 28.6.1954. appendix: 'Erfahrung mit der Mltbesttmmung'. 
Settling the miner 366 
Amongst other things, Wille promoted the separate kitchen/living room, a 
proper bathroom, provision for motorcycles as well as the decent gardens that 
1 
everyone could agree on. 
Alongside moderniSing the house's amenities and promoting the bourgeois 
dining room, there were also attempts to improve the miners' taste in furniture. 
TIle 1GB encouraged exhibitions of fUrniture appropriate for the smaller Size of 
2 post-war housing. The employers too, particularly the 'Vereinigung der 
Freunde von Kunst und Kultur 1m Bergbau' did their bit to provide the miners 
with what they saw as a valid and integrative aesthetic.3 
The joy of fwme-ownership 4 
Alongside appropriate design, another strategy for enhancing hOUSing'S impact 
on workforce stability was promoting owner-occupied housing. As with many 
of the design proposals noted earlier, the aim was not just to give the miners 
what they wanted (or what the housing authorities felt they wanted) but to create 
the sort of environment that would, it was believed, bind them to their 
profession and cause them to grow roots in the locality. 
Like most of the proposals mooted after 1945, the idea of giving workers the 
chance to become property owners was not a new one. It had received a 
conSiderable boost in 1931 when the Bruning government had passed an 
emergency decree providing for the establishment of Kleinstedlungen, owner-
I ibid. 
2 1GB (ed.), Ja1vbuch 1953, p.727ff. 
S See Helnrlch Wlnkelmann. 'HeJm und Herd und Sport und Spiel des Bergmanos', 
in Westdeutsche WlrtBchafts-Monographle, FoJge I, Stelnkohle Ausgabe Aprl11953, cited 
in 'Ole Entwlcldung des Bergarbe1terwohnungsbaus In Heme', no author, no date. (1959) 
(available In Heme city archive). For more details on thls, see chapter 9. p.434. 
" 'Freude am Elgentum', a secUon beading In Hibernia Konzem (ed.), SozfaIberfcht 
1956, p.25. 
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occupied houses for the unemployed With large vegetable gardens attached. 1 
Over the folloWing years, the idea was extended to long-serving members of the 
workforce and a conSiderable number of Kleinsiedlungen were built in the Ruhr. 
By 1939, 7,500 owner-occupied homes had been built by the Treuhandstelle fur 
Bergmannswohnsta.tten alone. 2 Ov all th h er , oug, owner-occupied homes 
remained a very small fraction of miners' housing. 
In the post-war period up to 1948 there were neither materials nor finance 
ava1lable for new building. Public funds were swallowed up by repairs and the 
3 housing associations lacked their own resources, difficulties that the currency 
reform served only to exacerbate. The result was that the building of 
Kleinsiedlungen was extremely restricted both before and in the two years 
4 follOwing the currency reform. When in Autumn 1948, the IVB appealed to the 
Reconstruction Minister to give financial support to prospective Kleinstedler, 
5 the WAM regretted that it was unable to do so. Only at the end of 1949, did the 
Ministry feel able to make its first substantial contribution for the construction 
of owner-occupied homes for miners (500,000 DM)6 and even this would pay for 
less than 100 homes. 
1 A good general account is given in Deutscher Siedlerbund (ed.), Dte 
Kletnsfedlung und thre Entwtcklung. Etn flberbltck rlber Setn und Werden der 
Kletnstedlung und des Deutschen Stedlerbundes, Hamburg 1960. 
2 Treuhandstelle tar BergmannswohnstAtten (ed.), DretJjtg Jahre TreuhandsteUe 
fO.r Bergmannswohnst4tten , Essen, no date [1949], p.30; see also, for the housing 
SOCieties belonging to the VSt. BBA 55.25300. F.MOnkemOller, '5. Jahre Wohnstatten-
gesellschaften'. 1938. 
3 See the exchange between the WestfAlische WohnstAtten AG and the building 
authorities in HStaD NW9. 145. WestfAlische WohnstAtten AG to Oberprlsident of West-
phalia ProVInce. 21.1.1946; OberprAs •• Genera1referat IX AIV to SVR. 24.4.1946. 
4 A number of modest schemes were proposed and a few actually Implemented. 
HStaD NW73.458. WAM IA 303 to CCG(BE) Manpower Dept. 19.2.1948; NW42.912, paper 
from Nebelung. 'Vorschl4ge far die Beselttgung der Nacbwuch~not 1m 
Ruhrkohlenbergbau'. 28.4.1948; FQtterer. 'Bergmannswohnstatten 1m Rubrgeblet. p.450. 
5 'Ole MJttel tar Neubau sind so knapp'. wrote the WAM, 'dd es Dleht m6gl1eh 
lat .. den EtgenheJmstedlem, far die Sle elch wArmstene einsetzten. wesentltche Beltrage 
zurv~ zu stellen', In HstaD NW73. 47. WAM to IVB, 28.10.1948. 
8 BaA 8. 406. DKBL. CirCular No.IV-31 to mining companles and collieries. 
28.6.1950. 
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Even if more money had been available from the Land, it is unlikely that more 
than a small minority of miners could have made use of it. A key problem that 
had limited the number of miners beCOming Kleinsiedler even before the specific 
problems of the wartime and post-war period arose, was that though the 
financial support from public funds was considerable, the owner-occupier still 
had to make a Sizeable inital contribution himself. 1 Many miners found the 
money impossible to raise. True, the required financial contribution could be 
commuted to labour, whereby the miner himself worked on the construction 
site, but this was an exhausting business, requiring the miner to follow his day's 
work at the mine with more toil on the building site. The higher building costs 
of the post-war period made it if anything even harder for the miners to pay 
their contribution, generally fixed at 20-25 percent.2 A further financial 
disincentive to buy ones' own home was that rents in the older mining properties 
were so very low. Once the miner had scraped the initial funds together, he 
would find himself with repayments more than twice as high as the typical rent 
in an older miners' estate.3 And of course there was the ever present fear that an 
accident or loss of health might make It impossible to maintain the payments. 
In 1950 it seemed therefore as if 'Etgenheim' and 'Kleinsiedlung' would be little 
more than minor sidelines. Yet just four years later almost 50 percent of new 
houses built in the miners' housing programme were intended for owner-
4 
occupation. In a country where rented accommodation had traditionally 
1 See Knlpplng, 'Der Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau', pp.3-4. The other problem 
noted by Knlpptng was the miners' resistance to the tie between the house and their 
profession, a tie which could affect their ch1ldren. This is discussed below. 
2 20% for Klemsiedlungen and 25% for other owner-occupied homes. See WAM, 
Bestlmmungen Qber die FOrderung des Wohnungsneubaues (Klemwohnungen und 
Klelnsledlungen) 1m Lande Nordrhem-Westfalen (NBB)', Mtntsterf.alBlatt jilr das Land 
NRWI951,4, 19, pp.I82-200. 
S Christoffel 'Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau 1m rhe1n1scb-westfAltschen Steln-
kohlenbezJrk'. p.S44: Ges.Verb. Flle Wohnungswesen. Aussch\.\lS 9', MInutes of Housing 
Committee on 24.3.1955. 
4 Ges. Verb. File Wohnungswesen 4 Bergarbelterwohnungsbauprogramm 41 
Programme. 1954-1961 Bezlrksausschu.lS Sitzungen', Minutes of the 12th 
Beztrkaausach\.\lS meeUng. 16.12.1954. 
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dominated the urban housing market and particularly the working class 
housing market this was a truly dramatic social innovation. 
What had happened? One factor, of course, was that the volume of funds 
released by the new coal mtning levy made it easier for the state to increase 
grants to individual projects so as to reduce the burden on the miner. However, 
even more deCisive than the volume of funds was the energy with which the ECA 
and even more the Federal parliament and government pursued the idea of 
owner-occupied housing. The ECA's idea was that it would provide a positive 
incentive to remaining in mtning and producing more coal. 1 For their part, the 
German proponents went beyond the notion of a simple incentive, believing that 
owning a house would help the new miners strike roots in their local 
2 
environment. For an English-speaking reader, the logic of these proposals is 
less obvious than to a German one because, unlike Britain, in Germany at that 
time (and indeed now) the reselling of one's own home was most uncommon. 
The 'second hand' housing market was small. Most people who became owner-
occupiers either inherited housing or had new houses built. The new house was 
then seen as an investment for life. 
The Federal government's hopes also involved a more far reaching goal of social 
integration. It is worth remembering that the original idea behind the 
Kleinsiedlung had had little to do with promoting workforce stability - it was, 
after all. initially aimed at the unemployed - and more to do with social and 
political stabilisation. The idea was that the vegetable garden and livestock 
would enable the occupant to be substantially self-suffiCient. thus reducing his 
living costs suffiCiently to enable him to pay otT the mortgage and to weather 
1 MSA. '2.Fortschrtttsberlcht'. p.l0. 
2 8AK-ZWSt.H BI34. 1361. Deutscher Bundestag 2.Wahlperlode 1953 Drucbache 
817 'SchrIftJJcher Berlcht des Ausschusse8 fOr W1ederaufbau und Wohnungswesen Qbel 
den • Entwurf zur Anderung des Gesetzes zur F6rdenmg des aergarbe1terwohnungsbaues 
1m. Kohlenbergbau'. esp. p.2. 
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periods of unemployment. Beyond making the workers 'krisenfest' there was 
the longer term hope that giving them the chance to own property would enhance 
their self-esteem and their integration into society. 
It was this goal that the Federal govenunent revived in the post-war period but 
now coupled with the hope that the refugees too could be compensated for their 
losses and reconciled with their new home. In a volume extolling the virtues of 
the owner-occupied home which appeared in 1951, the year the Miners' Housing 
Law was passed, Paul Lucke, one of the housing experts in the Bundestag, argued 
that, as well as protecting the occupants against future economic crises, home 
ownership ' ... garantiert die Bildung echter PersOnlichkeitswerte, die allein der 
Vermassung, die uns aus dem Osten droht, Einhalt gebieten kOnnen'. 1 Other 
2 
contributors developed the same theme. 
Because of the emphasis placed on the compensation and integration of refugees, 
they were the first group amongst the miners to benefit from the commitment to 
owner-occupied housing. Funds were initially made available by the 
3 Soforthilfegesetz of 1949 which raised a levy on all property owners in the 
Federal Republic to create a refugee aid fund and directed that some of the money 
4 
raised should go towards providing refugees with appropriate housing. From 
the end of 1949 onwards, the NRW Reconstruction Ministry put a limited amount 
of funds aside which could be made available in the form of a subsidy (ie non-
1 Paul LOcke, 'Die Funktlon des Elgenhe1ms In der SozIalordnung unserer Zeit', in 
Die Funktton des Efgen.hetms in der SoztalDrclnung wtSeTer Zett. Vortrage unci Referate 
des Drttten Deutschen VoUcshefmst4ttentages, Hannover 1951 , Bielefeld 1951, pp.57-71, 
here p.59 & p.65. LOcke was a leading light of the Parl1amentaly Committee for housing 
and reconstruction. 
2 Friedrich LQtge, 'Die Funktlon des Grundeigentums In der Rechts- und 
Sozialordnung unserer Zeit'. In ibid. pp.7-18. here p.l2. 
8 'Gesetz zur MUderung dr1ngender 80zlaler NotstAode (SoforthUfegesetz - SHG) 
8.8.1949'. In Oesetzblatt der Ven.utJltun9 des Veretntgten Wfrtschaftsgebletes 1949. 28, 
pp.205-214. 
4 ~'. ct: SHG, §44. 
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repayable) to refugees wishing to build their own home. 1 In November 19502 , 
the HAfSH made additional funds available via the regional housing authorities 
to help home purchase for refugees who did not have any means of their own. 
The refugees received an interest free loan (sometimes a straight subSidy) to 
cover the contribution to the house price which they would normally be expected 
to find from their own funds. 3 
For miners as a whole, 1951 was the year in which the drive for owner-
occupation really took off. When. in October 1951. the Minister for the 
Marshall Plan set up a special committee to enhance productivity in coal 
mining.4 he specifically mentioned the desirability of owner-occupation.5 A 
special sub-committee for housing was set up with federal. regional and 
6 industrial representatives. Over the following two years it was to concern itself 
extensively with making it easier to acquire a home. In the Miners' Housing 
Law, owner-occupied housing was given a clear priority over all other types of 
7 housing. The impact of this commitment was manifest in the financing 
provisions introduced by both the German and the ECA building programmes 
1951-1952. Instead of the customary 20-25 percent, the miners now had to find 
only 10 percent of the house price in advance and even for this element, the state 
8 
was willing to offer interest-free loans. This was almost as good as the deal 
1 WWA F35, 3554. DKBL. Circular No.IV-l to m1n1ng companies and colllertes. 
7.1.1950. 
2 The funds were not actually made avallable In NRW until March 1951. 
s HStaD NWI0 13 WAM IIIB 6 to ReglerungsprAsldenten. 10.3.1951; WAM. Erla6. 
'Bestlmmungen Qber die GewAhrung von Be1h1lfen a1s Ersatz fOr fehlendes Elgenkapltal', 
10.3.1951. 
4 See BAK-ZwSt.H B149. 672. BAM Abt.Dal, Memo. 2.10.1951. 
5 Ibid, p.4. 
6 UnterausschuB DI. Records are in BAK-ZwSt.H BI34, 1372. 
7 a: 13, BAWBG. 
8 WWA F29. 368/2, DKBL. Circular No.IV-7 to mtnJ.ng companies and colI1ertes, 
4.2.1952, annex: paper by Ludwtg Fehlemann. 'Ole wlchtlgsten bauwtrtschaft11chen und 
flnanztechnlschen Geslchtspunkte. die bel der DurchfQhrung des 
Bergarbelterwohnungsbauprogrammes 1952 von Bedeutung sind', 22.1.1952: MSA. 
'2.Fortschr1ttsber1cht', p.16. 
Settling the miner 372 
offered the refugees. 1 Miners could now buy houses for little more than the cost 
of renting a newly built house and with payments that were less than 20 percent 
of gross income (though rents for older properties were still considerably 
2 
cheaper). 'Die neuen Bestimmungen', noted the DKBL, 'erleichtern ... den 
Eigentumserwerb fur den Bergmann in einer Weise, die bis vor kurzem kaum fur 
mOglich gehalten wurde. Bei gutem Willen kann der Bergmann fast risikolos bei 
einem verhAltnismA.Big nur geringen wertbestandigen Sparen zu einem 
3 E1gentum gelangen'. 
Though no one in the Ruhr was actually hostile to owner-occupied property, this 
sudden transformation met with a certain amount of scepticism. Many 
officials and housing society experts believed that few miners would respond. 4 
In any case, the 1952 building programm was mapped out before the new terms 
became known so that it was dominated by rented property. The pressure from 
parliament and state to alter this emphasis showed just how important a 
measure the state believed it to be. Though the subcommittee for miners' 
housing had in December 1951 set an advertisement campaign in motion, this 
was not enough for the Parliamentary Committee for Housing and 
Reconstruction which in June 1952 called for more intensive measures. 5 This 
was more evidence that hOUSing was seen as more than just an incentive. The 
parliamentarians were not content just to offer home ownership to those who 
expressed interest: they wanted actively to create that interest. 
1 Refugees had the advantage that even while paying the pre-payment the house 
belonged to them, whereas other miners became owners only when they began paying off 
the remaining loans. In addition refugees could payoff the pre-payment in 25 years, 
other miners &ad to do it in 10. See WWA F29. 332. DKBL. Circular No.VI 1-15 to mining 
companies. 6.7.1953. 
2 MSA. '2.Fortschrlttsberlcht' .p.15. 
S Fehlemann. 'Die wlchtlgsten bauwtrtschaftllchen und ftnanztechnlschen 
Gesichtspunkte' . 
4 MSA. '2.FortachrIttsbericht' .p.15. 
5 8AK-ZWStH 8134. 1372. Unterausschl\8 ID. 3rd Report. 5.12.1951: 6th Report. 
3.7.1952. 
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In November the committee came to the Ruhr. At the centre of discussions was 
the question whether more could be done to promote owner-occupied homes. 
An SVR representative at a meeting with the committee argued that the 
achievement hitherto - almost 30 percent of 1952 building being in the form of 
owner-occupied property - was considerable. But the deputies were not satisfied. 
They contended that most miners could be persuaded to buy their own property 
and stressed the importance of broadening property ownership as a bullwark 
against 'infiltration' from the other side of the Iron Curtain. 1 As a result the 
NRW regional committee responsible for distributing funds raised by the miners' 
housing levy (Bez1rksausschu~) deCided to commit 40 percent of funds in 1953 to 
owner-occupied homes, a decision warmly received by the Federal Housing 
2 Ministry. Mines' building proposals which envisaged more than 60 percent of 
their building in the form of rented property were rejected. 3 
Other voices too urged the transformation of the miners into a property-owning 
class. In a j oint appeal distributed to all the mines, the Protestant and Catholic 
church argued that: 4 
Nur aus einer ethischen Haltung heraus und geschult in der 
Verantwortung urn ein kleines Eigentum wird der Bergmann willig sein, 
die Aufgaben der sozialen Gemeinschaft in einem gro~en 
Industrtebetrteb wie innerhalb des ganzen Volkes auf sich zu nehmen. 
The miners' union too. strongly endorsed the idea of owner-occupied housing. 
Even before Dusseldorf and Bonn resolved to offer the favourable financial 
5 
terms. the 1GB had been demanding more support for home buyers. In 1952 the 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H BI02. 33175. 'Kurzprotokoll Qber die Beslchtlgungsfahrt des 
Bundestagsausschusses fOr Wlederautbau und Wohnungswesen In das Ruhrgeblet. 
13/14.11.1952'.20.11.1952. 
2 BAK-ZwSt.H B134. 3727. Unterausschl\6 m. 7th Report. 28.10.1952. 
s BBA 55,12200. Nr.lS. Minutes of Bergausschl\6 MeeUng, 29.9.1952. 
"WWA F29.335. appendix to General Director. DKBL. Circular Nr.IV-14 to minlng 
companies. 8.S.1952; See ala BBA 42.65. 'Der Mensch 1m Bergbau. 1. Rundbrlef aus der 
gemelnaamen SozIalarbelt der Komesalonen 1m Bergbau'. no date. 
s HStaD NWI0.83. SVR. Memo. 28.9.1950. 
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1GB carried out a survey of its members which revealed that interest in acquiring 
a house was much higher than some of the Ruhr sceptics had Originally 
1 
thought. When the subcommittee on miners' houSing looked into difficulties 
still inhibiting house purchase at the end of 1952, the 1GB was one of the 
strongest supporters of an increased home-ownership ratio. 
TIle 1GB shared many of the goals, hopes and fears of the government. It was 
noteworthy that when Frau Dr. Brokelschen of the Parliamentary Housing 
Committee expressed her thoughts on property and Eastern inflitration, she had 
no qualms about presenting her views even though union representatives were 
2 present. Writing in the unionjoumal Bergbau und Wirtschajt in 1953, labour 
director Triem criticised the employers for having too long neglected the 
'Eigentums- und Entproletartsierungsfrage,. 3 The DGB, which was rather 
sceptical about the whole project, believing it to be more a government hobby-
horse rather than what the miners really wanted, got a flea in its ear when it put 
this thought to the 1GB. 'Es ist an der Zeit', responded the miners' union, 'durch 
eine verstArlrte EigentumsfOrderung allen jenen Menschen zu helfen, die .... Haus 
und Herd verloren haben und wieder zu einer neuen VelWUIZelung auf eigener 
Scholle und zu einem eigenen Helm kommen wollen ... ' and went on to assert the 
4 
enonnous interest present amongst the miners for owner-occupied homes. 
Like the parliamentarians. the 1GB saw eminent dangers in big estates full of 
rented accommodation. Initially it had jOined in the protests agafnst the ECA's 
5 
idea of buUding big estates for fear of losing control to radical elements and in 
Its response to the DGB it said of multi-storey rented accommodation. 'Ihr Weg 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H B134, 3727, 6th report of Unteraussch~ III and 1GB (ed.) , 
Jahrbuch 1952, p.429. 
2 'Kurzprotokoll Qber die Besichtlgungsfahrt des Bundestagsausschusses'. 
S Trlem. Wohn- und LebenssUl', p.99. 
4 DOBA. Ftle 'IGBergbau (1949-1966)', 1GB Hauptverwaltung to DOB Vorstand. 
21.3.1963. 
5 HStaD NW13. 100. WAM 1DB1. Memo, 17.7.1951 • 
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fiihrt geradewegs zum Lautsprecher mit zentral emgeschalteter Welle, Kontrolle 
1 der Zeitung, Besucher usw'. 
Incentive or fetter 
The problem with using housing as a means of workforce integration was 
deciding what to do if the occupant left the company. Either the right to be a 
tenant was linked to the employment contract. which meant that 
unemployment was followed by eviction and, for those tenants still in 
employment. might well allow the employer to use the threat of eviction as a 
means of discipline. These were very high social costs. Alternatively. the tie 
between employment and housing was not enforced, which might well encourage 
the very behaviour It was supposed to prevent: would-be tenants or home-owners 
would work in the mines just long enough to obtain a dwelling and then leave. 
The legislators of the Weimar Republic had already had a crack at this problem. 
In general tenns they were hostile to company housing and by means of tax 
incentive and penalties, encouraged employers to subsidise public utility 
2 
societies instead of building for themselves. On the other hand, the state 
wanted to ensure that the houses built with the conSiderable public funds 
flOWing into the miners' housing programme would continue to be available to 
the mines. It therefore designed a compromise solution whereby housing built 
With the help of the levy was tied to the industry rather than to any particular 
mine, thus reducing the danger of employers abusing their power. A further 
restriction on the tie was that it lasted for only twenty years from the day the 
house was built.3 These restrictions applied only to houses built with the aid of 
1 1GB Hauptverwaltung to DOB Vorstand, 21.3.1953. 
2 Josef Lang. 'Die geschlchtl1che und rAuml1che Entwlcklung des 
Bergarbe1telWOhnungsbaus1m Ruhrgeblet' (Olss., Cologne University, 1952). p.861f. 
S Gesetz Qber Bergmanns81edlungen. 10.3.1930. In Relchsgesetzblatt 1930. I, p.32 
and Retchsgesetzblatt 1934. I. p.354: Monlka sturm and Hartmut Hohmann. 'Der 
(Continued overleaf.) 
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the miners' levy. There was still a large stock of older company housing. and 
indeed of public utility housing funded by other means, whose tenancy 
agreements allowed employees leaving a mine to be evicted. 
Legislation and regulations in the early post-1945 period went further in 
weakening company ties. Though it was prepared to provide funds for repairs to 
existing company housing, NRW, for instance, gave no aid towards the 
construction of new company properties. 1 The tax incentives provided by the 
2 1949 tax law were largely denied companies who did their own building. Most 
important of all was the First Federal Housing Law of 1950 which laid down that 
company housing could in future only receive public funds if the tie between 
employment contract and tenancy agreement dissolved once the tenant had been 
in company employment for more than five years. 3 This was a conSiderable 
extension to previous legislation since it was phrased broadly enough as to affect 
not only housing belonging to a particular company but also housing tied to an 
industry. 
As far as owner-occupied housing was concerned, NRW introduced the ruling 
that companies assisting their employees to become owner-occupiers were 
allowed to maintain their control over the property for three years. during 
which time the prospective owner could be evicted if he left the company. 
Thereafter, as owner of the property the employee could no longer be evicted. 
The company had the right to increase the speed of repayments and the interest 
Bergarbelterwobnungsbau 1m Rubrgeblet nacb 1945 unter dem EInO~ der 
Wirtscbaftllcben Entwlcklung des Stelnkoblenbergbaus', (Dlplomarbelt, Bielefeld 
Untvera11¥, 1971), pp.78-79. 
1 HStaD NW10.92. WAM. 'Bestlmmungen Ober die FOrderung des Baus von 
BergarbelterwobnstAtten', 24.3.1948. 
2 See chapter 5. p.245. 
s 120. Erates Wobnungsbaugeaetz. 24.4.1950. Bgbl1950, 16. pp.83-88. 
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on the loan but such increases could not exceed what the mortgagee was able to 
1 
afford. 
It therefore looked in the post-war period as if general social-political 
considerations would be allowed to outweigh the economic deSideratum of 
maintaining housing for the industry. However, in 1950-51 there was some 
intense lobbying by the DKBL and the Economics Ministry. The DKBL was 
Critical of both NRWs general financing regulations and fiercely critical of the 
five year limit in the housing law.2 Though unable to alter the law, it did enlist 
the support of Federal Economics Ministry offiCials who put the industry's case 
forcefully to their colleagues in the Housing Ministry.3 Presumably because of 
the Economics Ministry's influence, the Miners' HOUSing Law of 1951, while 
maintaining the principle that hOUSing could not be tied to a particular 
4 
colliery, introduced a ferocious link between hOUSing and mining employment 
which reversed not only the First Housing Law provisions but also Weimar 
legislation. 
Whereas the Bergmannssiedlungsgesetz of 1930 had settled for a 20 year tie, 
hOUSing under the 1951 act remained 'pennanently' tied to the industry, in other 
words until the loan from the mining levy funds had been fully repaid. A tenant 
1 
Cf. para 95 of the WAM's 'Bestimmungen Qber die FOrderung des 
Wohnungsneubaues (Kleinwohnungen und Kleinsiedlungen) in Lande Nordrheln-
Westfalen (NBB)', in MtntstertalblattfOr das Land Nordrhetn-Westfalen 12.3.1951, 4, 19, 
pp.182-200. 
2 See WWA F35,3549, DKBL, Circular No. CJ 48 to mining companies, 1.8.1950 and 
the DKBL's comments on the NBB in DKBL, Circular No.IV-7 to Mtn1ng companies and 
coIl1erles, 4.2.1952, part II. 
s BAK-ZwSt.H BI34, 1365, BWoM 1334/4797 /SO, Memo, 15.8.1950. 
4 In fact. movlng from one pit to another could still have some negative 
consequences for the miner because in such cases collierles making loans to potential 
home-owners were allowed to raise the interest. In addition. some collieries continued to 
by to evtct tenants (Ie of rented accommodation) who had changed pits. The 1GB fought a 
fierce battle against these moves but It was only in 1954 that a clear court dedston on 
evictions was obtained. As far as the home-owners were concerned. the revtsed 
mortgage agreements progressively increased the pressure on employers to negotiate 
With the new employer in cases where miners bad gone from one pit to another. 1GB 
(ed.). Jahrbuch J952. p.431 & Jahrbuch 1954. p.671: WWA F29. 367/1. DKBJ... Circular 
No.Cj 69 to mining companies and coIJierles. 5.9.1952. 
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leaving mining even after long service would be liable to eviction. 1 The most 
tnvidious conditions applied to owner-occupied property. If, for example, a 
miner died and his son inherited the house before the loan had been paid off (a 
vety likely event, since the loan took 66 years to pay), the son would be obliged to 
enter the mining industry or else lose his right to the house. Similarly a miner's 
widow, though she herself could stay in the house, could lose her right to it if she 
married a non-miner. In addition, the loss of right to the house was initially 
intended to mean not just, as in NRW's other new housing legislation, having to 
pay the loan back faster and at a higher rate of interest than previously but 
actually losing the house. The act laid down that houses were to be sold as 
'Reichshe1msUltten' which meant that they could be bought back at a price 
unfavourable for the sellers if the stipulated conditions were not met. 2 
Even before the legislation was on the statute book, the housing authorities 
began a rear-guard action to strengthen the occupants' rights. The NRW 
Reconstruction Ministry informed the Federal Housing Minister that 
supplementary regulations for NRW would contain a clause preventing the 
3 houses from being issued as 'ReichsheimstAtten'. In the event, the 
4 
supplementary regulations did not contain this clause. However. there are 
indications that the Ministry was able to make its influence felt so that in such 
5 
cases forced purchases were not in fact undertaken. Since, under general 
1 Employees rettrtng from the company would not be affected. Employers had 
long accepted pensioners' rights to continued occupancy. Pensioners continued to be by 
far the Single largest category of non-active miners in mine-owned housing. 
2 See the BAWBO, 23.10.1951 §5 and HStaD NW9,85. WAM.lntemal memo from 
Gruppe IB to !VC. 13.11.1951. 
s HStaD NW9.85. WAM IVC to BWoM. 24.11.1951. 
" WAM DlBI. Memo, 21.12.1951. in HeinZ Tostorff. Der Bery~s~ 
Efn Kurzkommentar aber das Gesetz zw" F6rderung des Bergarbette:, WVfP"," ~s us 
Kohlenbergbau. Essen 1952, p.35ff. 
5 ConflrmaUon that the ReichheimstAtte regulations were not being used to the 
miners' disadvantage came in 1954 when the 10 Bergbau called for all houses to be Issued 
as ReichaheimBtAtten because of the (tax and other) benefits this brought the miner. See 
lOB (ed.). Jahrbuch 1954. p.672. 
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housing laws. repayments could never be raised to the point where the occupants 
could no longer afford them. this was a major change in the impact of the law. 
Together, the NRW Reconstruction Minister and the Federal Housing Minister 
found a subtle way to alter the slant of the housing programme without any 
legislation, namely. by stipulating the conditions which agreements between 
mortgagee and lenders had to contain. An example is given by miners who had 
taken a loan to substitute for the 10 percent initial contribution (Eigenletstung) 
they were normally expected to pay. Until this 10 percent had been paid, the 
miners were technically not yet house owners and could be evicted if they left the 
indUStry. In 1952, however, the DKBL was forced accept a new model loan 
agreement which in such an eventuality restricted the employers' sanctions to 
increasing the rate of repayments. This was more favourable to the mortgagee 
1 than even NRW's general housing regulations. In addition, the agreements 
2 
ensured that housing was tied to the industry for no longer than 20 years. 
The most dramatic changes came in 1952-1953. Under pressure from the 
Parliamentary Committee for Housing and Reconstruction. the mining 
productivity subcommittee for miners' housing looked into the reasons still 
3 inhibiting miners from becoming property owners. As a result of the 
committee's deliberations a number of changes were now introduced. Amongst 
other provisions. the widow who remarried did not automatically lose her r:tght 
to the house: adult children inheriting the house too were freed from the tie as 
long as at least part was sub-let to a IIlin1ng tenant.4 Finally. towards the end of 
1 WWA F29. 367/1. DKBL. Circular No.CJ 69 to MInIng companies and collieries, 
5.9.1952 and annex: Darlehensmustervertrag Qber die Gewahrung von Arbeltgebmiar-
!eben zur FOrdenmg von Bergarbelter-Kletnsledlungen und Bergarbelteretgenhelmen. 
2 BAK-ZWSt.H 8134. 1372. BAM Da1. Memo. 14.5.1952. 
s BAK-ZwSt.H 8134,3727. 7th report of the UnterausschulS m. 28.10.1952. 
4 BAK-ZWSt.H 8134. 1365. 'Ergebnlsprotokoll Qber die Sltzung vom 4.Februar 
Qber die endgOlUge Fassung der Musterachuldurkunden unci Vertrlge fOr Elgenhelme unci 
KlelnsIed1ungen'. no date (Feb. 1953). 
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1953, the DKBL was forced to accept a new set of loan conditions in which the 
grounds for terminating the loan did not include the occupant leaving the 
1 industry at all! The only listed grounds now were the normal technical 
reasons such as defaulting on payments and so forth. Exactly how this affected 
the DKBL's legal position is not clear, since the new wording of the model 
agreements was in direct contravention of the 1951 law.2 About a key decision 
in the following year, however, there was no doubt however: when the Miners' 
Housing Law was renewed in 1954, the support given to owner-occupied 
properties became even more marked and the link between job contract and 
3 house was llmited to ten years. 
In effect, two goals were in conflict. The priority of workforce regeneration 
confronted the aspiration to create a broad property-owning working class. The 
housing authorities believed that the general socio-political goals which owner-
occupation were intended to fulfill would be fatally compromised if the property 
was burdened with the rigid and long-lasting conditions originally laid down in 
4 the Miners' Housing Law. Thus the societal integration strategy was 
progressively given greater priority than workforce regeneration. Of course, the 
two goals were not necessarily in conflict. There was the hope that by making 
the conditions for house ownership less irksome, the miners would voluntarily 
choose to stay in the industry - and this may even have been partially successful. 
The point was, however. that the drive to make home-ownership easier was not 
primarily orientated to the interests of coal mining. but to broader socto-
political goals. 
1 See WWA F29. 367/1. DKBL. Circular No.CJ 92 to mining companies and 
coll1ertes. 19.11.1953. annex. esp. §11 (1) & (2). For the earlier version of the §11. see 
DKBL, Circular No.Cj 69 to m1nJng companies and co1llertes. 5.9.1952. 
2 WW A F29. 367/1. DKBL. CtrcuJar No.CJ 92 to mtntng companies and coll1er1es, 
19.11.1953. 
:I 'Schrtftllcher Bertcht des Ausschusses fQrWlederaufbau und Wobnungswesen', 
esp. p.3. 
4 See. eg. HStaD NW9.85. WAM IVC to SWoM. 24.11.1951. 
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In this context it is worth noting that even when mine-owners did have the right 
to evict. the eviction very often failed because of a provision in federal hOUSing 
control legislation that tenants could be evicted only if suitable hOUSing was 
1 
avaUable for them elsewhere. The situation worsened in 1954 because, as a 
result of a NRW ruling. some of the mining companies' rights to nominate 
tenants for vacant housing not actually belonging to them were removed. 2 The 
general problem of evictions was not unique to coal-mining but faced by many 
industries. In 1954, a BWiM enquiry to the mines on the subject elicited a reply 
not from the UVR but from the Housing Committe of the Association of 
3 Chambers of Commerce. The committee's representations were to no avail. 
Here, as in the question of the Zweckbindung, social policy considerations were 
allowed to carry the day. 
Housing's impact on the integration of the new miners 
By 1954, the waiting time for a house or apartment had at most mines dropped to 
less than a year. Of course, there were mines which by virtue of particularly 
heavy bomb damage and a poor finanCial position were still suffering from a 
4 
severe shortage of family accommodation, but by and large the acute housing 
shortage present at the end of the late 1940's had been solved. In 1955, most 
companies were in a position to offer all prospective new miners an apartment 
within six months. 5 
1 830, Wohnraumbewirtschaftungsgesetz, Bgbl1953, I, pp.97-105. 
2 StaM Reglerung Amsberg, 5.143, Report of the Verblndungsstelle der 
Regterungsprlsldenten Amsberg, OOsseldorf, MQnster for May 1953. 
S Ges.Verb. Ftle 'Wohnungswesen Aussch~ 9', Minutes of housing committee 
meeUng, 2.3.1954. 
, The Friedrich Krupp Bergwerke being a notable example, see Gee.Verb. FIle 
Wohnungawesen 4 Bergarbelterwohnungsbauprogramm 41 Programme 1954-1961 
BezlrkasauschWS-Sltzungen', Table 'Bergarbeltenwhnungsbau', Essen 30.6.1956. 
5 See, for Instance the 'Wegwelser' for potenUal recruits produced ~ the 
Hambomer aergbau AO in Gee.Verb. FIle '300-301.1, Ausbtldung von Neubergleuten . 
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What was the impact of all this building on the workforce? In the pre-1951 
period, when the miners' building programme limped along on limited funds, 
housing was seen by most observers in the Ruhr as absolutely decisive for 
creating a stable and productive workforce. 
'Die Frage der BesUindigkeit der 
Neu-Bergleute steht im ursachlichen Zusammenhang mit der LOsung der 
Wohnraumsfrage', commented a manager from the Concordia mine in 1949. 1 
As wastage increased in the 1950-51 period, the clamour for more housing only 
increased. A major report on the mining industry produced by the US High 
Commissioner's office in November 1951 noted that 'there is general agreement 
that miners' hOUSing is the No.1 requirement for stabilizing the workers and 
increasing efficiency since there is presently a very high labor turnover,.2 Yet 
towards the end of 1952, a year after the miners' levy had been introduced, the 
Federal Economics Ministry submitted a report to the Miners' Housing 
Subcommittee (Unterausschu~ III) which showed that the increased building 
3 
rate had not had a measurable effect on wastage. True. in 1953. when the time 
came to conSider whether a renewal of the miners' housing levy was sUll 
4 desirable, all the members of the subcommittee still believed that it was. It 
was noteworthy. however. that when the Federal Housing Minister wrote to his 
colleague in the Economics Ministry for arguments that could be used in 
parliament to justify renewal, it was a rather uncertain reply that came back. 
After contending that housing was still important to reduce wastage and 
strengthen productivity the Ministry went on. 'Auch in diesem Punkte kann 
man skeptisch sein hinsichtlich des durch den Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau zu 
1 BBA 8,384, Concordia to DKBL. AbteUungArbe1tsetnsatz. 25.2.1949. 
2 BAK-ZwSt.H B102, 21258, Office of the US High ColDIDisSloner for Germany, 
P.RD1vts1on, "lbe West German Coal Jndusby since 1945', 14.11.1951, p.&. 
s SAK-ZwSt.H Bl34, 3727. 7th report ofUnteraussch1.l8lD, 28.10.1952. 
4 SAK-ZwStH 8134,3727, 8th report of the Unteraussch1.l8 01, 7.8.1953. 
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Erreichenden, aber das Argument diirfte zu veIWenden sein'. 1 The chainnan of 
the UVR's housing COmmittee, Dubusc, noted that between 1949 and 1953 almost 
50 percent of the Klockner miners had obtained new company housing. Yet 
productivity had not risen and, Dubusc contended, would probably not have 
fallen if there had been no new apartments. Somewhat surprising, given this 
judgement, was his view that miners' housing was nevertheless probably worth 
it in the long run. 2 
The evidence adduced by these experts suggests, at least at first sight, that 
miners' housing was not worth it. Was the whole drive for miners' houSing, 
then, based on an 1llusion? 
One question must be whether the romantics had built houses that were actually 
unsuitable for the newcomers. No doubt a two/three storey building or a 
reasonably Sized garden were acceptable to most, but could it really be assumed 
that the newcomers would want to live in the kitchen or to keep a pig or a goat? 
It should be remembered that where the stall for the animals was built directly 
on to the house it took up a fair amount of the ground floor space. 
In addition, many of the houses produced by the Treuhandstelle fiiI' Bergmanns-
siedlungen and other housing associations at least until the early 1950's 
balanced the cost of offering a fair sized garden and keeping the number of 
storeys down by economising on the standard of amenities. In the early years 
the Reconstruction Ministry. which as has been seen was not without out its own 
romantic conception of the miner. encouraged this. In a paper on the best types 
of social hOUSing for NRW. the Ministry disttngutshed between blocks of flats for 
the fully urbanised population and two storey housing for the small town and 
1 8AK-ZwSt.H BI02. 33315. BWIM to BWoM. 26.7.1954. 
2 BAK-ZwSt.H BI02. 33148. Copy of Memo. concerning the Meeting of 
Studlenausschul' 01 des Beratenden Ausschusses 'Arbelterwohnungsbau. Produktton. 
Produkt1v1tat' on 2.8.19541n lA..Dcemburg. 2.8.1954. 
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rural communities, the latter bUilding style being, as a subsequent note 
obselVed, outlined with the miners particularly in mind. Because the miners 
and other Similar groups still revealed 'stark Uindliche Zuge' in their 
Wohngesittung', argued the Ministry, the houses could be built with a 
'vergleichsweise gertngen Aufwand an technischen Einrichtungen,.l 
What was the new miners' reponse to this? The available material is somewhat 
contradictory. The MSA reported, for instance, that they had found many 
instances of houses with stalls being offered to tenants who said they had no 
intention of keeping animals and resented the loss of living space.2 According 
to the miners' housing investigation, however, 83 percent of miners interviewed 
expressed an interest in having some sort of outhouse for animals. It was 
evident that the newcomers had not been unaffected by the prevailing attitudes 
and habits and in addition many of them came from rural or small town 
3 backgrounds. Neither report was free from its own ideology. The MSA was 
keen to bring a modem lifestyle to what it saw as a situation where the 
conselVatism of the builders was maintaining archaic and primitive living 
conditions. For his part, Gunther Ipsen, the driving force behind the SoFoSt 
report. was not without his own romantic image of the miner and was keen to 
demonstrate that the traditional miners' cottage (BergmannskOtten). prevalent 
before before the Ruhr's expansion really began. had somehow ffitered through 
4 into the minds of modem miners. 
What can be said is that the differences between outsiders and locals were less 
significant than generational differences. This applied particularly to the 
D. 
1 HStaD NW73. 259. WAM IA/300. Memo, 25.3.1950 and attached note to Gruppe I 
2 MSA. '2.Fortsclu1ttsbel1cht' .p. 7. 
s SoFoSt. 'SchlQ8berIcht', pp.l0/10a & p.25. 
4 Ibid., p.11. and intervIeW with Prof. Croon. 9.4.1984. 
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Wohnldiche, which younger families of all backgrounds rejected. 1 To that 
extent, Professor Knipping was advocating a design unsuitable for most young 
mtntng families. Thanks to the sUlVey, within a short time the seperate kitchen 
came to dominate housing construction. 
As far as the gardens were concerned, there were two groups amongst the new 
miners with specific wishes different from the established men. On the one 
hand there were the refugees, many of whom wanted a large garden and arumals; 
had the investigation not been blinkered by its vision of the 'Berg-KOtter', it 
would have recognised that the refugees as a whole were more likely than the 
established men to want subsantialland and livestock.2 On the other hand, 
there were many young new miners where the wife wanted to work They had no 
time to look after animals. 3 A variety of different housing designs was 
therefore required. 
True of all groups, however, was that the attitude to vegetable gardening and 
animal keeping was changing rapidly as material conditions Improved. In a 
company estate belonging to the Friedrich der GroJ3e mine, for example, the 
inhabitants had before the war kept over 200 pigs, a couple of dozen sheep and 
there had even been one cow. By 1954, the local newspaper recorded that there 
weren't five pigs left on the whole estate, though a few inhabitants still wanted 
their chicken run. Whereas in the whole of Heme there were 97 goats in 1950 
(along with 656 sheep. 77.319 chickens. 1.785 geese, 1.141 ducks and 135 bee 
hives), by 1953 the number of goats had fallen to 24. (Sometime between 1963 
and 1965 the last Heme goat quietly dtsappeared).4 Here too, therefore, many 
1 SoFoSt, 'Schl~ber1cht'. p.Sl 
2 ibid. and Intetvtewwith Dr.Croon, 9.4.1984. 
s SoFoSt. 'Schl~ber1cht', p.S. 
4 'Sledlung Holper Heide wlrd modernlslert', Westtaltsche Rundschau: Heme 
ed!Uon, 10.7.1954: 'Die Ertnnerung 1st gebUeben. Zlegen bet uns ausgestorben. Heme 
Zettung. 9.11.1965; 'Klelnvleh ntcht nur fOr den suppentopt. Hemer Stadtanzefger, 
&9.1981. 
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houses were being fitted with features which would not be used or used for only a 
short period. 
Writing in 1980's Britain with a general awareness of the architectural and 
social disasters created by modernisers in the 1950's and 1960's, it is hard to 
resist the impression that the Ruhr did not really suffer from the conselVatism 
of the planners, designers and builders. Many of the undeSirable features could 
be altered by the occupants and by the end of the decade, a great many barns and 
stalls had been converted to garages for motor bikes. The most general problem 
with German social housing from the 50's was that to save time and expense the 
housing was often too small. This affected the miners too, l but they were much 
better off than most. Some of the new estates suffered also initially from a 
2 
shortage of communal amenities, but in general a positive, if sometimes 
somewhat cramped housing environment was on offer. It should also be borne 
in mind that the newcomers were very aware of the cramped housing conditions 
existing for other population groups. Almost one third of adult householders in 
3 NRW did not have an apartment to themselves. It was noteworthy that in a 
survey of reasons why men left the pits in 1954, discontent with housing 
4 
conditions was virtually never raised. 
1 SoFoSt, 'SchluBbericht'. pp.13-14. 
2 On the problems with new estates. see the autobiography of the former new 
miner Berger. Der Pritt hat mtch ausgespuckt. p.l07ff. It was the characteristic Ruhr 
problem that the pace of workforce growth led to house building unaccompanied by the 
appropriate infrastructure. The problem both pre-1914 and post-I945 was that the local 
towns. particularly those in the northern part of the Ruhr. did not have enough money to 
pay for Infrastructure. Because of this the Miners' Housng Law provtslons were changed 
eo that some of the housing funds could be used to meet tnfrastructural expenses. See 
HStaD NWI09 134 WAM III A2 to BWoM. 20.5.1953; Ges.Verb .• FIle Wohnungswesen, 
Ausschu.6 9'. Mtnu~ ofmeetlng. 2.3.1954; 8AK-ZwSt.H BI02. 4392. 'Begrondungzu dem 
Entwwf eines Gesetzes zur Andenmg des Gesetzes zur FOrderung des Wohnungabaus 1m 
Kohlenbelgbau vom 23.10.1951'. no date (1954]. 
S Abe and Echterhoff. Dos Vest -efn dynlI1n1scher Wfrtschajtsraum. p.I53. 
" BAK-ZwSLH BI02. 33091. BWIM IIIAI 33079/54. Memo. Annex 8 and 
accompanying document with no author( almost certatnly UUrtch. UVRl. 'Bemerkungen zu 
der Soildelerhebung zur Ermlttlung der AbkebrgrQnde'. no date. p.4. 
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Why then was housing unable to prevent the high wastage of the 1950's? Many 
occupants of miners' housing could easily reach a steel mill from where they 
lived and it was indeed the mines of Essen, Bochum and Dortmund situated near 
steel works and other big industrial employers which suffered some of the 
highest wastage levels. This competition in mining's back yard, coupled with 
the fact that evictions were now difficult to carty out (and that it was easier for 
home owners to quit the mines while retaining their house) reduced housing's 
ability to compel the occupants to remain in the workforce. There was evidence 
that qUite a number of recruits came with the intention of obtaining a house and 
1 then leaving the mines. On the other hand, the extent of this phenomon should 
not be exaggerated. Though the number of tenants in company houses no longer 
employed by the mines grew, the proportion of houses with such tenants did not. 
In 1948 just under 9 percent of tenants in colliery-owned properties were 
employed outside the mines (this figure does not include pensioners). In 1951 
the proportion had fallen to a little under 8 percent. In 1955, for all mining 
houses whether mine-owned, public utility or privately owned, the proportion 
wasjust under 7 percent. Even the proportion of pensioners had fallen. In 1951 
they amounted to 18 percent of tenants in company houses but by 1955 had 
2 fallen to about 14 percent of all miners' housing. 
A more Important factor reducing housing'S effectiveness in controll1ng wastage 
was the fact that it came so late. By 1951-52 many mines had got themselves 
into a hiring-wastage cycle from which it was hard to extricate themselves. 
Forced in the post-1948 period to hire mobile young men because there was no 
1 STAM Regterung Arnsberg. 5.143 •• Report of the Verblndungsatelle der 
Reglerungspnlsldenten Amsberg. DQsseldorf. MOnster fOr BergarbelterunterkOnfte. May 
1953. 
2 Sources 1948 and 1951 In WWA F29. 333/1. DKBL. Ctrcular No.IV-9 to Mlnlng 
companies. 12.2.1952. annex: 1955. calculated from figures In StaM Regterung =~ 
5.143 •• Report of the VerblndUDgsstelle der Reglerungspnlstdenten Amsberg. DO. 
MOnster fOr BergarbelterunterkOnfte. March 1955. 
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1 
family accommodation, the mines found in the early 1950's that they had 
increasingly Uttle chance to choose people likely to stay. 2 Though the mines 
increasingly recognised the deSirability of hiring married men who could be 
offered a home, their demand for labour was too large to allow more than a 
small proportion of it to be met by married men.3 Because many of the people 
they hired in the 1950's were single and had expressed no intention to marry 
they would, at least in the short term, be unaffected by the hOUSing programme. 
In 1952, for example, the 1GB estimated that at the very outside 10,000 of the 
36,000 or so occupants of the adult mining hostels might be interested in 
obtaining a house.4 A SoFoSt survey came to similar conclusions.5 This was 
born out by housing allocation figures produced a year later which revealed that 
of 28,400 miners given a house in that year, only 2,804 or about 10 percent had 
come from the camps and a further 2,188 were new reCruits. (The rest were long-
standing workers in unsatisfactory accommodaUon.)6 Yet it was precisely 
amongst the group of young hostel occupants that wastage was at Its highest. 
Thus there was a Sizeable proportion of wastage which hOUSing could do nothing 
about. 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H BI02, 33091, BWiM IIIAI 33079/54, Memo, Annex 8 and 
accompanying document with no author (almost certainly Ullrtch, UVR), 'Bemerkungen zu 
der Sondererhebung zur Ermtttlung der Ahkehrgnlnde', no date, p.5. 
2 The comment of the DKBL's Manpower and Training Committee in 1952 that 'die 
Zechen beftnden sich in einer Notlage, well 1hnen das Polster 1m Belegschaftsvolumen a1s 
notwendtge Voraussetzung fehIt' could apply equally well to the problem of choosing new 
recruits as it did to actual subject of discussion at the committee, namely ensuring that 
recruits got a proper introduction to the work. See Budde, 'GrQnde und Auswirkungen', 
p.40. 
s In 1950 some mines began to recruit married men, though in view of the housing 
llsts they were generally less than keen. By the mid-1950's virtually all mines were 
recruiting married men by preference. See ego StaM Arbeltsamt Dortmund, 46, ABB, 
Circular 8/51, IS. 7.1951 and Starn Arbeltsamt Bochum, 27, AAHeme, Nebenstelle Wanne-
Etcke1, Reports on new miner recruitment, Sl.1.1955 and 26.5.1955. 
4 The 10,000 figure In 1GB (ed.), Jahrbuch 1952, p.440fl' and Kadow's remarks in 
IGBEA Handakten Rudi guast, file 'M.Asslstenten Tagungen (Alt)', Minutes of S.Meettng of 
the 'Herner Kreis', 24.6.1953. 
!5 AZG Ftle 'I 1 26 Zuwel8ung von ArbeitskrAften aus anderen Beztrken 
(Um8chQler)', MInute8 of 2nd meeting of Arbeltsgemelnschaft ArbeItsamt-Bergbau, 
8.5.1953. p.4, cnmnv:nts mDr.Buchholz. 
8 SlaM Reglerung Amsberg, 5.14S., Report of the Verblndungs8telle der 
Reglerung8pr181denten Am8berg, DQsseldorf, MOnster fOr BergarbelterunterkOnfte, 
20.1.1954 . 
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TIle delay in developing a major housing initiative was exacerbated by the fact 
that the established workforce was frequently allowed to come first on the 
housing list. With the exception of some refugee housing and also the MSA 
programme, housing allocation decisions were made within the colliery by 
management and works council. Usually a whole series of different criteria, 
such as length of service, family size, whether the miner was part of the mine's 
emergency accident service and so on, were employed to decide an individual's 
position on the housing list. The mines had to conSider not only the 
desirability of obtaining and integrating new labour but also the rest of the 
workforce's 'moral economy', particularly the attitudes of established miners 
who were quick to believe that newcomers were being overprivileged. It was 
only logical for management to make sure that the established miners were kept 
reasonably content. 
TIlis tendency was strength end by the fact that, to avoid causing uproar through 
unpopular decisions, management was keen to delegate a lot of the 
responsibility to the works council. The councillors generally tried hard to be 
fair and were wont to say that decisions about housing were the hardest they had 
to make, l but it was only natural that they should see to it that the established 
workforce was well looked after. 2 Though the established miners frequently 
complained that they were having to wait longer than the new miners, this was 
not the case. In the mine Shamrock 3/4, for eample, where such complaints 
were as frequently heard as anywhere else, 65 percent of housing recipients up to 
1951 were from the established workforce and only 35 percent were newcomers, 
despite the fact that the latter made up 70 percent of the workforce and 
1 BBA35. 237. _ung Emscher Uppe. 21.5.1950. 
2 BBA 35. 236. Belegachattsversammlung Emscher Uppe. 23.5.1948. 
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presumably an even higher proportion of those seeking housing. 1 And 
Shamrock, it should be added, was a mine that approached its newcomers with 
more understanding than most. The cost of social peace, therefore, was that 
newcomers were slower to obtain housing than they might have been had purely 
2 productive criteria applied. 
Perhaps the most important and obvious point, however, was that the 
expectations associated with miners' housing had been exaggerated from the 
start. The power of the romantic images of hearth and garden had raised hopes 
that were not really justified in the labour market of post-war Germany. The 
image of the simple miner and the romantic-agrarian model of integration were 
poor guides to the real integration process. The employers had relied on housing 
too much when they should have been trying to change the working experience. 
All that having been said, there is ample evidence that without the rapid 
provision of reasonable quality housing, the mines would have been far worse 
off than they were. Without housing, as the labour exchanges repeatedly 
testified, the mines would have had d1fBculty in the 1950's being able to soliett 
3 
any long-term (ie not seasonal) recruits at all. In addition, the colliery 
workforces would probably have disintegrated. It is worth re-emphasising what 
the Hibernia figures 4 have already indicated, that a conSiderable proportion of 
the newcomers proved highly stable additions to the workforce. This is borne 
out by figure 10. Earlier statistics have indicated that the workforce share of 
1 BBA 32. 3055. Minutes of BelegschaftsausschuB Meeting. Shamrock 3/4. 
3.10.1951. 
:I It should. however. be added that the newcomer who proved himself in the mine 
01' eatabl1shed contacts with the local community could often flnd some contact which 
speeded up the rate at which he obtained a house. Interviews with Hermann Kuhn. June-
July 1982. JoeefLaslop. 9.5. 1984 .. Alfons Nowak. 2.7.1985. 
S See eg StaM Arbe1tsam.t Dortmund. 11. AA Do to ABS. 25.11.1954; StaM 
ArbeitBamt Bochum. 27. AA Heme. Nebenstelle Wanne-Eickel. Reports on new miner 
r=uJ.tment. 31.1.1955 and 26.5.1955. 
" See chapter 7. table 18. p.333. 
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trainees with less than three year's experience fell rapidly dUring the 1950's; 1 
thus, figure 10 which shows that present and former trainees - irrespective oj 
Iww long they had been in the mines - constituted a fairly stable proportion of 
the workforce indicates that many of the earlier new recruits actually remained 
2 in the mines throughout the 1950's. It is unthinkable that the mines would 
have been able to maintain this core workforce had it not been for mining's lead 
over other industries (and general public housing programmes) in providing 
reasonable family accommodation. 
Fig. 10: Composition of underground workforce according to status when hired 
3 (Mine Shamrock 1/2) 
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1 See chapter 7, fig. 9, p.334. thin 
2 Other mines' statistics corroborate this general pattern. In 1952 d~r:nlt>af 
between 1/4 and 1/3 of the underground workforce a~~;s min:
r 
~~C:!nan three years. 
was composed of new miners who hal d bee~~ ~~e 'Gn:ze und Auswirkungen', p.60. 
The wastage amongst these men was ow. u, ally th two pits Involved 
table 30 and pp.22-25, table 13. The tables do not actu =~bal. 
but It I evident from the Ust of sources that they are Hannover t 
ht 1956 5 The Shamrock figure are no 
S Hibernia Konzem (ed.), SozI.alberlcth Sh ' ~'~rkforce barely grew at all in the en1:frellv pre n of the Ruhr ince e ~ kfi rce increased by more than 
od 1 51 - 1 58 th ofuhr ,::rgro~ l1;:ra~ average. 
0% J P n ne 
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If the housing programme was moderately successful at securing a core 
workforce for the industry, albeit one that fell short of the numbers needed, was 
it also moderately successful at creating the integrated property-owning class? 
In numerical terms, the results were substantial. Between 1950 and 1960, 
almost 50,000 owner-occupied properties were built and, in addition, some 
housing companies, notably the Treuhandstelle, sold off formerly rented 
1 property to their tenants. By 1957, some 10-15 percent of the mining 
industry's employees must have been owner-occupiers. But the really intensive 
drive to expand owner-occupation was short lived. By 1955 it was coming up 
against the problem that the number of prosepctive buyers was diminishing. 2 
One problem, particularly in the more heavily urbanised areas, was the shortage 
of suitable land; the pressure on space made blocks of flats deSirable and few 
miners wanted to become owner of a flat. And of course the old worries about 
3 invalidity and the ensuing payments-burden continued. In 1955 and 1956 the 
UVR and 1GB both recognised that they had got into a situation where if they 
built according to the miners' wishes they would contravene the Federal Housing 
4 Minister's guidelines by creating too many apartments for rent. In 1956, they 
aVOided the problem by using regional funds to build rented accommodation so 
that housing with the mining levy funds produced the correct proportion of 
owner-occupied property.5 In 1957, the Bezirksaussch1.\6 agreed that the owner-
occupied quota should not be taken too rigidly and, indeed, the proportion of 
1 UVR (ed.). Ja.hresberlcht 1958-1960. table facing p.94. 
2 Ges.Verb. File Wohnungswesen 4 ... 1954-1961 Bez1rk.saussch~-Sltzungen'. 
MInutes of 12th Bez1rksausschQB meeting, 16.12.1954. 
s WWA F29. 368/2, Clipping from West:flllsche Rundschau (Hatttngen). 17.10.1955 
on 1GB survey. 76% wanted a detached family house but only 48% would consider 
becoming owners because of anxiety about 111 health etc. , 
4 Ges.Verb. File Wohnungswesen 4 ... 1954-1961 ~ksaussch~-Sltzungen. 
Table: 'Bergarbelterwohnungsbauprogramm 1956 (Vorschau). ?o date; UVR to Schulz, 
1GB. 15.3.1956; Memo on the meeting of the 'Kleiner AusschuB of the Bez1rksauschulS. 
9.4.1956. • 
5 Ges.Verb. File 'Wohnungawesen 4 ... 1954-1961 Bez1rksausschulS-Sltzungen. 
MInutes of 15th BezlrbauaechulS meeting. 5.4.1957. 
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owner-occupied housing was from 1956 onwards far lower than it had been 
1 previously. 
As in many other aspects of the mines' and the state's integration policy, both 
the hopes and the anxieties that lay behind these programmes were relatively 
short lived. The voices warning against Eastern infiltration, or demanding the 
miner be given 'ein kleines Etgentum' were increasingly seldom heard. Whereas 
the 1954 renewal of the Miners' Housing Law had considerably strengthened the 
pro-ownership provisions, the 1957 law contained no further intensification. 
No doubt both the clear limits to the miners' willingness to become buyers and 
the general political stabilisation of the Republic combined to make owner-
occupation an increasingly marginal issue. 
The political impact of the housing itself is hard to gauge. It is, in fact. difficult 
to make any clear assessment of the miners', and particularly the new miners', 
political views, let alone to distinguish between home-owners and others. 
Recent work on the way in which the SPO attained hegemony in the Ruhr in the 
course of the 1950's has stressed the role of party patronage in creating large 
'client groups' reasonably well disposed to the party.2 Amongst this 'patronage' 
was the power of the SPO-dominated works councils in the allocation of scarce 
resources, above all housing. Certainly, many new miners obtained a house 
because they had a decent connection to the local union organisation and the 
works council. It is perfectly possible, therefore, that the impact of the building 
programme was to strengthen the hold of the SPO. This was probably not what 
the COU-dominated Bundestag had had in mind! 
1 Ibid. and tNR (ed.), Jahresberlcht 1958-1960, table facing p.94. 
2 Above all Michael Zimmermann, "'Geh zu Hermann, der Macht dat schon". 
Bergarbettertnteressenvertretung 1m nOrdUchen Ruhrgeblet', In Nlethammer (ed.) , 
"Htnterher merkt man", pp.277-310. 
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2: Integration through segregation. Building hostels for the 
apprentices 
The princes and the paupers: Iwstel conditions prior to 1948 
The other living environment over which the employers took considerable care 
was the apprentice hostel. In the pre-currency refonn period, when conditions 
in the adult camps were frequently appalling and colliery managers were doing 
little more than passively and resignedly watch the great mass of often 
unwilling labour flow through the mines, the apprentice hostels were generally 
in good order. This was partly because the labour exchanges were able to put 
more pressure on Military Government and employers to provide decent 
1 
accommodation for the youngsters. But even more, it reflected the fact that 
those employers suffiCiently aware of the importance of apprenticeships to build 
or convert hostels for the youngsters also believed that good quality 
2 
accommodation had to be made available. 1iue, even apprentice hostel 
amenities and facilities remained very limited, but that was the result of the 
unavailability of everything from wardrobes to table tennis bats rather than a 
3 lack of employer interest. As the LAA Mining Office wrote in a circular to the 
labour exchanges, it was true that not everything in the hostels was 'in 
Ordnung ... aberwo in Deutschland ist alles in Qrdnung?,4 
That the quality of apprentice hostels was offered not out of general welfare 
motives but in the interests of 'Standesbildung' was made abundantly clear by 
the enonnous discrepancy between the standard of apprentices' hostels on the 
1 OBADA 16303/568/47, ABB to OBAD. 25.2.1947. 
2 OBADA 16301/969/47. ABB. Circular to all coWeIY managements. 17.3.1947: 
IGBEA BR7. ABB to IVB. 28.4.1947. 
S On the shortage of equipment. see BBA 35, 36, Emscher-Llppe to RCD4. 
26.8.1948. 
"OBADA 16301/628/47. ABB. CJrcu1ar8/41. 22.2.1947. 
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one hand and the lack of provision for the admittedly smaller number of non-
local young trainees. True, untU 1948, aU youngsters from outside the Ruhr 
should theoretically have been taken on as apprentices. This was a condition 
made by the labour exchanges to ensure that the outsiders were well looked 
1 
after. In fact however, as many obseIVers testified, the workforce included a 
considerable number of young trainees coming from outside the Ruhr, most of 
them housed with adult trainees in the camps.2 In most cases they had been 
hired as trainees because the mines were generally loath to take on youngsters 
3 
over 15 as apprentices. 
In 1947, the NRW Social Ministry gradually became aware of this problem and 
demanded that young trainees be segregated from their adult counterparts, a 
4 demand echoed by the Mining Office of the regional labour administration, and 
also by a Military Government Youth Officer for the Recklinghausen area, 
Captain Elphick. whose involvement was prompted by a strong feeling of 
5 distaste at the compulsory recruitment of youngsters for the mines. Elpbick 
set up a committee to look into the living conditions of young miners and 
discovered that of all the mines in his area, only one seperated the under 18s in 
6 the camps from the rest. Yet despite all the pressure the employers were 
extremely unwilling to do something about the problem. indeed even to 
acknowledge that 1t existed. At a time when the labour administration 
estimated there to be more than a thousand juveniles in adult camps. the DKBL's 
1 Ibid 
2 HStaD NW41, 761, Socia) Ministry 1llB/6. Memo, 7.8.1948. 
s OBADA 16301/969/47. ABB. Circular to colllery managements, 17.3.1947. 
4 HStaD NW41. 746, Soctal MlnJstry NRW IIIB/6 to colliery directors. 17.7.1947: 
IGBEA BR7, ABB to IVa 28.4.1947. 
5 OBADA 16303/1757/47, Elpblck, 'Ole Bedlngungen Junger Arbeiter In den 
Zechen', 15.1.1947. 
8IbkL 
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senior manpower officer argued there to be none at all. 1 The difficulty for the 
employers was that they did not want to dilute the special atmosphere of the 
apprentice hostel or undermine the attempts to create a new elite by including 
other types of young labour. It was noteworthy that when Elphick outlined his 
plan to help the young trainees at a meeting in September 1947, Koker, the 
training and social services director of the giant Hibernia company and a man 
generally conSidered to belong to the more progressive wing of mining directors, 
suggested that their work would be more effective if they concentrated on the 
apprentices' hostels and ignored the rest. Elphick retorted that it was precisely 
2 
'the rest' that was the problem. 
After 1948, the problem of the young trainees remained. True, most hostels 
were soon reasonably well appointed, but the mines continued to house 
youngsters with older men. In 1951, the KPD put a motion to the NRW 
parliament calling for something to be done about the primitive conditions in 
the youngsters' hostels. Though nobody else at that stage liked agreeing with 
KPD motions and hostel conditions were generally seen as good, Weber, the 
Social MInistry's officer for occupational and training questions, had to 
concede that there had been 'ein ausgesprochenes Stagnieren in der Betreuung 
der Bergjungarbelter' and above all that the DKBL had not responded to his 
repeated calls for seperate juvenile hostels.3 It was only in the post -1953 period. 
when the labour market situation forced the mines to take every recruit 
seriously. that they began to offer seperate accommodation for Juvenile 
trainees. 4 
1 HStaD NW41, 747. Soz.Mtn III B/6, Memo. 25.7.1948: 41, 761. Soz.Mln 11IB/6. 
Memo. 7.8.1948. 
2 OBACA 16303/2572/47. MInutes o(meetlng on 5.9.1947. 
3 HStaD NW41. 746. Antrag der Abgeordneten Schabrod. Selndler usw. KPD. 
4.4.1951; Weber to Dr.Laarmann. 16.5.1951 . 
.. Starn ArbeItMmt Dortmund. 46. ABB. Circular to NRW labour exchanges. 
28.12.1953. 
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True for all types of mining hostel, however, was that after the currency reform, 
when table tennis bats were to be had for the asking, the standard of amenities 
and facilities improved rapidly. This was particularly the case in the 
1 
apprentice hostels. In many there were no more than three beds to a room and 
the hostels were equipped with table-tennis rooms, small gymnasia, dark 
rooms, their own libraries and so on.2 Of course, the companies could recover 
some of their outlay by charging the apprentices for accommodation. Yet given 
the high standard of the hostels and the fact that apprentices earned less than 
their adult colleagues, it is not surprising to find that apprentices in the hostels 
were heavily subsidised, even more than their increasingly subSidised adult 
counterparts. In 1956, for example, the Hibernia company laid out 1,355 DM per 
new miner in the hostels but 1,786 DM for each apprentice. 3 
Integration or segregation? 
Now that their endeavours were no longer dominated by the struggle to obtain 
even the most basic items of equipment, the employers were able to think more 
seriously about the optimum type of hostel environment. Fairly early on, a 
central dilemma emerged which throughout the 1950's was to bedevil attempts to 
Integrate the apprentices. On the one hand, the employers wanted the 
newcomers to strike roots in the Ruhr and become permanent members of the 
workforce. On the other hand, they did not want them to assume the worst 
1 For a While, the shortage of funds induced employers to cut comers by building 
very large apprentice hostels with a relatively high density of occupation. However, the 
Soclal M1n1stly was able to nip this development in the bud and soon most hostels were 
ofan extemelyhigh standard. HStaD NW41, 764, WAM memo, 21.2.1951: Soz.M1n mB/5c 
to F1nanz.M1n. NRW, 12.3.1951. 
2 'MAnner von Morgen', Junlor Magaztn 1952, 12, pp.474-477. 
3 Hibernia Konzem (ed.), Soztalber1cht 1956, p.15 and p.20 Apprentice ~ 
are for hostels only. The apprentice villages were somewhat cheaper. It should be noted 
that these 8gures date from a ttme when the mines faced acute competition on the adult 
labour market and were subsidlsing the new miner hostels much more heavily than a few 
,... earlier. Ifftgures from 1952/1953 were avaJ1able the contrast would have been even 
more mark.ed. 
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habits of the existing workforce. 1 In addition, the controlled environment in 
the hostels represented a marvellous opportunity to tranSmit the 'right' values to 
a captive and impressionable 'audience'. The question, therefore, was: 
integration or segregation? 
The dilemma was summed up perfectly in a paper presented to the Kommission 
fftr soziale Aufgaben (KfSA) (the welfare organisation run jointly by DKBL and 
1GB) by Klaus von Bismarck, director of the Sozialamt of the Protestant church 
in Westphalia. The paper contained his thoughts about the best way to build and 
run a hostel. On the one hand, noted the (generally progressive) churchman, it 
was an often obselVed fact that the girls from the local community exerted an 
unhappy influence on apprentices. On the other hand? 
ist das Streb en zu bejahen, die Jungen mit ihrer neuen sozialen Umwelt 
in Verbindung zu brtngen, insbesondere unter dem Gesichtspunkt, d~ 
ihre Se~haftmachung und Verwurzelung nur dann ffrr die Dauer mOgl1ch 
ist, wenn sie die Menschen ihrer neuen Heimat. ihre 
Lebensgewohnheiten, Sitten und GebIiluche kennen und schAtzen lernen. 
What was the answer? On the whole segregation seems to have been emphasised 
at the expense of integration. This was in part because both state and church 
reinforced the mines' wishes with their own fears and ambitions. As Klaus von 
Bismarck makes clear. there was widespread anxiety about the negative nnpact 
of proximity to the adult community. Drunken new miners and promiscuous 
3 
miners' daughters seem to have been the chief dangers faCing the apprentices. 
Von Bismarck himself concluded that. in the final analysis. building a hostel 
near a miners' estate was more negative than positive. 
1 See chapter 6. p.272ff. 
2 HStaD NW41. 747. 'Zusammenstellungen des Sozlalamtes der evangellsche~ 
K1rche in Westfalen Qber die in etnJgen Berglehrllngshelmen angefallenen Erfahrungen I 
no date (1951). 
S For a powerful example of this fear of predatory women leading the Innocents 
astray. see Erwin Jochum. 'Ou sexuelle Problem unserer heutlgen Jugend und der 
Beitrag der Bergberufaachule zu seiner U)eung', MttteU.ungen.filr die Bergben.ifsschulen 
1954,6, esp. p.lo. 
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Bismarck's gUidelines were very influential l and were adopted largely 
unchanged as the KfSA's own. 2 Most hostels were built a good distance away 
from the mining estates. At least one reason for the comprehensive provision of 
facilities in the hostels was the deSire to keep the apprentices out of the wrong 
3 
company. 
The organic village 
Perhaps the most innovative experiment, and a sign of just how far the 
employers were prepared to go to create their new workforce, was the 
establishment of special youth villages to house the apprentices. In 1948, the 
Pestalozzi Association - an organisation dedicated to disseminating the 
educational Ideas of the the 18th century Swiss educational theorist Pestalozzl -
approached the VSt's housing aSSOCiations to see whether they would consider 
building a Pestalozzi village In the Ruhr. Together Heinrich Vormbrock, a 
leading figure in the housIng aSSOCiations, and Walter Forstmann, board-
member of the GBAG. persuaded the chairman of GBAG to endorse an experiment 
with two Pestalozzi villages. one in Lohberg. site of a mine belonging to the 
4 GBAG's Hambom group and the other in Bochum. The Idea then caught on 
elsewhere and by 1956 there were 33 villages with. in all. 5.500 places. 
equivalent to almost a third of all the accommodation provided for apprentices 
and Knappen.5 
1 Erzmonelt. Was tut der Ruhrbergbau fOr seinen Nachwuchs·. p.173. caption to 
nIustration 8. 
2 The KfSA version did. however. suggest It might be possible to buUd a hostel 
near 'einer moclemen Bergmannssledlung'. Presumably what they had in mind was a new 
estate of owner-occupied properties where they felt that the behaviOur of the residents 
mJght be expected not to set a bad example. Mftteflungen der KjSA 1952. 1/2. p.5. 
S See. for example. the comments of the Bezlrk VI (Dortmund) of the IG Bergbau 
Beztrk VI(ed.). Jahresberlcht 1954. p.24. 
4 HStaD NW41. 764. Forstmann. 'AusfQhrung in der Aufslchtsratsltzung vom 
21.11.1949'. 
5 Calculated from Arbeltsgemelnschaft He1mstatthilfe 1m Lande NRW (ed.). 
Verzefchn1s der Jugendhel.mst4tten in NRW. NRW 1956. Evidently not an of these were 
(ConUnued overleaf.) 
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Generally, the villages consisted of a series of large houses With big gardens in 
the manner of the Kleinsiedlung, each house occupied by a 'parent' family and 
six youngsters. Each village had its own leader and, With time, its own 
community centre. The village parents obtained their accommodation free plus 
a monthly payment from which to feed the youngsters. The village leader 
supervised the parents and watched over the youngsters. 1 
TIle attractions of the village concept were manifold. Although the cost factor 
was probably not decisive, it was certainly significant that the villages cost the 
employers less than conventional hostels. 2 The initial investment was lower 
because they qualified both for housing subsidies from the Reconstruction 
Ministry and for the more usual apprentice hostel funds. 3 The Reconstruction 
Ministry funds were particularly important because they were given at a much 
more favourable rate of interest than some of the loans With which builders of 
normal apprentice hostels had to make do. The low or non-existent interest 
charges and the low staff costs made the Pestalozz1 villages cheaper to run as 
4 
well. In addition, the houses could in the future be used as normal housing. 
The real logic to the village concept was that it was seen as a way of overcoming 
the conflict between integration and segregation. The idea was to introduce the 
youngsters to the best of the min1ng community in a controlled and mOnitored 
afDliated to the Pestalozzi AsSOCiation, which in 1956 counted 30 vmages with 3,600 
youngsters amongst Its members. Klinkert Papers, File 'Sammlung Vorstandssltzungen'. 
Minutes of executive meeting of JugendheimstAttenwerk e.V. Pestalozzklorf-Vere1nigung 
OHStWPV), 17.10.1956. 
1 Otto-WUhelm Roelen. 'Ole Bedeutung der PestalOZZldOrfer tar die Gewinnung 
einea bergbaulichen Nachwuchses' (DIss., Cologne University, 1956). passim. 
2 A point stressed by the Gruppe Hambom's training director when asked for his 
view on the Pesta10zzi villages. See Kl1nkert Papers, Minutes of the ftrst meeting of the 
JHStWPV,31.7.1948. 
s HStaD NW41 764 Minutes of meeting on 21 November 1950 In Essen with 
DKBL. 23.11.1950; Roeien, 'Ole Bedeutung der PestalozzidOrfer', p.l64 which shows the 
enormous difference between the repayments burden on a typical apprentice bOSbightel and 
that In the case of the Pesta10zzl village - the former being almost 4 times as per 
occupant 
" Roelen. 'Dle Bedeutwlg der PestalozzldOrfer', pp.I6S-164. 
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environment. The parents would be carefully chosen so as to avoid 
contaminating the youngsters with the 'Untugenden' of the mining community 
and to transmit the appropriate values and outlook. 1 The villages themselves 
were carefully situated well away from the miners' estates, 'SchmuckkAstchen 
inIDitten einer griinen Landsch aft , as Walter Forstmann put it.2 Thus the 
dangers of the wrong sort of company would be aVOided but at the same time so 
would the risks associated with communal living in a large hostel. The degree to 
which contact with the local community was sought tended to vary from village 
to village depending on the outlook of the village leader. 3 
The resonance which the idea of the miners' village enj oyed and the way in 
which it was implemented reveal once again many of the myths about the 
integration process which abounded in the mining indUStry. The houses were 
built on the Kleinsiedler pattern in part so that the youngsters could be rooted by 
means of garden work. 4 Here the notion of deep roots in local soil emerged vexy 
strongly: 5 
Man will die jungen Bergleute gleich mit der Arbeit 1m Stall und Garten 
vertraut machen und besonders ihre Lust und Liebe zur Kleintlerzucht 
und Gartenbewfrtschaftung elWecken, damit sie einmal auf eigenen 
Kleinsiedlerstellen oder als Einlieger sich fest in der NAhe ihrer 
Schacht anlage velWUrzeln konnen 
Though there was talk of 'Ausgleich'. of pleasant compensation for the work 
underground. it was evident that the garden work was far more than that because 
It was actually a duty for the youngsters. When at a meeting of the village 
leaders it was suggested that the youngsters were not necessartly all that 
interested In gardening. the cha1Iman of the Pestalozzi Association came down 
1 JHStW PV (ed.), PestalDzzteltem tm PestalozztdDrf. Essen 1952, cited in Roelen. 
'Ole Bedeutung der PestalozzidOrfer'. p.25ff. 
2 Walter Forstmann. 'Die Erziehung zum Eigentumsgedanken', Die 
VoUcshetmst4tte. Monatszettschr1/l des Deutschen Volkshetmst4ttenwerks 1955, 7. 5. 
pp.I-5. 
8 Roeien, 'DIe Bedeutung der PestalozzidOrfer', p.72. 
"'Dle PestalomdOrferdes Bergbaus'. Bergftef.heU 1951. 8. pp.17-19. 
5 Foratmann. 'AuafQbrung In der Aufsichtsratssltzung VOID 24.11.1949', op.dt.. 
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very strongly on the issue. reminding all present that the villages had been 
created specifically 'urn der Jugend den Grund und Boden nahe zu br1ngen'. 1 The 
designation 'DorfIDteste' rather than 'Dorfleiter' for the village leaders indicated 
the desire to resurrect the notion of an intact. quasi-rural community. Another 
virtue of the housing design in the eyes of the village founders was that the 
apprentices would feel encouraged to become owner-occupiers. 'Das Ziel ist 
dann endgiilUg erreicht'. wrote Walter Forstmann. 'wenn der Weg zur 
Familiengrundung inl eigenen Heinl geebnet 1st'. 2 
From a fairly early stage it became apparent that though wastage remained low 
amongst apprentices esconced in either hostels or villages. it rose rapidly in the 
first months after the youngsters qualified as Knappen. The Obad wrote in a 
1950 report to the Economics Ministry that there was no point in building 
beautiful apprentice hostels if the 17 or 18 year old youngster was then 
abandoned to his own devices and forced to take an expensive private room or 
live in the rougher climate of an adult hostel. As experience showed. wrote the 
Obad, 'ist dieser Obergang der Augenblick. in dem sehr viele Knappen der 
unfreundlichen Wohn- und LebensverhIDtnisse wegen dem Bergbau trotz eben 
erfolgreich abgeschlossener Lehre den Riicken kehren'. 3 
One might have thought that the goal of integration into the local community 
would make it deSirable to find suitable lodgingS with a mining family - and 
many Knappen did indeed become subtenants in miners' housing - yet both 
employers and the state were reluctant to encourage this. There was the feeling 
that the householders would not exercise the right sort of 1nfluence and a fear 
that the values and attitudes being inculcated in the apprentice hostels would be 
1 Kllnkert Papers. File 'Nlederschrlften der Arbeltstagungen und 
Vortl'agsveraDsta1tungen', MInutes ofmeetlng ofvUJage leaders. 10.12.1958. 
2 Walter Forstmann. Die Erzlehung zwn E1gentumsgedanken', p.5. 
s OBADA 16301/774/50. Obad to VfW (sic!), 13.3.1950. annex: 'Bertcht Qbe~ die 
bergmAnnlache Nachwuchs- und AuablldungsJage 1m Oberbergamtsbezlrk Dortmund. 
Settling the miner 403 
1 
dissipated. As a result, the employers pressed for funds to construct hostels for 
2 
the Knappen as well. Evidently, at one point, there were plans to construct 
enough hostels so that every single graduate apprentice would find a place 
3 
there, though in the end, finanCial shortages (and probably also the inclination 
of many Knappen themselves) led to the more modest achievement of something 
over 3,000 places in hostels deSignated specifically for Knappen and a further 
1,600 in hostels for young miners in the 18-25 age range.4 
Various other attempts were made to sustain the special environment and 
protect the fonner apprentices from the ostensibly negative charatertstics of the 
mining community. In the Pestalozzi villages, the youngsters were not expected 
to leave after qualifying and there was the hope that they would go straight from 
the village to marriage and their own home without ever passing through the 
5 tntennediate phase of full exposure to the mining community as single men. A 
number of mining companies encouraged apprentices and Knappen to become 
owner-occupiers straight away, once again ensuring a direct transition from the 
sheltered atmosphere of the hostel to the binding environment of their own 
hearth and plot of land.6 The Hibernia company went even further along this 
road and in 1956 completed an experimental housing estate for 25 young owner-
occupiers near by the youth village where they had formerly been 
accommodated.7 Youngsters who had saved for a house were rewarded with an 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H BI02, 33189, Hensel BWiM, Memo, 9.10.1951; HStaD NW41, 747, 
Sozialamt der evangeUschen Kirche, 'VorschlAge zum Bau und zur FOhrung von 
Knappenhelmen', 15.10.1951; Roelen, 'Die Bedeutung der PestalozzidOrfer', p.91. 
2 BAK-ZwStH BI02, 33189, BWIM, Memo, 9.10.1951. 
s BAK-ZwSt.H BI02, 33189, BWiM IIIA3 (lmhAuser) to Min Ogt. Classen, 
30.5.1951. 
4 Source Minutes of AAA meeting. 14.1.1959 and calculation from 
Arbeltsgemeinschaft Heimstatthllfe im Lande NRW (ed.), Ver%etchnts der 
Jugendhetmsti1tten in NRW. 
5 Roelen, 'Die Bedeutung der PestalozzidOrfer'. p.92. 
8 Klinkert Papers. File 'SammJung Vorstandssitzungen'. Minutes of executive 
meetlng of JHStW PV. 20.1.1956. Foratmann's comments; Hibernia Konzem (ed.). 
SaztalberI.cht 1956. p.23ft'. 
71btd. 
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extra loan from the company on top of the usual employer contribution. 1 This 
was a particularly striking example of the desire to maintain a protected 
environment and help the youngsters strike roots without ever immersing them 
in the life of the mining community. 
Hostels. villages and their impact 
Decisions about hostel location and the type of accommodation to be offered 
created only the raw bones of the hostel environment. the framework within 
which the newcomers could be monitored, controlled, counselled. influenced 
and educated. The framework itself could not determine the character of the 
social and spiritual environment within. Thus, before the hostels' impact can 
be understood and evaluated, it is vital to look in more detail at that 
environment. The following chapter, analyses the ideologies brought to bear on 
the occupants and the success of employers and other interested parties in 
gUiding and communicating with the men and boys within their care. 
1 Hlbernla Konzern (ed.). Soztalbericht 1957. p.23. 
Chapter 9: Fighting for their hearts and sows. Welfare. 
propaganda and miners' hostels. 1948-58 
The emergence oj a welfare policy 
For a long time, the employers found it hard to get overly interested in the 
spiritual welfare of hostel occupants, be they adults or apprentices. Their low 
opinion of most of the newcomers within their charge, preoccupation with more 
fundamental issues and the general passivity in the face of Military Government 
actions all mitigated against a constructive welfare policy. 1 As late as October 
1948, the Coal Control Group's welfare advisor found 'it hard to resist the 
impression that the DKBL are not really interested in welfare and only lend 
support when pressed from one side or the other and that most of the progress 
and development is due to outside organisations and individuals rather than to 
the DKBL'? 
As this comment suggests, the main initiatives in the early post-war period 
came from outside the mines. Ever since the early part of 1947, a number of 
organisations had begun to concern themselves with the new miners' well-being 
and to put pressure on the employers to take their responsibilities more 
seriously. '!\vo of the most active and COmmitted figures were British officers. 
Apart from Captain ElphiCk,3 there was also a more senior figure, the welfare 
officer of the UK/USCCG, C.S.Hudson, who went so far as to spend a week In a 
1 StaM Arbeitsamt Dortmund, 47, ABB, Minutes of conference In Buer on 
28.10.1947.7.11.1947. 
2 WWA S22 (OMGUS) BICO BISEC 11/104-2/2, US/UK CCO, Report to BICO for 
October 1948. See also BHA 8.404, DKBL, Erhebung Ober WerksfOrsorgeelnrlchtungen 
1m Stelnkohlenbergbau, Stand Ende Feb. 1949, a questionnaire, about the level of 
amenities and cultural services provided by the mines. Concordia s answers (entered 
directly on to the above questionnaire) reveal that at the beginning of 1949 the mine was 
sUll doing virtually nothing in this direction. 
3 See chapter 8, p.395. 
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new miners' camp incognito in order to discover what life there was like. 1 At 
the beginning of 1948, Hudson argued that the main problem with the camps was 
no longer overcrowding but instead a shortage of entertainment and leisure 
amenities and suggested the creation of a Joint employer-union organisation to 
look into new miners' welfare.2 Hudson's idea was that by solving some of the 
new miners' difficulties and providing them with entertainment, wastage could 
be reduced and productivity increased. 
At the same time both state and church were grOwing increasingly concerned 
about conditions in the camps. They were less worried about boosting coal 
production than hindering what they saw as the moral and political dangers of 
camp life. The NRW Social Ministry and Labour Administration were 
particularly concerned about the lack of supervision and gUidance being offered 
the younger men, who were not being protected from alcoholism, sexual excess 
3 
and possibly even political extremism. These anxieties were echoed by the 
churches. They had been involved in pastoral work in the miners' camps since 
1946, at first purely on a parish by parish basiS but failry soon the work had 
become centrally directed and coordinated as a result of episcopal initiatives 
and the efforts of certain central church organisations such as the KAB and 
Caritas on the Catholic side and the CVJM and the Innere Mission for the 
Protestants. Many churchmen were unnerved by the 'eisige KcUte, die einem 
4 
beim Betreten des Lagers entgegenschlagt .. ' as one priest put it, and felt this 
1 Hudson's German language was not so good that he could pretend to be a 
Gennan national but his true identity and rank remained concealed. HStaD NW42. 912. 
Paper. 'Besuch d~r GutehofTnungshtltte. Oberhausen. 12.-19.0ezember 1948'. no date. 
2 HStaD NW42. 912. C.S.Hudson. 'Oenkschrtft aber die Englandreise 1m Januar 
1948'. 19.1.1948; NW53. 492. Wheatley to Labour Minister. NRW. 3. 1. 1947[sicl It should be 
1948). 
3 IGBEA BR7. ABB to IVB. 28.4.1947: OBADA 16301/628/47. ABB. Circular to 
mine administrations. 17.3.1947; HStaD NW41. 746. S1mons. 'Oie BerglehrUngshime in 
NRW. 14.7.1947. 
4 BM AIOI. 251. pfarrer Tebroke to Dechant Niehues. Westerholt. 15.3.1947. 
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antagonism proved there to be a radical, anti-Christian spirit pervading the 
1 
camps. 
The union too began to wake up at central level to the needs of the new miners 
The IVB encouraged camp and hostel occupants to set up COmmittees and appoint 
representatives. From the end of 1947 onwards, the union organised 
conferences where grievances could be articulated and suggestions for 
improvements to camp life or union activity could be put fOlWard. 2 Some union 
branches began to think about ways of offering entertainment and education to 
hostel inmates. In addition, both SPD and KPD intensified their efforts to 
mobllise support from new labour towards the end of 1947. Partly under cover 
of union activity, partly alongside it, the battle for support in the works councils 
3 
was probably fiercer in 1947 than in any subsequent year. 
All these groups helped to stimulate employer interest in providing 
entertainment, education and cultural welfare policies for the camps. The 
British were able to exert pressure directly, and it was largely due to Hudson's 
urgings that spring 1948 saw the formation of the Kommission fiir soziale 
Aufgaben 4 (KfSA), the primary function of which was to provide better services 
for the new miners. 5 The state administration's ability to exert pressure was 
more indirect but no less effective, particularly when it came to the apprentices. 
The labour administration, for example, could and did deny those mines young 
1 BM Al 0 1, 251, OiOzesanverband Kathol1sche Arbelterbewegung (KAB) to 
Kapttularvlkar, 26.2.1947. 
2 See chapter 7, p.313ff. 
3 ASO-FESt WW, 68, Minutes of the Ruhr mining conference on 31.8.1947 In 
Bochum, no date; N 25, vol. 1946-1948, SPO Bezirk West!. Westfalen. Report on the works 
councU elections In mtning. 10.11.1947. 
4 Initially 'Kommission ftlr Bergmannswohlfahrt'. On Its first meeting. see WWA 
522 (OMOUS) CO 'HIST BR 3/404-1/7. UKjUS CCO. Report to BICO for March 1948. 
5 Ge V b File "'K" vol 2'(The distinction between vol. I and vol.2 has been 
s. er .. •. h betwee tw flies with the same Introduced by the author as a means to dJstinguis n 0 
name). Unsigned and undated paper. V~rgeschlagene Tagesordnung fOr die erste Slztung 
des Bergarbelter-FOrsorge-Ausschusses . 
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labour which failed to provide adequate supervision. In addition, as state 
funding for apprentice hostels came in prospect, the mines were at pains to 
demonstrate the pedagogical and other services they performed. 1 Union 
activities, too, galvanised employers into action since they had no desire to 
leave the field open to works councils and the 1GB and certainly not to SPD and 
KPD.2 
Thus by the end of 1948, the employers were showing conSiderable interest in 
3 
this area of policy. There was growing recognition of the value of good public 
relations and of ideological and cultural policy. 1948 was, for instance, the first 
4 year in which works' newspapers began to reappear. In September of that year, 
the DKBL created a small committee to look into ways of extending 'inner-
5 betriebliche Werbung' and another example of the new awareness of public 
relations came in December 1948, when new miners received to take home with 
them on Christmas leave a little brochure about coal's achievements and value 
for the economy. This, the DKBL, hoped, would encourage the newcomers to 
6 
return promptly to the mines when their offiCial leave expired. 
Compulsive talking 
Once the employers had begun hying to influence their 'charges', there was no 
stopping them. Over the following years, virtually no entertainment or service 
was offered the miners without it in some way carrying a moral or political 
1 See DKBL (ed.), Die Berglehrltngsheime des Stetnkohlenbergbaus. 
2 HStaD NW41. 747, Soz.Min. I1IB/6, Memo, 25.7.1948. 
3 WWA S22 (OMGUS) BICO BISEC 11/104-2/2, UK/US CCG, Report to BICO for 
December 1948. 
4 E Der Fc5rderturm. works newspaper of the Gruppe Hambom, GSAG. F?r a 
clear stateJ~nt of the works' newspapers' intended function, see Alfons Neukirchen, Ole 
Werkszeitschrift als Mittel betrtebl1cher MenschenfOhrung', BAG Ewald-KOnig Ludwig, 
December 1951, pp.14-16. 
5 Ges.Verb. File 'Rundschreiben Werbung 1946-1949', General Director, DKBL. 
Circular No. V 102 to mining company directors, 15.9.1948. 
6 Ges.Verb. FIle 'Rundschreiben Werbung 1946-1949', DKBL, Circular No. V 129 to 
mining companies and coIlleries, 9.12.1948. 
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message. Even when in reality all that was being provided was a little 
entertainment, the employers and other German groups involved were Simply 
unable to concede that that was all they were doing. There was a compulsion to 
find a higher purpose, a deeper mission to everything that was done. 
This was one of the most striking differences between the British and American 
attempts to help in the new miner programme and the Germans' approach. 
Captain Elphick's idea, for example, was quite simple - to provide some sort of 
room or meeting place with appropriate facUities and a little superivision so 
that the young miners could do what they wanted. If there was any 'higher' aim 
than providing entertainment, it was to give the youngsters a taste of democracy 
1 by letting them organise their own club. And in simUar vein, a British 
investigation of mining trainees conducted in 1947 concluded that, The trainees 
2 
should not be nursed and cosseted but induced to do things for themselves. ' 
The German proposals at the time have a completely different tone. They are 
full of anxieties and hopes, of the dangers of doing nothing and the high moral 
ideals towards which the youngsters must be led by wise elders. A small 
indicative example came at a meeting of the KfSA's sub-committee for 
entertainment. It was suggested that fUms might be provided at some of the 
hostels because the new miners often had no going-out clothes and many hostels 
were some distance away from the Cinema.3 Immediately, it was then proposed 
that only culturally valuable films should be shown so as to raise the 
intellectual and spiritual level of the miners. And a further justification for 
showing the films was found - it would keep the newcomers away from 
1 OBADA 16303/1757/47, Copy. Elphlck. 'Ole BedlngungenJunger Arbeiter In den 
Zechen. 2RCD u. 3RCD Bereich'. 15.1.1947. 
2 PORO (ed.), The mining trainee 1947, p.30. 
3 Ges.Verb. File '1.11', Section 024,3, Minutes of 2nd meeting of Arbeltskrels II, 
24.8.1948. 
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'abwegtgen Vergniigungsrummeln' in the local towns. 1 This compulsion to have 
a mission, and the compulsion to gUide rather than to let speak, seems to have 
been a fundamental characteristic of bourgeois culture in post-war Germany. 
'Personltchkeit' and 'Vermassung' 
What were the values and ideas which the employers wished to convey? One pair 
of concepts that continually recurs in the discussions about welfare policy. 
particularly towards young trainees and apprentices. is 'Personlichkeit' and 
Vermassung'. Here. for example. is Jiirgen Heuer, writing about the work in the 
2 Pestalozzi villages: 
DaB iiber allem letztlich das Moment der PersonlichkeitsbUdung steht. 
entspricht nicht nur der Notwendigkeit. bereits in der Jugend das Gefiihl 
des Kollektivismus einzudammen. sondern auch dem Ziel, dem 
werdenden Bergmann mit den ersten Ansatzen der AusbUdung ein festes 
Berufsethos zu vermitteln. das der Tradition des Bergmanns entsprtcht. 
And here is an excerpt from a lecture on the subject of 'Ziele staatsbiirgerlicher 
W1llensbildung in der kulturellen Bergmannsbetreuung', given by an adult 
3 
educationalist involved in cultural policy for miners: 
Es ist die Aufgabe des in der Bergmannsbetreuung wirkenden Dozenten in 
standigem persl>nlichen Kontakt mit dem emzelnen Arbeiter zu stehen, 
urn in einer Art sakularisierter Seelsorge moglichst unmittelbar an den 
Menschen, an den Personalkem des Individuums heranzukommen. so 
verursachend, dieses der Vermassung zu entrelBen. 
1 Ibid. 
2 JOrgen Heuer. 'Pestalozzldorf - Sozlallelstung des Bergbaus. AutbaUl~~2d 
Probleme. in H.J.Seraphtm (ed.), Siedlungen lU1.d wohnungen oon h.eute . MOnster . 
pp.54-72, here p.62. 
3 Precis of Dozent Sieburg 'Zlele staatsbargerlicher Wtllensbildung in der 
kulturellen Bergmannsbetreuung'. in HStaD NW17, 141. RAG. Report on the conference in 
Kranenburg 21-26.9.1953. October 1953. 
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This antithesis. Pers()nlichkeit. or 'echte Pers()nlichkeit,1 or 'Personalkem des 
Individuums,.2 on the one hand. and Vermassung3 or Kollektivierung4 on the 
other was so widespread that it can be seen as a sort of shorthand. which could be 
communicated and understood without the need for thought or explanation. 
Behind it lay an entire world view. part of which was peculiar to mining, or at 
least concentrated there. and part of which was characteristic of a lot of 
thinking in post-war Germany. 
The erosion oj authority and the danger oj radicalism 
The fundamental view behind the contrast between 'genuine personalities' and 
'collectivisation'. and the one that would have been understood anywhere in 
Germany, was as follows. The individual personality will hold true to certain 
values, if not swallowed up in mass society. The individual. in an organic 
society. has firm roots, a clear social picture and values. In mass society, the 
individual loses his roots and his 'intactness' and is swallowed up in emptier 
mass values. Unfortunately. many individuals are naturally drawn to the mass 
and therefore need protecting from it. 
It is clear. though it was seldom said at the time. that the explanatory and 
emotional power of the concept 'Vermassung' stemmed from the way many 
middle class Germans had experienced fascism (or at least from the way they 
were trying. retrospectively. to order and reinterpret that experience). It is 
eVident that their attitude towards the fascist era was to reject its 'excesses' 
1 'Statt Kasemengeist die echte PersOnlichkelt', Rheinischer Merkur, Koblenz. 
5.2.1949. 
2 HStaD NW17, 141. lecture from Sieburg. 'Ziele staatsbOrgerlicher Wlliensbildung 
in der kulturel1en Bergmannsbetreuung' in report on the RAG conference at Kronenburg 
21-26.9.1953. 
3 SoFoStA F1le 'Dr.Jantke SoZlalausschosse der ev. Klrche 4.11.1951. 12', Pastor 
P.Arnold Dannenmann. Vas Jugendproblem heute, Reprint of lecture given on 22. 1. 1952 
1n Essen, no date [1952]. 
4 Report on speech from Heinrich Kost, In HStaO NW41. 761. Senft. 
Tagungsbericht von der Ausblldungstagung 1m DKV-Haus, Essen, 15.1.1953. 
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which they interpreted as the excesses of a 'mass age' in which conventional 
values had disappeared. It was therefore not surprising that they saw young 
people as being the group most endangered by Vermassung. The younger 
generation, having been most strongly influenced by the Nazi era. was the 
generation which had lost or never had a sense of an organic society and which 
had been and sometimes still was swept along by the enthusiasms and whims of 
the mass. 
Apart from the Nazi influence, the other main source of danger was believed to 
be the uprooting caused by war and the events of the immediate post-war period. 
Here again the young were felt to be the most endangered group. having in many 
cases lost or been separated from their parents. In a draft paper for a conference 
of hostel wardens, the unstoppable Dr. Herwegen jotted down as key words on the 
situation of youngsters on post-war society VernachlMigung. Verelendung. 
Gefrutrdung, Verwahrlosung, Kr1m1naliHit' but also. as a solution. 'Verwurzelung 
1 durch Heim und Beruf.' Adult refugees too and other groups who had been swept 
away from their homeland or their former life by war and the consequences of 
war were believed to be vulnerable to the call of the mass. One of the field 
workers involved in cultural welfare policy observed that the refugees in the 
hostels had a high educational level but had lost a sense for genuine morality 
2 
and ethics as a result of brutal wartime and post-war experiences. Hostel 
occupants, who were away from home and lived in a mass. were seen as being 
particularly endangered. 3 Since the miners' hostels were full of young. 
unattached former refugees. many of whom had lost parents as well as their 
homeland, it was not surprising that the new miner was often regarded as the 
1 HStaD NW41. 746, Dr.HeIWegen, 'Entwurfftlr die Tagesordnung einer Heimleiter-
Tagung'. no date [1948/9]. . 
2 BBA 8. 191. Copy of report from Fischer. 'Alkohol tn Bergarbeiterwohnhelmen . 
27.4.1950. 
3 VorschlAge zum Bau und zur Ftlhrung von Berglehrltngs- und Knappenhelmen'. 
Mtttet.lungen der K.fSA, 1952. 1/2, p.3. 
flghting for their hearts and souls 413 
'Massenmensch' par excellence. In some gUidelines produced by the Catholic 
church, seminary students were advised to spend several months working and 
living in the hostels, 'urn den modernen Massenmenschen kennenzulernen'. 1 
The danger was that radical organisations would exploit and intensifty the 
negative consequences of this Vermassung. The 'personalities' of the youngsters 
needed rescuing not just from their past experiences but from the machinations 
of extremist organisations, above all from the KPD and the influences 
2 
emanating from the GDR. 
Personality and occupation 
Alongside this general feeling of the need to restore and protect the personality 
after the ravages of a mass age, there was a feeling. very strong in mining circles 
and clearly apparent in the quotation above from Heuer, that it is a feature of the 
modern age for the individual worker to lose his sense of self-worth and of the 
worth of his occupation. Job changing was seen as a sign of a lack of social 
roots, the absence of a rounded personality. In his guidelines for constructing 
and running hostels for Knappen, Klaus von Bismarck attributed wastage 
primarily not to material causes but to 'Verlust von Heimat und Besitz, 
AuflOsung der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung und Bindung, das Versanden aller 
standesm~igen Gruppierung, die allgemeine Ungeborgenheit in einer sachlich 
und unpersOnlich gewordenen Welt'. 3 It was therefore only logical that his 
guidelines had as their goal, 'den Menschen von heute aus seiner Vermassung zu 
IOsen und ibm den Ubergang zu organischen Lebensformen der Ehe, der Familie. 
1 BM A201, 47, Merkblatt fOr Theologen tm Bergbau. no date. 
2 On the dangers ostenSibly emanating from that quarter, see BBA 32. 267. 
H~cker to Premer. 3.6.1950. 
3 HStaD NW41. 747, Sozla1-Amt der evangelischen ktrche. vorschlage zum Bau 
und zur FOhrungvon Knappenhetmen', 15.10.1951. 
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der Siedlung auf eigenem Grund und Boden zu ermoglichen,.1 The 'organic' way 
of life and the rounded personality would recreate the stability and ties which 
mass society had eroded. 
Another churchman, this time the very influentional Pastor Dannenmann. one 
of the leading figures in youth voluntary work in post-war Germany and a major 
voice in advising where and how Federal funds should be allocated, also saw job 
changing in these terms. In a speech to mining employers. Dannenmann talked 
of the wandering youngster. today mining coal in the Ruhr. tomorrow perhaps 
labouring in South Germany. Dannenmann argued that the fact that they did 
not stay in the best-paid Jobs. by which he presumably meant mining. proved 
that it was a spiritual problem and not a material one. 'Es ist zuletzt die Frage 
nach dem Sinn des Lebens' and the problem was that the wanderers 'haben noch 
2 
nicht aus der Vermassung herausgefunden'. Strengthening the miners' 
personality. then, meant strengthening his sense of status. and rescuing the 
miners' 'estate' and an organic hierarchy from the fluid unsatisfying anonymity 
of mass society. 
Strategy, fwpe andfear in the RUM 
Of course. the frequent use of quasi-sociological language. like Vermassung. had 
its tactical purposes. The mines found it very useful to stress that they were not 
just trying to get workers for a Job but were embarked on a high moral mission. 
That sort of thing went down well with the state. After a visit to the Ruhr in 
October 1952 by a Parliamentary Committee for youth welfare. the chaimlan 
reported to the Chancellor that they were very impressed by what they saw and 
above all 'von dem etndeutigen Bekenntnis des Herro Generaldtrektors Kost. daB 
1 Ibid. 
2 Dannenmann. Das Jugendproblem heute. 
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die Bergbauunternehmer nicht gewillt seien, bei der Ubernahme der 
Berufsausbildungspflichten auf die erzieherischen und ethischen Werte des 
1 Christentums zu verzichten'. Apparently the Chancellor himself was very 
pleased and promised to praise Kost at the appropriate opportunity. 2 
'Vermassung' was also a useful word to invoke when the danger that was really 
meant was that the left-wing would gain more influence. Warning of the dangers 
of Vermassung' was less partisan and less likely to offend the Social-Democrat 
and Christian-Democrat elements of the 1GB than were statements about 
possible left wing radicalism. 
But, as the previous remarks have suggested, it was much more than a tactical 
expression. The contrast between Vermassung und true personality expressed a 
powerful and optimistic vision. It suggested that if only the true personality of 
the miners could be restored and protected against levelling influences, mining 
could be transformed to what it once was. And similarly it evoked the hope that 
some stable social order could be resurrected, in which authority was recognised 
and respected and the different estates lived harmoniously alongside each other, 
each proud of its own specifiC contribution to the community. 
Behind this optimism lay a conSiderable amount of anxiety. At one level there 
was the fear of the political radicalism that might result if the youngsters were 
to get into the wrong hands. 'Diese Arbeitslager', reported the head of the KAB 
within the diocese of Munster, 'werden immer mehr zu Brutsta.tten des 
Kommunismus. Die Tatsache, d~ die Arbeiter dieser Lager bei den 
Betriebsratswahlen mitwa.hlen, erkla.rt den hohen marxistischen Einflu.$3 in 
1 BAK-ZwSlH 8102.3306. Hensel to Ullrich. 23.10.1952. 
2 Ibid. 
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1 den Betrtebsra.ten'. Other prtests made the same observation. 2 In 1951. the 
sociologist Curt Bondy presented his thoughts on welfare policy after viSiting 
miners' hostels and. in a section of the paper underlined by Bondy. warned of the 
danger that the youngsters could become the followers of extreme left or right 
wing parties if not handled in the right way. 3 
At a deeper level, the notion that the young and the dispossessed needed gUidance 
to return to the values and behaviour of an ordered society was a way of 
suppressing the anxiety that it was precisely the older generation and the 
established classes who had been comprOmised by fascism. whose values had 
been called into question and who could no longer provide convincing 
leadership for the young. An inner uncertainty was being turned outwards into 
a mission to rescue the 'uprooted' and transmit firm values. The employers. the 
churchmen and others were struggling to make something within themselves 
strong. As the Bochum director of apprentice education. Dr.Herwick. said in a 
talk about the moral and educational goals beyond the schools' narrower 
technical curriculum: 4 
Steins Worte waren unser Wegweiser: 'Was wir an Au.6erem Ruhm 
verloren haben, mussen wir durch innere Werte wiedergewinnen". Unser 
Glaube stutzte sich auf die Ewigkeitswerte der deutschen Seele, die nur 
verschuUet sein konnten, fur die aber nach Goethes Wissen alle LAnder 
und Meere zu klein sind, urn ihren Reichtum zu fassen. 
Barriers to communication 
The opportunity and the urgent necessity of the post-war period was therefore to 
win the newcomers over from mass valuelessness, to revive and strengthen their 
1 BM AI01. 251. DIOzesanverband KAB to KapttulaIVikar. 26.2.1947. 
2 BM Al 01, 251. various responses to a Circular from the Kapltularvikar. See 
Pfarrer Clemens Kitten to Dechant (Buer). 12.3.1947: Pfarrer Terborke to Dechant 
Nlehues. 15.3.1947. 
3 HStaD NW41. 747. Curt Bondy. 'Gedanken zur atU3erbetrieblichen Beetnflussung 
von BergbaulehrUngen. Knappen undJungen Neubergleuten'. Hamburg. November 1951. 
4 WBKA. Photocopied extract from Mitteilungen der WBK 1950. Nr.3. V~rtrag des 
Bezirksschuldlrektors Herwtck. 'Unsere Bergberufsschule als Erzlehungsschule. 
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genuine personalities and thus to attain the twin goals of societal integration 
1 
and occupational stability. 
Most employers would have endorsed this view, but equally, most were aware of 
two major difficulties in implementing it. The first was money. Even in the 
best of circumstances, no colliery manager liked COmmitting funds to such aiIy-
fairy projects as cultural policy, lectures and hostel entertainment. There was 
never any shortage of muttertngs about 'sozialer Klimbim'. In any case, the 
years after 1948 were far from being the best of circumstances. The mines were 
for a long period extremely hard-pressed for funds. Not only the accounts but 
also the Coal Control Group spoke against extravagance away from the 
immediate needs of production. When the DKBL tried to add a small amount on 
the coal price to provide steady funding for welfare policies, the UK/USCCG 
refused. 2 This made the mines reluctant to hire large numbers of additional 
personnel to offer services to the hostels. 
Secondly, there was the problem of keeping out labour representatives. Under 
Control Council legislation, there was no doubt that works councillors had a 
3 
right to codetermine this type of social policy. Particularly during the 
immediate post war years, employers did not feel strong enough to prevent 
works councillors from nominating hostel wardens. In addition. the DKBL was 
4 
unwilling to antagonise the unions openly on social questions. 
1 Bondy, 'Gedanken zur au.6erbetrleblichen Beeinflussung'. 
2 WWA S22 (OMGUS) CO HIST BR 3/404-1/7. Minutes of 18th meeting of 
UK/USCCG, 6.8.1948: interview with Siegfried Schroeder, 18.2.1984. 
3 Control Council Law No.22, Works Council Law. repri?t~~oln Military 
Government Gazette Jor the British Zone, 1946, 9. pp.197 -199, esp. Artic e . 
4 For an example of the DKBL's caution. see BM AI0l. 251. DKBL to Blschl'>n. 
Gen.vikariat. 29.4.1948. See also chapter 7, p.306if. 
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Kulturkampj in the lwstels 
As far as the latter problem was concerned. it was the churches which offered a 
solution. It was no accident that it was a church organisation. in this case the 
Sozialamt. which had made the definitive general statement on building 
1 
hostels. For. the church played a crucial role in the hostel programme. 
providing personnel and assisting the employers to protect their apprentices 
both from too much contact with the local community and from union and 
works council influence. 
The Catholics seem to have become aware of the apprentice hostels' spec1f1c 
importance in 1947 as a result of a Social Ministry conference to look into 
welfare policy for young miners. Present was Theodor Fennemann. director of 
what at that time was the only Catholic hostel for miners in the Ruhr. 
Fennemann was both alarmed and excited by what he heard and sent a letter to 
2 the Archbishop of Cologne and the Bishops of the other dioceses in the region. 
What was alarming for Fennemann was the generally anticlerical atmosphere. 
emanating mainly from the union but not openly opposed by any of the other 
bodies present at the conference. No one seemed to be envisaging inclUding 
Christian teaching or religious supervision amongst the proposed welfare 
measures and it was evident that the church was not to be given any major role. 
If the proJected figures for apprentice recruitment were realised. wrote 
Fennemann. the implications could be disastrous. Unless the church 
organisations did something soon. there would be a strongly anticlerical 
atmosphere in the apprentice hostels and in fifteeen years time this could well 
mean that the entire mining community was lost to the church. The good news 
for the church. however. was that both Social Ministry and Labour 
1 See chapter 8. pp.398-9. 
2 BM AI0I. 251. T.Fennemann. Director st. Johannesstift der Saleslaner to 
KardlnaI Ft1ngs et aI. 12.7.1947. 
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Adm!nstration were privately well disposed to the idea of hostels being run 
under church supeIVision. This was an opportunity the church could not afford 
1 
to miSS. 
This feeling that the apprentice hostels represented an opportunity to influence 
the character of the entire mining community was echoed by a number of church 
organisations over the following years. The Catholic Worker's Movement, for 
example, approved an attempt to found a Catholic hostel in Westerholt with the 
argument that the local mine was '90% red' and that the hostel was the only 
chance to break this Marxist stronghold. 2 The Caritas organisation and the 
eAJ were increasingly active in promoting the establishment of Catholic 
hostels, while Similar initiatives emanted from the CVJM and the Innere 
Mission on the Protestant side. 3 As the Caritas organisation argued in a 
pamphlet devoted to its new apprentice hostel in Bottrop. ' ... wer einen christlich 
ausgerichteten bergm~nnischen Nachwuchs hat, der hat sp~ter auch einen 
4 
christlichen Bergmannsstand'. In 1950 the Arbeitsgemeinschaft katholische 
Heimstattbewegung fur heimatlose Jugend im Lande NRW was fonned to 
coordinate these initiatives for the Catholic side. 5 
During the period up to 1950/51, I.e., up to the beginning of the rapid hostel 
construction programme, NRW gave quiet but conSistent support for church 
involvement in this area. 6 Both social ministry and labour administration 
1 Ibid. 
2 BM A10I,252, Wlnkelheide to GeneraMkartat. 27.11.1948. 
3 BM A10I, 253. Paper, 'Die religiOse Situation und die seelsorgllche Betreuung in 
den Wohnheimen und Lagem des Industrlegebiets'. no date. 
4 BM A10I. 253. 'Caritas Berglehrl1ngsheim Bottrop. Ein Beitrag zum 
chnstllchen Nachwuchs des Bergmanns'. [1949/ 19501. 
5 BM A10I,252. Paper. 'AG der kath. Heimstattbewegung In der DiOzese Munster'. 
Ouisburg no date. 
6 At an important meeting In 1950. for Instance. when the terms of ~e t5 ~illl~n 
OM loan from the HAfSH were thrashed out. the Social Ministry made sure 9 ~l~U~~ or 
run hostels could and would be recipients of funding. See HStaD NW41. 76 , 
lntermlnlsterlal meeting at the SWIM. 6.6.1950. 
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believed the churches were better qualified than employers to supervise the 
hostels. The employers were sometimes accused of not taking care and 
1 
supervision seriously enough. They lacked qualified personnel. particularly 
in the early years when most of the mines' employees formerly involved in 
youth and training work were disqualified by virtue of their Nazi party 
2 
connections. The state was also highly Critical of the practice of allOwing 
works councillors to nominate as hostel wardens men whose only qualification 
was that they were deserving social cases, often with some disability. rather 
than being pedagogically qualified.3 
Initially the employers themselves were very cautious in their response to the 
church's initiative.4 Nevertheless it did not take the employers long to see that 
handing hostels over to the churches was the best way to keep union and works 
5 
council at bay. At confidential meetings, influential employers gave the 
church to understand that their initiatives were very welcome if handled 
6 delicately enough. An early step was to establish a special camp at Adelheide. a 
former aerodrome. where homeless youngsters not yet ready for an 
7 
apprenticeship could be prepared under church supervision. From 1950 
onwards, the DKBL felt confident enough actively to promote the establishment 
of church-run hostels. Even where mines were not particularly disposed to 
involve the church, they were urged by the DKBL to do so. 'Ich brauche Ihnen 
gegeniiber nicht zu betonen', wrote the DKBL's Lorenz Hocker to the director of 
1 HStaD NW41. 747, Minutes ofmeetlng of committee 'FOrsorge fOr Jungbergleute 
und 8erglehrlinge' (Elphick committee). 30.1.1948. 
2 'OAF belastet' as Walter Niemann put it. see HStaO NW41. 761. Niemann to 
Weber 19.4.1949. 
3 'Jugend ohne innere Bindung. IV Industrieheime mit Komfort und ohne Seele', 
DieNeueZeitw1g, 1952. No. 218. p.5. 
4 BMAI01. 251. OKBL to BtschOfl. Gen.v1kar1at. 29.4.1948. 
5 HStaD NW41. 747, Soz.Min. NRW 1118/6. Memo, 25.7.1948. 
6 BM Al 0 1. 251. J ullus Angerhauen to Bischof Michael Keller, 9.4.1948. K A 
7 Ges.Verb Ftle '003 Adelheide', Sogemeier to Kost. 9.6.1949: Mttteilungen der ':jS 
1950.5, p.3. 
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the mine Emscher-Lippe, 'd~ nach unserer Auffassung der Christliche Geist 
iiberall, insbesondere aber in den Heimen ausstrahlen mu.B. 1st er doch letztlich 
die einzige Kraft gegeniiber dem nicht nur im Osten herrschenden Ungelst!,.l 
As well as protecting the youngsters from unions and works councils and 
spreading a 'Christian spirit', whatever that was, the churches saved the 
employers money, in some cases because they were able to tap external sources of 
funding but more generally because in 1953 the 1GB managed to extend the 
industry's wage norms to employees in colliery-run hostels. Church hostels 
were not covered by the agreement and their employees cost considerably less. 
As an insight to employers' calculations it Is interesting to conSider the case of 
the Hibernia concern. In 1953, the director of the Caritas in Bottrop had very 
Interesting news for the Bishop of Miinster. 2 Dr.Koker from Hibernia had 
arranged a meeting to inform him of Hibernia's wish that control over its 
apprentice hostels be transferred to the church. Since Hibernia controlled some 
20 percent of all apprentices in the industry this could not but be of interest to 
the church.3 According to Dr.Koker, Hibernia was having difficulty bringing up 
the youngsters in an appropriate way because the works council, unions and the 
youngsters themselves undermined the warden's best intentions. At the same 
time the union was insisting that the company pay wardens according to the 
industry's wage rates. The question for Hibernia was how to get the hostels into 
church hands when the powerful communist-led works council was opposed. 
Hibernia suggested that the church should 'pressure' the company into changing 
its hostel regime. Wir miissen uns daruber klar sein', said Dr. KOker, 'd~ durch 
ein Klingelzeichen der BischOfe von MOnster und von KOln der gesamte 
1 BBA 35, 267, HOcker to Premer, 3.6.1950. 
2 BM AI0I, 253, Carttas-Verband Bottrop to Blschofl. Gen.vtkarlat. 23.7.1953. 
3 It was noteworthy that the Generalvtkar did not waste a day 1n replying. At last 
the employers were having some reasonable thoughts on how to I brtn2~ ~Pl:;;;1r young 
miners, he wrote. BM AI0I, 253, Gen.vtkar to Carttasdlrektor Dr.Pe ster. ., . 
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Nachwuchs 1m Bergbau aus den katholischen Gegenden gesperrt werden 
kOnnte,.l 
These moves were, understandably, a source of considerable unease to the 
miners' union which felt the question of hostel regime to be one of fundamental 
2 importance. When, in 1949, a DGB offiCial wrote to the 1GB to find out if it 
knew about the Adelheide project and to ask what it was doing to combat the 
Christian influence, the response was peSS1m1stic. The 1GB did not see what it 
could do to hinder the project and in general suffered from a lack of the 
pedagogically qualified personnel of which the church had a large reselVe. 3 
However, the 1GB trted where it could to prevent the church from becoming 
involved. In 1951, it felt the situation serious enough to send a circular to all 
works councillors warning them of Carttas and Innere Mission efforts. When 
the hostels were under church control, warned the 1GB, union and works council 
lost the power to influence the youngsters. It attributed the employers' support 
for the church to a desire to undermine the union.4 A copy of the circular fell 
into the hands of the Carttas which passed it on to the Bishop of MOnster with 
the commentary that the letter 'kennzeichnet in seiner ganzen SchArfe die 
Situation, in der wir augenbl1cklich stehen,.5 A quiet war developed with 
church representatives wooing the employers and union representatives trying 
to prevent the mines from putting their hostels in the churches' hands. 
1 BM AlOl, 253, Carttas-Verband fOr die stadt Bottrop to Blschon.Gen.v1karIat, 
23.7.1953. 
2 1GBEA V6.IGB. Memo, 10.5.1954. 
3 IGBEA. Flle 'Jugend', August Enderle to August Schmidt, 12.5.1949; 1GB 
Abte1lung Schulung u. BIldung to Enderle, 1.6.1949. 
4 IGBEA File 'Jugend', 1GB Hauptverwa1tung, Circular Nr.88/51 to works counctls 
and socta1 repreeentat1Yes. 23.7.1951. 
5 8M AlOl, 252. B.v.Heyden to Qen.vikar, 3.8.1951. 
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In some cases. for example. in the Lothringen mine in 1952. the 1GB was 
1 
successful. However it suffered a decisive disadvantage in that the state gave the 
churches a great deal of covert support. An official in the LAA Mining Office 
informed the diocese of Munster that funds could be diverted to enable Catholic 
hostels to be built; another offiCial in the same administration offered to 
segregate incoming apprentices on confessional lines to facilitate the founding 
2 
of Catholic hostels. In October 1951. Hensel. one of the mining specialists in 
the Economics Minstry. sent a letter to the NRW Social MinisUy's youth officer 
3 Willi Weber. In response to the above noted 1GB circular. Hensel asked Weber if 
he could not get the religious organisations to show the absurdity of the union's 
accusations. In the same breath. however. he continued. 'Das chrtstliche 
Element darf 1m Bergbau keinesfalls erstickt werden. besonders nicht bei der 
Bergbau-Jugend. Die letzte Bremse gegen die sowieso schon zu stark 
fortgschrtttene Radikalisierung wAre auf diese Weise beseitlgt'. 4 
The danger was. wrote Hensel. that when the Codeterminatlon Law carne into 
operation. the labour directors would probably prevent the creation of further 
church hostels. Hensel asked Weber to use his influence so that pro-church 
labour directors were elected by the union. At the same time he proposed to his 
superiors in the Economics Ministry that the provision of funds for hostel 
construction be accelerated so that church influence could be extended as widely 
5 
as possible before the Co-determination Law came into force. 
1 IGBEA V3. 1GB. Two internal memos from Abtellung VII to GeacbAftsfOhrenden 
Vorstand, both dated 17.6.1952. to Bisch r 
2 BM AI0l.252. Winkelheide to Gen.vIkar. 27.11.1951: B. v.Heyden 0 
Keller, 15.3.1951. 
s BAK-ZWSUI BI02. 33189. Hensel to Weber. 13.10.1951. 
4 ibid. 
5 lbtd• and SAK-ZwStH BI02. 33189. Hensel to KattenatlOth. 13.10.1951. 
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In view of the support for the churches. it is not surpriSing to discover that they 
made rapid headway. By the end of 1952. according to 1GB calculations. some 
108 apprentice and Knappen hostels had been completed. Of these 33. or just 
under a third. had been removed from colliery control. 13 were in the hands of 
Carttas. 15 run by the Innere Mission and 5 by other church organisations. Of 
the 30 hostels then under construction virtually half were church controlled. so 
that by 1954. the church would be in charge of between one third and two fifths of 
1 young miners' hostels. 
Gradually the Codeterm1nation Law began to affect the Situation. as the labour 
directors were appointed and they extended their influence. But their impact 
was to confound the expectations of employers. church and union. For. because 
of the lower costs. the labour directors were very often well disposed to the 
church hostels. In other words they were keen not to have to pay the wardens 
according to the industry's general wage-rates because not doing so left them 
2 
with more money to spend on other aspects of social services. At the same 
time. however. the labour directors were able to insist on agreements that 
ensured union and works council free access. In the case of Hibernia. for 
example. the labour director and works council abandoned their opposition to 
church-run hostels once it appeared that a low-cost. pro-union solution was 
possible. The 1GB. st1ll opposed to the idea. found Itself in the unhappy situation 
3 
of opposing not only the employers. but the workers' representattves as well. 
Eventually. the union felt obliged to abandon Its hard line againSt the church 
hostels, particularly since the church was feeling its way towards some sort of 
1 Calculated from figures In DGBA Protokoll-Sammlung. 1GB. Hauptverwaltung. 
Abtellung Jugend (ed.). OeschiJ.jtsberfcht 1950-1952. [Bochum 19531. p.87: and ~: 
IOBEA VB. lOB. Memo concerning transfer of hostels to outside organlsaU 
(rrageJVerblnde), 10.5.1954. • 
2 10BEA Handakten Rudl guast. FIle 'Arbeltsmls-Arbeltsdlrektoren 1952-1956. 
Meeting of Albeitskrds der Arbeltsclirektoren. BezIrk Recldtngbausen. 30.9.1953. 
s 10BEA VB. lOB. Memo concemtng transfer of hostels to outside organtaaUona 
trrIgerverbInde, 10.5.1954. 
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1 
an arrangement. Thus although in hostels covered by existing agreements. the 
union sometimes continued to have problems of access.2 new agreements with 
the church caused less concern. From the employer's viewpoint. they therefore 
offered less protection from the union than before and were probably Inspired 
more by the deSire to save money than by anything else. Still, it is a fact that the 
churches continued to extend their influence and by 1956. of the 187 Ruhr 
hostels for apprentices and Knappen only 119 were in the mines' hands. 31 being 
run by the Catholic organisation. 33 by Protestant groups and 4 by other 
3 Independent organisations. 
Organising culture and entertainment 
The involvement of the church in running apprentice hostels did not end the 
problem of who should provide seIVices. In the first place. there was the 
question of adult hostels. It was not considered appropriate to place the adults 
wholly in the churches' hands. nor did the mines have the sort of hopes of the 
adult trainees that would have made their segregation from the mining 
community deSirable. Nevertheless. the importance of transmitting the right 
message here too was undisputed. Secondly. there were the many apprentice 
hostels which remained in mines' hands and needed attention and. finally. even 
the church-run hostels were not always self-suffiCient when it came to providing 
entertainment and education. 
Though they gave the church discrete encouragement (during 1949, there were 
monthly confidential meetings between representatives of the DKBL and the 
1 Ibid. 
2 1GB Bez1rksleitung Essen (ed.), Geschdftsbertcht 1954/1955. p.117; 1GB (ed.), 
Jahrbuch 1956. p.252. 
3 This included JugenddOrfer but excluding 'Jung~~t~~~t~t~uret:~~~~ 
18 other than Knappen. Calculated from Arbeltsgemeinsc e 
NRW (ed.), Verzetchnts derJugend.heimsUitten in NRW. 
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church organisations involved in adult camp and hostel welfare policies), 1 the 
employers were reluctant to allow the churches to hold meetings in their own 
hostels, because of the danger that this would give other political groups carte 
blanche to organise events there and would antagOnise the 1GB. The DKBL did 
manage, at first experimentally, then as a permanent fixture, to include 
religious instruction as part of the curriculum at the apprentice training 
schools, albeit at a cost of allowing the unions to hold some lectures too. But, 
sympathetic as it was, the DKBL did not want to take the risk of giving church 
organisations free access to mine-owned hostels. The union leadership too was 
agreeable to a general prohibition on 'political' meetings (under which heading it 
2 included the church) in the hostels because this would keep not only the church 
but also the KPD youth groups at bay. 
The question, therefore, was who should provide the hostels with 
entertainment. The state stepped in the breech, and at the beginning of 1949, 
negotiations between the DKBL and the Ministry for Education and Culture led 
to the creation of a Fachstelle fur Bergarbeiterbetreuung, run by the regional 
association for adult education (Landesverband der Volkshochschulen). The 
Fachstelle was wound up in 1949 and replaced by the Revierarbeitsgemetnschaft 
fUr die kulturelle Bergarbeiterbetreuung (RAG), an organisation that perSists till 
this day.3 Five field workers were appOinted to stimulate and coordinate 
cultural activities in the miners' hostels. The sums invested were not large, but 
the RAG in conjunction with local wardens and Volkshochschulen did organise 
4 
a conSiderable number of events. 
1 BM AIOI. 252, Kath. LageIWerk to Bishop of MOnster, 10.6.1949. 
2 Ges.Verb., Ftle "'K", vo1.2', Minutes of KtSA meeting, 16.11.1950. 
3 HStaO NW17, 136, Landesverband der Volkshochschulen NRW. Circular to 
members of the Landesverband, 10.1.1950. 
4 See Egon Dietzel. 'Kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung, elne Notwe~!~gk~~~ 
Gedanken zur kulturellen Bergmannsbetreuung der Volkshochschule Bach , 
Anschnttt. 1954,6, 2, pp.20-21. 
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Conveying the true ethos of the miner 
Turning to the actual practical work of prOviding services for the new miners. 
the first obvious feature is that a lot of energy was expended trying to increase 
their pride and interest in mining. Both church and state recognised the 
priority of strengthening 'Berufsstolz' through suitable lectures. 1 There was a 
widespread hope that, if the right spiritual guidance were given, it would be 
possible to convey to the newcomers a specific mining mentality, as Jiirgen 
2 Heuer wrote in his account of the Pestalozzi villages: 
Hier ist es erforderlich ... ein Gefuhl fur die MentaliHlt des Bergmanns zu 
erwecken. Die Vermittlung eines echten Tradit1onsbewuJ3tseins in 
Verbindung mit einem fundierten Berufsstolz und Standesbewuj3tsein, 
das das Ansehen des Bergmanns hochhalt, 1st hier eine der wesent11chen 
psychologischen Aufgaben, die vor aHem den Pfiegeeltern des 
Pestalozzidorfs obliegt. 
Or as Curt Bondy put it, a new 'StandesbewuJ3tsein' was to be created through 
3 
'auJ3erbetriebliche Beeinflussung'. 
At a celebration to commemorate the lOOth anniversary of the mining company 
Concordia. two short musical recitals were followed by three poems; first came 
the miner with long service behind him and then a new miner, who recited the 
4 following: 
Die Werksgemeinschaft schlieJ3t mit unsichtbaren Banden 
Zusammen all. die sich hier zusammenfanden 
Sie webt urn Lehrling, Knappen. Hauer, Veteranen 
Und urn uns Neubergleute. die von weither kamen. 
Urn Arbeit und auch Heimat hier zu finden 
Und altern Stamm uns gliicklich zu verbinden. 
An even more theatrical attempt to emphasise th1s continuity with the past and 
to celebrate the steadfastness of the miner was a ceremony at the Dirgardt-
1 HStaD NW41 746 Copy Carttasverband Bottrop, Berglehrllngshelm 
, " B d 'Gedanken zur ErzlehungsgrundsAtze. Bottrop, 21.10.1948; Curt on y. 
auBerbetrteblichen Beeinflussung'. 
2 Heuer, 'Pestalozzidorf, p.62. 
3 Bondy, 'Gedanken zur a~rbetr1ebl1chen Beelnflussung'. . 
rdt BAG Oberhausen Rhld. 4 BBA 8, 191. 'Festfolge. Feterstunde der Conco a 
September 1950. 
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Mevissen mine. The 250,OOOth newcomer to be found a job in the Ruhr was 
symbolically presented with the miner's tools by the oldest miner in the pit. 
The celebration was attended by the 5O,OOOth newcomer, the lOO,OOOth and so on 
as well as a mining family of grandfather, father, son and son-in-law. all of 
1 
whom worked at the mine Hugo. 
There were countless other attempts to cultivate a sense of tradition and the 
miners' mentality. In 1948, for example, the GBAG Gruppe Hamborn 
publication, Der Fordertunn, offered a piece on the nature and soul of the miner. 
accompanied by a poem about the farmer and miner as two kindred souls 
2 
working hand in hand. Issues in 1949 saw further pieces on old mining 
3 traditions and practices. A major paper on cultural policy, produced for the 
KfSA in 1952, suggested going beyond the new miners and trying to persuade the 
whole workforce of minings' inner value. Was der Bergmann friiher einmal 
gewesen ist: auf dem Wege fiber das Erlebnis kulturellen Lebens und seinen 
4 Anteil daran wird er sich wieder finden'. By and large, however, it was the 
hostel residents who remained the chief objects of cultural welfare policy. 
Apart from communicating a sense of mining's inner worth and tradition. there 
were also various attempts to convey the notion that occupational loyalty was a 
sign of personal strength. Der Fordertunn, for example, offered its readers an 
article of high moral tone. Wer besUzt Bildung'. It stressed that genuine 
personality was more important than any school-book education and lamented 
the absence of the harmoniously balanced personality, full of occupational 
1 'Sechs Jahre A~nstelle Bergbau'. p.79. 
2 See Von Art und Seele des Bergmanns', Der F'6rc1erttam. July 1948. 
3 See, for instance, 'SchOpfertsches Bergmannstum,' Ib3'td.Da~ berg:nl~4~i.S.c;.: 
ErzAhlgut' Der FOrderturm. June 1948' 'Der Bergbau der Vorzeit. • ugus . Bergmann~sprache" Ibid .. Otober 1948; 'Gute aIte Bergmannsart', Ibid.. October 1949, 
4 HStaD NW41, 747, Dr.Hoemecke, Wiesbaden. 'Gedanken zur kulturellen 
Bergrnannsbetl'euung 1m Steinkohlenbergbau', (Gutachten fOr die KfSAl, 15.5.1952. 
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ethos and integrity.l The view that occupational loyalty was the sign of a 
balanced personality, and could be inculcated as such, is also apparent in the 
criteria for choosing the village 'parents' laid down by the JhStW PV. The 
second in the list of criteria, was 'Bodenstandigkeit und Heimatverbundenheit'? 
the implication being that this could be transmitted to the youngsters by the 
force of the house parents' personality. 
Of course, not all the attempts to encourage integration were in this romantic-
historical mould. A glance through the RAG's standard lecture topics in 1953 
shows a large number of more straight-forward subjects: Was kann lch dazu 
bettragen, urn in meinem Beruf zu bleiben und vorwartszukommen', WeIche 
Blldungsm6glichkeiten und welches Verhalten erleichtern dem Neubergmann 
die Eingew6hnung in die neue Heimat', and so on, though the programme was not 
3 
without lectures on the history of mining and the mentality of the miner. 
'Man benimmt sich wieder' 
Alongside these aspirations and often in conflict with the goal of integration 
into the local environment, was the desire to restore a lost moral order, to 
recreate proper behaviour and a respect for authority. The pressure to detach 
the hostels from the mining community has already revealed Just how strong 
this deSire was.4 No programme for cultural welfare was complete without a 
reference to reviving an 'aktive chrtstliche Gesinnung', 5 to the 'erziehertschen 
1 Wer besltzt BUdung', .Der FOrderturm. June 1948. 
2 JHStW PV (ed.), .Pestalozzteltem tm Pestalozzidorj. Essen 1952, cited In Roelen, 
'DIe Bedeutung der PestalozzldOrfer', p.27ff. 
3 Ges.Verb., File 'Untemehmensverband 662-668', Tclugkeltsberlcht der RAG 
1953. 
4 See chapter 8, p.398ff. 
5 Kl1nkert Papers, Flle 'Nlederschrlften der Arbettstagungen und 
Vortragsveranstaltungen', Vormbrock. 'Oberbl1ck fiber die blshe~ge Arbelt des Jugend-
heimstattenwerks und den Entwlcklungsstand der PestalozztdOrfer. 7.10.1953. 
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und ethischen Werte des Christentums', 1 or the values of 'der auf christlicher 
Grundlage beruhenden abendlandischen Kultur'. 2 
Exactly what was meant by Christian values was never specified but the value on 
which greatest emphasis was placed was undoubtedly respect for authOrity. At 
the very top of the Pestalozzi Association's criteria for selecting village parents 
was a decent moral outlook (Anstandtgkeit der Gesinnung), elaborated as a sense 
3 
of duty and of responsibility. 'Gegen Unbescheidenheit, Mangel an Ehrfurcht, 
Ablehnung jeglicher AutoriUlt anzugehen, benutze ich jede Gelegenheit, jede 
Au ssprache , , reported one of the field workers in cultural welfare. 4 
Controlling sexual behaviour was another priority and many hostels instituted 
5 dance classes as a way of regulating how young men and women came together. 
There was a discussion in 1953 about whether youngsters should be allowed to 
take their girlfriends on trips. Yes, was the answer, because the young miner 
then has:6 
einen gesunden Ehrgeiz, den anderen gegenuber mit diesem Ma.del 
bestehen zu konnen; danach wird er sich seine Gefiihrtin aussuchen und 
wird sich selbst entsprechend benehmen. Das sind Dinge, die zu 
erreichen die kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung als einen ihrer 
Programmpunkte betrachtet. 
Suitable lectures were also offered to influence the youngsters' choice of partner, 
on 'Gesunde und ungesunde Frauenschonhe!t', for example, which presumably 
1 BAK-ZwSt.H B102, 3306, Hensel to Ullrtch, 23.10.1952. 
2 'PestalozzidOrfer des Bergbaus', p.17; Roelen, 'Die Bedeutung der 
PestalozzldOrfer', p.26. 
3 JHStW PV (ed.), PestalozzieUem im PestalozztdorJ, in Roelen, 'Ole Bedeutung der 
PestalozzidOrfer', p.27ff. 
4 HStAD NW17, 10, Erich Burrlsch to Kultusmin., 2.12.1949, annex. 
5 Roelen 'Ole Bedeutung der PestalozzldOrfer', p.84: BBA 32, 1186, 's~am;-oC"k 
8erglehrlinge wtdmen slch begelstert dem Tango nach der Schlcht', cUpp ng rom 
Westfdltsche Rundschau. f, t 
6 HStaO NW17, 141. Lecture from Fischer In report on the RAG con erence a 
KronenbUrg 21-26.9.1953. 
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warned the young miners against flashy girls wearing too much make-up. 1 The 
hostel wardens were instructed how to help prevent premature sex and 
2 
masturbation. General social behaviour too, needed improving, and fitting 
lectures with titles such as 'Man ben1mmt sich wieder' were given to meet this 
3 
need. 
These 'secondary virtues' had become the symbols of the struggle to preseIVe or 
revive a past moral order. 1\vo examples will suffice to show the strength of the 
anxieties that were aroused here. In a lecture given in 1954, Erwin Jochum 
talked about the way in which the apprentice schools could help to shape 
apprentices' sexual behaviour. He deSCribed some of the shocking cases that had 
come to his attention, the worst being two young miners who, invited to spend 
the nicht at the house of a widow, slept with her two daughters after having 
drawn straws to see who slept with whom. Leaving aside the fact that the story 
in the form in which it is presented seems rather apocryphal, it is noteworthy 
4 that Jochum went on to say: 
Da l>ifnet sich ein Abgrund, der uns mit Ekel und Grauen erfiillen mu~. 
Doch das ist die Situation unserer Tage ... das ist das unheimlich 
gl1mmende Feuer unter der Oberfl~che, das sich zu einer verheerenden 
Feuersbrunst ausweiten kann. 
Less apocalyptic, but no less striking was a paper delivered in the previous year 
at a conference for field workers and other interested partiCipants in cultural 
welfare policy. Without embarassment, but with an emotion that comes 
1 HStaD NW17, 10, Report on cultural events in the hostels of mine Lohberg 
during Januaxy 1950. 
2 HStaD NW42, 912. Slmons, Bericht aber den Lehrgang far Heimlelter von 
Berglehrlingen- und Ledigenhelmen yom 6.10.1947,18.1.1948. 
3 141 RAG Report on the conference in Lecture from Fischer in HStaD NW 17, ' ' 
Kronenburg 21-26.9.1953, October 1953. 
4 Erwin Jochum 'Das sexuelle Problem unserer heutlgen Jugend uhund, der19Be54ltra6g 
, 'U hlr die BergberuJssc en. " der Bergberufsschule zu seiner LOsung, Mitte ungenJUI 
here p.l0. 
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through clearly in the text, Dozent Fischer had this to say about the cultural 
value of organised outings with young miners: 1 
Es wird so oft gesagt, daB die jungen Menschen keinen Sinn mehr fUr 
ethische Werte hatten. Diese Auffassung entspricht nicht ganz den 
Tatsachen. Es 1st immer wieder ein Erlebnis, festzustellen. wie diese 
Menschen 1m Dom still und ruhig werden und sogar die Hande falten 
Das allein konnte schon die Berechtigung der Betreuungsarbeit 
unterstreichen. 
There is a sort of shuddery feeling of pleasure here at that little physical gesture 
of bourgeois propriety. The decently held hands, though in reality indicating 
nothing more than that their owners were intimidated by the atmosphere of a 
large cathedral and uncertain as to how to behave, symbolise for the speaker an 
acceptance of proper values. The values themselves remain undefined. Such 
gestures - decent behaviour, respectful demeanour and so on - become the focal 
point of cultural policy, because of the difficulty in actually specifying what the 
deeper values might be. 
One other element of moral education was the fight against alcoholism. Though 
there was no doubt that alcohol intake in many of the hostels was high, this 
aspect of moral education too reveals as much about the anxieties and high 
moral hopes of its propagators as it does about the actual social problems on the 
ground. The most active organisations in this field were the Deutsche 
Hauptstelle fur die Beldimpfung der Suchtgefahren (DHS). a long established 
body with an ignominious history in the 1933-45 period, and the Hoheneck 
group within the Catholic church. In 1948, the DHS unsuccessfully applied for a 
general ban on the sale of alcohol in camps.2 Together with a body calling itself 
the Sozialhygienischer Volksdienst it produced a brochure called 
'Jungbergmann --Moment maH', warning of the dangers of addiction and 
1 HStaD NW17, 141. lecture from Ftscher in report on the RAG conference at 
Kronenburg 21-26.9.1953. 
2 HStaD NW41, 761. DHS to M1nlsterpn\sident. 20.12.1948. 
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stressing the advantages of an upright life. Purporting to come from 'Euer alter 
Schie~meister Otto'. the brochure went through the usual litany of warning 
againSt films of doubtful quality and offered two photos on how and how not to 
spend one's leisure time. While the 'how not to' photo depicts a mixed group 
rather the worse for drink and cheerfully toasting the photo-taker with their 
Schnapps bottles. the contrasting picture offers a group of clean faced and sporty 
apprentices standing around quietly with some decently dressed local girls. 1 
Modesty, decency and restraint were the watch-words here. To intensify its 
campaign, the DRS set up a special office in Bochum.2 but seems to have 
undertaken little more than lecture tours. A request for finanCial support in 
1951 apparently brought little response from the DKBL.3 Unfortunately the 
records of the office have been destroyed so that it is difficult to say much about 
the office's subsequent activities. 
'German music or Jazz?' 
As well as integrating the newcomers into the moral order, the cultural policy 
makers also felt the need to communicate a genuine aesthetic. Lecture topics 
and works newspaper articles such as 'SchOne Welt'. 'Gesunde und ungesunde 
FrauenschOnheit" 'Deutsche Musik oder Jazz' and so on were meant to lead the 
youngsters to an appreciation of true culture.4 There was a sense of returning -
or attempting to return - to a valid, German aesthetic. In a 1950 article on 
1 HStaD "'1'0"41 761 'Jung'-rdlftDftft Moment mall', no date (1951?). 
"""', • ,---aa--- ~It..--"vfllftn 1950 3 
2 See HStaD NW41. 747, 'RI,iftns Volk'. MonatsschrlftjilT V~~ ... -"=" " 
Nr.8. 
s HStaD NW17 136. DHS to DKB~ 20.1.1951. 
,,' Bo h Dozent for kulturelle 
HStaD NW17. 10. StAdt1sche '::l~ 1~ ~clmchau auf die Kultur-
Bergmannsbetreuung. Berlcht. 1.5.1952':_~ Lohberg'lm Januar 1950 durcbgefOhrt 
veranata1tungen die In den Helmen der ~.e 
\WIden'; JIIt8Clungen del' ~ 1949. 4. p.4. 
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cultural activities in the hostels and mining community. Der Forderturm 
praiSed a recent concert of much loved tunes: 1 
Herz und Gemiit schwingen mit in jenen frohen KindheUs- und Helmats-
erinnerungen, die in der Unrast der Kriegs- und Nachkrtegsjahre nicht 
zuletzt aber auch in den Jazz- und Negerrhythmen der Neuzeit, v~llig zu 
erstlcken drohten. 
The Pestalozzi association saw one of their missions in leading youngsters out 
of the contemporary mass culture and back to the true and beautiful cultural 
2 
works of the German people. 
Many hoped that not only the newcomers but also the established miners could 
be drawn into the wider community through appreciation of the classics of 
national culture. Cultural policy, wrote a Dr.Hoemecke in a paper 
3 
commiSSioned by the KfSA: 
will den Bergleuten in ihrer GesamtheU. nicht nur den Neubergleuten. 
durch den Anteil an den Kulturgutem, die sie Ihnen vermittelt. und in 
denen sie heimisch macht, das Bewu~tsein geben. ob mit oder ohne 
Wohnung, ein vollwertiges und gleichberechtigtes Glied der Gesellschaft 
zu werden, in der sie leben. 
An experiment in exposing the whole workforce to improving cultural events 
4 had in fact been underway at the GHH mines since 1949. This was also the goal 
of another organisation, the Association of Friends of Art and Culture in 
Mining. One of its members wrote of the need to assist the miners in aesthetic 
judgements about furnishing their house. His article is worth quoting at length 
because of the way many of the motifs and anxieties we have obselVed elsewhere 
are brought together here. After streSSing the need for caution and subtlety in 
1 'Gesang und Instrumentalmusik im Rahmen der kulturellen Bergmanns-
betreuung', Der R5rderturm. March 1950. 
2 Vormbrock. 'Oberblick aber die bisherlge Arbelt'. 
3 HStaO NW41. 747. Dr.Hoemecke. Wlesbaden. Gedanken zur kulturellen 
Bergmannsbetreuung 1m Stelnkohlenbergbau. 15.5.1952. 
4 Ges.Verb. File "'K" vo1.2'. Minutes of the 7th meeting of K.fSA. 1 L 11.1948: File 
'III.N'. meeting of Arbeltskreis III. 24.9.1952. 
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approaching what was after all part of the miners' private familiy life. 
Winkelmann outlined what was wrong with the miners' choice of furniture: 1 
Die riesigen, schwellenden, Unruhe ausstrahlenden Kuchenbufetts. die 
schweren protzigen Betten und Frisierkommoden. kurz all das was wir 
heute als "Gelsenkirchener Barock" bezeichnen. ist in Wahrheit den 
inneren. geraden. etnfachen Werten des Bergmanns fremd ... Gerade weil 
wir mit der Frage der Wohnkultur zur personlichsten Sphare unserer 
Bergleute, ins Familienleben, in das Innenleben vorstoJ3en. gerade 
darum ergibt sich hier fur uns eine Aufgabe grundsatzlicher Bedeutung. 
Die Erziehung zu echtem Formgefuhl, zu einem Gefuhl fur abgewogene 
VerhaItnisse zwischen Raum und Einrtchtung. die Hinwendung zu echten 
Formen und Farben sind Voraussetzungen fur das Wachsen einer neuen 
Wohnkultur, die unserem innersten Wesen. unserer augenblicklichen 
Situation und unserem Bedurfnis nach Wahrhaftigkeit entspricht. 
On the one hand there was the idea of returning to purer and simpler forms. an 
idea which evoked the myth of the miner of the past. a genuine and simple figure 
who knew his place and did not aspire to anything else. On the other there was a 
clear anxiety towards the kind of statement that the 'Gelsenkirchen Baroque' 
style was making. The robust. pompous showiness that characterised a lot of 
miners' furniture at that time, was anathema to a nervous bourgeoisie anxious 
to restore restraint. modesty and propriety. In effect. two sorts of anxiety were 
in collision: the bourgeoisie's general unease made it recoil from this type of 
shOwiness. while the miners' social insecurity inspired them to exhibit it - that. 
at any rate. was how the Dortmund sociologists explained the miners' 
perSistence with 'Gelsenkirchen Baroque' even in the smaller housing of the 
2 post-war period. 
Democracy: a nation of dutiful and responsible citiZens 
th ti s had a political element. A lot of the gUidance on moral and aes etic ques on 
in that it aimed to remove a 'proletarian' consciousness and life-style. Beyond 
this type of indirect propaganda, there was a good deal of explicit political 
d S rt und Spiel des Bergmanns'. 
1 Heinrich Winkelmann. 'Heim und He~t u~kottle Ausgabe'. Aprtl 1953. 
Westdeutsche Wtrtschajts-Monographie Part 1, e 
2 SoFoSt. 'Schlu6bertcht'. pp.35-36. 
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education. There was a general consensus that the new miners should be 
educated to be good democrats. l The stress. however. was on the dUties and 
responsibilities of the Citizen. rather on his freedom or participation. As 
Herwick, the director of apprentice education. declared: Wir hoftien M sch 
... en en 
zu fonnen. die slch spAter schAmen in der Str~enbahn zu sagen: "Das ist 
demokrat1sche Freiheit. jeder kann machen was er will"'. 2 There was a strong 
emphasis on the need for a moral reawakening or a moral rearmament. 3 There 
was also frequent stress on the need for European unity. on European 
integration as the ultimate aim of politics. 4 
In terms of the approach to the miners, the older generation's anxiety, natural 
authoritarianism and burning sense of mission all tended to preclude much 
practical democracy. Again this was a striking contrast between the British 
initiatives and those of their Gennan counterparts. Consider the closing words 
of the British sulVey oftralnees in 1947:5 
Finally, there is presented here a golden opportunity to introduce 
democratic practices. The trainees should not be nursed and cosseted but 
induced to do things for themselves. It might be recommended to the 
trainees in each camp that they set up a social committee. A house 
committee is also indicated, to decide upon those day to day matters and 
questions of conduct and discipline which fall outside the general 
supeIVisory functions of the pit management or camp leader. Such a 
committee could also act as the representative voice of the trainees in 
dealing with the management of the pit or with outside bodies. A seat on 
the Works' Councll should be reselVed for a representative elected by this 
committee. 
In German hands, by contrast, instruction and moral education was often 
real1sed in a very authoritarian manner. particularly in relation to the young 
apprentices. There was a general feel1ng that the uprooted young needed to be 
1 Sleburg. 'Staatabargerllche WIJlensblldung In der aergmannsbetreuung'. 
2 Berwick. 'Unaere Bergberufsschule'. 
3 BStaD NW17.1 0 StAdtlache VHS aochum Dozent r. kultureUen Bergarbelter-
betreuung. Bedeht. 1.5.1950; ErIch BOrtach to KultusmtnJater. 2.12.1949. 
"Sleburg, 'StaatsbOrgerliche WIJlenablldung In der BeqpDaIlD8betreuung'. 
5 PORO (ed.). 'l11e mtntrw t:ratnee J941. p.SO. 
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brought up within a firm and a religious environment. 1 They had been 
deprived too long of the 'strenge. rlchtungswe1sende vAterliche Hand,.2 The 
hostel rules produced by the Carttas in Bottrop reveal this particularly clearly. 3 
Begtnntng with the menacing greeting. 'Unser Heim solI Oein "Zuhause" seine 
Du sollst Oich bier wohlfiihlen'. it goes on to tell the youngster when to get up. 
how to wash and in what state the room must be left. No matter what the 
weather. the windows must be opened on aWakening - Wir sind alle Freunde der 
frlschen Morgenluft'. Only on two weekdays and Sundays did the youngsters 
have free use of their leisure time. (Needless to say. church going was 
compulsory). The youngsters were trained to sing grace at mealtlmes in canon. 4 
But outside the hostels. even local-born youngsters experienced a new reUgious-
5 
authOritarian spirtt in their schools. Indeed. It peIVaded the way mining 
employers brought up their own children, as the memoirs of mining englneer 
Rudolf Wawersik make clear. 6 
Free discussions were difficult and often unrewarding because so many areas 
were taboo. This applied particularly to the state-sponsored actiVities because 
of the state's strong desire to appear politically and religiously neutral. Both 
Volkshochschulen and NRW ministries felt their work could not be effective if 
1 Bondy. 'Gedanken zur a~rbetrlebl1chen Beelnflussung'. 
2 Jochum. 'Das sexuelle Problem'. p.8. 
s HStaD NW41. 746. Carltasverband BottroP. Berglehrl1ngshelm Hausordnung. 
21.10.1948. her Merkur 
4 Ibid. and 'Statt Kasemengeist die echte PersOnlichkelt'. Rhetntsc , 
5.2.19495 H h6ne ~ten. Munich 1982. p.58. Hans Dlether Baroth. ~ es waren Be en wlr elne Lehrerln. Sle war 
'Nachdem elnIge Monate Ins Land gegangen waren. be:d11ch Irgendwle elne magere 
streng und kathollsch. hager. s~l h. ra;.t le:~ das n~ue ErOfJnungarltual zu 
gaue Maus. mit vlel Lust fOr PrOge . e 
Unterrlchtsbeglnn eln: das Morgengebet..... ErinnenDlllf'R an den 
8 Rudolf Wawerslk. Ausbeute ~!'~~Essen 1981. In a apeech 
obe.sehlestschei1. saarUlndtschen und westJ - him 'Ou wtrat 1m Lebenalwnpr &her 
addressed to hla son at conflrmatlon. Wawerslk told FleUS Gbat uod ateta yom 
our dann Erfolg haben. wenn Ou uneelrm:~::~ttl1cben dlenen. alnd BUcb 1m 
POlchtbewLdStaeJn erfQllt blat' and 'Dle am m a 
Rampfe \'01'80', p.IS 1. 
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1 
their neutrality was placed in jeopardy. If this neutrality were not seen to be 
preselVed, the speakers would lose credibility and there was a danger of losing 
the youngsters or driving them to extremes. Thus lectures tended to concentrate 
on formal issues. As a speaker at a conference for hostel wardens said. a good 
topic was not 'socialism or capitalism' but 'the refugee and equal rights', 'I read a 
constitution'. and 'what is politics and is it necessary'. 2 Religious questions too 
were evidently seen as dangerous if they dragged the lecturers into any area that 
could be conSidered denominational. At a conference on cultural poUey in 1953. 
the question was raised whether religious issues should be discussed. Yes. was 
the answer, and the fieldworkers must be in a pOSition. 'die oft sehr prekAren 
3 Fragen zu beantworten. Again. there was a strong sense of danger here if the 
tightrope of 'neutrality' was left. 
Finally. of course there were inner uncertainties that made any discussion 
dangerous. Wo ist seelisch 1m deutschen Volk das Geschehen der letzten 20 
Jahre wirklich verarbeitet worden?'. asked Oberkirchenrat Kloppenburg. in a 
lecture to mining educationalists whose refreshing openness contrasted 
4 
strongly with so much that was said after the war. Wie soDen wiT'. continued 
the speaker. 'wenn wir seIber in Hysterte geraten bei der Diskussion fiber diese 
Dfnge. erwarten. da.6 eine Jugend gesund reagtert?,5 
If the Nazi era was mentioned at all. it rushed through discussion under the 
euphemism of 1Q ngste Vergangenheit'. This same inner uncertainty made 
discussion of many contemporary issues also very rtgld. In a revealing phrase 
1 HStaD NW17. 136. Kultusmtnlsterlum NRW liES. Internal memo to MtnIster 
Teusch.8.11.1950. ( h la Co 
2 HStaD NW42. 912. Simons. Report on a course (or wardens 0 08te r 
apprentices and young miners. ~10.10.1947. 18.1.1948. 
s HStaD NW17. 141. RAG. Report on the conference In Kronenburg 21-26.9.1953. 
October 1953. 
• Kloppenburg 'Jugend In Beruf und FrelZelt', MftteUul1l1en fOr die 
Bergben.ifsschulsn der WBK 1957. 15. 
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in his dissertation about the Pestalozzi villages, Roelen observed that religious 
groups had been set up in a number of villages where the youngsters could discuss 
rel1g1ous issues and 'eliminate religious doubts,.l There was no room for doubt. 
This fear of admitting uncertainty or embarking on contentious issues gave a lot 
of the political and reUgious messages a rather sterile quality. 
It should be noted, however, that, because of the rather formalistic approach to 
democracy, when democratic experiments were made, they were made on a 
thorough and institutional basis. For instance when the CVJM set up special 
hostels known as 'GuUds' to help the young migrants who streamed in from the 
GDR in the mid-1950's find their feet, they contained special courts and 
2 parUaments to give the youngsters a taste of democracy. Some of the Pestalozi 
vUIages had youth parUaments to allow the youngsters decide how to spend their 
leisure tlme.3 When the Ewald-KOnig Ludwig mining company organised a 
skiing trip for its youngsters, they too formed their own parUament and shaped 
their time according to popular vote.4 And there were a number of other sim1lar 
examples. 
The 1GB on the road to a classless society 
How did the union respond the general tenor of the cultural work and to what 
extent was the union able to offer a different line? In 1949, when state-
sponsored cultural work began, the 1GB was uneasy about It, fearing that the 
approach would be hostUe to the unIOD.5 In Bochum, the district organisation 
1 Roelen 'Ole Bedeutung der PestalozzidOrfer', p.77. 
2 'He1m~t1ose haben wieder em Zuhause', Ruhr Nachrlchten. 7.1.1956: '1m 
Glldenhaua gilt ketne D-Mark', WAZ 27.1.1966. 
S RoeIen. 'DIe Bedeutung der Pestalozzld6rfer'. p.89. 
, 'Scb1-Frelzelt unserer Berglehrllnge In WlllIngen'. BAG EwaId-KlInIg Ludwig, 
Feb/MarCh 1950. pp.15-18. rtl 1949 Bochum 
5 DGHA FIle '1GB Monatsbedchte 1949', 1GB, Report for Ap , 
dtatrlct. 
rlgllUDg lor UleIr neans ana SOuJ.s 440 
there contested the local field worker's right to hold political lectures, saying 
1 
this was the union prerogative. However this Suspicion was short lived and the 
Bochum district's annual report for 1950, for example, praised the VHS work. 2 
The big difference between the union and the rest of the workers in the cultural 
welfare field. was that the 1GB was hostile to any attempts to segregate the 
newcomers from the rest of the workforce. It grew increasingly crttical of such 
things as seperate sport or other activities for hostel occupants which prevented 
the inmates from seeking more links with the local community. There is little 
doubt that the union's own efforts were concentrated far more on building 
bridges between newcomers and locals than creating a new ethos in the hostels.3 
Nevertheless. there was a surprtsing degree of common ground between the 1GB 
and the other groups involved in cultural policy. For one thing. the 1GB was. 
4 
understandably, committed to party-political neutrality. This was, after all. 
the keystone of the new post-war unity within the labour movement. Another 
point of common ground was that top 1GB omcials were at least as hostile as 
their bourgeois counterparts to giving the youngsters a taste of democracy. At 
the first youth conference. Walter Maibaum. the union's youth secretary said 
that the union's goal was 'pflichtbe~te Junge Menschen zu erzlehen' who 
would be the citizens of tomorrow and convinced democrats. The emphasiS was 
on educating them to be aware of their duties. before gtvtng them a taste of 
1 HStaD NW17. 140. SteJnmeyer. Report. 14.11.1949. 
2 1GB D~ IV 'ed) Jahtesberlt:ht 1950. p.14. 
gca.ua. t •• ubergleute bIa 1952' 
S lOBE Presse-Arehlv. FUe 'ArbeltskrAfte fOr den 8el'gbau.) r::ahrbuch 1952. p.442; 
lOB Referat Neubergleute. Circular 133/49. 21.1.1949;!l!,~~,; (alt)' Minutes of 3rd 
IOBEA. Handakten Rudl Quast. FIle 'M. Asslstenten- &-e-a • • 
meeting ofHemel' KreIs. 24.8.1953. JGhTbut;h J953. 
4 for pie tb report on the youth conference In 1GB (ed.), See. exam • e 
p.28S. 
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democracy. Thus the union, too, talked of rescuing the youngsters from 
Vennassung' and nihilism. 1 
The union's hostility to giving young miners the experience of participation 
advocated by the British had already emerged much earlier. namely in 1946 in a 
disCussion between OGB leaders. August Schmidt (the IVB president) and 
Military Government representatives. A British official pOinted out the 
discrepancy between the British law. which allowed all employees to vote in 
works council elections and the OGB ruling which restricted this right to the 
over IS's. Hans HOclder said 'er wikde 10 mallieber zum Arbeitsgericht gehen. 
als nur einem einzigen Jugendlichen unter IS Jahren das Recht zugestehen. 
einen Betriebsrat zu wAhlen. oder selbst gewAhlt zu werden'. When Foulds. the 
British officer, pointed out that this was not likely to educate the youngsters to 
be good democrats and that the same held true for the OGB's minimum age of 24 
for a works councillor. August Schmidt's reponse was to say that 24 was too low 
for the mining industry. For Schmidt a minimum age of 2S-30 was more 
suitable. 2 
At a deeper level. the 1GB shared much of the employers' world view as 
encapsulated in the contrast between 'PersOn1lchkeit' and 'Vermassung'. 
Astonishingly. given the recent past. the union felt obliged to defend itself 
against the employers' charge that, as a mass organisation it was contributing to 
vermassung.3 The vision of the 'stAndisChe Gesellschaft' was attractive to the 
union's conservative leaders who, as Hans-Eckbert Treu identifted in his study 
1 DOBA Protokoll-Sammlung. lOB Hauptverwaltung (ed.), Pro}~~deS 
1 Verbandsjugendtags Bochwn 1950 Sept 22- 24. Bochum 1950. comments 0 UID a~d Bartonlczek. p.15 and p.SUf.: lOB Hauptverwaltung Abt.Jugend led.), 
Gesch4jtsberfcht 1950-1952. p.54Jf. 
2 Ernst Schmidt papers, File '1900', doc. 1946-10, 'KUlZer Berlcht aber eme 
Sltzung mit Vertretern der MIIltArreglenmg In oasseldort. 4.9.1948. 
S See Bartonlczek's comments in lOB Hauptvel waltung (ed.). ProtokoU des 
J.V~. p.31ff. 
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of the 1GB. had a vision of restoring the Bergmannsstand of yore. of finding once 
more a finn place in a vanished social order. 1 Though this particular wish was 
unique to the 1GB. Theo Pirker has argued convincingly that in the union 
movement generally. the older generation shared a great deal of the outlook in 
the opposite camp. Both had no understanding for youthful rebellion and 'eine 
ganz bestlmmte Vorstellung der sozialen Ordnung .... eine Vorstellung dessen. 
was gehOI1g ist und nicht gehOI1g ist ... '. 2 
On morality and culture. too. the older generation of union officials and that 
meant all the senior union men. had much in common with the employers and 
state representatives. Union representatives talked of leading youngsters 
towards the true values of Western culture. while rejecting the modern excesses 
of American civilisation. Wenn man sich anderswo so nackt wie eben mOglich 
auszieht. so braucht das durchaus nicht unsere Lebensart zu werden'. 3 Union 
offiCials. like employers. felt that young miners needed to learn good manners 
for their own sake and the status of the profession. 4 
Having said that. the local 1GB and DGB youth organisations did offer a number 
of young miners a chance to learn a much more direct and partiCipatory 
democracy. 5 Many youngsters who found the lack of democracy in normal 
union meetings and congresses stifling. enjoyed a much freer atmosphere in the 
youth section. 6 Younger union officials tended to be more informal. allowing 
1 See Hans-Eckbert Treu. Stabtlttdt und Wandel in der organtsatortschen 
Entwtcklung der Industrtegewerkschaft Bergbau wvl Energfe, Frankfurt 1979, pp.l05-6. 
2 Thea P1rker. 'Die Jugend In der struktur unserer GeseDachaft'. In OOB AbteUung 
Jugend (ed.). Protokoll der Arbeitstagung der GewerkschaftsJugend 25-30.11.1951. 
DQaseldon 1952. pp.7-30. here pp.lo-I9. 
S Helmut Schorr. 'Wege und Zlele der GewerkschaftsJugend'. talk reprlnted In 1GB 
Hauptverwaltung (ed.). ProtDkoll des 1. verbandsJUgendtags. p.88fI'. bere p.97. 
, A view not restricted to older officials alone;.reU' ~;:tt~~3~e:~~: 
Handakten Rudi guast. FIle"M. Assistenten-TagungeD,· ~"6 
24.6.1953-
5 See tor lnatance Baroth. Aber es waren schiJne ?Sten .p.l TI. 
e A fact obliquely conftrmed In 1GB (ed.). Jahrbuch 1953 , p.286. See al80 Treu. 
stabaftc1t und Wandel. pp.111-112. 
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youngsters to address them with the 'Du' form, for example, or incurring 
employer suspicions by allowing young apprentices to drive with them on the 
way to union weekends and camping trips. 1 
In many respects the churches were more dissatisfied with the cultural work in 
the hostels than was the 1GB. The problem for the former was that they felt 
neither state nor employer had all that much sympathy for their specific 
denominational concerns. 'Ich halte es nicht fiir klug, von konfessionellen 
Heimen zu sprechen, wohl aber, nach konfessionellen Gesichtspunkten zu 
handeln, da fast bei sAmtlichen leitenden Stellen fur unsere eigentliche Aufgabe 
wenig VersUlndnis vorhanden ist', wrote Carttas director v.Heyden to Bishop 
2 Keller in 1951. Both Protestant and Catholic organisations, for example, often 
wanted to ensure that only youngsters of appropriate denomination came into 
3 4 their hostels, but were criticised by the employers for doing this. To 
compensate for the lack of missionary spirit in the general welfare and cultural 
measures, the churches organised their own programmes, the Catholics, for 
instance, launching their 'Laienaktion im Ruhrgebiet' in 1951. 'People's 
Missionaries' were sent into the camps and secret bible groups held there In 
5 
contravention of camp regulations. The results, however, were negUgeable. 
An end to visions and nightmares: the hostels and their trnpact 
How successful were the employers, the state or the church at putting across a 
speclflc message or transmitting the desired values to the young men in their 
1 Zimmermann papers, Interview with Heinrich Klever, 15.7.1980. 
2 BMAI0l, 252, B. v.Heyden to BIshop Keller, 15.3.1951. 
s BMAlOl, 253, GeneraMkar, Memos. 11.3.1953 and 8.4.1953. 
4 KlInkert Pa rs File 'Niederachrtften der Arbeltstagungen und Vortrags· 
veranstaltungen', vo~b~ck. 'Oberbl1ck Qber die ~i:~!":t:.. :r:u'!: ~~= 
helmstattenwerks'; File 'SammJung Voratandssltzungen • 
17.10.1958. ste .... -
s HStaD NW41. 746. Heinrich Werth to Weber, 21.6.1951; NW17, 140, "~"J-' 
Report. 14.11.1949: 'DeI'"Lager Mensch" - Symptom elDer Entwlcklung'. 
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charge? As far as the adult new miners were concerned. one problem limitlng 
the effectiveness of cultural work in particular was that spending remained 
fairly llmited. The VHS cultural work. for example. was very underfunded. 
receiving annually approximately 4 DM for each hostel inhabitant. l At least 
1nitially. the field workers had not yet been provided with phones and were 
spread too thin on the ground too see hostels more than once a fortnight. 2 As a 
result. they tended to concentrate on hostels where mine managements 
3 
supported their efforts and to ignore the rest. It is therefore not surprising that 
a 1952 sUIVey discovered that 60 percent of new miners had not taken part in 
any of the VHS courses offered in the hostels. 4 
The reasons for this lack of funding are not hard to find. Mine managers. 
though they may have shared the values and aspirations embodied in the 
lectures and other cultural work. were often reluctant to spend money on 
matters that seemed so far removed from the needs of dally production. There 
were, however, large variations here between collieries. One problem common 
to all was that they were neIVOUS of investing too much in the outsiders for fear 
of alienating local men. The 'moral economy' of the indigenous workforce (and, 
it should be said, of those newcomers who had found lodgings or housing locally) 
dampened any potential over-exuberance in the provision of services for hostel 
occupants. 5 Since the growing competition between the mines for labour 
nevertheless forced the employers to provide ever greater subSidies for board and 
lodging in the hostels, the lim1ts to the social seIVices budget and to the patience 
1 Ges.Verb. File '1.11', section 024,3, Minutes of 5th Meeting of the Arbeltskre18lD. 
12.7.1949; Theodor Terhorst. 'ZehnjAhrlge Zusammenarbelt 1m Dlenste der 
Mttbestlmmtmg beIm Hambomer Bergbau'. (unpub MS. 1963), p.I34. 
2 HStaD NW17. 140, stetnmeyer to Reglerung&rat Kraemer. 18.11.1949. 
s See. for Instance. Terhorst. 'ZehnjAhrlge zusammenarbelt'. p.134. 
4 BM 201. 47. SozIal-Amt der ev. Ktrche. 'Gedanken zur Volkablldungaarbelt 1m 
SteInkohlenbergu', 20.9.1952. 
5 See K6ker's comments in Gee.Verb., FIle "1(". voL 2', Minutes of KISA meeting. 
15.3.1961. 
of the established miners both counselled managements to control their cultural 
expenditure. 
As far as the apprentices were concerned, a great deal of money was invested in 
creating the right environment. Yet many of the hostels employed only a small 
number of personnel so that a lot of the contact with the youngsters fell on the 
shoulders of the hostel wardens or, as in the case of the Pestalozzl villages, the 
house parents. They were often not particularly well paid (indeed the KfSA 
itself admitted to being rather shocked at the employment conditions it found in 
some hostels) and, as a result, they often lacked the motivation or the 
qualiftcations to guide and instruct the youngsters very intensively. 1 In many 
cases, they were far more down to earth than the senior personnel involved in 
creating the institutions. In the Pestalozzi villages for example, house parents 
and village leaders were happy to let the youngsters concentrate on repairing 
their motorbikes rather than tUling the soil, much to the chagrin of the 
Pestalozzl Association's founders.2 
For many hostel occupants, the lectures and courses offered were often wide of 
their target, either because they were too intellectually demanding, or because 
3 
they were motivated by anxieties or concerns not shared by their audience. 
There were, however, those amongst the new miners who were very conscious of 
the break in their education caused by war and Its aftermath and who responded 
4 
enthusiastically to the educational opportunities offered. Courses on German 
1 MI1teIILIngender I(/SA 1951, 1/2, p.4. 
2 Kllnkert Papers, File 'Nlederscbrlften der Arbeltstagungen und 
Vortragsveranstaltungen'. Minutes of meeting of vlllage leaduersbe, !2}2,;!!:!t rn!:n w:e noteworth: that in 1954 the vUlage leaders inSIsted on their U e .. ~ c 
archaic ':rfl1teste' to 'DorOe1ter'. Roeien. 'DIe Bedeutung der Pestalozi.ldGrfer'. pp.32-33. 
3 Sozlal-Amt der eve Klrche, 'Gedanken zur Volksbildungsarbelt'. 
, Ibid. and HStaD NW17. 238, Joachim Moller to Bundeamlnlstedum fOr 
&zlebung unci Untr:n1cht. 20.11.1949. 
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and mathematics and other basic subjects found a small circle of keen 
1 participants. 
In general, the hostel occupants seem to have 'subverted' what was offered for 
their own purposes, attending courses and events according to their 
entertainment value and ignOring those that seemed out merely to improve. 
Theatre and film evenings enjoyed good aUdiences, sporting events drew the best 
participation, while lectures were often poorly attended unless bolstered by a 
good slide show or a sexy topiC. Thus a report from a Lohberg hostel in April 
1950 noted 195 particpants for the film 'Schiisse in Kabine 7', 104 for a lecture on 
Young women of today and their problems' but only 19 for 'The world of the 
unconscious'. The lecture 'Beautiful women in changing times' (with slides) 
overfilled the hall? 
The greater the choice of entertainment in the locality, the worse attended were 
the cultural events in the hostels. As local services improved after the war and 
television became more widespread in the hostels, the field workers found it ever 
3 
more d1fflcult to muster up an audience. Some concentrated on actMtles. such 
as sport, which were sure to win a wide following. Others were hostile to 
providing mere entertainment, and one report from Dinslaken went so far as to 
comment, 'Der Film scheint das etnzige Bildungsmtttel zu sem, da6 die Jungen 
Leute anerkennen, daneben noch der Rundfunk.. Ich habe daher die F11marbeit 
etngestellt' .4 
1 HStaD NWI7, 10, Stadt Dortmund, BUdungswerk 'Kulturelle Betreuung der 
BergarbeiterJager' to Kultusmlnister, 19.4.1950. 
2 HStaD NW17 10 Report on cultural events in Lohberg. AprtII950: IGBE Presae-
Archiv FIle 'Arbeltskritte 'fOr den Bergbau. Neubergleute. BIs 1952', clipping ~ DIe Neue~, Munich, (no date), 'Helmhochschule fOr Neubergleute. D~ DtnIL8 Jner 
Arbeit 1st belsplelgebend 1m Ruhrgeblet'; 'Sport formt den Menschen, Der MUtatI, 
DOaaeldor£ 6.5.1950. 
3 Gea. Velb. F1le 'Untemehmensverband 662-668', RAG repmt far' 1954. 
"HStaDNW17, 10. BurIsch to Kultusmtnlster, 2.12.1949, annex. 
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Apart from the attendance problem, one of the weaknesses of the lectures and of 
other attempts to influence young miners was, as has already been noted. that a 
core message was often lacking. 1iue, there was a clear 'yes' to democracy and a 
'yes' to Europe, but in terms of practical politics or of moral and religious values 
there was often uncertainty and anxiety about what to communicate. 
Much of the work was simply urmecessary, in that it was impelled or shaped by 
fears that were understandable but inappropriate. Gradually the realisation 
spread that neither the Ruhr in general nor the hostels in particular were 
hotbeds of radicalism. As a speaker at a conference on cultural polley noted in 
1953, recent elections had revealed 'in we1chem AusmaB bereits dem 
Radikalismus und daruber hinaus dem Nihilismus abgesagt wurde'. 1 In fact. 
left-wing radicalism had at no point been a danger in the hostels, contrary to all 
the fears of employers, church and state. The KPD had, from the very beginning. 
found it hard to mobUise a following. Wir haben es noch nicht geschafft', noted 
the KPD's Ruhr organisation as early as 1946, 'die Jugend zu gewinnen'? The 
SPD was quick to recognise and capitalise on hostel occupants' antipathy to the 
Communists.3 The fact that many of the outsiders to the Ruhr were expellees or 
refugees undoubtedly accounted for a lot of the KPD's difficulties. 4 Renewed 
attempts by the KPD in 1951-52 to mobUise the new miners enjoyed Uttle 
success,5 although newcomers, like established men, continued to vote respected 
1 Sieburg 'Staatsborgerllche WtllensbUdung In der kultureUen Bergman:-
betreuung'. In 1950,s code, 'Radlkallsmus' meant the KPD While 'Nlh1lIsmus' stood for e 
extreme right wing part1es. 
2 Ernst SchmIdt Papers. File '1900'. Doc. 1946 44. 'Rt'snluUonsentwurf'der KPD 1m 
Ruhrgblet', no date (End of 1946). 
S ASD-FESt WW 68, MInutes ofRuhr JDinlDg conferenn' on 31.8.1947 In Bocbum. 
no date. tb woaD 
• ASD-FESt N 25, 1946-1948, SPD aezirk westl.Westfalen. Report OIl e 
council electtons, 10.11.1947. 'Au8SChu8 
5 ASD-FESt N 171. 1952-1957, Undated. unu~ KPD tly8heet from the 
zur Wahnmg der Inten!esen c1er Jung- und Neubergleute . 
KPD representatives on to the works councll. years after the Communists had 
ceased to enjoy any following in municipal and national elections. 
Contemporary youth turned out not even to be particularly rebellious. even if it 
did regard the older generations and established institutions with something 
less than the reverence they would have liked. 1 But that was a general feature of 
the age. How should the employers expect young miners to show appropriate 
respect for the authorities when the media generally showed so Uttle?2 As these 
tendenCies became clear. a lot of the impetus behind the cultural programme 
disappeared. 
Certain values were clearly shared by both the providers of cultural seIVices and 
their reCipients, so that the work here found a good resonance. Above all there 
3 
was a vety moral approach to pubUc and political life. Communal welfare was 
rated above indivdual good; youth parliaments in the hostels tended to be 
4 draconian in their sentences. Though the approach of the older generation was 
often felt to be oppressive, no one advocated 'doing your own thing'. party 
5 poUtIcs were often condemned as self-seeking. As far as private morality was 
concerned, though sexual mores were undoubtedly changing, there was 
nevertheless a strong current within the younger generation af1lnn1ng the need 
for self-discipline and decency. It was noteworthy that when the speaker at the 
1GB conference made his comment about near nudity abroad, he was rewarded 
1 A point put to the employers by the Pastor Dannemann In 1956. See P. Arnold 
Dannemann, 'Ole Situation des Jugendl1chen 1m Stelnkoblenbergbau und u:er; 
pAdagogtscbe Verpftlchtung', MtttetlWlgen jnr die Bergben.if'sschul.en der WBK 19 , • 
here p.4. 
2 Kloppenburg, 'Jugend In Oeruf und Frelzelt'. p.a 
S See for Instance the comments of Erlcb Burlscb In HStaD NW17, 10. Burlscb to 
KultusmmJster. 2.12.1949, annex. PIrke 
4 RoeIen 'Ole Bedeutung der PestalozziclOrfer'. p.89; More generally, see r. 
'DIe Jugend In d~r Struktur unserer GeseDschaft', passfnL 
5 293' '1 CoW'Nl District PoIlUcallnteWgence Report lOB (ed.), Jahrbuch 1953 , p. '''lb-histo r National Socialism In Heme 
No. 20', 12.1.1946. dted In Chrlstlan Kunz. 3e75' Plrk: 'Dle Jugend In der Struktur 
1925-1949', (DPhil. Oxford University, 1987). p., , 
unaerer GeseUschaft', passtnL 
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with strong applause (a striking fact given that within twenty years naked 
Germans would be causing uproar across the beaches of southern Europe). 1 
TIle proffered values met with least response as soon as they became romantic. 
Many hostel wardens, lecturers and churchmen identified this lack of illusions 
on the part of younger men, sometimes wrongly diagnosed as nihilism. 2 
Appeals to the 'German spirit', the invoking of a 'christliche Weltanschauung 
and so on, served only to repel the far more pragmatic and realistic younger 
generation. Thus, for instance, the pathos of the old labour movement left 
most of the new miners cold, but there was a ready understanding of the value 
and function of the union. 
One major failure of the programme, from the employers' viewpoint, was that it 
had not kept newcomers and union apart. but then. whatever their deeper hopes. 
the employers had not really tried to do so. In the late 1940's and early 1950's 
they had. after all. been very cautious. In addition, the state's commitment to 
neutrality precluded propaganda work against the union on the part of the RAG, 
although the RAG's fieldworkers certainly preached social partnership and 
responsibility. It seems unlikely in any case that a more open assault on 
unionism would have had any success. New labour was generally wen disposed 
to the union. The apprentices were almost 100 percent organised and it was 
noteworthy that in what was virtually the only mfntng strike since the currency 
reform, the 'Reusch strike' of 1955. considerable numbers of apprentices took 
part.3 The union did face membership problems with adult newcomers but these 
resulted more from the fact that many new miners were not intending to stay 
1 1GB HauptverwaItung (ed.). Protokolldes 1.Verbands.JUtlenC.ftdgs. p.97. 
2 Gee Verb File 'Unternehmensverband 662-668', RAG paper, tBergarbelterbeireu~g'. no date (1951); 'Der "Lager Mensch" - Symptom elner 
Entwlcklung' • 
3 Gee.Verb. FIle tArbeltsausacb~ 1948-1958', Minutes of Arb.aua.fA meet1ng. 
3.2.1965. 
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long in the 1ndustry. rather than from any Principled Oppositlon. 1 A survey 
towards the end of the 1950's identlfled that virtually all the min 
ers. even non-
union members. believed the 1GB was doing a valuable job and found no marked 
differences between old and new miners. 2 
Ultimately. neither the bourgeoisie nor the union got quite the folloWing they 
wanted. but neither were their worst fears confInned. As a result both union 
and employers had to come to terms With a generation that did not fit into 
conventional categories. Thls was the result of broad generational experiences 
on which it would be inappropriate to dwell here.3 What can be said is that the 
notion that the youngsters in the hostels would be more influenced by hostel 
lectures than by their peers or by broader soctalinfluences had been implausible 
from the very beginning. 
For the employers crucial disappointment was the failure of the hostel 
environment to create a stable workforce. No doubt some of the lectures and 
guidance offered to hostel occupants had their positive impact: a decision here to 
enter the mining school after a lecture on career opportunities in mtntng: an 
aCCident aVOided there as a result of gaining some general background 
lmowledge about mining techniques and so on. But. generally speaking. there 
1 This problem arose after 1953. when. in response to a tlm:atened 1GB strike. the 
employers refused to deduct union dues automatically from the wages of union members. 
The union had to go out and collect dues and membership statistics fell off considerably 
as a result Whereas prior to then. union oganlsatlon in the hostels had been nearly 
100%. it dropped to as low as 40-50% in some areas. See 1GB Bez1rk IV (eel.). Jahrbuch 
1951. p.21 and p.SO and 1GB Bez1rk VI (ed.), Jahrbuch 1951/1952, p.SI. for the bJgb leYel 
before the sWitch to 'Ortskassienmg': for the problems afterwanis, see 1GB Bezlrk V (ed). 
Jahrbuch 1954-1955. p.5S and 1GB Bezlrk VI (ed.), Jahrbuch 1953, pp.24-25. See also 
Tml, Stabt1l.ti1t tend Wandel. p.58. 
2 Unpubllahed EMNID sUl'Yey conducted in April 1958. the mau1ta of which are In 
manUSCript form in possession of the IGBE. Bochum. The survey remains c:onftdentlal 
and cannot be properly cited here. nevertheless the author was allowed to review the 
survey's main n:aulta. which revealed there to be a baslca11y favourable attitude to the 
union from all miners and little difference in this respect between young and old or 
between establJahecl and new miners. 
S For an Introduction to these generaUonal experiences see Zimmermann. 
Auebruchehoffnungen', passim and Plrter. 'Ole Jugend in der Struktur uneerer 
GeeeUeehaft', passim. 
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was little evidence that the finest hostels or the most intensive welfare and 
cultural policy made much difference to the wastage levels of adult new miners 
or of apprentices once they had finished their training. The negative aspects of 
the work and the appeal of other types of employment was too great. For 
example, the company with the longest experience of Pestalozzi villages was the 
Hamborner Bergbau AG (fonnerly Gruppe Hamborn of the GBAG) and in 1955 its 
training and social seIVices director reported that the village had made little 
difference to the number of fonner apprentices leaving the company and worse, 
1 leaving the industry. The Hibernia company had much the same to report a 
year or two later. 2 
In part, the propaganda work had been based on a myth - the myth that 
occupational loyalty was a matter of personality. By the mid 1950's, the 
employers were, as a discussion in the UVR's Manpower and Tra1n1ng committee 
made clear, coming to tenns with the idea that the 'Tendenz zur Verwandlung des 
Berufs in einen Job, die z.T. in der VerAnderung der technischen Produktion 
3 
selbst begtiindet ist', had 'spread to the German economy'. 
In addition, providing entertainment in the hostels often actually inhibited the 
development of links with the locality. This, indeed, was the employers' aim as 
far as the apprentices were concerned. Towards the adult new miners too, the 
RAG field workers seemed often far more concerned to transmit ideals than 
create good local contacts.4 It must be aclmowledged, however. that even when 
the wardens or fieldworkers were favourable to the idea, it was difficult to 
cement links between hostel and neighbourhood. Local sports organlSatlODS 
1 Gee.Verb. FUe 'ArbettsausschuB', Minutes of Arhaus.t:A meeting. 5.4.1955 
2 Hibernia Konzem (ed.), Soztalberfcht 1957. p.24. 
S DAV _ -'..cM>H BI02 033092 MInutes of AM MeeUng. 12.12.1966. 
DnA: ~~ • , t. FIle 'M 
" 1GB (ed.). Jalvbuch 1952 , p.442 and IGBEA Handakten Rudl guaa . 
Aaatatenten-Tagungen (alt)', 3rd MeeUngofHemer KreJa. 24.6..1953. 
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often wanted only good talent and were not interested in offering a game to 
anyone who wished to come along. 1 Other groups had a spectftc religious or 
political affiliation, which made it difficult for the cultural workers to promote 
them. 
The result was that the hostel environment, though in ideological terms perhaps 
less detached from the outside world than the employers wanted, was in social 
terms often rather isolated. It might be argued that the cultural work or the 
money invested in the hostels (or indeed the increasing subsidies for hostel 
accommodation) contributed to integration by making the hostel environment 
bearable or even attractive until such point as the occupants obtained a house or 
lodgings in the local community and that without such investment, wastage 
would have been higher. This may be so, but what seems to have happened, as 
far as the adult trainees were concerned, is that by paSSively or actively 
encouraging social isolation, the hostels prevented the growth of the sort of 
social ties that might have kept the newcomers in the industry. 
There is, of course, no doubt that the provision of decently furbished hostels was 
essentlal during the 1940's and 1950's and there is equally no doubt that many of 
the fonner hostel occupants went on to be long serving members of the 
workforce. The decision to build apprentice accommodation on a grand scale 
opened up sources of well educated youngsters on whom the industry could not 
normally have drawn. Quite a number of these youngsters were to provide the 
2 
deputies and lower management of the following decades. For these reasons, 
the hostel programme was far from being a failure. It cannot even be asserted 
with certainty that any of the resources tnvested In the hostels would have been 
1 A repeated complaint of the VHS fte)dworkers - see the various reports In HStad 
NW17 and 1GB (ed) Jahtbuch 1952 p 441 & Jahrbuch 1955, p.244 • 
• • ' • by the thor which used 
2 Aa revealed by a staUsUcal analysis carried out au 
mlcroflche recorda of BergaehOler held by the WBK. Bochum. 
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better spent elsewhere. It does seem likely, however, that if more money and 
energy had been expended on social integration - rather than on spiritually 
improving the newcomers or on recasting the workforce - many more hostel 
occupants would have been won for the industry. To take one small example: 
partly because of convenience,. partly because of moral fears. prOVIsion was 
seldom made for young miners, even young adults, to bring girl friends back to 
the hostel. It was therefore often very difIlcult to develop intimate friendships 
with girls from the town. 1 This was a small but significant barrier to 
integration which the mines should have been able to solve. 
What is certain is that many of the anxieties and hopes that shaped hostel poUey 
and gave it such impetus and priority proved to be illusory. By the mid 1950's 
the mining employers were far sadder and wiser. By then, cultural welfare 
policy was running out of steam (though it enjoyed a brief flurry of official 
support in the 1954-55 period as a result of the increased influx from the GDR).2 
Between 1953 and 1956, the committee supervising the RAG did not meet once 
and when it met again in 1956 it did so despite clear sJgns of lack of interest from 
the UVR.3 In many adult hostels in the mid-1950's, the RAG field workers were 
barely in evidence, though the apprentices continued to enjoy their services for a 
whUe yet.4 Whereas in 1950, the FOrderturm , for example. gave a great deal of 
space to Christmas activities for the new miners, the January 1954 issue devoted 
only a small paragraph and the January 1958 issue nothing at all to such 
activities. The churches too, lost both their sense of misSion and their anxiety 
and gradually wound down their activltes In the mines. A number of 
1 'Jugend oboe 1nnere Blndung', p.5 d 
2 See Ges. Verb. FUe 'SBZ F1QchWnge Arb. 130.30-132.15', BundesYerelnlg\lng er 
deutachen Arbe1tgeberverblnde, CIrcUlar, 30.12.1955. 
3 Ges.Verb. FIle 'Untemehmensverband 662-668', KultusminJater De5 to Board of 
UVR. 911n~. TYlt-l ... 1.. Memo 18.4.1956; tNR to KuJtusmJnjster. 13.1.1966-•• ~uw~~ • ,rtl~.~~e 
" Gee.Verb. FIle 'Untemehmensverband noch662-668 ==, Bee lOB Bedlk V 
Betreuung'. noted the 1GB'. aezirk v. '1st kaum zu • 
(ed.). Ja1uWsber1cht J954-55. pp.20-21. 
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1n8tltuttons continued to tick over. indeed some still exist. but more because of 
lDStltutional inertia than for any other reason. The Katholisches Lagerwerk 
transferred its attentions to foreign exchanges for young people and indeed 
many of the mines' former villages were made available for general youth work. 
while others were turned into normal housing. 1 
Even the core of the regeneration project. the apprentice hostels and villages. 
lost their appeal. Apart from their failure to prevent wastage. they could do 
nothing about the marked decline in the size and quality of apprentice intake 
2 from 1955 onwards. By 1958. the mines felt that they were receiVing only 
those youngsters whom the labour exchanges had difficulty dispOSing of 
elsewhere. According to one Pestalozzi village leader. 60 percent of the 
3 incoming youngsters had a criminal record. It is therefore no surprise that the 
executive of the Pestalozzi AsSOCiation did not meet between October 1956 and 
4 March 1958 and that only half the board were present at the latter meeting. 
For a few more years apprentice hostels continued in operation. though in ever 
diminishing numbers. until by 1960 or so the stream of apprentices from outside 
the Ruhr had virtually disappeared.5 The great experiment was over. 
1 Ottokar Mund. (ed.). 25 Jahre Katholfsches Lagerwerk e. V. versuc~:­
zettgeschlchtlfchen Obersfcht. Recklinghausen 1973; As early as 1957. the UVR ha n 
free beds In villages and hostels to provide holiday homes for deprived Berlin chUdre , 
8AK-ZWSt.H BI02. 33092. MlnutesofAAAmeetlng, 2.5.1957. 
2 See chapter 6. p.28UJ. d 
S Klinkert Papers. File 'Nlederschriften der f.~:=gungen un 
~o.t-d ___ "stal"."den' Minutes ofmeetlng ofvtUage leaders, 1..· f 
• "''"''6'''''--- ..... -e • , Minutes 0 
" See records In Kllnkert Papers, Ftle 'Sammlung Vorstandssltzungen , 
executive meeting. 14.3.1958. 514 renUces or 
5 UVR (ed.). Jahresberlcht 1958-1960. p.89 facing: In 19~~1. U:C falle~ to 
40% oftota! apprentlce Intake, came from the Pa~n~~. 'N!%erschrtften 1956-1967', 
91 apprentlces or 9% of total Intake. See Ges. e . 
MInutes of Arb.ausiA meeting. 4.10.1961. 
Conclusion 
In the pre-currency reform period 1 the greatest possible priority was given to 
increasing coal production and specifically to rebuilding the colliery 
workforces. Despite this enormous commitment, it proved extraordinarily 
difficult to harness labour effectively. In part this was due to the prescriptive 
inefficiency of controlled economies, in part to the simple fact that there was too 
little food to go round. Superimposed on these problems were the weaknesses 
inherent in the nature of British and later Bipartite rule. There was a conflict 
between the Allies I overseas commitments and the needs of the Gennan 
economy. Then there was the fact that the Allies were ruling indirectly and yet 
lacked legitimacy amongst the civil seIVants, employers and labour on whom 
their efforts depended. There was a similar contradiction between the desire for 
political devolution and decentralisation. on the one hand, and the 
requirements of economic control on the other. For all these reasons, the 
British initially failed and later only half succeeded at providing suftlcient 
resources for workforce regeneration and at ensuring those resources were 
deployed effectively. 
Though more cost-effective, workforce regeneration was ultimately not much 
more successful in the post-1948 era. In the first place, the industry 
consistently lacked the funds necessary for the task. particularly in the years 
1948-50. Erhard had not thought through (or was loath to respond to) the 
consequences of holding down the coal price to avoid inflation. As a result of 
the industry's recurrent financial problems, house-building suffered in the early 
years, while in the mid-1950's the mines could not afford to pay competitive 
wages. 
1 Since the problems of the 1945-48 period have been sUll1llW'lsed earlier, only a 
very brief resumee Is g:tven here. See chapter 4, p.209ff. 
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Nevertheless. the failure to create a stable workforce was not due solely. perhaps 
not even mainly to the government's economic policy. The employers rightly 
recognised that money alone was not the key to success. yet they fa1led to find 
the fonnula that would hold labour in the mines. 
The problem with the employers was that they were stuck in the past. Surely 
one of the most striking themes to have emerged in the last four chapters is the 
degree of continuity between pre-war policies and thinking and those of the post-
1948 period. At one level this was not surprising. In the 1930's as in the post-
war period, the mines found themselves in a Situation where demand for coal 
was high but the price kept artificially low. It was only logical to pursue a 
strategy of 'immaterial gratification' in these circumstances. Yet beyond that, 
the employers' perception of the workforce remained frozen in that negative 
mould that had been set by the first mass influx of unskilled labour in the latter 
part of the 19th century. Their approach to labour took for granted the 
favourable labour market conditions that had disappeared in the1930's. Their 
vision of the model miner harked. insofar as it was not pure illUSion. even 
further back. namely to the first half of the 19th centuty. Their general values 
and their perceptions of society and social change were strongly reminiscent, 
not so much of Nazi ideology per set as of those aspects of pre-Nazi consetvatlve 
thinking on which Nazi ideology and symbollsm itself had drawn. 
These attitudes handicapped management in its approach to new labour. Above 
all, they prevented the industry from refashiOning labour relations within the 
colliery and thus from solving one of the major causes of labour InStability. 
Given the new competition mining faced on the labour market. the 
resourcefulness and background of many of Its new recruits and the fact that the 
employers themselves recognised the need to find a modus vtvendi with the 1GB. 
there was no way that the tradluonaI style of management could be e1Ject1've. 
COnClUSIon -4~ 
The employers were unable also to drive a wedge between new labour and union 
Indeed, apart from entrusting their hostels to the church, they did not really try. 
In part, this was because in the 1948-52 period union cooperation was 
indfspensable to them. But it also reflected the fact that there was a great deal of 
common ground between colliery managers and union officials. Both were 
interested in creating a stable workforce. Both were concerned to keep out 
foreign labour. Both sought special support from the state. Above all, the 1GB 
was at least as attracted as the employers to the notion of reviving the miners' 
lost status. 
The union played an important role in integratJng new labour. The absence of 
'skill-barriers' with which to protect experienced workers from competition, the 
collective nature of the mining wage, the fact that safety in the mine depended on 
every miner and the sheer size of the new Intake all made the established 
workforce vulnerable to the impact of the newcomers. Thus, whether they liked 
It or not, the 1GB and the works councils were forced to take the newcomers 
under their wing and they proved quite successful at doing so. But they were 
unable to change the nature of the working experience in the mines and thus 
ultimately were powerless to stem the tide leaving the Ruhr. 
The state too, though involved at all levels of integration policy, was unable to 
force a new style on to the industIy. Indeed, state officials shared much of the 
employers' outlook. Nevertheless, various branches of the state 
adm1n1strations did try to modify a number of the mines' poliCies. Their most 
notable contributions were to strengthen the commitment to broader goals of 
SOCietal integration (as opposed to the narrower aim of workforce rebuJIdtng) 
and, in the interests of social harmony, to mute some of the more aggressiVe 
elements of employer policy. In a number of areas, particularly in the approach 
to redundancies and in housing. state and union removed or weakened the 
means by which management had traditionally dlsclpl1ned the workforce. 
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They thus. at least parUally. emasculated the mines' authoritarian management 
style. Yet they were unable to put something positive in place of that traditional 
style. above all because the influence of both state and union on day-to-day 
management within the mine was negligible. 
The 1945-48 period and the post-currency reform era were thus united by a 
failure to regenerate the workforce effectively. Both the British and the 
Bergassessoren experienced immense difficulties in achieving quite limited 
results. The Allies' target was to be producing 400.000 tons a day by the end of 
1948, yet the high levels of wastage and the low levels of effiCiency with which 
the men were working meant that actual output fell far short of this. After 1948. 
the employers' priority was to create a stable and productive workforce and this 
they singularly failed to do. Not only was wastage substantial but. largely 
because of it. productivity remained well below pre-war levels for much of the 
period. 
Common to both eras was the enormous challenge presented by mining's 
peculiar conditions. In the first place. regenerating the workforce (and 
reconstructing the industry generally) required resources on a scale that the 
governments of the day were understandably loath to supply. In 1945-46. the 
potential costs were prfmarily political: providing the incentives that the mines 
needed m1ght lead either to unrest in Germany or to outrage in France. In 1948-
50, the costs (or, at any rate. the costs as the government percetved them) were 
pI1mar1ly economic. Erhard feared that if he increased the coal price inflation 
would result, while to raise taxation would undermine public confidence in the 
economy and retard growth elsewhere. 
Why was it coal that generated these problems for the governments of the day? 
The reasons were very sUnllar in both periods. In the first place. both in 1945-
46 and in the 1948-50 period. the foreign consumers of German coal were 
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unw1ll1ng to pay a market price for it. That meant that an unfair burden had to 
fall on the German economy. Secondly, both the British and the Federal 
Government were trying to treat the mining indusUy in a way out of line with 
their general reconstruction policy. For the British, coal was the only German 
resource which they needed so badly that they were not prepared to follow the 
path of least reSistance. In almost all other spheres of production they were 
willing to accept lower output, if doing so aVOided major difficulties. For Erhard 
and the German administration, no other major indusUy was seen as presenting 
the same threat to price stability as coal. Thus, only coal was subject to such 
stringent price controls. Ultimately the POint was that coal had a unique 
significance to the economy, was therefore treated specially and thus generated 
problems all of its own. 
Eventually, the British and the German governments provided at least some of 
the resources required. The 1946-47 and 1951-52 periods mark the two tUrning 
pOints here. What did the delay in responding to mining's needs say about the 
two administrations? Both had proved a little inflexible, the British out of an 
understandable anxiety about civil unrest, the German government out of a 
perhaps slightly less justified fear of inflation. Common to both, also, was 
uncertainty about the degree of help that would be forthcoming from the United 
States. The British were unsure how much grain they could expect, wh11e Erhard 
had probably expected that Marshall Aid would fill the gap in Illining'S funding. 
It is not surprising to find. therefore. that in both cases it was the US which 
brought about the change in policy. But this was not just because of the 
Americans' economic clout. The Americans proved particularly flexible in 
their response to changing economic conditions. Arriving as the punishers of 
evil Germany. they rapidly recognised the need for a rapid recovety fuelled by an 
incentive-led rn1ning indUStry. Then, enthusiaStic defenders of the free market 
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though they were, they nevertheless had no qualms about vigorously advocating 
a dirigiste capital transfer policy to benefit bottleneck sectors of the economy. 
Apart from the fact that mining made unique demands on the public purse, the 
other fundamental feature common to both the pre- and post-currency reform 
periods was that mining suffered from two key handicaps that made productive 
labour integration particularly difficult. In the first place, the work was very 
unattractive. The phySical conditions were unpleasant and taxing, the dangers 
associated with the work conSiderable and the prospect of almost certain Ul-
health in old age most uninviting. These conditions bedevilled attempts to hold 
on to new labour throughout the period under review. 
Secondly, the conditions under which coal was produced made it very difficult 
for management to create a positive and yet productive relationship with the 
workforce. The problem was that most of the time the men worked alone. 
beyond direct contro1. Managerial control was necessary. however. because 
safety demanded it and because, unlike many other industries. the tempo of 
production was not regulated by machines. So. somehow. at the limited points 
of contact with the men - either during the deputy's twice daily rounds or In the 
monthly contract wage negotiations - management had to assert itself and 
achieve a good level of output. Management's authority over the production 
process was therefore fragile and there was a danger that it might lose control. 
That, indeed, was the problem in the 1945-48 period when, because of their 
political principles and their fear of unrest, the British were unable to come 
down ftnnly on management's side. At the same tfme. there was inherent in the 
nature of coal production the opposite danger. namely. that in struggling to 
maintain control, management would ultimately adopt an approach so 
unyielding and authoritarian as to drive new recruits from the pit. That was the 
scourge of the post-1948 era. 
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It mJght be argued that the difIlculty of conditions was such as to preclude resuhs 
any better than those achieved, particularly in the 1950's. One line of reasoning 
might be that most other European countries were experiencing Similar 
difficulties. Belgium, for instance, had employed foreign labour since 1951. 
Did this not suggest that Gennany could hope for little better? It may be, of 
course, that managements in those countries, too, lacked the vision to respond 
to post-war conditions. However, the central point is that the presence of 
millions of refugees, expellees and other uprooted groups presented the Gennans 
with an opportunity not existing anywhere else in Europe. Uniquely, the Ruhr 
mines were offered the chance to integrate a vast group of youngsters and adults, 
many of them unwillingly mobUe and seeking a secure profession. The 
comparative argument is therefore not compel11ng. It is true, however. that once 
the Gennan government had faUed to fund the housing programme in the early 
years, mining'S chances of profiting from this special opportunity were 
significantly reduced. 
Another line of argument might well be that the production conditions existing 
in the 1950's precluded more modem styles of management. In its analysts of 
1 
wastage, the Institut fur Sozialforschung concluded: 
Es spricht vieles dafur, d~ die AutoritAtsstruktur 1m Bergbau, das 
VerhAltnis zwischen Vorgesetzten und Untergebenen, insbesondere die 
1m Vergleich zum Industriemeister weitergehenden Machtbefugrusse der 
Steiger, mit den spezifischen Arbeitsbedingungen unter Tage 
zusammenhAngt. 
Yet, in reality, this was being over-generous to the indUStry. The only sense in 
which one could see production conditions as being the decisive cause of 
management style and technique in m.tn1ng was that, in those industries which 
in the 19th centwy had shared Jll1n1ng'S style of management, technical changes 
1 Inst1tut fOr Sozlalforschung. 'Ole subjektJven und objektJven AbkehrgrQnde', 
p.22&. 
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had in the meantime undermined this naked authort+-... 9".I .... -·~ d od 
uu UUJ.C:)m an pr uced a 
new approach. The enonnous increase of management control and technical 
coordination in the factory environment had produced a different. less 
authOritarian style and had transformed lower management's role from 
subaltern to intennediary and conciliator. To that extent. it was mining's 
inabUity to attain factory production's levels of control and coordination that 
was ultimately deCisive for the maintenance of 'Grubenmllitarismus,.l 
This did not mean - and this is where the Instltut fur SOZialforschung was wrong 
- that many aspects of management could not be changed. if there was a w1ll. It 
meant only that technical development had not of itself created the impetus for 
change. The real problem during the 1940's and 1950's was that there was too 
little interest within the industry to create a new type of management. There 
was grave distrust of modem methods. The Mining School - the establishment 
where deputies and overmen received their training - contained in its 
curriculum 'no provision for acquainting the students with modern 
2 
management techniques or labour relations'. An illuminating episode came at 
the end of the 1940's, when the Americans were trying to persuade German 
managements to adopt their 1WI (Training Within Industry) Programme. The 
programme's goal was to dissemJnate new techniques of man-management and 
team leadership, particularly at shop-floor level, with the aim of enhancing 
morale and productivity. Many Industries responded enthusIaStically to the 
idea, but mining's response was luke-warm and little seems to have been 
undertaken. 3 The experts in the Manpower and Tra1n1ng Committee who took 
'Alarm 1m Bergbau' so seriOUsly were really at odds with the main tenor of 
1 Weltz, Vorgesetzte zwtschen Management und ArbeUem. passfm; Lu(~ 
Friedeburg, Soztologte des Betrtebskltmas. Studten zur Deutung ernp 
tmtersuchungen fn tndustrleUen GrojSbetrleben. Frankfurt/M 196&2, pp.l06-126. 
2 WWA 522 (OMGUS), Manpower 7/44-2/14, Shaw to MamhaIl. 22.10.1~. 
3 WWA 522 (OMGU5), Manpower 7/44-2/14, Memo from Leo ~erts: Man= 
7/51-1/3 GWJ Cole Chief, ManpowerGp. BICO, toJ.Chairmen UKUSCCO, Snyder , 
28.2.1949. 
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opinion in the industry. The debate about training policy revealed all too 
clearly the gulf between the training experts on the one hand and the 
'Betriebsfiihrer' on the other. 
Change did come to the industry but much later, in the 1960's and 1970's. as the 
labour directors' influence grew, the pace of technological change quickened and 
the industry came to terms with the contraction in coal demand. The author 
was able personally to experience a very different type of management when on a 
visit in the Friedrich Heinrich mine in 1984. As our small group of visitors 
neared the coal face, the ovennan was approached by a small group of miners 
who were having a problem with the influx of water. What was striking for 
someone with a knowledge of labour relations in the 1950's was the nature of the 
relationship here. There was, on the part of the men, no deference, except for the 
deference to expertise and on the part of the ovennan no side or terseness or 
ordering about, but a consultative and confident approach to the problem. It 
was a small indication of the way recession. technological change and 
government intervention had turned the mining industry upside down since the 
early 1960's. In the era of the new miners, however. mining's authoritarian past 
was far more evident than its liberal future. 
Is the story of the new miners unique? Many other industries had suffered large 
workforce losses and some of the problems associated with creating a sldlled. 
young workforce in the mining industry applied elsewhere too. The iron and 
steeltndustIy. for instance. experienced throughout the 1950's some difDculty in 
getting its new labour to stay. 1 Secondly. many of mining's diftlcultles in 
obta1n1ng and deploying resources prior to 1948 were general features of the 
period; labour everywhere was worldng very inefficiently. In this respect. 
1 ArbeUer Management MttbestImn'I1D1g, esp. p.219f1'. 
See Plriter. Braun. and Lutz. small fraction of the equIValent rate In mJnSng. 
Workforce turnover was. however. only a 
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mtntng's experiences hold good for the whole economy. Finally. the cultural. 
moral and political hopes and fears that the welfare programme brought to Ught 
after 1948 were probably to be found in a great many sections of Germany's 
provincial bourgeoisie. The welfare programme probably had countless 
analogues elsewhere, not so much in relation to specific industrial groups. but in 
more general programmes addressed to homeless youngsters and to the younger 
1 generation in general. 
But surely the final conclusion must be that rebuilding the workforce in the 
mines was uniquely challenging. It enjoyed an urgency and a priOrity in the 
early post-1945 period Unrivalled by almost any other task of social and 
economic reconstruction. Mter 1948. the mines were excluded from the spoils. 
but expected to follow the rules, of the market economy in a way true of no other 
major industzy. Above all. no other industry raised the same barriers to labour 
integration or the same problems of labour control. 
Ultimately, of course. failure to create a stable workforce in the Ruhr proved not 
to be all that serious. Certatnly, the economic and human costs in the 1940's 
and 1950's were substantial. But by 1958. the rapid growth of alternative 
sources of cheap energy and Germany's comfortable trade surplus had freed the 
economy from its dependence on home-produced coal. Since 1958. therefore. 
the Ruhr's basic problem has been not how to retain labour but how to get rid of 
it. For many of the 'unw1l11ngly moblle', attracted to the Ruhr in the 1940's and 
early 1950's with the promise of secure employment. the following decades were 
2 
to be a very unpleasant experience. 
1 These conclusions are of necessity very tentative because youth remalna one of 
the most under-researched aspects of the reconstruction era. 
2 Rudolf Orenzer. 'Den vertrtebenen Bergleuten droht jetzt Vertretbung aus dem 
Berut,1n Ost- WldMltte1deutsche Hef1nt1trVXe. 1966. 14.5/6. pp.l-S. 
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Economic and Industrial Planning Staff; 
Control Office: EconOmic; 
Records Library 
Archive of the Sozialforschun2sstelle. Dortmund (SoFoStAl 
'Datteln II. Verleihbares Material'; 
'Dr. Jantke Sozialausschiisse der evgl. Kirche 4.11.51 12'; 
, " " 
'Dattelner Neubergleute-Befragung': 
'Untersuchung Vincke Lager' 
Staatsarchiv. MUnster (StaM) 
11': 
Arbeitsamt - Ablen, Bochum, Bottrop, Dortmund, Gelsenklrchen: 
Bergamt - Bochum 1 (A12), Bottrop (A18), Castrop Rauxel (A7), Dortmund 
(A4), Gelsenkirchen (AI!), Heme (AS); 
RegierungAmsberg - WohnbaufOrderung B4013.2, B411; 
Regierung MOnster - WohnbaufOrderung B220/2, B219/220 
Archive of the WestfaHsche Ber22ewerkschaftskasse. Bochum IWBKA) 
Microfiche records of pupils of the Bergschule; 
VeIWaltungsbertchte; 
MttteUungen filr die Bergberufschulen; 
'Statlstlsche Erfassung der bergmanntschen Berufs- und Fachschulen'. 
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AG 1945 to 1949; 
BICOERPSEC 11/90 to 11/101; 
BICOBlSEC 11/101 to 11/109; 
BlooPABR 11/121 to 11/122; 
BIoo BECG/PABR 11/132 to 11/135; 
BICO JSEC 11/138 to 11/139; 
BIooIJBBR 11/140 to 11/149; 
SIoo 17/8192 to 17/8208; 
CO HISI'BR3/404 to 3/410; 
COS 3/176 to 3/177; 
Manpower 7/43 to 7/51. 17/257 to 17/258: 
001 7/25 to 7/27 
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1.2: Interviews and Conversations 
A) IntelViews/ conversations conducted by the author 
Hennann Kuhn (fonner new miner), Several conversations June 1982. 
Walther KOpping (fonner new miner and IGBE executive m~ber for ' 
culture and education), August 1982; 
Dr.Heinz Steffen (fonner personnel director HBAG) December1982 
May1983; '" 
Clemens Kreienhorst (fonner Communist head of Hibernia works 
council), August 1983; 
Siegfried Schroeder (fonner 1GB official responsible for new miners) 
February 1984; , 
Professor Helmut Croon (fonner researcher of the SOzialforschungsstelle 
Dortmund), Aprll1984; 
Hans Alker (fonner new miner and at time of inteIView deputy president 
of the IGBE), May 1984; 
Josef Laslop (fonner new miner and expellee), May 1984: 
Henry Collins CBE (fonner head of NGCC, later NCB production director) 
June 1984; , 
Alfons Nowak (fonner new miner), July 1985: 
Hubert Sommerfeld (fonner new miner and at time of interview stlll a 
miner), July 1985 
B) IntelView transcripts made available by 
The LUSIR group, Femuniversita.t Hagen (Interviews with former new 
miners Hans-Georg Stasiewsky, Paul Schemer, Rudolf Sass, Stefan Puhr. Anton 
Kessner. Konrad Boronski: IntelView with Josef Hennes); 
Michael Zimmermann, Alte Synagoge. Essen UnteIView with Heinrich 
Kleve) 
1.3: Unpublished Manuscripts 
A~enstelle Bergbau (ed.), 'Sechs Jahre Aussenstelle Bergbau des 
Landesarbeitsamtes NRW', (Unpublished Ms, no place, no date (1952)) 
Bonkowski. Helnfrted, '1m Kohlenpott und anderswo ... ErInnerungen und 
Gedanken eines Kumpels', (UnpubUshed Ms, Liinen-Horstmar, 1981) 
Instltut rur Sozialforschung, 'Die subjektiven und objektiven Abkehrgrunde bel 
sieben Zechen des westdeutschen Steinkohlenbergbaues in ihrer Auswirkung 
auf die Sicherung des Belegschaftsstandes unter Tage'. (UnpubUshed Ms., 
Frankfurt/M 1955) 
Institut fur angewandte Soztalwissenschaft. 'Untersuchung uber die Fluktuation 
der Arbeitskra.fte 1m Steinkohlenbergbau. Ergebrusbericht'. (Unpublished Ms., 
Bad Godesberg 1966) 
KOpping. Walter, Welches Verha.Itnls hat der gelemte bzw. der ungelemt~ 
Bergmann zu seinem Berui? Erne sozl010g1sch-emplr1sche Untersuchung. 
(Unpublished Ms., no place. 1952) 
Petz, Rudolf, 'Fluktuation 1m Stetnkohlenbergbaul Was kann noch dagegen 
geschehen? Empfehlungen zu den ErgebD1ssen einer industrlesozlologiSChen 
Untersuchung des Instituts fUr Sozlalforschung ... nach ErOrterung 1m Ausschu.8 
fllr soztalpoUttsche Fragen 1m Kohlenbergbau. zusammengestellt von dem 
Vorsltzer dleses Ausschusses M1nlstertaldlrektor Dr.Rudolf Petz 1m 
Bibliography 470 
Bundesm1n1stertum fUr Arbeit und Sozialordnung' (Unpublished Ms Bo date (1958)) . nn, no 
Sozialforschungsstelle Dortmund (SoFoSt) (ed.), 'SOziologische Erhebung zum 
Bergarbeiterwohnungsbauprogramm. SchluJ3bertcht' (Unpublished Ms 
Dortmund 1952) ' .. 
SoFoSt (ed.), 'Die Aufnahme der SOvietzonenfluchtlinge in Westdeutschland 
Bertcht der Sozialforschungsstelle an der UniversiUlt Munster in Dortmund 
uber ihre Erhebung in den Wohnlagern einer Grossstadt des Ruhrgebtets 
(Mal/Juni 1953)" (Unpublished Ms., Dortmund 1953) 
Terhorst, Theodor, 'Zehnjahrige Zusammenarbeit am Dtenste der 
Mitbestimmung be1m Hamborner Bergbau', (Unpublished Ms no place no date 
lDuisburg 1963)) · . 
1.4: Printed Sources 
Akten zur Vorgeschtchte der BRD, (ed.) Weisz et al, Vols. 4 und 5, Munich 1983 
and 1981 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft He1mstatthilfe im Lande NRW (ed.). Verzetchnts der 
JugendheimsUitten in NRW, Dusseldorf 1956 
Berger, Herbert, Der PiLtt hat mich ausgespuckt. Em Ruhrkumpel erzdhl.t aus 
semem Leben, Oberhausen 1981 
Booms, Hans (ed.). Die KabinettsprotokoUe der Bundesregierung. Vol. 2, 
Boppard am Rhein 1984 
Breder, Paul, Geschichten vor art. Ertnnerungen eines Bergma.nns, Essen 1979 
Brose, Hanns W., Die Nachwuchsnot im deutschen Bergbau. Frankfurt 1945 
Brose. Hanns W., Eine Gemeinschajtswerbung zur Gewinnung von Nachwuchs 
.fii.r den Bergbau. Reprint from the journal Die Werbung', July 1950 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Abteilung Jugend (ed.), Protokoll der 
Arbettstagung der GewerkschaftsJugend 25. -30.11.1951, Dusseldorf 1952 
Deutsche Kohlenbergbauleitung (DKBL) (later Statistik der Kohlenwirtschaft 
e.V.) (ed.), zahlen der Kohlenwirtschaft. Essen 1946ff. 
DKBL (ed.), Entwtcklung des Kohlenbergbaus in den Vereintgten 2'Dten (Plan AJ, 
Essen 1948 
DKBL (ed.) , Ruhr-Almanach. Yom Bergmann undBergbau. Cologne 1950 
DKBL (ed.), Uberblick Uber den Umjang. die btsherige Abwtcklung und die wettere 
Durc1!Jij.hrung des BergarbeU:erwohnungsbaues, Essen 1950 
DKBL (ed.), FOr den Bergbau etn Etgenhetm. Essen 1952 
DKBL (ed.), 'Bedarf an Bergarbe1terwohnungen bis Ende 1954', (Essen 1953) 
Deutscher Siedlerbund (ed.), Die Kletnsiedlung und thre EntwfCklung. Em 
tiberbltck Ilber Se#n und Werden der Kletnsiedlung WId des Deutschen 
Sted1erbundes, Hamburg 1960. 
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Die Funktton des Eigenhetms in der Sozialordnung unserer Zeit. Vortrdge und 
Referate des Dritten Deutschen Volksheimstdttentages, Hannover 1951. 
Bielefeld 1951 
DreiJ3ig Jahre Treuhandstelle for Bergmannswohnstdtten, Essen no date [1949] 
Europaische Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl, Gemeinsame Versammlung 
(ed.), Bericht im Namen des Unterausschusses uber die Maglichkeit einer 
Finanzierungshilje durch die Hohe Behorde fur den Arbeiterwohnungsbau, 
Document 19, June 1956 
EuropMsche Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl. Hohe Behorde (ed.), Entwicklung 
der LOhne und die Lohnpolltik in den Industrien der Gemeinschaft 1945-1956, 
Luxemburg 1960 
Falk, L & W.Blumich (eds.), Einkommenssteuergesetz. Kommentar, Munchen 
1982 
Forstmann, Walter, 'Die Erziehung zum Eigentumsgedanken', Die 
Volksheimstiitte. Monatszeitschrtjt des Deutschen Volksheimstdttenwerks 
1955, 7, 5, pp.1-5 
Franz, Fritz, Ich war ein Bergmannskind. Eine Zeitgeschichte aus dem 
Kohlenpott, Duisburg-Neumuhl 1981 
Handbuch des Landtags NRW, Dusseldorf 1951fI. 
Hibernia Konzern (ed.), Hibernia Sozialbericht 1956 [ff.], [no place). 1957fI 
Industrieverband Bergbau (ed.), Jahrbuch 1947, Bochum, no date [1948] 
Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau UGB) (ed.), Jahrbuch 1948/1949 [ff.], Bochum 
1949ff 
1GB Bezirk 1 (ed.), Geschiiftsberichtfor das Jahr 1948 [fIl, Oberhausen 1949fI. 
[and annual reports of Bezirke IV, V & VI] 
1GB Hauptverwaltung (ed.), Protokoll des 1. VerbandsJugendtags Bochum 1950, 
Sept 22- 24, Bochum 1950 
1GB, Hauptverwaltung, Abteilung Jugend (ed.), Geschdftsbericht 1950-1952. 
Bochum 1953 
IGBE (ed.), Bergleute erziihlen. (Beitriige zur Geschichte der IGBE), Bochum 1982. 
IGBE Bezirk Ruhr Nord, Recklinghausen (ed.), Jahre die wir ntcht verges sen 
1945-1950 Recklinghiiuser Bergbaugewerkschaftler erinnem sich, 
Recklinghausen 1980. 
Kopping, Walter (ed.), 100 Jahre Bergarbeiterdichtung. Oberhausen 1982 
Kopping, Walter (ed.), Lebensbertchte deutscher Bergarbeiter, Oberhausen 1984 
Kommission fur soziale Aufgaben (ed.), Mitteilungen der Kommisston Fur soziale 
Aufgaben. Essen 1948fI. 
Landesamt fur Datenverarbeitung und Statistik NRW (ed.). Beitrdge zur Statistik 
des Landes NRW. Dusseldorf 1949fI 
Martiny, Martin. and Hans-Jurgen Schneider (eds.l. Deutsche Energiepolitik 
seit 1945. Cologne 1981 
tllbl10grapny 4I:l 
Minister fur Wirtschaft und Verkehr des Landes NRW, Jahresbertcht der 
BergbehDrden des Landes NRW jilr das Jahre 1952 [fI), Dusseldorf 1953ff 
Mtntstertal-Blatt Nordrhein-Westjalens 1948 [ffl, Dusseldorf 1948ff 
Oberbergamt Dortmund (ed.), Bericht uber das Bergwesen im 
Obergbergamtsbezirk Dortmundfur das Jahr 1952[ff], Dortmund 1953ff 
Public Opinion Research Organisation, Political Division (ed.), The Ruhr miner 
and htsJamily 1947. A social survey, Bielefeld 1948 
Public Opinion Research Organisation, Political Division (ed.), A social survey: 
The Mining Trainee 1947, Bielefeld 1948 
Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Stattsttsches Jahrbuch fur die BRD 1953 [ff], 
Wiesbaden 1954ff 
Taschenbuch fur Verwaltungsbeamte 1950-1951 [ff] Behordennachwets und 
Personenverzeichnts, Berlin, Detmold, Cologne, Munich 1952ff 
Unternehmensverband Ruhrbergbau (ed.), Jahresbencht 1953-1954[ffl, Essen 
1954ff 
VelWeyen, Hertbert, Erfassung und Abgrenzung der fur die bergma..nntsche 
Ausbildung der Jugendlichen bet der Hambomer AG entstehenden Kosten, Essen 
1955 
Wawersik, Rudolf, Ausbeute eines Bergmannslebens. Erinnerungen an den 
oberschlestschen, saarla..ndtschen und westfliltschen Bergbau, Essen 1981 
WestHilische Berggewerkschaftskasse zu Bochurn (ed.), Verwaltungsbertcht fur 
die Zeit 1. 1.4 7 bts 31.12.48 [fil, Boch urn 1948ff 
1.5: Systematically evaluated periodicals 
Arbettsblatt fur die brtttsche Zone 
Arbeit und Sozialpolitik 
BAG Ewald-Konig LudWig (later given the name 'Ewald Kohle'), works newspaper 
of the Bergbau AG Ewald-Konig Ludwig 
Die Bergbau-Industrie 
Bergbau-Rundschau 
Bergbau und Wtrtschajt 
BergJreiheit 
Bundesarbeitsblatt 
Der Forderturm (works newspaper of the GBAG's Gruppe Harnbom. later 
Hambomer Bergbau AG) 
GlilckauJ 
Die Grubenlampe (works newspaper of the n11nes Hannover and Hannibal) 
Mitteilungen der WBK 
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2. Secondary Sources 
Abe, Edwin C. un? Alfons .Echterhoff, Das Vest - ein dynamischer 
Wirtschaftsraum. Dte sozialwtrtschaftliche Entwicklung und Struktur des 
Vestes Recklinghausen und seine wohnungs- und siedlungswirtschaftliche 
Problematik, Recklinghausen 1955 
Abelshauser, Werner, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948. 
Rekonstruktion und Wiederaujbaubedingungen in der amerikanischen und 
britischen Zone, Stuttgart 1975 
Abelshauser, Werner, 'Probleme des Wiederaufbaus der westdeutschen 
Wirtschaft 1945-1953', in Heinrich August Winkler(ed.}, Polittsche 
Weichenstellungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945-1953, Goettingen 1979. 
pp.208-253 
Abelshauser, Werner, 'Ansatze "korporativer Marktwirtschaft" in der Korea-
Krise der fruhen fiinfziger Jahre. Ein Briefwechsel zwischen dem Hohen 
Kommissar John McCloy und Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer', in 
ViertelJahreshejtefur Zeitgeschichte, 1982,30,4, pp.715-756 
Abelshauser, Werner, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1945 - 1980, Frankfurt 1983 
Abelshauser, Werner, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau selt 1945. Wiederaujbau. Krise, 
Anpassung, Munich 1984 
Abelshauser, Werner, 'Kohle und Marktwirtschaft. Ludwig Erhards Konflikt 
mit dem Unternehmensverband Ruhrbergbau am Vorabend der Kohlenkrise'. in 
ViertelJahresheftefilr Zeitgeschlchte, 1985. 33. 3. pp.489-546 
Adamsen, Heiner R .• Investitionshllfefilr die Ruhr. Wiederaujbau. Verbdnde und 
soziale Marktwirtschajt 1948-1952. Wuppertal 1981 
Albers, Willi, 'Die Eingliederung in volkswirtschaftlicher Sicht'. in Eugen 
Lemberg und Friedrich Edding (eds.). Die Vertrtebenen in Westdeutschland. Ihre 
Eingliederung und ihr EinfluJ3 auf Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft. PoUtik und 
Geistesleben, Kiel 1959, Vol II, pp.418-557 
Autorenkollektiv (Ernst-Ulrich Huster. Gerhard Kraiker et al), Determlnanten 
der westdeutschen Restauration 1945 - 1949. Frankfurt/M 1972 
Bahl, Volker, Staatliche Politik am Beispiel der Kohle. Frankfurt 1977 
Bahne. Siegfried. 'Die KPD im Ruhrgebiet in der Weimarer Republik'. in Jiirgen 
Reulecke (ed.). Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr. Wuppertal 1974. pp.315-
354 
Balfour. M .. Four Power control in Germany and Austria 1945-1946. New York 
1956 
Balfour. M .. West Gennany, London 1968 
Bandemer. Jens Diether von and August Peter Ilgen. Probleme des 
Steinkohlenbergbaus. Die Arbeiter- und Forderverlagerung in den Revieren der 
Bomage und Ruhr. Tiibmgen 1963 
Baroth. Hans Dieter. Aber es waren schOne Zetten. Cologne 1978 
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Baroth. Hans-Dieter. StTeuselkuchen in Ickern, Cologne 1980 
Bauer. Franz J .. Aufnahme und Eingliederung der F1uchtlinge und Vertriebenen. 
Das Betspiel Bayem 1945 - 1950. in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Die Vertreibung der 
Deutschen aus dem Osten. Ursachen, Eretgntsse, Folgen, Frankfurt/M. 1985, 
pp.158-172 
Baumert, Gerhard. Deutsche Familten nach dem Kriege, Darmstadt 1954 
Baumert. Gerhard. Jugend der Nachkriegszelt. Lebensverhdltntsse und 
Reakttonswetsen. Darmstadt 1952 
Becker. Josef. Theo Stammen, Peter Waldmann (eds.), Vorgeschichte der BRD. 
Zwtschen Kapltulatton und Grundgesetz. Munich 1979 
Bednarz. Homar, 'Die FluktuaUon 1m Ruhrbergbau und die Versuche zu ihrer 
Bekampfung'. (Diplom-Arbeit. Cologne University. 1957/8) 
Benz. Wolfgang. Wirtschaftspolitik zwischen Demontage und Wahrungsreform', 
in Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, (ed.). Westdeutschlands Weg zur Bundesrepublik 
1945-1949, Munich 1976, pp.69-89 
Benz. Wolfgang (ed.), Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten. Ursachen, 
Eretgntsse, Folgen. Frankfurt/M 1985 
Berg. Werner. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland und Groj3brltannten 
im Ubergang zum 'organtslerten Kapitalismus'. Unternehmer, AngesteUte, 
Arbeiter und Staat im Steinkohlenbergbau des Ruhrgebietes und von Sudwales 
1850 - 1914. Berlin 1984 
Berghahn. Volker R .. The Americantsation of West German Industry 1945 - 1973. 
Leamington Spa/ New York 1986 
Bethlehem. Siegfried. Heimatvertreibung, DDR-Flucht, Gastarbeiterzu-
wanderung: Wanderungsstrome und Wanderungspolitik in der BRD, Stuttgart 
1982 
Blei. Anton. 'Die Kriminalltat der Jungbergleute der Ruhrmetropole Essen nach 
dem Zusammenbruch (1945-1951)'. (Staatsexamensarbeit, Bonn University. 
1953) 
Bludau. Kuno. Gestapo - geheim! Widerstand und verfolgung in Dutsburg 1933-
45. Borm-Bad Godesberg 1973 
Bohnke. Wilfried. Die NSDAP im Ruhrgebiet 1920-1933. Borm-Bad Godesberg 
1974 
Boll. Heinrich .. K. Chargesheimer. Im Ruhrgebiet. Cologne/Berlin 1958 
Bolling. K .. Republic in suspense: politics. parties and personalitieS in postwar 
Gennany. London 1964 
Bollermann. Hans. 'Die KrtminaliUit der Ruhrbergleute 1945-1955'. (Diss .• 
Bonn University, 1961) 
Borsdorf. Ulrich and Hans a.Hemmer (eds.l. Gewerkschaftliche Politik. Reform 
aus Solidaritdt. Zum 60.Geburtstag von H.O.Vetter. Cologne 1977 
Borsdorf, Ulrich. 'Der Weg zur Einheitsgewerkschaft'. in Jiirgen Reulecke (ed.). 
Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein WldRuhr. Wuppertal1974, pp.385-414 
Bibliography 475 
Borsdorf, Ulrich, 'Speck oder Sozialisierung. Produktionssteigerungs-
kampagnen im Ruhrbergbau 1945-1947', in Hans Mommsen und Ulrtch Borsdorf 
(eds.l. Glilckauj Kameraden! Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in 
Deutschland, Cologne 1979, pp.345-366 
Brecht, Julius, 'Die gemeinniitzigen Wohnungsunternehmen in einer 
marktwirtschaftlichen Wohnversorgung', in Deutsche Siedlungs- und 
Wolmpolitik, Cologne 1956, pp.151-175 
Brehpohl, Wilhelm, Industrievolk im Wandel von der agraren zur indusmellen 
Daseinsjorm dargesteUt am Ruhrgebiet, Tiibingen 1957 
Brozio, Norbert, Gewerkschajtlicher Wiederaujbau im nordlichen Ruhrgebtet 
1945-1947, Miinster 1980 
Briiggemeier, Franz-Josef and Lutz Niethammer, 'Schlafga.nger, 
Schnapskasinos und schwerindustrielle Kolonie. Aspekte der 
Arbeiterwohnungsfrage im Ruhrgebiet vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg', in Jiirgen 
Reulecke, Wolfhard Weber (eds.l. Fabrlk, Familie, Feierabend. Beitrdge zur 
Sozialgeschichte des AUtags im Industriezeitalter, Wuppertal 1978, pp.247-72 
Briiggemeier, Franz-Josef, "Volle Kost voll". Die Wohnungsverha.ltnisse der 
Bergleute an der Ruhr urn die Jahrhundertwende', in Hans Mommsen und Ulrich 
Borsdorf (ed), Glilckauj Kameraden! Die Bergarbeiter und we Organisationen in 
Deutschland, Cologne 1979, pp. 151-174 
Briiggemeier, Franz-Josef, Leben vor Ort Ruhrbergleute und Ruhrbergbau 1889 -
1919, Munich 1983 
Brunn, G. (ed.), Nordrhein-Wesifalen und seine Anjiinge nach 1945/1946. Essen 
1986 
Buchholz, Ernst W., 'Der Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau als planertsche und 
sozialpolitlsche Aufgabe', Soziale Welt. 1952,4,1, pp.38-50 
Budde, Karl Heinrich, 'Die Griinde und die Auswirkungen des ubenna.ssig starken 
Belegschaftswechsels auf den Schachtanlagen des Ruhrgebiets in der 
Nachkrtegsze1t', (Staatswtss. priifungsarbe1t, Heme, April 1952) 
Burkhard, W., Abriss einer Wirtschajtsgeschichte des Niederrheins. Duisburg 
1977 
Clarke, Michael, 'Die Gewerkschaftspolitik der KPD 1945-1951. Dargestellt am 
Beispiel des !VB/1GB im Ruhrgebiet', (Staatsexamensarbeit. Bochum University. 
1982) 
Collins, Henry E., Mining memories and musings. The autobiOgraphy oj a 
mining engineer, London 1985 
Corsten. Hermann, Bibliographie des Ruhrgebiets: Vols 2 and 3, Dusseldorf 
1955-1962 
Crew, David F., A town in the Ruhr - A social history of Bochum 1860-1914. New 
York 1979 
Croon Helmuth and K. Utermann, Zeche und Gemeinde. Untersuchung:n ilber 
den Strukturwandel einer Zechengemeinde tm nordlichen Ruhrgebiet. Tubtngen 
1958 
Daberkow, Manfred, 'Die Se~haftmachung der vom westdeutsche? 
Steinkohlenbergbau aus bergfremden Gebieten angeworbenen Berglehrl1nge. 
(Exan1ensarbelt, Sozialschule Gelsenk1rchen, 1955) 
DIUllV~ apllY "t ( V 
Dennis, N., F. Henriques and C.Slaughter, Coal is our life: An analysis of a 
Yorkshire mining community, London 1956 
Deutsche Siedlungs- und Wohnungspolitik. Gegenwartsproblematik und 
Z~kunftsaspekte. Festschrift zum 25 jahrigen Bestehen des Institutes fur 
Stedlungs- und Wohnungswesen an der Westjalischen Wilhelmsuniversitat. 
Cologne 1956 
Ebsworth, Raymond, Restoring democracy in Germany. The British 
contribution, New York 1960 
Farquharson, John E., The Western Allies and the politics of food. Agrarian 
management in post-war Germany, Leamington Spa/New York 1985 
Faulenbach, Bernd, 'Die Herren an der Ruhr. Zum Typos des Unternehmers in 
der Schwerindustrie' , in Lutz Niethammer et al (eds.), "Die Menschen machen 
ihre Geschichte nicht aus jreien StUcken, aber sie mac hen sie selbsl:'. Einladung 
zu einer Geschichte des Volkes in NRW, Berlin. Bonn 1985. pp.76-85 
Follmer-Edling, Astrid, 'Die Politik des IVB im Ruhrgebiet 1945-1948. Die 
Anstrengungen urn die Erhohung der Kohlenforderung im Ruhrbergbau'. 
(Staatsexamensarbeit, RuhruniversiUit Bochum. 1977) 
Friedeburg, Ludwig von, 'Zur Fluktuation im Steinkohlenbergbau. Ergebnisse 
einer industriesoziologischen Untersuchung des Instituts fur Sozialforschung 
uber die Griinde der FluktuationsdifIerenzen bei sechs Zechen 1m Ruhrgebiet'. 
Bundesarbeitsblatt 1957, pp.705-721 
Fronz, Manfred and Gerd Peter (eds.l. Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung im 
Steinkohlenbergbau. Band 2: Der Steiger. Auszuge aus empirischen 
Untersuchungen 1950 - 1982, Bochum 1983 
Gebhardt, Gerhard, Ruhrbergbau, Geschichte, Aujbau und Verflechtung seiner 
Gesellschaften und Organisationen, Essen 1957 
Gillingham, John, 'Die Ruhrbergleute und Hitlers Krieg', in Hans Mommsen und 
Ulrich Borsdorf (eds.), Glilckauf Kameraden! Die Bergarbeiter und ihre 
Organisatlonen in Deutschland, Cologne 1979, pp.325-343 
Gillingham, John, Industry and politics in the Third Reich. Ruhr coal, Hitler 
and Europe, London 1985 
Gimbel, John, Amerikanische Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland 1945-1949. 
Frankfurt 1971 
Graml, Hermann, 'Die Alliierten in Deutschland', in Institut fur Zeitgeschichte 
(ed.), Westdeutschlands Weg zur Bundesrepublik 1945 - 1949, Munich 1976. 
pp.25-52 
Grebing, Helga, The history of the German labour movement, London 1969 
Grieser, Helmut, Die ausgebUebene Radikalisierung. Zur Sozialgeschtchte der 
Kieler Flilchtlingslager im Spannungsfeld von soziaLdemokratischer 
Landespolitk und Stadtverwaltung 1945-1950, Wiesbaden 1957 
Grube, Frank and Gerhard Richter, Die Schwarzmarktzeit. Deutschland 
zwischen 1945 und 1948, Hamburg 1979 
Grun, Max von der, IrrLiCht und Feuer, Rheinbek 1967 
I:nouograpny- ~I I 
Grundmann. Ingrid. 'Erfahrungen Essener Neubergleute. Untersuchungen zur 
Problematik Vertriebener 1m Ruhrgebiet nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg' 
(Staatsexamensarbeit. Essen University. 1981) · 
Hartmann. Heinz. Authority and organisation in Gennan management 
Princeton N.J. 1959 • 
Haumann. Heiko (ed.). ArbeiteraUtag in Stadt und Land - Neue Wege der 
GeschichtsschreibWlg. Argument Sonderband 94. Berlin 1982 
Heinrichsbauer. A .• IndustrteUe Stedlung im Ruhrgebtet in Vergangenheit, 
Gegenwart Wld Zukunft, Essen 1936 
He1nrichsbauer, A .• Der Ruhrbergbau in Vergangenhett, Gegenwart Wld Zukunft, 
Essen 1948 
Heinze, Joachim, 'Die Anderung der BevOlkerungsstruktur der Stadt Duisburg 
seit der Fhichtlingswanderung von 1945'. Duisburger Forschungen. 1967.4. 
pp.108-143 
Herbert. Ulrich, Fremdarbeiter. Poltttk und Praxis des "AusUinder-Einsatzes" in 
der Krtegswtrtschajt des Drttten Retches, Berlin/Bonn 1985 
Herchenroeder, Karl, H .• Neue Manner an der Ruhr, Dusseldorf 1958 
Heuer. Jurgen. 'Pestalozzidorf - Sozialleistung des Bergbaus. Aufbau und 
Probleme', in H.J.Seraphim (ed.), Stedlungen und Wohnungen von heute. 
MUnster 1952. pp.54-72 
Hickey. Stephen, 'Bergmannsarbeit an der Ruhr vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg'. in 
Hans Mommsen und Ulrich Borsdorf (eds.l. Glilckauj Kameradenl Dte 
Bergarbetter Wld ihre Organisattonen in Deutschland. Cologne 1979. pp.49-69 
Hickey. Stephen. Workers in Imperial. Germany. The Miners oj the RuN. Oxford 
1985 
Hochlarmarker Lesebuch. Kohle war ntcht alles: 100 Jahre 
Ruhrgebtetsgeschicht£, Oberhausen 1981 
Hockerts. Hans Gunther. Soztalpolittsche Entschetdungen tm 
Nachkrtegsdeutschland. Alltterte und deutsche Sozialverstcherungspoltttk 
1945-1957. Stuttgart 1980 
Hoff. Hans Viktor von. Die Entwtcklung der wtrtschajtUchen und 
BeOOlkerungsstruktur in Heme 1950-1970. Frankfurt/M 1974 
Holup. Gerhard. 'Die Deckung des Arbeitskraftebedarfs im Steinkohlenbergbau 
des Ruhrgebiets'. (Diplom-Arbeit. Cologne University. 1953) 
Horstmann. Theo. Die Angst vor dem ftnanzteUen KoUaps. Banken- und 
KredttpoltttJc in der brtttschen Zone zwischen 1945 und 1948. in Dietmar 
Petzina and Walter Euchner (eds.l. Wtrtschajtspoltttk tm brtttschen 
Besatzungsgebfet 1945 - 1949. Oiisseldorf 1984. pp.215-234 
HiUtenberger. Peter. Nordrhe1nwestfalen uncI die Entst£hung setner Dernokrat1e. 
Sieburg 1973 
Husmann. He1m1ch. 'Lebensformen und ihr Wandel belm Arbeiter in Hamboro'. 
Rhetntsch-westft1ltsche ZettschriftJUr VolIcskunde, 1957. 4. 1/2. pp.1-39 
tnollograpny 4/0 
Institut fur Sozlalforschung (ed.), BetriebsklfIna, eine industriesozwlogtsche 
Untersuchung in Mannesmann Bereich. Frankfurt 1955 
Ipsen, Gunther (ed.), Daseinsjormen der Gro.J3stadt. Typtsche Formen sozialer 
Extstenz in Stadtmttte, Vorstadt und Gurtel der industriellen Gro.J3stadt. 
Tiibingen 1959 
Jantke, Carl, Bergmann und Zeche. Die sozialen Arbeitsverhdltntsse etner 
~~~htanlage des nordlichen Ruhrgebiets in der Sicht der Bergleute, Tiibingen 
Jures, E.A., and H.Kesting, Die Reaktwn von Huttenarbettem auj techntsche 
Neuenmgen, Dortmund 1957 
Kerr, Clark, 'Collective bargaining in post-war Gennany', Industrial and Labour 
Relations Review, 1952,5,3, pp.323-342 
Klages, Helmut, Der Nachbarschajtsgedanke und die nachbarliche Wtrklichkeit 
in der Grossstadt, Cologne-Opladen 1958 
Klej3mann, Christoph and Peter Friedemann, Streiks und Hungenndrsche fIn 
Ruhrgebtet 1946-1948, Frankfurt 1977 
Klej3mann, Christoph, Polntsche Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebtet 1870-1945. Soztale 
Integratwn und natwnale Subkultur einer Minderhett in der deutschen 
Industrtegesellschajt, Gottingen 1978 
Klej3mann, Christoph, 'Betrtebsr~te und Gewerkschaftspolitlk in Deutschland 
1945-52', in Heinrich August Winkler(ed.) PoUttsche Weichenstellungen tm 
Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945-1953, Gottlngen 1979, pp.44-73 
Klej3mann, Christoph, 'Betriebsgruppen und Einheitsgewerkschaft. Zur 
betrieblichen Arbeit der poliUschen Parteien in der Friihphase der 
westdeutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1945-1952', VierteUahresheJte Jur 
Zettgeschichte, 1983, 31, 2, pp.272-307 
Koeka, Jurgen, '1945: Neubeginn oder Restauration', in Carola Stem and 
Heinrich August Winkler (eds.), Wendepunkte deutscher Geschichte 1848-1945, 
Frankfurt 1979, pp.141-168 
Konze, Heinz, Entwicklung des Steinkohlenbergbaues tm Ruhrgebtet 1957-1974. 
Essen 1975 
Kramer, Klaus-Dietrtch, Die Erziehung zum Bergmannsberuj. Wte wiTkt stch dte 
Erztehung tm Pestalozztdorj im Vergletch zur Erztehung un Berglehrltngsheim 
und un Eltemhaus auj dte Arbett der Bergberujsschule und die Erztehung zum 
Bergmannsberuj aus? Bochum 1955 
KUhr. Herbert. Die katholische Arbeiterbewegung im Ruhrgebiet naeh 1945'.10 
Karl Rohe and Herbert Kuhr (eds.l, PoUlik und Gesellschaft tm Ruhrgebtet. 
KOnJgstem 1979. pp.74-92 
Kundel. Heinz, Der techntsche Fortschritt tm Stetnkohlenbergbau, dargesteUt 
an der Entwtcklung der maschineUen Kohlengewtnnung, Essen 1966 
Lang, Josef F., 'Die geschiehtliche und rAumllche Entwleklung des 
BergarbeltelWOhnungsbaus im Rulugebiet'. (Dtss. Cologne UniverSity. 1952) 
Lange-Kothe, Irmgard. 'Elne Bergmannssledlung und ibre Bewohner', in Der 
Ansc:hn1tt. 1958, 10, 1, pp.12-15 
Lemberg, Eugen und Friedrich Edding (eds.). Die Vertriebenen in 
Westdeutschland. Ihre Etngltederung und ihr EinjluJj auf Gesellschaft, 
Wirlschajt. PoUtik und Geistesleben.. Vols 1,2 and 3, Kiel 1959 
Lubcke, Otto, Die Subventionterung des WOhnungsbaues tnsbes seit 1945 
MUnster 1951 . · 
Mat, Gunther, "Warum steht der deutsche Arbeiter zu Hitle!?" Zur Rolle der 
Deutschen Arbeitsfront im Herrschaftssystem des Dritien Reiches'. Geschtchte 
und GeseUschaft, 1986. 12, 2, pp.212-234 
Maier, Charles S., The two post-war eras and the conditions for stability in 20th 
centuryWestem Europe', American Historical Revtew, 1981.86.2. pp.327-352. 
Maintz. Renate. Soziale Schichtung und sozialer Wandel in etner 
Industrtegemetnde. Eine soziologische Untersuchung der Stadt Eusktrchen 
Stuttgart 1958 • 
Mannschatz. Gerhard and J.Seider. Zum Kampf der KPD im Ruhrgebietfor die 
Eintgung der Arbeiterklasse und die Entmachtung der Monopolherren 1945-
1947. Berlin (GDR) 1962 
Marchwitza. Hans. Die Kumiaks, Berlin und Weimar 19752 
Marciniak. FriedheIm. Wahlverhalten in Nordrheinwesifalen 1948 -1970. Eine 
stattstlsch-okologlsche Analyse. Cologne 1978 
Marshall. Barbara. 'German attitudes to British Military Government 1945-
1947', Joumal ojSoc1al History. 1980, 15,4, pp.655-684 
Martiny, Martin, 'Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr vorn Scheitem der RAte-
und Sozialisierungsbewegung bis zum Ende der letzten parlamentartschen 
Reglerung der Weimarer Republik (1920-1930)', in Surgen Reulecke (ed.), 
Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein WldRuhr, Wuppertall974, pp.241-274 
Mason, TIm, Sozialpoltttk tm Drttten Retch: Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemein-
schaft. Opladen 1977 
Mausolff, Anneliese, Gewerkschajt und Betriebsrat tIn UrreU der Arbettneruner. 
Dannstadt 1952 
Merritt, Anna J., and Richard L.Merritt, Publtc Opinion in Occupied Gennany: 
The OMGUS Surveys 1945-1949, London 1970 
Mielke, Siegfried, 'Der Wiederaufbau der Gewerkschaften: Legenden und Wirk-
lichkeit', in Heinrich August Wtnkler(ed.), Polttfsche WetchensteUungen tm 
Nachkrlegsdeutschland 1945-1953. GOttlngen 1979, pp.74-88 
Milert, Werner, 'Die verschenkte Kontrolle. BestlmmungsgrQnde der br1t1schen 
Kohlenpolitik fm Ruhrbergbau 1945 - 1947', in Dietmar Petztna and Walter 
Euchner (eds.), Wtrtschaftspoltttk tm brttlschen Besatzungsgebfet 1945 - 1949. 
Dusseldorf 1984, pp.105-120 
Milward, Alan, The reconstructton of We stem Europe 1945 - 1951. London 1984 
Mommsen Hans 'Die aergarbe1terbewegung an der Ruhr 1918-1933', tnJQrgen 
Reulecke (~d.), kbetterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr. Wuppertal 1974, pp.275-
314 
Mommsen Hans 'Staatliche Soztalpol1tik und gewerkschaftl1che Strateg1e In 
der Wetm~rer R~publik'. in Ulrich Borsdorf and Hans O.Hemmer (eds.). 
B1Dllograpny iRSU 
Gewerkschajtlfche Politlk. Rejorm aus Solidarttdt. Zum 60 Geburtstag 
H.O.Vetter, Cologne 1977, pp.61-80 . von 
Monunsen, Hans (ed.), Arbeiterbewegung und industrieUer Wandel: Studien zu 
gewerkschajtlichen Organtsattonsproblemen tm Reich und de R-· ... -Wuppertall980 an r UlU, 
Mommsen Hans and Ulrich Borsdorf (ed), GliLckauj Kameraden1 Die Bergarbet.ter 
und ihre Organtsattonen in Deutschland, Cologne 1979 
Miinke, Stephanie, Die mobile GeseUschaft. Einfiihrung in die Soztalstruktur 
der Bundesrepubltk Deutschland, Stuttgart 1968 
Mund, Ottokar, ~5 Jahre katholisches Lagerwerk e. V. Versuch einer 
zettgeschtchtlfchen Ubersfcht, Recklinghausen 1973 
Munton, M., 'Training young miners in the Ruhr' Colliery Engineer 1956 33 
pp.294-298 " , 
Neuloh, Otto, Der neue Betrlebsstil. TUbtngen 1960 
Neumann, Walter, Die Gewerkschajten tm Ruhrgebiet. Voraussetzungen. 
Entwfcklung und Wtrksamkeit, Cologne 1951 
NeundOrfer, Ludwig, Unser Schtcksal. Frankfurt 1947 
Nlethammer, Lutz 'Strukturreform und Wachstumspakt. WesteuropAische 
Bedingungen der einheitsgewerkschaft1ichen Bewegung nach dem 
Zusammenbruch des Faschismus', In Hans Oskar Vetter, (ed.), Yom 
Sozialtstengesetz ZUT Mitbesttmmung. Zum 100. Geburtstag von Hans BOckler, 
Cologne 1975, pp.303-358 
Niethammer, Lutz and Peter Brandt (eds.), Arbeitertnittative 1945. Anti-
jaschtsttsche Ausschusse und Reorgantsation der Arbetterbewegung in 
Deutschland, Wuppertal 1976 
Niethammer, Lutz (ed.), Wohnen im WandeL Bettriige ZUT GeschJchte des AUtags 
in der Burgerltchen Gesellschaft, Wuppertal 1979 
Nlethammer, Lutz, 'Rekonstruktion und Desintegration. Zum VerstAndnis der 
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung zwischen Krieg und kaltem Krieg', in Heinrich 
August Winkler(ed.), Polittsche WefchensteUungen im Nach1criegsdeutschland 
1945-1953, GOttlngen 1979, pp.26-43 
Niethammer, Lutz, Umstandltche Erlduterung der seeltschen SMrung etnes 
Communalbaumetsters in Preujjens gr{)jjtem Industrtedorj oder: die 
Un.fdh:ItJkett ZUT Stadtentwfcklung, Frankfurt 1979 
Niethammer, Lutz (ed.), "Die Jahre wetB man nfchl, wo man die heute htnsetzen 
soU". Faschismuserjahrungen tm Ruhrgebtet, Berlin/Bonn 1983 
Nlethammer Lutz 'Heimat und Front. Versuch, zehn Krlegsertnnerungen aus 
der ArbeiterkIasse' des Ruhrgeblets zu verstehen', in Lutz Nlethammer (ed.), "DIe 
Jahre wefJj man nleht', pp.I63-232 
Nlethammer, Lutz (ed.), "Htnterher mer1ct man, d.oJj es rtchtfg war, do,/J es 
schiefgegangen tsf'. Nach1criegserjahrun{Jen. tIn Ruhryeblet. Berlin/Bonn 1983 
Nlethammer, Lutz, 'Prtvatwirtschaft. Ertnnerungsfragmente einer anderen 
Umerz1ehung', ttl Lutz Nlethammer (ed.), "Htnterher mer1ct manN. pp.17-107 
DIUllU~ClpUy <to 1 
Nieth~er, Lutz et al (eds.), "Die Menschen machen ihre Geschichte nichl aus 
freten StUcken. aber ste machen ste selbsf'. Berlin/Bonn 1985 
Oppen, Dietrich von, FamUien in ihrer Umwelt A .. /2.nre Bedin ~ Ute tm Pri ,/2 de . ~ gungen von 
am n ozep r tndustrieUen Verstddterung einer Zechengemeinde 
Cologne and Opladen 1958 ' 
Oppen, Dietrich von, 'Soziale MobiliUit und StabillHit in einer Stadt d 
Ruhrgebiets'. ZettschriftjUr die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 1956, 112. 685_71;s 
Oswald, H., 'Ergebnisse der deutschen Gemeindesoziologie nach 1950'. ArchWjiir 
Kommunalwissenschajten, 1966.5, pp.93-111 
Patterson. William, Social Democracy in post-war Europe, London 1974 
Petzina, Dietmar, WirtschaftUche Entwicklung und sozialer Wandel in der 
Stadtregion Dortmund 1m 20.Jahrhundert'. in G.Luntowski and N.Reimann 
(ed.), Dortmund. 1100 Jahre Stadtgeschichte, Dortmund 1982. pp.297-312 
Petzina, Dietmar and Walter Euchner (eds.), Wirtschajtspolitik im brtttschen 
Besatzungsgebiet 1945 - 1949, Dusseldorf 1984 
Peukert, Detlev, 'Zur Regionalgeschichtsschreibung der Arbeiterbewegung', Das 
Argument. 1978,20,110, pp.546-565 
Peukert, Detlev, Die KPD im Widerstand. Verjolgung und Untergrundarbeit an 
Rhein undRuhr 1933 bis 1945, Wuppertal1980 
Peukert, Detlev, 'Kolorue und Zeche. Arbeiterradikalismus, WiderstAndtgkeit 
und Anpassung der Bergarbeiter zwischen Faschismus und Wirtschaftswunder', 
Sozlalwissenschajtliche Injormattonen jilr Unterrtcht und Studium, 1980, 9, 
pp.24-30 
Peukert, Detlev and Jiirgen Reulecke (eds.), Die ReihenJast geschlossen. Bettrlige 
zur Geschichte des AUtags untenn NatiDnalsoztaltsmus, Wuppertal 1981 
Peukert, Detlev, 'Arbeiteralltag - Mode oder Methode?', in Heiko Haumann (ed.). 
Arbeiteralltag in Stadt und Land - Neue Wege der Geschichtsschreibung. 
Argument Sonderband 94. Berlin 1982, pp.8-39 
pfeil, Elisabeth, Der Flilchtltng: Gestalt etner Zettenwende, Hamburg 1948 
pfell, Elisabeth, Fiinj Jahre spdter. Die Eingltederung der Heimatvertrtebenen 
in Bayem bis 1950, Frankfurt/M 1951 
pfell Elisabeth Die Wohnwilnsche der BergarbeiteT. Soztologtsche Erhebungen 
Deutung und Krl.tnc der WohnvorsteUungen eines Berujes, Tiibingen 1954 
pfeil, Elisabeth & Ernst Wolfgang Buchholz, EtngUederungschancen und 
Etnglted.erungserjolge: Regtonalstattsttsche Analysen der Erwerbslosfg1cetL 
BerujssteUung und Behausung der vertrtebenen. Bad Godes'berg 1958 
PilAg1ng, Kurt, DIe Wiege des Ruhrkoh1enbergbaus. Die GeschJchte der zechen 1m 
sildlfchen Ruhrgebtet, Essen 1978 
Pietsch. Hartmut, Milttiirregterung, BuroJcratte und soztaltsmus. Zu 
Entwfcklung des poltttschen Systems in den StiJdten des Ruhrgebtets 1945-1948. 
DuiSburg 1978 
Hlbl10grapny 4~2 
Pingel, Falk, "'Die Russen am Rhein?" Zur Wende der britischen 
BesatzungspoliUk 1m Friihjahr 1946', Vierteljahreshejte jUr Zeitgeschichte, 
1982,30, I, pp.98-116 
Pingel, Falk, 'Der aufhaltsame Aufschwung. Die Wirtschaftsplanung fur die 
britische Zone im Rahmen der au~enpolitischen Interessen der 
Besatzungsmacht', in Dietmar Petzina and Walter Euchner(eds) 
Wtrtschajtspolittk im brttischen Besatzungsgebiet 1945 - 1949. Dusseldorf 198'4: 
pp.41-64 
Pirker, Theo, 'Die Jugend in der Struktur unserer Gesellschaft' in DGB 
Abteilung Jugend (ed.), Protokoll der Arbeitstagung der Gewerksct~rtsJugend 
25.-30.11.1951, Dusseldorf 1952, pp.7-30 
Pirker, Theo, S.Braun, B.Lutz, Arbeiter Management Mitbestimmung, eine 
tndustriesoziologische Untersuchung der Struktur, der Organisation und des 
Verhaltens der Arbeiterbelegschajt tn Werken der deutschen Elsen- und 
Stahltndustrle, Jar die die Mitbestimmung gUt. Stuttgart/Dusseldorf 1955 
Pirker, Theo, Die blinde Macht. Die Gewerkschajtsbewegung in 
Westdeutschland, vols 1 and 2, Munich 1960 
Plato, Alexander, 'Nachkriegssieger. Sozialdemokratische BetriebsrAte 1m 
Ruhrgebiet - Eine lebensgeschichtliche Untersuchung', in Lutz Nietharnmer (ed.), 
"Hinterher merkt man, daJ3 es richtig war, daJ3 es schiejgegangen lst". 
Nachkrlegserjahrungen im Ruhrgebiet, Berlin/Bonn 1983, pp.311-359 
Plumpe, Werner, 'Auf dem Weg in die Marktwirtschaft: Organisierte 
Industrteinteressen, Wtrtschaftsverwaltung und Besatzungsmacht in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 1945 - 1947'. in G.Brunn (ed.), Nordrhetn-West{alen und 
seine Anfdnge nach 1945/1946, Essen 1986, pp.67-84 
Popitz, H. et aI, vas GeseUschaftsbUd des Arbeiters, TObingen 1961 
Poth, Fritz, Die Entwtcklung der LOhne tm Stetnkohlenbergbau, in der 
etsenschaffenden Industrie und im Baugewerbe sett 1924, Cologne 1950 
Pounds, N.J. G., The economic pattern oj modem Germany, London 1963 
Pounds, N.J.G., The Ruhr: a study in historical and economic geography. 
London 1952 
Reding, Josef, Der Mensch tm Revier, ReckUnghausen 1967 
Retch, Nathan. Labour relations in repubUcan Germany. New York 1938 
Retchllng, Gerhard, Die Heimatvertrtebenen un Spiegel der StattstOc, 
1958 
Remers, Leo. Heme 1945-1950. FCtnJJahre Wtederaujbau. Heme 1950 
Berlin 
Reulecke. Jiirgen (ed.), Arbetterbewegung an Rhein und RuhT. Bettrage zur 
Gesch.fchte der Arbetterbewegung In Rhefnland-Westfalen. Wupperta11974. 
Reulecke, Juergen and Wolfbard Weber (ed.), Fabrtk FamUfe F~~: 
Bet1riJge zur SoziDlgesch.fchte des AUtIltJs fm Indust:rtezeUa1ter. Wuppe 
Roden. Gimter von, Geschtchte der Stadt Dulsburg, DulSburg 1974 
Roelen. Otto-WUheJm, 'Dte Bedeutung der PestalozztdOner (ilr die Gewtnnung 
emes bergbaul1chen Nachwuchses', (Dtss .• Cologne Umverstty. 1956) 
tnollograpny 'lOJ 
Rohe. Karl. 'Vom alten Revier zum heutigen Ruhrgebiet Die Entwi kl 
regionalen Politischen Gesellschaft 1m Spiegel der Wahlen' 1m c ~~ einer 
Herbert Kiihr (ed.). PoUtik und GeseUschaft im Ruhrgebi~L B itrr. Rohe, 
regiDnalen Polittk-Forschung, Meisenheim 1979. pp.21-73 e age zur 
Rohe. Karl and Herbert Kiihr (ed.). Politik und Gesellschajt im R lUi b 
BeUrfJge zur regionalen Polittk-Forschung. Meisenheim 1979 u ge ieL 
Rohlfing, Marga. Lohn und Lebenshaltung, Dortmund 1947 
Rudolph. Fritz, Wie steht der Arbeiter zu Betrteb, Arbeit und Gewerkschaft?' 
Neue GeseUschajt 1956, 3, 6. pp.411-41 ' 
Runge. Erika, Bottroper Protokolle, Frankfurt 1968 
S~er. Heinz. 'Fluchtlinge und Vertriebene. Ein Beitrag zum Fluchlingsproblem 
dargestellt am Beispiel der Stadt Witten an der Ruhr fur die Zeit von 1945 bis 
1955'. (Diss .. Mannheim University. 1971) 
SchAdel. Gudrun. 'Die KPD in Nordrhein-Westfalen 1945-1956', (D18s., Bochum 
University. 1973) 
SchAfer. Hans Dieter, Das gespaltene Bewu./3tsetn. iJber die Lebenswtrkltchkeit 
in Deutschland 1933-1945, Munich 1981 
Scharf. Claus und Hans-Jiirgen SchrOder (eds.); Die Deutschlandpoltttk 
Grossbrltanniens und die britische Zone 1945-1949, Wiesbaden 1979 
Schelsky. Helmut. Die skeptische Generation. Eine Soziologie der deutschen 
Jugend. Dusseldorf/ Cologne 1963 
Schelsky. Helmut. Auf der Suche nach Wtrkltchkeit, Dusseldorf/Cologne 1964 
Schelsky. Helmut. Wandlungen der deutschen FamUie in der Gegenwart. 
Stuttgart 19815. 
Schmidt. Eberhard. Die verhinderte Neuordnung. Frankfurt 1970 
Schmidt, Uwe und T. Fichter. Der erzwungene Kapttaltsmus. Berlin 1971 
Schmitz. Rudolf. 'Das Gedinge, seine Bedeutung und seine Wirkung auf die 
zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen 1m Ruhrkohlenbergbau'. (Dlss., Munster 
University. 1952) 
SchOnberg. Hans. Germans from the East. A study of their mtgratfon. 
resettlement and subsequent group history since 1945. The Hague 1970 
Schrumpf. Emil. 'GewerkschaftsbUdung und -politik 1m Bergbau·. (Di88 .• 
Miinster Untversity. 1958) 
Schuster. D .• Die deutschen Gewerkschqfien seit 1945. Berlin 19734 
Schwarz. Hans-Peter. Die Ara Adenauer: Griinderjahre der RepubUk 1949-1951. 
Stuttgart 1981 
Seraphtm. H.J. (ed.). Stedlungen und Wohnungen von heute. MUnster 1952 
Siebert. Willy. 'Oer Umschichtungsprozess der Belegschaften 1m westdeutschen 
Ste1nkohlenbergbau'. (Dtss. Mdnster University. 1953) 
Stahlberg. Gertrud. Die vertrtebenen tn Nordrhetn-Westfalen. Berlin 1957 
Bibliography 484 
Steinberg, Heinz Gunter, Soztalrdumliche Entwicklung und Gli de 
Ruhrgebtets, Bad Godesberg 1967 e rung des 
Steinbock-Fermor, Alexander, Meine Erlebnisse als Be~garbeite 1~8 ~ Stuttgart 
Steininger, Rolf, 'Die Rhein-Ruhr Frage im Kontext britischer 
DeutschlandpoliUk 1945-6, in Heinrich August Winkler(ed) P Ziti h 
Weichenstellungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945-1953 GOttfng 0 1s9c7ge pp.III-I66 . en . 
Steinlsch, Inngard, 'Der Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter' in Hans 
Mommsen und Ulrich Borsdorf(ed.), Glilckauj Kameraden! Die Berg~beiter und 
thre Organisationen in DeutschlWld, Cologne 1979, pp.273-299 
Streit, Chrtstian, Keine Kameraden. Die Wehnnacht und die sowJetischen 
Kr1egsgejangenen 1941 - 1945, Stuttgart 1978 
Sturm, Moruka and Hartmut Hohmann, 'Der Bergarbeiterwohnungsbau 1m 
Ruhrgeblet nach 1945 unter dem Einflu~ der wtrtschaftlichen Entwlcklung des 
Steinkohlenbergbaus' (Diplomarbelt, Bielefeld University, 1977) 
Teleaak, Heinrich, 'Das Nachwuchsproblem 1m Steinkohlenbergbau der 
Montan-Uruon', (Diss., Cologne Untversity, 1954) 
Tenfelde, Klaus, Soztalgeschtchte der Bergarbeiterschajt an der Ruhr Un 
19.Jahrhundert, Bonn 19812 
Tenfelde, Klaus, 'Proletartsche Provinz. Radikalislerung und Wlderstand in 
Penzberg, Oberbayern 1900-1945', in Martin Broszat and Elke FrOhlich (ed.) 
Bayem in der NS-Zett. Herrschaft und GeseUschajt im Konflikt, Part C. Munich 
1981, pp.I-382 
Thies, J ochen, 'What is going on in Gennany? Brltlsche MilitArverwaltung in 
Deutschland 1945-1946', in Claus Scharf und Hans-Jiirgen SchrOder (eds.), DIe 
Deutschlandpolitik Grojjbrttanntens und die brtttsche Zone 1945-1949, 
WIesbaden 1979. pp.29-50 
Tosstorff, Heinz, Der BergarbetterwohnungsbaU. Ein Kurz-Kommentar i1ber die 
Gesetze zur Forderung des Bergarbetterwohnungsbaus im Kohlenbergbau. Essen 
1952 
Treu, Hans-Eckbert, Stabtlttdt und Wandel tn der organtsatortschen 
Entwtcklung der Industrtegewerkschajt Bergbau und Energie, Frankfurt 1979 
Tschfrbs, Rudolf. Tarifpolttik tm Ruhrbergbau 1918 - 1933. Berlin 1986 
Utermann, Kurt. Fretzettprobleme bet der mdnnUchen Jugend etner 
Zechengemetnde, Cologne/Opladen 1957 
Vetter, H.O.(ed.), Yom Soztaltstengesetz zur Mttbesttmmung. ZUm 100. 
Geburtstag von Hans BOckler, Cologne 1975 
Wald, Renate, Industrtearbetter prtvat Etne Studfe iIber prtvate Le~ormen 
und perslRtltche Interessen. Stuttgart 1966 
Waldmann, Peter, 'Ole Etngl1ederung der vertrlebe:e~~r In :"~d=:e(:~)~ 
Gesellschaft', in Josef Becker, Theo stammu:. G "lVIsetz. MunICh 1979, 
Vorgeschlchte der BRD. Zwischen KapttuIatiDn nm~ 
pp.I63-192 
Bibllography 485 -
Wallraff, Gunter, Industrtereportagen. Als Arbeiter in deuts hen 
Hamburg 1970 c Grossbetrteben.. 
Watt, Donald C., 'Hauptprobleme der brttlschen De 
in Claus Scharf und Hans Jurgen Schroder ( du~~andPOlitlk 1945-1949', 
Grossbrttanntens und dte britische Zone 1945-194~ ~i' b ted DeutschlandpolUik 
, es a en 1979, pp.I5-28 
Wehling, Eberhard, 'Die Zusammenarbeit der Sozial rtn 
Bestehens der DKBL auf sozial- und wtrtschaft:a lit~r hWAhrend des (Staatsexamen, Herne, 1958) po sc em Gebiet', 
Wehrmann, Heinz-Helmut, Hamborn, eine wirtschal"tsgeographische 
Untersuchung, Krefeld 1960 ~I 
Weisbrod. Bernd. 'Economic power and political stability reconsidered' h 
industry in Weimar Germany'. Social History, 1979. 4, 2. pp.241-265 . eavy 
Werner. Wolfgang. "Bleib Ubrig". Deutsche Arbeiter in der nattonal-
soztaltstischen Kriegswtrtschajt. Dusseldorf 1983 
Wiel. Paul. Wtrtschajtsgeschtchte des Ruhrgebtets. Essen 1970 
Wiesemann. Falk and Uwe Kleinert. 'Fluchtlinge und wtrtschaftlicher 
Wiederaufbau in der brttlschen Besatzungszone', in Dietmar Petzina and Walter 
Euchner (eds.). Wirtschajtspolitik im britischen Besatzungsgebtet 1945 - 1949 
Dusseldorf 1984. pp.297-326 ' 
Wiesemann. Falk. 'Flt1chtltngspoUtik in Nordrhein-Westfalen', in Wolfgang 
Benz (ed.). Die Vertreibung cler Deutschen aus dem Osten. Ursachen, Eretgntsse, 
Folgen. Frankfurt/M 1985. pp.173-182 
Winkler. Heinrich August (ed.). Politische WeichensteUungen in 
Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945-1953, Gotttngen 1979 
Wirth. Dieter. 'Die Familie in der Nachkriegszelt. DesorganisaUon oder 
Stabilisation'. in Josef Becker, Theo Stammen, Peter Waldmann (eds.), 
Vorgeschtchte der BRD. Zwischen KapitulatiDn und Grundgesetz. Munich 1979. 
pp.I93-216 
Wisotzky. Klaus. 'Der Ruhrbergbau am Vorabend des 2.Weltkrieges. 
Vorgeschichte. Entstehung und Auswirkung der "Verordnung zur ErhOhung der 
FOrderleistung und des Leistungslohnes 1m Bergbau vorn 2.MArz 1939"', 
Vterteljalveshejtejiir Zettgeschtchte. 1982. 30. 3. pp.418-461 
Wisotzky. Klaus. Der Ruhrbergbau im Dritten Retch. Studien zur Sozfalpolitik 
tm Ruhrbergbau und zum soztalen Verhalten der Bergleute in den Jahren 1933 
bis 1939. Dusseldort 1983 
Zahn. Erich. 'Der Wohnungsbau 1m Ruhrgebiet nach 1945' , in H.Wanderleb led.), 
Etgenhetrne.fijr den Bergmann. Bonn 1954, pp.14-16 
Zimmermann Michael "'Em schwer zu bearbeltendes Pflaster": der 
Bergarbeiterort Hochla~ark unter dern Nationalsoziallsmus', in Detlev 
Peukert and Jurgen Reulecke (eds.), DIe Rethenjast geschlDssen. Bett:rdge %W" 
Geschtchte des AUtags unterm NatIDnalsoztalismus, Wuppertal 1981, pp.65-84 
Zimmermann. Michael. 'Au sbru chshoffnu Dgen. Junge Bergleute In den 
dret6tger Jahren', in Lutz Niethammer (ed.), "Die Jahre weUJ man nfcht. wo man 
die heute htnsetzen soU". Faschismuserjahrungen tm Ruhrgeblet. Berl1n/Bonn 
1983, pp.97-132 
BiblIography 486 
Zimmermann, Michael, "'Geh zu Hermann, der macht dat schon". Berg-
arbeiterlnteressenvertretung im nOrdlichen Ruhrgebiet', Lutz Niethammer (ed.), 
"Dte Jahre weij3 man ntcht, wo man die heute hinsetzen soU". 
Faschismuserjahrungen im Ruhrgebiet, Berlin/Bonn 1983, pp.277-310 
Zimmermann, Michael, "'Betrtebsgemetnschaft" - der unterdnickte Konfltkt. 
Aus den Protokollen des Vertrauensrats der Zeche "Friedrtch der Gro.6e"', in Lutz 
Niethammer et a1 (eds.), "Die Menschen machen ihre Geschichte ntcht aus.freien 
Stilcken. aber sie machen sie se[bsf', BerlIn/Bonn 1985, pp.171-174 
Zimmermann, Michael, Schachtanlage und Zechenkolonie. Leben, Arbeit und 
Politik in einer Arbeitersiedlung 1880 - 1980, Essen 1987 
Zwickhofer, Iris, 'Das Problem der Vertreibung in der Nachkriegszeit 1945-1950 
unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Integration Zwangsausgewiesener in 
Herne und Wanne-Eickel', (Staatsexamensarbeit, Bochum University, 1981) 
